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Abstract  
This thesis investigates what medical confidentiality means in practice, in the context of a 
trial for domestic abuse. Despite the recent landmark case of WF (2016), which upheld a 
complainer’s right to privacy in relation to the use of their medical records, I demonstrate 
that medical records continue to be used routinely in criminal prosecutions in ways which 
undermine the supposed protections supported in WF. This points to the need for a more 
fundamental assessment of the underlying processes of the type that I have carried out in 
this thesis. There is no other research that properly takes account of these issues, while 
including the views of the survivors, as well as the front-line clinicians and lawyers 
involved. This thesis offers a fundamental exploration of how perceptions of medical 
confidentiality affect how records are made, sought and used in this context.  
Using data from twenty-eight in-depth interviews with survivors, clinicians and lawyers, I 
show how medical confidentiality is routinely undermined in cases of domestic abuse and 
sexual violence. My research demonstrates the need for a new approach to the definition of 
medical confidentiality and a review of the ways that medical records are used in these 
kinds of cases. Interview responses are complemented by a questionnaire study, recounting 
survivors’ experiences with medical and legal services, alongside further quantitative data 
tracing the medical records requests made to an NHS health board. Throughout, I highlight 
issues with the consent process, finding that prosecution staff use the potential for failed 
convictions to encourage survivors to agree to their medical records being recovered and 
disclosed. The concept of relevance is also discussed, with my data bolstering accusations 
by other researchers that it is too widely interpreted, by legal professionals in particular. 
The potential for future legal proceedings is shown to have a powerful impact on the way 
confidentiality is perceived in the health service, with clinicians, on occasion, willing to 
amend practice to assist the chance of prosecutions succeeding. Overall, this thesis 
highlights the importance of medical confidentiality in survivors’ perceptions of the 
criminal justice process and the health service. Moving away from the simplistic 
assumptions that confidentiality has no effect on courtroom experiences, my research 
instead shows that diverging perceptions of confidentiality risk the disclosure of large 
amounts of sensitive medical information that in turn affects the chances of survivors 
engaging with clinicians and lawyers in future.  
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Introduction 
The case of WF v Scottish Ministers (2016) has been celebrated as a victory for the 
protection for the right of privacy of complainers in trials for rape and domestic abuse.
1
 
The case resulted from a prosecution for domestic abuse, in which the defence applied to 
the court for access to WF’s (the complainer’s) full medical records across a seven year 
period in order to challenge her credibility. The Sheriff in the criminal trial granted this 
request. WF sought a judicial review of the decision in the Court of Session, on the 
grounds that it infringed her right to privacy under Article 8 of the European Convention 
on Human Rights (ECHR). The Court of Session held that WF was entitled to have any 
disclosure of medical records restricted to the minimum necessary for the purposes of the 
prosecution.
2
 Importantly, the court also held that a complainer had a right to be heard 
when such information was sought, and to make representations challenging the recovery 
of their records.
3
 This could be accomplished, the court suggested, through access to 
independent legal representation, supported by legal aid where required.
4
 Only in doing so, 
the court argued, could a complainer’s right to privacy be respected.5  
The case brought attention to the apparently commonplace practice of defence lawyers 
requesting extensive medical records under disclosure rules.
6
 For abuse survivors, this 
practice seemed to ride roughshod over expectations of medical confidentiality between 
doctor and patient, on the one hand, and rules for the protection of complainers in criminal 
trials, on the other. The decision, accordingly, was greeted with approval by victims’ rights 
groups.
7
 
However welcome and essential the decision is, important questions remain. These are 
complex and multifaceted but centre on three main concerns. Firstly, on the apparently 
different understandings of confidentiality between complainers, medical professionals and 
                                                             
1 WF v Scottish Ministers, Court of Session (Outer House), 9 February 2016, [2016] CSOH 27; BBC, 'Anti-rape 
groups hail legal aid ruling', (12th February 2016), <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-35562009>, 
[accessed: 3rd July 2018] 
2 Inksters,'Privacy rights of victims of crime protected', (12 February 2016), 
<www.inksters.com/privacyrightsofvictimsofcrimeprotected.aspx>, [accessed: 12th July 2019] 
3
 WF v Scottish Ministers [2016] CSOH 27, at [45] 
4
 Despite this ruling, the judge (Lord Glennie) did leave the precise timescale for a complainer to be heard 
open, suggesting that this may be required in every case, when the complainer indicated that they wished 
to be heard or upon the conclusion of the court that the documents requested passed the test of relevancy 
and should therefore be recovered subject to any objections for privacy concerns, see WF v Scottish 
Ministers, [2016] CSOH 27 at [45] 
5 Ibid, at [38] 
6 Ibid, at [20] 
7 Rape Crisis Scotland, 'A case for human rights / In praise of the legal profession', Rape Crisis Scotland, (16th 
March 2016), <https://www.rapecrisisscotland.org.uk/news/blog/a-case-for-human-rights-in-praise-of-the-
legal-profession/>, [accessed: 13th June 2019] 
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lawyers. The case highlighted the complainer’s dissatisfaction with such a wide-ranging 
enquiry into her sensitive medical records, information she expected to be protected 
between her and her treating clinicians, and yet the accused’s defence counsel argued that 
the request was proportionate and accordingly, did not unfairly compromise her medical 
confidentiality.  
Secondly, the disputed status of medical records raises questions about the relationship 
between health providers (doctors) and the legal system. In WF, the judge (Lord Glennie) 
stressed that the NHS as holders of the records were content to remain neutral in the case 
in the discussions of confidentiality and privacy.
8
 This position was supported by earlier 
court authority which noted that health boards could not be expected to represent patients’ 
confidentiality interests in court, not least as these interests would not always be 
compatible with their own.
9
 What remains unclear is if this neutral position on the 
confidentiality of records applies as readily to clinicians themselves, especially those that 
treat domestic abuse survivors and particularly if these clinical relationships persist over a 
long period of time. Clinicians are professionally obliged to maintain confidentiality, 
without which it would be difficult to assist and treat patients.
10
 Unlike lawyers, their 
primary duty is not to the court but to their patients. Accordingly, while they may be 
obliged to disclose information by law, it seems inadequate to assume that their attitudes 
towards the use of extensive, confidential records in court will simply match those held by 
legal practitioners, or indeed health board managers. Since a loss of faith in confidentiality 
could affect the chances of an abuse survivor seeking healthcare assistance in future, 
clinicians’ perspectives of confidentiality in this context need to be explored.  
Thirdly, there are questions about what kinds of sensitive medical information are relevant 
in criminal cases of domestic abuse and rape. The case highlighted the role of lawyers in 
determining what information can legitimately be recovered for use in court, when the 
accused’s defence argued such a substantial amount of records were relevant to 
determining the guilt of the accused. In the absence of support from both the complainer 
and the health services involved in the production of those medical records, it appears that 
these relevance decisions were made solely from a legal perspective. The determinations 
                                                             
8
 WF v Scottish Ministers, [2016] CSOH 27 at [12], [39] 
9
 See R(B) v Crown Court at Stafford [2007] 1 WLR 1524 at [27] 
10 General Medical Council, Confidentiality: good practice in handling patient information, (January 2017), 
available at < https://www.gmc-uk.org/-/media/documents/confidentiality-good-practice-in-handling-
patient-information---english-0417_pdf-
70080105.pdf?la=en&hash=2F39E0A8258FE82F573040DBB14617D5DB9E84C1>, [accessed: 16th July, 2018], 
p. 10 
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behind these relevance decisions remains uncertain, but blanket requests, comprising large 
volumes of sensitive records give the appearance of ‘fishing expeditions’, with lawyers 
obtaining as much information about the complainer as possible so as to increase the 
chance of attacking their credibility. This would appear to seriously challenge the rules 
designed to protect complainers from unjustified attacks on their character, particularly 
when information concerning their sexual history is disclosed, something that the courts 
appear not to be policing as effectively as they might.
11
 Ultimately, the WF case poses a 
larger question over who exactly should be making these decisions, since they appear to be 
led at present at the discretion of defence lawyers, without resistance from the Crown, the 
court, or the NHS.  
The lack of clarity on these points suggests a fundamental disconnect between the 
expectations of confidentiality held by complainers and the use of medical records in 
criminal proceedings, and that, while welcome, cases like WF might arise again. There is, 
accordingly, a need to have more information about the extent and scope of such requests, 
(as well as the expectations of doctors and complainers about confidentiality) in order to 
help in the development of better guidelines for the future. The aim of this thesis is to 
explore the meaning of medical confidentiality in this post-WF landscape, and to assess 
whether it represents adequate protection for complainers or whether further reform or 
guidance is needed. 
1.1. Project outline  
Medical records are used in a variety of criminal and civil cases as necessary sources of 
evidence.
12
 In the context of domestic abuse (particularly in cases involving sexual 
violence) these records are used by both prosecution and defence lawyers, to support or 
undermine a complainer’s allegations respectively. There has been little assessment of the 
role that medical confidentiality occupies in this context. This omission is important, and 
risks not only failing to ensure that proper consideration of confidentiality is made during 
criminal proceedings, but in a practical sense misses the chance to measure the effect that 
confidentiality has on complainers’ willingness to report abuse and participate in 
prosecutions.  
                                                             
11 See Liz Campbell and Sharon Cowan, ‘The relevance of sexual history and vulnerability in the prosecution 
of sexual offences’ in Scottish Criminal Evidence Law: Current Developments and Future Trends, Peter Duff 
and Pamela R. Ferguson eds., (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2018), pp. 67-96 
12 Archibald MacSporran and Andrew R.W. Young, Commission and Diligence, (Edinburgh: W. Green & Sons 
Ltd, 1995), pp. 94-95 
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Recent cases, including WF, have addressed some of these concerns and are seen to reflect 
a greater societal awareness and increased sensitivity towards the treatment of complainers 
by the criminal justice system.
13
 These cases have been joined by concurrent changes in 
law designed to protect survivors and encourage reporting.
14
 As a consequence of media 
coverage, the public are now more aware of the potential use and misuse of medical 
records in the context of legal proceedings.
15
 
Despite these measures however, the place of medical confidentiality in domestic abuse 
proceedings remains a problem and there has been little meaningful assessment of the 
importance of confidentiality in complainers’ interactions with medical and legal systems. 
This is despite the increased willingness of legal authorities to tackle issues previously 
regulated by the medical profession, for example in addressing notions of consent for 
treatment.
16
  
The judgement of Lord Glennie in WF was useful in highlighting the role of medical 
evidence in cases of domestic abuse more generally.
17
 Through this judgement, some 
argued the court was correcting past decisions which allowed greater access to complainers’ 
sensitive records.
18
 What the case did not do was address the fundamental relationship 
between lawyers, survivors, and clinicians, which allowed the transfer of this material to 
take place. Glennie noted that WF had the right to be heard in a petition for the recovery of 
her medical records.
19
 However, the court left open the decision of when the right to be 
heard in these cases should take place, leaving this ultimately to the discretion of those 
creating disclosure regulations and, in the meantime, to individual Sheriffs. Given that the 
case considered recovery of records by the defence, the court was unable to give 
recommendations on prosecution practice in this area, leaving no assessment of informed 
consent in these circumstances.  
                                                             
13 See for example the Abusive Behaviour and Sexual Harm (Scotland) Act 2016 asp. 22, which mandates the 
judge informs a jury that late or absent disclosure of sexual abuse does not indicate that no such abuse ever 
occurred.  
14 See Victims and Witnesses (Scotland) Act 2014 asp. 1; Domestic Abuse (Scotland) Act 2018 asp. 5 
15 Joan Smith and Claire Waxman, 'No wonder so few people report rape. They are hung out to dry in court', 
The Guardian (Wednesday 21st March 2018), 
<https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/mar/21/rape-complainant-loss-privacy-intrusive-
investigations>, [accessed: 5
th
 July, 2018] 
16
 See for example, the recent case of Montgomery v Lanarkshire Health Board [2015] UKSC 11, which 
realigned the clinical relationship, by obliging doctors to tell patients whatever they wanted to know, rather 
than simply information that doctors might consider relevant. 
17 BBC, 'Anti-rape groups hail legal aid ruling'; Dominic Scullion, 'Mine, and they're private', The Journal of 
the Law Society of Scotland, (15th August 2016), <www.journalonline.co.uk/Magazine/61-8/1022121.aspx>, 
[accessed: 20th June, 2018] 
18 See for example, Inksters 'Privacy rights’; HM Advocate v Ronald [2007] S.L.T. 1170 
19 WF v Scottish Ministers, [2016] CSOH 27, at [38] 
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Glennie was able to argue however, that the complainer’s right to be heard in recovery 
proceedings already existed, by way of the article 8 right to private and family life under 
the ECHR, to which the UK is a signatory.
20
 Medical confidentiality, is simply seen as a 
broader aspect of this general right to privacy, and must be respected by the legal systems 
of ‘contracting parties’.21  Article 8, was engaged, Glennie argued, when a complainer’s 
medical records were sought for disclosure.
22
 As such, all complainers had a right to 
oppose such disclosure and to be heard on that basis.
23
 
The case of Z v Finland actually confirmed the relevance of article 8 in the context of 
medical confidentiality in 1997.
24
 However, it then took until 2016 – nearly twenty years 
after Z v Finland - for the existence of this right to be fully recognised by the court. There 
are no clear explanations for why this is the case.  It could be because convention rights 
were so entrenched in practice in cases of this type that the court saw no need to comment. 
Alternatively, it is possible to argue that it was accepted practice for article 8 rights to be 
routinely lain aside in order to protect the fair trial rights of the accused. Ultimately, the 
WF case suggests that while medical confidentiality is recognised in principle, the scope of 
this right may be very different in practice.  
My research investigates this practice. In order to do this, I have gone beyond legal sources, 
in order to carry out a wide-ranging exploration of the attitudes of clinicians, lawyers and 
survivors to medical confidentiality and the use of records, looking at the way that records 
are constructed and employed by medical and legal systems. Instead of focusing solely on 
the place of medical records in criminal trials, my work goes further, exploring how 
medical confidentiality is constructed and continually re-interpreted as a survivor moves 
from their initial encounters with health services, through the investigation of a case, the 
trial and its aftermath. The aim is to fully understand what medical confidentiality means 
in the context of domestic and sexual abuse in Scotland. 
                                                             
20 European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) art 8. Available at 
<https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Convention_ENG.pdf>, [accessed: 4th July 2018], p.. 11 
21 Z v Finland (1998) 25 E.H.R.R. 371 at [7a] 
22 WF v Scottish Ministers, [2016] CSOH 27 at [28] 
23 Ibid, at [45]; Article 8 of the ECHR notes that: 
1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence. 
2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is 
in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, 
public safety or the economic wellbeing of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the 
protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.  
See ECHR art 8. 
24 Z v Finland (1998) 25 E.H.R.R. 371 
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I am undertaking this research at an auspicious time, with increasing societal interest in 
engaging abuse survivors in medical and legal systems.
25
 New measures aimed at 
improving survivors’ experiences have been introduced, including a distinct criminal 
offence for domestic abuse, and mandatory jury directions explaining that late reporting of 
sexual abuse may occur for many reasons and should not infer that an allegation is false.
26
 
It is hoped these actions will help to increase reporting and tackle low conviction rates.
27
 
Interest has grown among scholars (though it has long been championed by charitable 
organisations) in the “secondary victimisation” of survivors through interactions with 
medical and legal systems (in particular the latter), resulting in the emergence of 
victimology as a distinct discipline and a greater focus on victims’ rights in many 
countries.
28
 Multiple jurisdictions have now adopted reforms aimed at involving victims 
much more meaningfully in trials, changing their role from the ‘private parties’ in 
proceedings described by Doak, where victims were in effect, simply additional witnesses 
in a case.
29
 In 2014, Scotland introduced the Victims and Witnesses Act, which promised 
to ‘make provision for certain rights and support for victims and witnesses’, by for 
example, creating an automatic entitlement for complainers of alleged sexual crimes to 
give evidence by alternate means i.e. behind a screen or by video link.
30
 
The Scottish and UK Governments have in recent years attempted to address domestic 
abuse through new legislation.
31
 These efforts recognise the issues in tackling abuse under 
existing common assault offences, where domestic abuse was poorly defined, something 
Tuerkheimer argued, risked minimising the harm it caused in the eyes of the public.
32
 
These arguments seem to have displaced those casting doubt on the creation of a new 
                                                             
25 'Advocacy support for rape victims to be extended', The Journal of the Law Society of Scotland, (1st 
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offence for fear of  limiting the charging options already available under existing criminal 
acts.
33
 Those favouring the creation of new statutes in this area argue that instead of 
displacing existing common-law or statutory offences, new offences would instead offer 
another ‘string to the bow’ for prosecutors.34  
With specific offences aimed at punishing intimate partner violence now in effect, police 
officers in both Scotland and England and Wales have the power to charge offenders 
suspected of emotional abuse (or coercive control) rather than having to rely on common 
law assault charges for physical injury.
35
 These efforts take account of a much wider 
definition of what constitutes domestic abuse and - Bishop and Bettison argue – go some 
way toward recognising the limitations of the criminal law in prosecuting domestic abuse, 
something inherently difficult given its often frequent occurrence over a prolonged 
period.
36
 The criminal law, the researchers argue, is more comfortable with tackling 
individual acts.
37
 In 2015, Youngs argued that it was only by recognising coercive control 
as a ‘necessary component’ of domestic abuse and criminalising it within this context that 
any domestic abuse law would be in any way effective.
38
 
The creation of such distinct offences has been twinned with a wider, more holistic 
understanding of what constitutes abuse. It is only in recent times that broader definitions 
of domestic abuse have been adopted, including the nationally agreed formulation in 
Scotland below:   
Any form of physical, verbal, sexual, psychological or financial abuse which might 
amount to criminal conduct and which takes place within the context of a 
relationship.  
The relationship will be between partners (married, cohabiting, civil partnership or 
otherwise) or ex-partners. The abuse can be committed in the home or elsewhere 
including online. 
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There is a common misconception that domestic abuse is just physical abuse. This 
is not the case. Domestic abuse can be physical, sexual, and emotional or mental 
abuse.
39
 
The delay in adopting these broader definitions is partly understood by the law’s difficulty 
in tackling domestic abuse more generally. As Youngs argues, domestic abuse is ‘a wrong 
qualitatively different from any other’.40 The primacy of a patriarchal society has been 
reflected in British courtrooms, and until relatively recently domestic abuse was seen to be 
a private matter.
41
 Not only did the law fail to recognise domestic abuse as a criminal act in 
itself, but also frequently used the “domestic” context of it to reduce the severity of pre-
existing crimes.
42
 
Other scholars analysing interactions with medical and legal services have observed that 
survivors will often take proactive steps to recover or at least bolster their agency in 
proceedings.
43
 This can take the form of attempting to input into the direction of their care 
and may even involve attempts to undermine prosecutions to protect themselves from 
additional harm.
44
 Research concerning survivors’ relationships with health and legal 
systems is rarely comprehensive, with literature tending to focus on either legal or medical 
interactions and rarely investigating specific issues like survivors’ thoughts on new 
legislation or the use of sensitive records by both services. Academic studies investigating 
why survivors may avoid healthcare or participation in a prosecution remain scarce, 
despite Greeson and Campbell’s 2011 call to assess perceptions of both medical and legal 
services among the same population.
45
 The experiences of survivors meanwhile, suggest 
that many perceive these services negatively.
 46
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The WF case was critical in highlighting how survivors’ medical records can be used in 
criminal court cases involving domestic abuse. The use of such evidence represents a 
flashpoint between the survivor, medical and legal systems and offers an undeniable 
opportunity for further research to fully assess how the various actors involved in these 
processes interact around the locus of medical confidentiality.  
1.2. Why is medical confidentiality important and how is it defined in law?  
Medical confidentiality is essential for open and honest discussion between doctors and 
their patients, however, as Chico and Taylor note, health systems require sensitive 
information to be shared, both to ensure effective treatment and for wider performance:   
It is no exaggeration to say that the future of the National Health Service, along 
with other health systems across the world, is dependent upon the flow of 
confidential data.
47
 
Clearly however, if medical confidentiality is not maintained, patients cannot trust their 
doctors with often sensitive and embarrassing information relating to their health. As the 
GMC notes, in the absence of confidentiality:  
Patients may avoid seeking medical help, or may under-report symptoms, if they 
think their personal information will be disclosed by doctors without consent, or 
without the chance to have some control over the timing or amount of information 
shared.
48
  
The importance of confidentiality as an essential tenant of medicine is borne out through 
its place in healthcare systems across the globe. On October 14
th
, 2017, the World Medical 
Association updated its ‘Modern Day Physician’s Pledge’ – the modern Hippocratic Oath – 
reaffirming a doctor’s obligation to ensure medical confidentiality in the following 
passage:  
‘I WILL RESPECT the secrets that are confided in me, even after the patient has 
died’49 
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Without confidentiality, a patient cannot speak frankly to their doctor.
50
 An expectation of 
confidentiality is critical when the information imparted by the patient carries with it the 
potential for ‘fear of embarrassment or social retribution’.51 The strength of confidentiality 
expected is doubtlessly linked to the potential damage caused by the imparted information 
being widely known. For example, a patient experiencing severe toothache may be less 
concerned about their confidentiality compared to a patient infected with a sexual disease, 
seeking a termination of pregnancy or suffering injuries caused by criminal violence. In 
Personality, Confidentiality and Privacy in Scots Law, Reid articulates this point further, 
arguing that when an injury or condition is sufficiently sensitive, a significant level of 
public interest arises in confidence being maintained, and only ‘exceptional circumstances’ 
would justify disclosure in such cases.
52
 Recognition of an enhanced form of 
confidentiality - what Kennedy and Grubb term as ‘particular circumstances’ - can be 
observed in specific legislation.
53
 Nonetheless, a duty of confidentiality applies to all 
patients regardless of the condition they suffer from.  
The construction of medical confidentiality offers a key insight into the intersection 
between medical and legal systems. Despite being a duty held by medical practitioners in 
respect to their patients, “medical confidentiality” is as much a legal as a medical concept. 
As Sabine Michalowski noted in the opening to her 2003 text Medical Confidentiality and 
Crime, ‘medical confidentiality lies at the very heart of the physician-patient relationship 
and is relevant to all areas of medical law’.54 This dynamic is longstanding and attempts by 
clinicians to argue for the supremacy of a doctor’s idea of medical confidentiality at the 
expense of legal authority have met with defeat.
55
 It is now widely accepted that medical 
information is protected by the same common law duty as that which applies to all 
confidential information.
56
 For information to be considered confidential under common 
law, it must be received in circumstances which might be thought of as confidential and/or 
have the quality of confidence. According to the Department of Health:  
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In practice, this means that all patient/client information, whether held on paper, 
computer, visually or audio recorded, or held in the memory of the professional, 
must not normally be disclosed without the consent of the patient/client.
57
 
Despite the robust protection suggested by this statement, the common law duty of 
confidentiality is not absolute, though there is no overarching law governing disclosure of 
confidential information, three exceptions exist to allow a breach of the common law duty: 
1. The patient has consented to disclosure  
2. Disclosure is in the public interest (i.e. for patient safety or the safety of others) 
3. Where disclosure is compelled by law. 58   
The third exception highlights the primacy of legal authority in this area. In the criminal 
context in which this research focuses however, all three of these exceptions can enable the 
use of sensitive medical information.   
1.2.1.1. Disclosure 
Clinicians can breach the duty of confidence in the public interest to protect patients and 
others from harm as a result of serious crime, though they may have to determine what 
particular criminal acts meet this threshold.
59
 Data Protection and Human Rights 
legislation have similar exceptions to confidentiality and privacy.
60
 This raises the question 
of what serious crime is and in which circumstances individual doctors feel obliged to 
breach their patients’ confidence. As Mason and McCall Smith argue, a doctor is not 
automatically obligated to inform authorities about suspicions of a patient’s criminal 
conduct.
61
  
Meanwhile, the GMC argues that disclosures made without consent – even when the 
patient themselves are the only individuals at risk – should be made only when ‘absolutely 
necessary’, and a situation must exist where there is ‘clear evidence of an imminent risk of 
serious harm to the individual’ for such a disclosure to be justified.62 They then add a 
further caveat to this statement, writing:  
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This is an uncertain area of law and, if practicable, you should seek independent 
legal advice before making such a disclosure without consent.
63
 
While such a statement accurately conveys the confusion felt by many health professionals 
in these circumstances, how often they are able to access independent legal advice in 
practice, when disclosure decisions may need to be made promptly, is unknown.  
1.2.1.2. Statute 
Rather than relying on common law authority alone, over time, court systems across the 
UK have been able to refer to numerous pieces of peripheral legislation, employment 
regulations and medical regulatory obligations - described by Taylor as ‘a complex matrix 
of legal requirements’ - employed to protect a patients’ sensitive information and regulate 
its disclosure.
64
 This includes the updated General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) and 
Human Rights Act (HRA).
65
 The latter (in the form of the ECHR, which it incorporated in 
a UK context) has a particular bearing on this research and was the legislation Lord 
Glennie referred to when making his judgement in WF.
66
  
Accordingly, despite the Scottish focus, English and European jurisprudence is also 
considered in this research. Though there are considerable differences between English and 
Scots law, there are also numerous similarities in the context of medical confidentiality and 
domestic abuse, meaning that the findings of this project could have implications beyond 
Scotland.  After all, the UK as a whole is an ECHR signatory and both the English and 
Scottish legal systems make use of European case law. Scottish cases concerning medical 
confidentiality often refer to English authority and vice versa, and though health is a 
devolved matter, both countries have a national health service with similar patterns of 
medical reporting. Indeed, Lord Glennie made considerable reference to English cases in 
WF, with special reference to the similar case of R(B) v Crown Court at Stafford [2007].
67
 
Even without WF, the HRA is of essential importance when considering confidentiality 
and the interactions of lawyers, survivors and clinicians, being not only a novel piece of 
legislation in itself, but incorporating protections already afforded under the existing 
common law duty of confidentiality.
68
 The interactions of criminal law and human rights 
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law in this area are profound and roundly supported by Kennedy and Grubb’s description 
of medical law in its entirety as simply ‘a subset of human rights law’.69  
While common law, statute law and regulatory advice are now fairly similar in defining 
confidentiality however, the application of medical confidentiality in practice remains an 
understudied topic.  
1.3. Medical confidentiality and domestic abuse  
Medical evidence is commonly led in criminal cases involving domestic abuse.
70
 The 
issues associated with this practice are well illustrated in the comparable area of rape trials. 
As Quilter notes, for centuries, proving rape has required evidence in addition to a 
woman’s allegation and ‘corroboration was required typically in the form of medical 
evidence of injuries’ with the absence of physical injury often used to suggest a false 
allegation.
71
.  This practice continues, despite the introduction of jury directions referred to 
in section 1.1.
72
 In November 2017, a Prosecution Inspectorate Report of evidence use in 
sexual offence cases in Scotland noted:  
The defence may request records to attribute the cause of any medical findings to 
some event other than the alleged crime or to seek to draw an adverse inference 
from, for example, the absence of an injury.
73
 
The practice of obtaining records extends across jurisdictions. As American defence 
attorney Oppenheim observed, records are commonly sought by lawyers, ‘the first step in 
any case where there is medical scientific evidence is to obtain all relevant medical 
records’.74 
Canadian legislators were so concerned at the increased use of records in this context, that 
they enacted numerous protective laws designed to restrict widespread recovery.
75
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The legal benefits of medical records come from offering ostensibly neutral third-party 
evidence that can help determine guilt. Accordingly, using medical information appears 
relatively uncontroversial to prosecution and defence counsel, and yet, as the case of WF 
shows, it rides roughshod over confidentiality rights. The use of medical evidence in 
domestic abuse cases appears widespread, usually increasing when sexual abuse is also 
alleged; as Oppenheim noted, ‘in sexual crimes, there often is much medical evidence’.76 
Given the harm caused by abuse of any form, survivors often have extensive contact with 
medical services, making the existence of contemporaneous medical notes likely by the 
time a case reaches trial.
77
 As the Identification & Referral to Improve Safety (IRIS) 
commissioning group assessing domestic abuse in General Practice observed:  
On average, survivors of abuse experience more operative surgery [surgical 
procedures], more visits by and to doctors, more hospital stays, more visits to 
pharmacies and more mental health consultations over their lifetime than non-
victims. Women who have depression, PTSD or are suicidal as a result of DVA 
[domestic violence and abuse] have approximately twice the level of usage of 
general medical services and between three and eight times the level of usage of 
mental health services. They are admitted to hospital more often than are non-
abused women and are issued more prescriptions.
78
 
While the IRIS group did not define whether ‘more hospital stays’ for average survivors 
concerned the number of admissions or duration of individual stays, their conclusions were 
bolstered by the SafeLives assessment of domestic abuse services in hospitals, which 
found survivors presenting at hospital were associated with a range of complex health 
needs, with poorer physical and mental health than the general population.
79
 This is borne 
out elsewhere in the literature, with evidence that both acute and long-term care is often 
required by survivors.
80
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Usually, the most controversial aspect of using records in court concerns the use of 
complainers’ medical history to determine credibility and/or reliability. This can facilitate 
questions around a complainer’s sexual history to impugn their reputation to the jury, a 
practice is largely restricted to domestic/sexual abuse cases.
81
  Leahy suggests this tactic – 
at least in trials involving sexual offences – is a long running defence strategy, developed 
because of the ‘oath against oath’ nature of the crimes concerned, and that as sexual history 
evidence becomes more difficult to obtain, counsel have turned to sensitive records to 
make their arguments.
82
  
The legacy of this approach, coupled with the gendered nature of domestic abuse, has 
increased calls for reviewing systems, with fears that current practices dissuade reports of 
rape and other forms of domestic abuse.
83
 These calls feed into discussions of secondary 
victimisation in the Criminal Justice System, leading scholars to argue that medical and 
legal professionals should engage with survivors as more autonomous actors to increase 
reporting and support for prosecutions.
84
 
The Crown Office advice on disclosure in these cases (under review since 2014) suggests  
medical confidentiality breaches are extremely rare, complainers are treated with respect 
when records are sought and that extensive requests are rarely made (and poorly regarded 
by the court).
85
 This view was  supported by the 2017 Inspectorate Report, and mirrors 
similar comments by the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) disclosure manual for England 
and Wales.
86
 The CPS advice even refers to legal representation that will likely feature in 
the Crown Office’s updated manual.87 
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While the Crown Office position states the law, there is evidence suggesting that practice 
in this area is rather different. Indeed, some scholars argue that the use of medical records 
in this context is widespread. In 2016, Leahy argued that with increases in “rape shield” 
legislation across the UK, defence lawyers in England increasingly used sensitive personal 
records in order to question survivors’ credibility.88 This issue was previously identified by 
Temkin, who identified defence counsel using medical records to build up a ‘detrimental 
picture of the complainant as far as her moral and sexual character is concerned’. 89 
Leahy’s argument in particular supported previous assertions in a Scottish context by Duff 
and Raitt.
90
 In her 2010 briefing paper on the subject, Raitt argued for the changes enacted 
in WF six years later, noting that complainers required legal representation when their 
records were sought.
91
 Even the Inspectorate report acknowledged the limitations of their 
more positive conclusions on the extent of this practice.
92
 
In the wake of WF, the Chief Medical Officer (CMO) for Scotland, sent a notice to all 
Scottish Health Boards, advising staff to carefully scrutinise all medical record requests 
connected to alleged crimes.
93
 Dr Calderwood stated that there was confusion over the 
manner in which such records were sought, with court orders commonly sent on by 
lawyers rather than the court. She referred to a case where clinicians received a request 
from defence solicitors and wrongly assumed it was sent with court authority. In her advice, 
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the CMO noted, ‘we would urge you to be vigilant about the person who requests the 
release of medical/clinical records and its purpose’.94 
That such advice was required across the country, by Scotland’s most senior medical 
authority indicates the uncertainty among clinicians on this point. Dr Calderwood’s 
argument is supported by BMA advice, which noted that despite obligations for lawyers to 
intimate record requests to the patient concerned, this rarely occurred in practice: 
Applications for court orders must be served on patients who, if they object to the 
disclosure of the information, must be given an opportunity to make representations 
to the court. However, often applications are served on health care organisations 
when they should be served on patients.
95
 
The BMA then suggested clinicians should object to judges if convinced records contained 
information that ‘should not be disclosed’, an indication of the role they see clinicians 
having in the recovery process that runs contrary to the current lack of healthcare 
representation in opposing record requests.
96
 The GMC also noted the difficulty for 
clinicians when they are obliged to make quasi-legal decisions before releasing records:  
The common law and other laws that require or permit the disclosure of patient 
information interact in complex ways and it is not possible to decide whether a use 
or disclosure of patient information would be lawful by considering any aspect of 
the law in isolation.
97
  
The comments of these medical bodies, the writings of scholars and cases like WF paint a 
very different picture to that of the Crown Office on the use of medical records in cases of 
domestic abuse. It is clear that the time has come for an empirical analysis of current 
systems to get a realistic view of how medical confidentiality works in practice among the 
various actors concerned.  
In this thesis, I demonstrate that medical evidence is frequently used in criminal cases 
involving domestic abuse and that, in legal terms, medical confidentiality –while 
undoubtedly important- is readily set aside when required. As WF and other cases have 
indicated, the use of complainers’ medical records does not always successfully balance 
privacy rights with rights to a fair trial.  
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Domestic abuse often places survivors between medical and legal services (particularly 
when featuring sexual abuse). To obtain medical care, survivors are compelled to be at 
least partly frank with clinicians concerning their injuries – even choosing to engage with 
clinicians ahead of other professionals, precisely because of the perceived confidentiality 
afforded by the relationship.
98
 If clinicians are compelled to report all serious crime to 
legal authorities, with or without survivors’ consent then it becomes clear that by seeking  
medical care, survivors will also be engaging with legal services. While there is an 
emerging literature on individuals’ experiences of criminal justice in the UK, there is still 
no satisfactory assessment of how using medical evidence influences these experiences. 
Other studies have included the views of survivors, lawyers and clinicians individually, but 
this work is the first substantive attempt to assess all three simultaneously in a UK context, 
certainly with practitioners from different medical specialities and with defence lawyers, 
prosecution lawyers and members of the judiciary.
99
 
The primary focus of this thesis is to discern what medical confidentiality means in the 
context of domestic abuse. In order to answer this question, further questions arise. It is 
necessary to unpick the duty of confidentiality as it applies to survivors, clinicians and 
lawyers – those principle actors involved in creating and controlling medical 
confidentiality throughout the health and criminal justice process.  
1.4. Thesis structure 
In the first part of my thesis (chapters 2 and 3) I outline how current perceptions of medical 
confidentiality are measured and understood among survivors, clinicians and lawyers, 
identifying significant knowledge gaps in the available research and outlining how my PhD 
project addresses these. Referring to relevant literature, I highlight the fact that it is when 
these groups come together that different understandings of confidentiality are exposed.  I 
discuss the guidelines lawyers use to recover sensitive medical information and admit it 
into court, as this information is required to contextualise the research data in subsequent 
chapters. I then consider the appropriate methodological approach for tackling knowledge 
gaps in this area, referring to the significant ethical considerations required when 
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researching such a sensitive topic. Given the inherent sensitivity of the topic, I develop this 
methodology considerably; the aim is to provide the most detailed analysis without causing 
distress or harm to any of the participants involved. 
In the second part of the thesis (chapters 4, 5 and 6) I present the findings of my research, 
moving from understandings of confidentiality in a clinical setting, through the beginnings 
of a prosecution to the trial itself. I consider how medical confidentiality is understood in 
patient-clinician relationships, analysing clinicians and survivors’ perceptions and how 
these affect practice. Moving to the investigation stage, I explore how lawyers perceive 
confidentiality and how these perceptions are shaped by their interactions with medical 
information in a professional capacity. I then assess clinicians and survivors, documenting 
their experiences with medical record requests. In the final data chapter, I assess how 
perceptions of confidentiality are affected when medical information moves into court. 
Beginning with an exploration of how lawyers use medical information as evidence, I use 
legal testimony to analyse practitioners’ perceptions of this process, then also describing 
the experiences of clinicians and survivors, ultimately considering how these (particularly 
those concerning survivors) affect their trust in medical and legal services.  
In the final part of my thesis (chapter 7), I draw together the project findings and 
conclusions, assessing how medical confidentiality is defined and shaped by the survivors, 
lawyers and clinicians involved in the progression of sensitive information from the health 
system to court. By taking account of how these understandings shape experiences, I 
ultimate consider whether a coherent understanding of confidentiality between groups is 
apparent. I conclude by discussing the major implications of my research, its limitations 
and future directions.
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Chapter Two: Current Understandings  
There is evidence to suggest that understandings of confidentiality are varied. This can be 
observed though in the conflation of confidentiality and privacy, where the two are either 
described interchangeably or are referred to with the distinctions undefined.
1
  From a legal 
perspective, individual privacy rights are more encompassing than medical confidentiality, 
extending across many aspects of a person’s life and yet, in advice given by the GMC, 
doctors are told to ‘respect confidentiality and privacy’ without a clear explanation of how 
they differ, as though the distinctions are widely known.
2
 Privacy should instead be discussed 
as an aspect of confidentiality, a way of understanding it, even if the two should not be 
understood as identical. In a purely clinical context, the Centres for Disease Control and 
Prevention (CDC) detailed the difference:  
Privacy refers to the right of an individual to keep his or her health information 
private. Confidentiality refers to the duty of anyone entrusted with health information 
to keep that information private.
3
 
This analysis captures something important. In a Scottish and British healthcare context, the 
two are undoubtedly related. Importantly however, privacy and confidentiality can be 
distinguished, and information about a person that might not be considered confidential could 
still be private.
4
 Properly understood, privacy protects an individual’s informational and 
spatial privacy, with confidentiality operating as a ‘subset’ of the former.5 A breach of 
informational privacy does not always require a relationship of trust, whereas, when 
confidentiality is broken, this is as a result of information subject to a relationship (i.e. that 
between a doctor and patient) being released outside of that relationship ‘without 
authorisation’.6 Given its broader reach therefore, amendments to privacy law have 
undoubtedly affected protections of medical confidentiality, as under article 8 of the ECHR.
7
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This was highlighted in the case of WF, where the complainer’s confidential medical 
information was protected as an aspect of her right to private and family life, rather than 
under the common law duty of confidentiality.
8
 Reid notes that, in the modern era, ‘privacy 
for health problems and their treatment has more readily been protected by the law of 
confidentiality.
9
 This argument was certainly valid in the context of some of the landmark 
cases in the twentieth century.
10
 However, since the introduction of privacy legislation at a 
British and European level, as in the WF case, there has been an increasing willingness to 
recognise and protect medical confidentiality as an aspect of privacy.
11
  
To properly assess medical confidentiality and domestic abuse however, it is important to 
take a step back and consider how confidentiality is understood by those involved in making 
and using medical records. Accordingly, this chapter will look at current understandings of 
confidentiality held by patients, clinicians and lawyers. Referring to relevant scholarship, I 
assess how perceptions of confidentiality are measured, both in theory and in practice among 
these groups, identifying the key research questions that arise from scrutinising an in-depth 
and multidisciplinary literature. I then move on to considering the available guidelines for 
obtaining medical records for use in court. Outlining the various legal restrictions governing 
the admittance of such information, I identify the role of both prosecution and defence 
counsel in this process. Given the potential intersections between medical information 
records and the use of sexual character evidence, I then assess how rape shield legislation 
affects the use of sensitive medical records. Finally, I identify the issues associated with 
current systems, using a wide-ranging literature to identify the knowledge gaps in 
understandings of the use of medical records in domestic abuse trials.  
2.1 Medical understandings  
The importance of medical confidentiality is stressed to clinicians throughout their careers. 
Trainee doctors, from the undergraduate level, are cautioned on the necessity of maintaining 
their patients’ confidence as a means of encouraging frank discussion.12 As outlined in 
chapter 1, numerous legal and regulatory mechanisms exist to enforce confidentiality and 
punish those who undermine it without significant justification. Clinicians are reminded to 
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uphold confidentiality, a fundamental aspect of medical practice, built up over centuries, and 
their contracts of employment note that unnecessary breach of confidence can result in 
dismissal.
13
 Guidance on how to promote best practice is provided by organisations like the 
National Institute for Health and Care Excellence (NICE), which suggests measures for 
facilitating appropriate information sharing, and promoting openness and trust between 
clinicians and patients.
14
 Additionally, Health and social care organisations are all obliged to 
have a Caldicott Guardian, a senior staff member responsible for ensuring that patient 
information (as well as information relating to others using the healthcare service) is used 
legally and ethically within that organisation. Fulfilling their role as the ‘conscience of the 
organisation’ Caldicott Guardians prevent patient information from being used 
inappropriately, advising clinical staff on confidentiality concerns, including those where the 
police have requested patient information.
15
  News stories highlight breaches of 
confidentiality and those who allow their patients’ health data to be disclosed without cause 
risk censure by the Information Commissioners Office among others.
16
 Patients can also refer 
clinicians to the GMC if they feel their confidentiality has been unfairly breached, a practice 
that appears to be growing.
17
 Complaints over unfair use of data may increase in future, 
following the introduction of the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), under which, 
the GMC notes, the consent standard for the use of personal information is ‘higher than under 
the common law of confidentiality’.18  
While usually considered through the lens of the doctor-patient relationship, confidentiality is 
as vitally important for other clinicians and their patients. Accordingly, while the General 
Medical Council and British Medical Association (BMA) both provide comprehensive 
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guidance on confidentiality, similar advice is available from the Nursing and Midwifery 
Council (NMC), British Dental Association (BDA), General Dental Council (GDC) and 
British Psychological Association (BPA).
19
 
Clinicians are also expected to determine when confidentiality ought to be breached, either to 
protect their patient or third party and some statutory requirements compel this.
20
 In other 
circumstances, breaches are more discretionary, but advice generally errs in favour of 
disclosure. If patients present with gunshot or stab wounds for example, clinicians are 
typically expected to report incidents to the police to allow them to establish the risk to the 
patient and others.
21
As the perpetrator in a majority of female homicide cases (mostly 
committed using a bladed instrument) is a partner or ex-partner, it is reasonable to assume 
that knife crime is not uncommonly involved in domestic abuse attacks.
22
 While noting that 
the police are typically responsible for determining risk in firearms cases, the GMC does add 
a caveat in the context of knife injuries:  
The police should not usually be informed if a knife or blade injury appears to be 
accidental, or a result of self-harm. There may also be other circumstances in which 
you consider that contacting the police is not proportionate. For example, this might 
be the case if you consider that no one other than the patient is at risk of harm, and 
that contacting the police might cause the patient harm or distress, or might damage 
their trust in you or in doctors generally.
23
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Child abuse also often features in households where domestic abuse occurs.
24
 Clinical 
organisations provide clear advice on reporting suspected child abuse, with practitioners 
advised to always report cases to a relevant agency (i.e. police, local authority) unless it 
would not be in the child’s interest:  
You must tell an appropriate agency, such as your local authority children’s services, 
the NSPCC or the police, promptly if you are concerned that a child or young person 
is at risk of, or is suffering, abuse or neglect unless it is not in their best interests to do 
so. You do not need to be certain that the child or young person is at risk of 
significant harm to take this step. If a child or young person is at risk of, or is 
suffering, abuse or neglect, the possible consequences of not sharing relevant 
information will, in the overwhelming majority of cases, outweigh any harm that 
sharing your concerns with an appropriate agency might cause.
25
 
As noted in chapter one however, in cases of domestic abuse where a single adult is at risk, 
recommendations are generally qualified, with survivors’ consent usually required for any 
disclosure to occur.
26
 Little research has investigated clinicians’ own opinions on 
confidentiality in these circumstances, nor their experience of approaching confidentiality 
with these patients.  
Given the acceptance of the necessity for confidentiality in healthcare, it is perhaps 
unsurprising that research analysing clinicians’ views on confidentiality is rare. They must 
support confidentiality and that is enough. Accordingly, most of the literature addressing 
clinicians’ views of confidentiality (usually focussing on doctors) merely restates the 
obligation, often referring to the historical legacy of circumspection required by the 
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profession. Mention of Hippocrates is never far away, often appearing alongside descriptions 
of confidentiality as a ‘venerable moral obligation’ or variations thereon.27 
Modern day arguments for maintaining medical confidentiality centre on ensuring 
appropriate treatment and respecting patient autonomy.
28
 Both ideas are expressed in the 
GMC’s updated confidentiality guidance, by the council’s Chief Executive, Charlie Massie:  
Confidentiality is at the heart of medical practice but it should not be a barrier to good 
care. That’s why in this publication we emphasise the importance of talking, and 
listening to patients about what should happen to information about them.
29
 
Traditionally however, support for confidentiality was driven primarily by consequentialist 
concerns, with confidentiality seen as a method for encouraging patients to be as open and 
honest with their clinicians as possible in order to facilitate appropriate care. While the 
importance of patient autonomy has increasingly been recognised, the consequentialist 
position continues to dominate discussions in both medical and legal circles.
30
 
The absence of empirical research addressing clinicians’ views on medical confidentiality is 
problematic as it runs the risk of suggesting that professional understandings of 
confidentiality are fixed and settled. A deeper analysis suggests that this is not the case and 
that medical confidentiality continues to provoke considerable debate among clinicians. In 
2008, the Medical Protection Society (MPS) reported that a third of calls they received from 
doctors related to questions over confidentiality.
31
 
Medicine is, by nature, resistant to doctrinal rulings on practice. Just as what works for 
treating one patient may fail in another, so patient expectations of confidentiality may differ. 
For example, an individual may be more concerned about protecting their HIV status than 
evidence that they have suffered a broken leg.
32
 This is evidenced by the distinctive levels of 
confidentiality afforded to patients in sexual health services, with information held by 
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genitourinary medicine clinics generally not shared with other areas of the NHS, i.e. with 
GPs, something that clinicians continue to advocate for.
33
 It is therefore surprising that, as 
care providers, clinicians’ views and experiences are so rarely sought when confidentiality is 
considered.  
There is even less research evaluating clinicians’ perspectives on the relationship between 
medical confidentiality and domestic abuse. Large portions of the literature addressing 
medico-legal issues in this area tends to focus on relationships between the medical and legal 
professionals more generally, and the experience of attending court.
34
 This is despite the 
benefits to be gained from increased rates of reporting and engagement of survivors with 
health services. As the BMA noted in its 2014 advice regarding domestic abuse:  
An increase in public awareness of confidentiality may result in improved reporting 
rates of crimes such as domestic abuse, which in turn raises the number of people 
treated.
35
 
Nonetheless, among the assessments of clinicians’ views on confidentiality, few include 
empirical data of any kind, tending to be doctrinal in nature, for example advice from 
advocates or clinicians on how to act in court and what is expected from them in presenting 
evidence.
36
 Regulatory organisations understandably tend to adopt the same approach, 
although they will often also refer to clinicians’ concerns over breaching their patients’ 
confidentiality.
37
    
Assessments of clinicians’ interactions with both lawyers and survivors in the context of 
criminal matters is rarer still, as survivors’ experiences tend to be documented in isolation, 
through for example, courtroom observations.
38
 A holistic exploration of how doctors, 
lawyers and survivors view medical confidentiality in these interactions is basically absent 
from the literature.  
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While more comprehensive, contemporary work is required, several older British and North 
American research studies provide some insights into the potential for conflicting ideas of 
medical confidentiality in domestic abuse trials. In 1982, Weiss explored the potential for 
differing conceptions of medical confidentiality between patients, doctors and medical 
students. Patients were asked a number of questions concerning when they would expect their 
confidential medical information to be shared by their doctor. This process was repeated with 
medical participants, with the questions re-phrased to reflect their point of view. Though all 
groups considered it uncontroversial for information to be shared in medical meetings and 
among doctors seeking a second opinion, there was a significant divide between participants 
when information was shared outwith these circumstances, with patients much less likely to 
expect their doctors to discuss their case with others. In response, Weiss noted ‘this study 
documents that patients expect a more rigorous standard of confidentiality than actually 
exists’.39 
Weiss was able to highlight the similarity in the opinions of practicing doctors and medical 
students, (even those had been enrolled for less than six months).
40
  Similarly, there was no 
noticeable difference between primary care and hospital doctors.
41
 Later research completed 
by Weiss suggested that a commonality of opinion was also shared among patients treated in 
teaching hospital clinics and in private practice.
42
 Importantly, as Weiss noted, none of this 
work provided information on the confidentiality preferences among patients and doctors, but 
instead evaluated ‘perceptions of confidentiality’.43 
Weiss’ view was endorsed by Sankar et al, twenty years later, when, through an extensive 
literature review, researchers found a ‘wider variety of understandings and beliefs about 
medical confidentiality among patients than are often indicated in the writings of practitioners 
or legal experts’.44 Sankar et al’s findings are particularly illuminating. Not only were 
patients’ views on confidentiality shown to be diverse and complex, but these views diverged 
from those held by medical and legal practitioners, with whom patients would engage when 
interacting with health services and the criminal justice system.  
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While these scholars identified differing conceptions of confidentiality between patients and 
medical and legal professionals, Elger and Harding were able to highlight differences 
between the professionals themselves. Their study recorded the responses of 311 medical, 
legal and dental students. Questionnaires provided six theoretical examples where medical 
confidentiality may have been compromised, asking participants whether it had been unfairly 
breached. All participants were given two-hour education session prior to taking part, though 
none had received any other formal training regarding confidentiality.
45
 The results showed a 
significant difference in opinion between medical and legal students in four of the six 
scenarios, with the legal group believing no breach occurred in three cases, while the medical 
group believed the opposite. The positions were reversed in the fourth case.
46
 Elger and 
Harding’s findings were informative, as they suggested that, generally speaking, legal 
participants were more comfortable with disclosure of sensitive information than medical and 
dental volunteers, particularly when disclosure was perceived as reducing risk to third parties.  
In 1998, Temkin gave some indication of the issues differing conceptions of medical 
confidentiality could have, when patients, clinicians and lawyers were brought together in the 
context of investigating and prosecuting rape.
47
 By interviewing ten police surgeons (now 
commonly known as forensic medical examiners or FMEs) Temkin explored the process of 
obtaining consent for forensic examination after rape, during which a history would be taken 
and disclosed to prosecutors and then, in all likelihood, to the defence. A majority of the 
doctors interviewed did not explain the confidentiality implications of this process to patients, 
namely that their medical history would be provided to lawyers involved in the case, this was 
despite many of the doctors being concerned about disclosure to legal services since they 
were, ‘used to a regime of confidentiality with their patients’.48 All of the doctors in the study 
routinely recorded medical histories on disclosable examination forms.
49
  
These findings compared unfavourably with interviews Temkin had completed earlier with 
abuse survivors, who were shocked to find their medical histories had been disclosed, 
information they had considered confidential between themselves and their doctor. Among 
the clinician interviewees, there was a blurring of the typical doctor-patient role – Temkin 
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noted that the normal doctor-patient relationship did not apply - with several participants 
feeling obligated to ‘get to the truth of what happened’, an attitude that Temkin described as 
‘difficult to reconcile with the actual role of the doctor in these circumstances’.50 These 
practices, Temkin argued, actually enabled defence practitioners to obtain sensitive elements 
of survivors’ records to which they otherwise wouldn’t have access, suggesting that clinicians 
had a role in restricting this process.
51
 Temkin then bolstered these findings by interviewing 
prosecution and defence barristers two years later. When discussing the practice of FMEs 
detailing survivors’ medical histories, the barristers noted the benefit this had for the defence 
case in particular, noting that defence counsel found it ‘very useful’ as a ‘mine of 
information’.52  
In a rare example of research specifically addressing the use of medical records in domestic 
abuse trials, Isaac and Enos noted that clinicians were concerned about both documentation 
and testifying in court, which they feared may negatively affect abuse survivors.
53
 This view 
found support from clinicians in a Canadian study by Cory et al. In Reasonable Doubt, 
medical participants specifically raised doubts over maintaining confidentiality of medical 
notes later used in court.
54
 While these studies were completed in different jurisdictions, they 
offer some key insights into the potential issues associated with medical confidentiality in the 
prosecution of domestic abuse. Reasonable Doubt in particular is relevant to this research as 
it also makes use of multiple testimonies and was undertaken in Canada, a nation which 
provided the blueprint for rules governing the use of evidence in the context of domestic 
abuse and rape in Scotland.
55
 
It is clear from the available literature that differing conceptions of medical confidentiality 
among survivors, clinicians and lawyers have the potential to cause disagreement and conflict 
when medical information is used in the context of prosecuting domestic abuse.  
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2.2 Patient understandings  
In his 2003 quantitative study, consultant forensic psychiatrist Dr Chris Jones posited the idea 
that a majority of those defending medical confidentiality did so using essentially 
consequentialist arguments, stressing that confidentiality was essential in promoting open 
discussion between clinicians and patients. This position, he argued, meant that actual 
explorations of patient understandings of confidentiality were ignored:  
The utilitarian justification for maintaining medical confidentiality rests ultimately on 
a calculation of the effects of confidentiality or disclosure on the behaviour of current 
and potential future patients. This calculation is often based upon theoretical views of 
how patients are likely to behave, but in principle it is also open to empirical study: 
how does the behaviour of patients alter when presented with different standards of 
confidentiality?
56
 
Despite Jones’ observation, investigations into patients’ views of medical confidentiality 
have typically eschewed an empirical approach. Testament perhaps to Jones’ own view that 
‘ethical questions are commonly considered to be better answered by appeal to theory rather 
than by practical testing’.57 Assumptions are made about patients’ understandings of 
confidentiality in everyday practice, particularly when information sharing is required for that 
patient’s own wellbeing. For example, while disclosing patient information to other 
healthcare providers does technically require patient consent, this consent is often implied so 
as to allow the rapid sharing of information required for effective treatment. As the GMC 
notes:  
Most patients understand and expect that relevant information must be shared within 
the direct care team to provide their care. You should share relevant information with 
those who provide or support direct care to a patient, unless the patient has objected.
58
 
The GMC’s view that ‘most patients’ are satisfied their information is shared with other 
healthcare providers is uncontroversial and in fact is generally borne out by available 
literature.  Sankar et al, reviewing available confidentiality studies in 2003, found support for 
the GMC’s assertion, noting:  
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Patients prefer that medical information be used exclusively for treatment. Studies 
showed that patients grasp the need for and benefit of sharing medical information. 
Some studies, indeed, indicated that under certain circumstances, patients approved 
disclosures made without a patient's authorization.
59
 
Patients’ positions on confidentiality in circumstances unrelated to treatment are little 
explored. Research investigating crime victims’ views of medical confidentiality for example 
is rare, and that focussing on domestic abuse survivors is essentially non-existent. To begin 
researching confidentiality in these particular circumstances, it is therefore necessary to refer 
to a pluralistic, international literature assessing patients’ views on confidentiality generally. 
In doing so, it appears evident that patients’ understandings of confidentiality are not always 
shared by clinicians. 
In 2004, in a US study, Jenkins, Merz and Sankar conducted in-depth face-to-face interviews 
with eighty-five women in five different centres, both clinician and non-clinical. In these 
interviews, researchers asked participants about what medical confidentiality meant to them, 
when it should be upheld, whether any breaches could be justified and why.
60
 While 
participants were overwhelmingly supportive of confidentiality between themselves and their 
doctor, many of their descriptions differed from legal and medical definitions. This was 
particularly evident when patients were asked to define medical confidentiality itself, and 
59% emphasised the importance of the relationship with the doctor, describing medical 
confidentiality as something akin to the confidence between friends, rather than a fiduciary 
relationship between lay person and professional. The researchers concluded that if other 
patients held similar views to the study group, then their expectations would likely not be met, 
supporting Weiss’ conclusions that patients’ expectations of confidentiality were divergent 
from the reality of everyday practice. It was up to practitioners – Jenkins et al argued - to 
discern where gaps between medical practice and patient’s own ‘confidentiality models’ 
existed, so as to support those individuals in speaking frankly.
61
 
Jones’ study (discussed above), also indicated dislocations between patient and clinician 
views of confidentiality. In this instance, participants – patients attending GP appointments - 
were presented with five situations in which a breach of confidentiality might occur in order 
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to protect the safety of third parties. While a majority supported disclosure to authorities in all 
of these cases, they noted that they were not confident that doctors would make the same 
decisions.
62
 This is an interesting conclusion as it suggests that these patients – while having 
a strong general support for confidentiality themselves – felt that their doctors had a more 
absolutist stance on protecting confidentiality, a stance that the patients felt may not be in the 
public interest. These conclusions appear to be at odds with other studies that highlighted 
patients’ as having stronger views on confidentiality than clinicians. As Jones acknowledges 
however, the reliability of the conclusions drawn from this study is questionable, due mostly 
to the difficulty of wording in the questionnaires as well as the small sample size of 
participants.  
Jones’ comments over the value of empirical research in this area however, do appear 
warranted. It is clear that relying on theoretical concepts of medical confidentiality does not 
sufficiently address the possibility of discrepancies between the views of patients and doctors 
in individual situations. Confidentiality does not appear to mean one fixed thing to any one 
person. Differences in attitudes towards medical confidentiality have been observed in 
different age groups, among different ethnic groups and populations of individuals with 
specific diseases.
63
 This makes it more surprising that survivors’ views of medical 
confidentiality are so under-reported, with research tending to address confidentiality as a 
peripheral subject in wider discussions of healthcare use. This is despite indications that 
abuse survivors’ views of confidentiality are particularly strong.64 There are clear reasons 
why this would be the case. The BMA notes:  
In the case of victims of domestic abuse, confidentiality is essential in enabling them 
to disclose their experiences as their physical safety may be dependent on 
confidentiality being maintained.
65
 
As Drinkwater et al state, maintaining confidentiality is crucial to prevent escalating abuse 
should disclosure to healthcare workers be discovered by perpetrators.
66
  Accordingly, 
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confidentiality concerns have been identified as significant barriers to disclosure in medical 
settings.
67
 Survivors will often choose health services as the first formal organisation to 
engage with, sometimes occasioning their ‘only point of contact with professionals’.68 This is 
not just for immediate treatment, but is instead part of a much more complex picture, with 
survivors requiring input from numerous specialties. As Koss et al noted in 1991,‘the 
criminally victimized woman’s needs for medical treatment transcend the traditional focus on 
emergency care and forensic evaluation’.69 
Survivor engagement with healthcare professionals is therefore not motivated only by clinical 
need, but seems at least partly due to survivors’ faith in medical services, with some 
indications that survivors will talk to clinicians over family members and others in the 
community, due in no small part to the relative anonymity and confidentiality of the medical 
setting.
70
 Preference for disclosure in a clinician-patient context is even evidenced when 
compared to disclosure in other professional, confidential relationships. In a 2014 British 
assessment where men were asked about domestic abuse in a general health setting, 
confidentiality was found to be ‘a key issue for participants’, indeed, one individual 
emphasised his belief that doctor-patient confidentiality was more secure than that between 
churchgoers and members of the clergy.
71
  These findings support advice given to healthcare 
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professionals, which notes that an absence of confidentiality acts as a significant barrier to 
survivors seeking treatment.
72
   
The Reasonable Doubt project in British Columbia (featuring interviews with survivors, 
doctors and lawyers) provides perhaps the most reliable data in this field, assessing the use of 
medical records in criminal (and civil) court cases involving violence against women.
73
 
Importantly, the project was situated between health and legal research and focussed on the 
space ‘where records move from health care to litigation’.74  In concluding, Cory et al 
provided a number of key insights relating to record use. Discussing a potential spill over 
effect, they argued that medical and legal services had to ensure that the practice of disclosing 
and using medical information in criminal courts did not have a negative impact on survivors 
using health services when required.
75
  The risk of survivors withdrawing from medical and 
legal services was increased, they argued, when medical records were used against survivors’ 
interests rather than in support of them.
76
 This idea, that survivors’ perceptions of health 
services may be affected by their experiences of confidentiality in court - and the lack of 
consideration for their opinions in these circumstances - will help to inform this work.  
The applicability of these studies in my own research is however, ultimately limited. While 
Canada shares a similar legal system to Scotland, the two jurisdictions are not identical, just 
as the two health systems are significantly distinct and Cory et al’s findings cannot be 
considered representative of the Scottish context.  
Temkin’s work provides novel insights by using interviews with survivors, lawyers and 
doctors, finding that survivors’ medical records were often used contrary to their own 
interests.
77
 However, while based in the UK, Temkin’s work was completed twenty years ago, 
and significant social and legal changes regarding domestic abuse have occurred in the 
interim. Also, any conclusions Temkin was able to draw were limited to interviews with 
police surgeons based in England, with no further medical staff taking part. 
The dearth of empirical research into patients’ own views in this area remains problematic. 
As I have shown, limited studies have suggested there is a potential for substantially different 
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conceptions of medical confidentiality between patients and professionals. A 1998 
questionnaire study in the United States analysed doctors’ interactions with 115 abuse 
survivors. Here, participants expressed strong support for medical confidentiality not just as 
an example of good clinical practice but as a form of emotional support, particularly when 
abusive partners attempted to remain physically present during consultation, with survivors 
relying on doctors to ensure abusers were removed and confidentiality supported.
78
 This 
further indicates that not only do the confidentiality expectations appear to diverge between 
the survivor as a patient and the clinician treating them, but that confidentiality may mean 
something entirely different between each group.  
It seems clear that understandings of medical confidentiality in the context of domestic abuse 
can only be properly assessed by using both clinician and survivor perspectives. A qualitative 
exploration of this topic with both groups offers a real opportunity to determine their 
confidentiality expectations, comparing these to the doctrines of contemporary practice.  
2.3 Legal understandings 
As noted in chapter 1, the law recognises the importance of medical confidentiality, 
employing numerous mechanisms to protect information imparted between clinicians and 
patients. This is not simply to reinforce individual privacy rights, but instead recognises 
medical confidentiality as a concept worth preserving in the public interest.
79
 Nor do legal 
protections apply to patients alone and concern for medical advisors can feature in decisions 
to resist disclosure.
80
  
Medical and legal views of confidentiality are not always in agreement however. Elger and 
Harding highlighted that the potential for divergence does exist and,  as  in the case of 
Montgomery v Lanarkshire Health Board, where the court was able to alter the definition of 
informed consent and redefine clinicians’ roles in this process, there have been instances in 
which clinicians and lawyers have differed in their interpretation of confidentiality.
81
 As an 
example, in 2003 Leigh, pointed to the discrepancy between clinicians being unwilling to 
‘publish photographs of unrecognisable parts of people’s bodies without their consent’ and 
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the courts which in a legal case at the time ‘held that a patient had no right to restrict 
publication of information about themselves which did not identify them’.82 
The common law supports medical confidentiality – deeming health information imparted in 
a confidential relationship to be under a duty of confidence.
83
 This duty is underpinned by 
case law involving therapeutic exchanges of information but also by analogous cases 
involving a general duty of confidence. For example, in a House of Lords case concerning 
press reporting and privacy - Campbell v Mirror Group Newspapers Ltd where the court 
found that health information remained private when shared if the person the information 
concerned had a reasonable expectation of privacy.
84
 In this case, Lady Hale suggested that 
confidentiality varied with the sensitivity of the health information imparted:  
Not every statement about a person's health will carry the badge of confidentiality or 
risk doing harm to that person's physical or moral integrity. The privacy interest in the 
fact that a public figure has a cold or a broken leg is unlikely to be strong enough to 
justify restricting the press's freedom to report it. What harm could it possibly do?
85
 
While the authority of this case is useful, it did not occur in the context of criminal 
proceedings and Hale’s comments were made in reference to press reporting rather than 
public safety. However, the assessment by Lady Hale chimes with some of the views put 
forward in cases more directly concerning confidentiality and crime. In R(B) v Crown Court 
at Stafford, for example, the court suggested that levels of confidentiality existed between 
records in different specialties, noting that 'medical records, in particular perhaps psychiatric 
records, are confidential between the medical practitioner and the patient'.
86
 Further insight 
into the relationship between medical confidentiality and crime can be gained from Z v 
Finland, which, while a civil case, did arise from criminal proceedings. Z v Finland took 
place in 1997, after Z’s medical records and medical advisors were used to prove sexual 
offences (including rape) committed by her husband (X) against others. In their judgement 
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over whether Z’s medical information had been improperly used, the European Court of 
Human Rights (ECHR) described the public interest in maintaining confidentiality:  
Respecting the confidentiality of health data is a vital principle in the legal systems of 
all the Contracting Parties to the Convention. It is crucial not only to respect the sense 
of privacy of a patient but also to preserve his or her confidence in the medical 
profession and in the health services in general. Without such protection, those in 
need of medical assistance may be deterred from revealing such information of a 
personal and intimate nature as may be necessary in order to receive appropriate 
treatment and, even, from seeking such assistance, thereby endangering their own 
health and, in the case of transmissible diseases, that of the community.
87
 
The case was informative for crystallising questions of confidentiality both as they applied to 
patient records and the testimony of clinicians. In fact, the first sentence of the passage above 
has been referred to in numerous other cases grappling with confidentiality issues.
88
 Z v 
Finland is unusual in providing evidence of clinicians’ conceptions of confidentiality in a 
criminal court case. Z’s doctors all initially resisted testifying about her medical history, 
seeking to protect the confidentiality of her data.
89
Z v Finland is also instructive in 
highlighting the consequentialist arguments for maintaining medical confidentiality - a 
position generally supported in both the medical and legal literature.
90
  These arguments are 
generally less secure when protecting medical confidentiality risks impeding criminal justice 
and it is worth now considering the ways in which medical evidence may be used in criminal 
cases, exploring the arguments for relaxing strict standards of confidentiality.  
In his address to the Medico-Legal Society in 2000, then Director of Public Prosecutions, 
David Calvert-Smith, spoke about the use of medical evidence in criminal prosecutions, 
noting:  
It should go without saying, but perhaps needs restating, that medical evidence is 
absolutely crucial to the success of a criminal justice system. There are so many ways 
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in which, if we were deprived of good medical evidence, the system wouldn’t work. 
Indeed it would hardly be worth even setting up a system.
91
 
Though speaking in his capacity as senior prosecuting officer in England and Wales, Calvert-
Smith’s words ring true north of the border. In November 2017, the Inspectorate of 
Prosecution in Scotland argued that the primary reason for seeking sensitive records 
(including medical records) in the course of a criminal trial was to ‘consider whether the 
material contains information which supports or undermines the prosecution case or assists 
the defence’.92 
That description (albeit rather reductive) goes some way to indicating why medical records in 
particular may be sought as evidence in cases involving domestic abuse and/or sexual 
violence. Indeed, in the Inspectorate’s own case study, it found that ‘health records’ were 
more commonly sought than other ‘sensitive records’, including, social work and educational 
records. This is despite the fact that the Inspectorate, (somewhat unusually) described health 
records as distinct from psychological and psychiatric records.
93
 By contrast, in the Crown’s 
advice on disclosure in such cases, health records include those relating to mental health.
94
 It 
is the use of psychological and psychiatric records in these cases after all that has provoked 
the most external criticism.
95
 The reasons why medical records are particularly useful in this 
context, however, are multifaceted.  
Medical records can help prosecutors support an allegation. The corroboration requirement of 
the Scottish legal system imposes an obligation for two separate pieces of evidence to support 
                                                             
91 David Calvert-Smith, 'Medical Evidence in Criminal Prosecutions', The Medico-Legal Journal, 68 (2000), p. 
117 
92 Inspectorate of Prosecution in Scotland, Thematic Review of the Investigation and Prosecution of Sexual 
Crimes, (2017), available at <https://www.gov.scot/Publications/2017/11/3053>, [date accessed: 22th August, 
2018], p. 69 
93
 Ibid, p. 70 
94 Crown Office and Procurator Fiscal Service, Policy on Obtaining and Disclosing Sensitive Personal Records in 
The Investigation and Prosecution of Sexual Crime Cases, (April 2014), 
<https://www.copfs.gov.uk/images/Documents/Prosecution_Policy_Guidance/Guidelines_and_Policy/AMEND
ED%20POLICY%20_sensitive%20records_%20April%202014%20as%20sent%20to%20PF%20Eye%20-
%20website.pdf>, [accessed: 22nd August, 2018], p. 1 
95
 See for example, Elizabeth Charlotte Adamson, (2016) ‘A Critical Exploration of the Use of Mental Health 
Records in Rape Trials’, (Unpublished PhD Thesis: Durham University, 2016); Louise Ellison, 'The use and abuse 
of psychiatric evidence in rape trials', The International Journal of Evidence and Proof, 13 (2009), pp. 28-49 
51 
 
the proof of the individual elements of the crime alleged.
96
 Proving domestic abuse is 
therefore difficult as there are often no witnesses.
97
 As the Inspectorate Report notes: 
Corroboration is particularly problematic where the crime occurs in a private setting, 
as is very often the case with sexual crimes, as it is unlikely there will be any other 
direct eyewitness evidence to support the victim’s account of what happened.98 
Connelly – speaking about the availability of civil protection orders for domestic abuse 
survivors - described the benefit of medical evidence, noting that it was of particular value in 
court:  
Whilst the standard of evidence required by particular judges or courts may vary there 
was consensus that the court preferred evidence from professionals, particularly 
doctors.
99
 
Connelly’s comments regarding the judicial preference for medical evidence, even when 
compared to others in positions of authority - i.e. social workers, teachers - is telling and 
helps to indicate why clinicians’ testimony is so often sought in these cases. It builds on 
earlier courtroom observations completed by Burman in which a trial judge in a sexual 
offences case explained how essential medical opinion was in helping a jury to determine the 
credibility of the complainer:  
It has to be remembered that credibility and reliability in these areas is fundamentally 
a matter for the jury and in order to approach that topic what is required is objective 
evidence of a pathological or medical condition…100 
Here, the trial judge was referring to attempts by the defence to introduce corroborative 
character evidence from non-medical witnesses (teachers), relating to one of the two 
complainers. The judge eventually ruled that their evidence was inadmissible as they were 
not professional psychologists and so could not comment on the complainer’s credibility and 
                                                             
96 The testimony of a single witness would therefore be insufficient. For a full explanation of the corroboration 
rule, see Fiona Raitt, ‘Proof and Sufficiency of Evidence’ in Raitt on Evidence: Principles, Policy and Practice, 3rd 
edition, Eamon Keane and Fraser Davidson eds, (Edinburgh: Thomas Reuters, 2018), pp. 133-147 
97 Fiona Raitt, 'Corroboration in cases of gender violence: a case for special treatment?', Edinburgh Law Review, 
18 (2014), p. 94 
98
 Inspectorate of Prosecution in Scotland, Thematic Review, p. 83  
99
 Clare Connelly, ‘Institutional failure, social entrapment and post-separation abuse’, Juridical Review, 1 (2010), 
p.  61 
100
 Michele Burman, Lynn Jamieson, Jan Nicholson and Oona Brooks, Impact of Aspects of the Law of Evidence 
in Sexual Offence Trials: An Evaluation Study, (September 2007), 
<https://www.gov.scot/Publications/2007/09/12093427/0>, [accessed: 22nd August, 2018], p. 71 
52 
 
reliability.
101
 In providing corroborative evidence, the legal value of medical records to the 
prosecution case is clear. Discussing when to seek sensitive records, the Crown Office notes 
that such records can provide: 
An important perspective on the impact of sexual offending on the victim’s life, 
sometimes disclosing a pattern of behaviour typical in cases of sexual abuse and 
which may provide support for the complainer’s allegation.102 
This ‘important perspective’ referred to by the Crown, can, however, also favour the defence. 
In the 2007 case of HMA v Ronald for example, the defence’s medical expert (a psychiatrist) 
referred to the complainer’s previous behaviour, including supposedly false or mendacious 
allegations of rape against others. This allowed him to support his diagnosis of a borderline 
personality disorder, a condition which, in his opinion, could have an effect upon the 
complainer’s credibility and reliability.103 The expert’s assertion helped the defence to access 
more extensive medical records and then to pursue lines of questioning on their contents. The 
potency of these medical records was evident in the fact that the expert made his diagnosis 
and introduced it for legal scrutiny without having consulted the complainer in person. As 
Duff noted, the psychiatrist’s evidence was, ‘sufficiently significant to outweigh any risk of 
prejudice to the administration of justice’ in the eyes of the judge, when considering the 
implications of further disclosure to the complainer’s privacy and confidentiality.104 This 
position was later criticised in CJM v HMA, where the court noted that for objective medical 
evidence to be admissible regarding credibility and reliability, the complainer had to suffer 
from an ‘objective medical condition’, and where Ronald departed from this principle, it was 
disapproved.105 
Medical evidence often features in discussions of credibility in a manner similar to Ronald, 
and this defence tactic gave rise to WF.
106
  In the year WF was heard, jury directions were 
introduced under the Abusive Behaviour and Sexual Harm (Scotland) Act which mandated 
judges to explain to juries that late or non-disclosure of rape or sexual assault had no bearing 
on the credibility of the accusation.
107
 This followed arguments from other jurisdictions, that 
judges and lawyers generally ‘should not assume that a woman will disclose abuse at the first 
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opportunity’.108 Before this legislation it was common for prosecution and defence lawyers – 
each supported by expert medical opinion – to argue why  late or non-disclosure occurred.109 
The extent to which counsel continue to make these arguments, is unclear.  
The use of medical records to challenge credibility and reliability in the context of domestic 
abuse and rape has come under increasing scrutiny. Raitt has pointed to the potential for 
errors in medical records – unveiled in audit - to ultimately affect the outcome of 
prosecutions, arguing that because survivors have limited powers to correct faults and prevent 
their entry into court, they can ultimately become ostracised from the process and may not 
come forward in future.
110
 This argument is strengthened by the findings of other researchers, 
who note the potential for records to carry errors.
111
 Not only did Isaac and Enos find similar 
issues with accuracy in the records of survivors in the US, but also observed that differences 
in terminology between medical and legal professionals occasionally led to the 
misinterpretation of medical records in a court setting.
112
  
In 2007 Burman analysed the use of evidence in sexual offence trials in Scotland. Through a 
series of interviews with legal practitioners (senior prosecutors and judges), Burman 
demonstrated that medical evidence was commonly sought – particularly by the defence – 
and that its use was invariably tied to applications to lead sexual character evidence.
113
 
Burman reported a case where defence agents used a complainer’s medical record to lead 
evidence about her sexual history and her alcoholism, based on discussions held between her 
and her doctor.
114
 This example illustrates the potential for doctors to unwittingly gather 
useful evidence for the defence - offering the ‘way in’ as described by a legal participant in 
this research - and thus acting as the handmaiden’s of the defence as referred to by Temkin in 
1998.
115
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Given the passage of time, the relevance of Burman’s findings today is debatable. Over a 
decade has passed since the work was completed. New rules governing disclosure of medical 
records in these cases are now in effect (outlined below) and a specific domestic abuse 
offence now exists, targeting a range of behaviours.
116
 It would therefore be possible to 
conclude that the use of complainers’ medical information might be more strictly controlled, 
with a greater respect for medical confidentiality among lawyers.  
A deeper analysis however would suggest that Burman’s report from 2007 still offers 
meaningful conclusions on how medical information is used in domestic abuse and sexual 
violence trials and, more importantly, offers a call to provide modern day research. Though 
there are now statutory guidelines informing Crown disclosure, their difference from pre-
existing common law obligations is questionable. Stark argued that the disclosure legislation 
of 2010 and the case law which preceded it both relied on a ‘vague concept of “materiality”’ 
which made the delineation between ‘objectively material’ and ‘subjectively tactically useful’ 
extremely difficult.
117
 Raitt went further in 2011, arguing that rather than improving the 
confidentiality of complainers’ records, legislators had created a situation in which it was: 
Predictable that there will be an increase in the disclosure of medical and other 
personal records of complainers for any potential they have to cast doubt on the 
credibility and reliability of complainers.
118
 
This situation was all but guaranteed according to Raitt given the scarcity of resources 
available to the Crown to scrutinise records for relevance and oppose defence applications, 
and a landscape where ever greater amounts of evidence were being considered in each 
case.
119
 Her argument was supported by Duff, who noted that medical records were routinely 
passed to the defence by the Crown, he ascribed - at least in part - to the large workload of 
Crown staff, which didn’t afford them the time to go through records to determine 
relevance.
120
 Burman’s assertion that the practice of obtaining records seemed to be 
increasing then found support nine years later in the words of Rape Crisis Scotland (RCS) - 
acting in their capacity as Interveners in the case of WF. As recounted in Lord Glennie’s 
judgement, RCS reported that:  
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In their experience there had been an increasing use of complainers’ medical or other 
sensitive records within the context of sexual offence prosecutions, often to ascertain 
whether the complainer had a history of mental health issues.
121
 
As Campbell and Cowan note in their assessment of sexual history evidence in Scottish rape 
trials, since Burman’s work in 2007, there has been a dearth of research in this area, despite 
the legislative changes that have taken place in the intervening years.
 122
 Relying on figures 
provided by the Cabinet Secretary for Justice in 2016, they argued that 90% of requests under 
section 275  - the legislative measure that allows use of sexual history evidence, explained in 
section 2.4.2 of this chapter - were granted in part or in full in the first four months of that 
year.
123
 In terms of the impact this had on medical record use, as the authors noted, there is 
little ‘nuanced analysis’ possible from these figures, given the scarcity of detail provided in 
previous years or even in what information was requested.
124
 They were accordingly unable 
to ascertain if these figures showcased a similar frequency of disclosure to that observed by 
Burman.
125
 The picture is undeniably complex, though as McGlynn noted in her 2017 
assessment of the admissibility of sexual history evidence in rape trials, the experience in 
other common law jurisdictions suggests that restricting the use of such evidence can also 
lead ‘to an increase in the use of other forms of potentially prejudicial evidence, such as 
medical or counselling records’.126 
In light of these findings, one begins to understand how medical record requests can be tied 
to questions of a complainer’s credibility in domestic abuse and sexual violence cases. Given 
the associations between medical record requests and sexual character evidence, a thorough 
investigation of current prosecution and defence practice in this area seems warranted.   
The Inspectorate of Prosecution in Scotland’s report in 2017 in some ways built upon 
Burman’s work, but generally challenged the arguments of Raitt and RCS. Less than two 
years on from WF, the Inspectorate noted that ‘prosecution requests for sensitive, personal 
records are being tailored to the specific purpose for which records are being sought’.127 This 
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conclusion was based on an assessment of fifty indicted cases – ‘where the accused was 
indicted in the high court for a sexual crime’.128 Medical records were the most frequently 
retrieved sensitive records, and were successfully recovered in a total of fourteen cases, with 
complainer consent for recovery and disclosure obtained in all of these cases by the 
Crown.
129
 In twelve cases, applications (by the Crown, defence or both) were made to lead 
sexual character evidence, though the Inspectorate conceded that their ability to assess the 
relevance of these applications was limited.
130
  
Given other contemporary commentary on the subject, the Inspectorate’s conclusions are 
slightly unconvincing and depend on an assumption that the issues highlighted by Burman, 
Raitt, RCS and Lord Glennie were either erroneous or were corrected less than a year after 
WF was heard. Interestingly, the Inspectorate’s favourable conclusions contrasted sharply 
with an earlier report on prosecution practice in England and Wales that identified significant 
issues of ‘over-disclosure’ of medical and other sensitive records to the defence in similar 
cases
131
. Clearly, one jurisdiction does not mirror another, and comparisons between England 
and Wales and Scotland are limited. That said, the conclusions from England and Wales are 
noteworthy given the reference to English authority in the Scottish courts. In WF, the 
petitioner’s case relied partly on the authority of two English cases, R(B) v Crown Court at 
Stafford and M v Director of Legal Aid Casework, in 2007 and 2014 respectively, which both 
affirmed an individual’s right to be heard (under article 8 of the ECHR) when their personal 
records were sought without their consent.
132
 The Scottish Government did not refute the 
relevance of these cases but instead argued that they did not affirm a general right for legal 
aid coverage to oppose medical record applications.
133
 In making his recommendations for a 
change in the law, Lord Glennie even noted that ‘It would be adequate, in my view, for rules 
to be introduced along the lines of those in England and Wales’.134 
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However, extrapolating conclusions on this basis is impossible and recent evidence has 
shown that disclosure issues in England are varied and do not necessarily follow those in 
Scotland.
135
 Indeed, when a more recent CPS review was completed in June 2018, one of the 
common themes identified (though the review focussed on disclosure of social media and 
phone records) was the failure of prosecutors to identify and disclose relevant medical 
records in cases of rape and other serious sexual offences.
136
 
As basing conclusions on other jurisdictions is impossible, empirical research is required to 
assess how medical information is sought and used in a Scottish context. 
2.4 Guidelines for obtaining medical records 
Practically speaking, medical records are often sought alongside other documents deemed 
relevant for the prosecution or defence in a criminal case.
137
 The rules governing disclosure 
in Scotland come from a mixture of statutory obligations and case law. Before 2010, 
guidelines for disclosure were heavily influenced by cases from the preceding two decades. 
Prior to 1998, the Crown were under no obligation to disclose all materially relevant 
information which came into their possession, indeed, Duff noted that it was ‘virtually 
meaningless’ to argue that such a duty existed before then.138  This changed dramatically in 
1998, when Alistair McLeod petitioned the Appeal Court, arguing that the Crown Office had 
not disclosed sufficient levels of relevant evidence at his criminal trial.
139
 The subsequent full 
bench decision on disclosure, found against McLeod.
140
 Importantly however, the judgement 
ruled that the Crown had a ‘legal duty to disclose any potentially exculpatory information to 
the accused's representatives’, insofar as such information could have an effect on the 
accused’s defence and might tend to exculpate the accused.141 
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The position in McLeod was advanced by the cases of Sinclair and Holland in 2005, which 
saw the court go further in outlining the Crown’s disclosure obligations.142As Duff notes, 
these positions were taken to recognise an accused’s rights to a fair trial under article 6 of the 
ECHR.
143
 The courts argued that in future, ‘any evidence which would tend to undermine the 
prosecution’s case or to assist the case for the defence is to be taken as material’.144 As Raitt 
argued, the disclosure obligation was placed on the Crown to account for  the ‘greater 
resources of the state’ to investigate crime, relative to the resources of the accused for 
defence.
145
 Importantly however, while these moves protect the accused’s article 6 rights, if 
the Crown routinely obtain (or are sent) medical evidence, this is likely to be disclosed to the 
defence as material, undermining the complainer’s confidentiality.  
In 2010, the rules governing disclosure changed again, under the Criminal Justice and 
Licensing (Scotland) Act 2010.
146
 This measure, which in Raitt’s words ‘clarified and re-
drew the boundaries of disclosure in Scots law’, to a certain degree simply formalised the 
existing common law duties of disclosure.
147
 Indeed, Stark argued that while greater clarity 
was given on the process of achieving disclosure, the legislation did little to determine what 
information should be disclosed.
148
 Tellingly, Stark noted that while a vague notion of 
materiality continued to persist, it would be easy to ‘confuse what is (objectively) "material" 
and what is (subjectively) "tactically useful"’.149 This is clearly essential in understanding 
how medical records are utilised in domestic abuse cases, as it would support the ‘over-
disclosure’ of information by prosecutors and offer a wide remit for defence counsel in 
deciding what information to recover from a complainer’s medical record. By leaving the 
definition of materiality unchanged, Stark contended, the act failed in its motivation to ‘re-
state and clarify’ the ‘deliberately vague’ disclosure rules outlined in Holland and Sinclair.150  
Raitt and Duff were more critical, arguing that where the act differed from existing common 
law obligations was in its broader interpretation of disclosure.
151
 Their criticism – like Stark’s 
- referred to the failure of the legislation to add clarity to the meaning of ‘material’ 
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information, the benchmark by which decisions over disclosure were made.
152
 The ambiguity 
over what constituted relevant information meant that the act lacked the protective measures 
both Raitt and Duff argued were necessary to prevent the widespread disclosure of sensitive 
information.
153
  This in turn made it more likely that large volumes of complainers’ medical 
records would be routinely disclosed. As Raitt noted: 
The problem with this lies less in the principle of disclosure of these records, and 
more in the ways in which the privacy interests of complainers could be heavily 
compromised in circumstances where they will have no access to independent legal 
advice.
154
 
Information deemed ‘sensitive’ was nominally protected under the 2010 Act, and the Crown 
is not obliged to disclose such material to the defence. But for information to meet this 
threshold, its disclosure must risk:  
(a) causing serious injury, or death, to any person, 
(b) obstructing or preventing the prevention, detection, investigation or prosecution of 
crime, or 
(c) causing serious prejudice to the public interest.
155
 
Though disclosure of medical information can cause substantial distress to the complainer, it 
is unlikely their opposition to it would meet the parameters outlined above. Raitt pointed to 
the discrepancy in the retention of common law procedures for recovering records on the 
behalf of the accused (through commission and diligence) while no additional protective 
measures were allowed for the complainer. The accused’s reserved right to seek disclosure by 
methods outside the statute were described in Walker and Walker:  
The statutory provisions replace the common law rules on disclosure by the 
prosecutor, but preserve the accused's rights to seek disclosure by, or the recovery of 
information from, the prosecutor by means other than those prescribed under the 
statute.
156
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The ultimate difficulty in considering medical record disclosure continues to be in the test of 
materiality. In 2009, shortly before the introduction of disclosure specific legislation, Stark 
argued that legal interpretations of materiality were insufficiently outlined, with the concept 
remaining ‘inherently malleable’.157 Stark’s argument built on that made by Raitt and 
Ferguson shortly after Holland and Sinclair, which questioned the lack of prescribed limits to 
what might constitute ‘material evidence’. Raitt and Ferguson posited that the absence of 
clarity by the courts encouraged a culture where both the Crown and defence felt compelled 
to rigorously test the boundaries of a complainer’s credibility and reliability and that this 
would in turn lead to further applications for disclosure of sensitive documents.
158
 These 
arguments were supported by Burman’s work one year later, when discussions with 
prosecutors and judges uncovered a perceived increase in medical record requests among 
defence advocates and two of the five advocates depute interviewed raised specific concerns 
over this practice. One noted: 
“With disclosure these days, we are quite often met with requests for medical records, 
and what I’m hearing at preliminary hearings [from Defence] is that we need the 
medical records because that may lead, in turn, to an s.275 application. …. And 
generally our position is no.’159 
Here, they were referring to the issue predicted by Raitt and Ferguson, where requests for 
medical records were being used speculatively, in order to precipitate further disclosure and 
advances lines of questioning. A large portion of the data collected in Burman’s research pre-
dated Holland and Sinclair by one or two years, making their conclusions over the increased 
use of medical evidence all the more interesting, as the views of the senior lawyers 
expressing them were based on experience gathered from a time when disclosure was 
nominally more restricted. This in turn makes the lack of empirical work undertaken on this 
topic since 2007 all the more frustrating, as it is difficult to make any assessments over how 
disclosure has changed. This is magnified when the absence of investigation continued after 
the introduction of statutory rules governing disclosure in 2010 and then again after the case 
of WF v Scottish Ministers.  
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Medical records often contain sensitive information and exist primarily to provide clinicians 
with the information necessary to provide adequate treatment.
160
 As described succinctly by 
Allen, ‘encounters with health care professionals convert persons confronting illness into 
patients with charts’.161 The Crown Office, in its disclosure guidance, notes that sensitive 
records (including medical records): 
may contain a profoundly personal record of the victim’s life, much of which may be 
irrelevant to the matters under investigation but which has the power to undermine, 
significantly, not only the victim’s testimony but also the victim themselves.162 
This view is recognised too, among the senior judiciary and, in WF Lord Glennie noted that 
‘medical records are likely to contain highly sensitive information about an individual’.163 
Disclosure of medical records therefore has the potential to cause significant distress to the 
survivors they concern, though the impact of this phenomenon on reporting of crime and 
withdrawal from prosecution remains understudied. Domestic abuse survivors are more likely 
to engage with medical services than the general public and consequently, to generate more 
comprehensive medical records, and Raitt noted that domestic abuse survivors often ‘have a 
very extensive set of medical, including mental health records’164 Though such records can 
contain legally relevant information, most of an individual’s medical file will contain 
information which has no bearing on a case.
165
  
From a prosecution perspective, medical records are often sought to support the complainer’s 
case, i.e. to provide evidence that they were injured in the manner alleged. Accordingly, the 
Crown will often seek the complainer’s consent for their records to be accessed. If the 
complainer opposes access to records and the Crown cannot convince them otherwise, then it 
possesses reserved powers for seizing such information, though it does argue that ‘recovering 
records against the victim’s wishes should be regarded as a last option’.166  The Crown’s 
petition warrant allows prosecutors to recover records without complainer consent. It also 
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allows recovery of medical records in the face of resistance by the NHS board concerned (the 
havers). The haver does not breach their own data protection obligations in this 
circumstance.
167
 However, the petition warrant is not unlimited in scope. As noted in the 
Crown Office Disclosure Manual:  
Establishing a lawful basis for the processing of data in terms of the Data Protection 
Act does not necessarily mean that processing the information will be in accordance 
with the complainer’s right to privacy in terms of the ECHR.168 
If consent is given by the complainer however, then there is no privacy issue. As I outlined 
earlier in the chapter, the common law protection of confidentiality is abrogated when 
individuals consent to the recovery and disclosure of their records. The issue over consent on 
this point - one I will return to throughout this research - is how truly informed it is. While a 
complainer undoubtedly has the right to refuse the disclosure of their records, if such 
information is deemed relevant by the prosecution and/or defence, then refusal of the 
complainer may, theoretically affect the chance of conviction. Raitt is one of the few 
researchers to comment on the potential for ‘tension’ in the prosecutor’s role in this instance: 
Complainers who are faced with a direct request for permission may feel they have 
little choice in the matter, as to refuse consent would likely result in no proceedings. 
Victim support organisations are already dealing with enquiries from complainers that 
capture precisely these issues. Some complainers may opt to withdraw their co-
operation from a prosecution which may endanger its viability and lead to it being 
abandoned.
169
 
There is effectively no empirical work to support or challenge Raitt’s argument. The Crown 
Office disclosure policy makes considerable reference to ‘engaging the complainer’ in the 
process of obtaining records and making them fully aware of ‘the implications of their 
records being obtained’.170 Whether this advice is adhered to in practice is an open question. 
There has been no assessment into the impact of scant resources on disclosure practice 
identified by Raitt and Duff, nor has there been any attempt to scrutinise the police role in the 
consent process. 
171
 Cory et al noted that once police had obtained consent for medical 
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records to be recovered by the Crown, they would then be reviewed. If they supported the 
prosecution or defence case, they could then be subject to disclosure rules, based on the 
assumption that the initial consent given by the complainer supported this outcome.
172
 The 
authors cautioned this could lead to further records being sought and that clinicians should 
have a more pronounced regulatory role in this process, noting ‘it is critical that the patient 
understands the possible legal implications before she signs such a release’.173 
Despite issues in the practice of obtaining consent, disclosure of records in these 
circumstances is still lawful. In Medicine, Patients and the Law, Brazier and Cave note that 
‘Disclosure is self-evidently lawful if the patient expressly consents to disclosure’.174 There is 
no system for recording how frequently survivors of abuse give consent for their medical 
records to be obtained, nor is there any research which explores the perceptions of the 
survivors on how compliance or noncompliance may affect the chances of prosecution. There 
is also no exploration of the potentially differing views of medical confidentiality between 
survivors and lawyers in this context, despite the impact these could have on the expectations 
of how much medical information could be obtained, with who it could be shared in court, 
and ultimately the validity of the consent itself. This research will address these issues.  
2.4.1 Defence and the Rumsfeldian unknown unknowns  
From a defence perspective, the first method for recovering complainers’ medical records 
rests with disclosure by the Crown - detailed above - and medical records deemed to meet the 
threshold outlined under disclosure rules would need to be passed to the defence for their 
scrutiny. Clearly, in order to determine what is relevant, the Crown must scrutinise the 
documents themselves.
 175
  
In McDonald v HM Advocate, disclosure concerns resulted in three murderers being given 
leave to appeal their convictions to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council.
176
 The 
Committee discussed the extent to which the Crown could be expected to seek and provide 
material which may benefit the accused’s case or undermine the Crown’s. The appellants’ 
cases were all dismissed and opining on disclosure, Lord Rodger of Earlsferry argued:  
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the representatives of the Crown were under no duty to comb through all the material 
in their possession to look out for anything which might assist the defence and so 
should be disclosed, rather they must disclose disclosable material of which they 
became aware, or to which their attention was drawn, while diligently carrying out 
their core duties of preparing and prosecuting the case.
177
 
When referring to ‘disclosable material of which they became aware, or to which their 
attention was drawn’ Lord Rodger articulates one of the fundamental issues with disclosure 
under equality of arms, a principle which has a great bearing upon the use of medical records. 
The Crown may only become aware of relevant information through access to the medical 
records, yet as Lord Rodger suggests, if they are unaware of its existence, then they are not 
obliged to seek out all information that might be relevant.
178
 With that in mind, it seems 
necessary to outline to complainers that their consent for recovery could apply to the entirety 
of their medical record, encompassing any information they might contain that a prosecutor 
might see and might then be deemed relevant. In their disclosure manual, the Crown 
articulate the pitfalls in the recovery process, noting that ‘no firm or misleading assurances 
should be given about the prospect of maintaining the confidentiality of information which is 
obtained’ to the complainer.179 In this extract, the Crown refer to the issue of the unknown-
unknown quality of sensitive records, where until they are recovered, prosecutors are unable 
to determine what information may be relevant: 
While it will always be necessary to apply judgement to the question of whether it is 
appropriate to obtain sensitive, personal records, it is also important to recognise that 
it is impossible to know in advance what information sensitive, personal records will 
yield. Accordingly, there may continue to be cases in which early decisions to obtain 
records will ultimately prove to be unpopular because the exercise did not yield 
relevant information or because the exercise disclosed information which was 
regarded as problematic for the complainer. Similarly, there may be cases in which 
early decisions not to obtain records require to be revisited in light of defence requests 
for access or developments in the Crown’s investigation. These are inevitable 
consequences of a policy which recognises that there can be no universal approach 
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and which requires decisions to be taken by the Crown in advance of trial and without 
knowledge of the precise nature of the defence.
180
 
People are often unaware of the nature and extent of information contained in their medical 
records, as evidenced by numerous studies into patients’ recall abilities during medical 
history taking.
 181
 It is therefore unlikely that they will be able to accurately point to relevant 
entries in their records. As Scullion noted in his assessment of WF:  
the order for recovery of medical or other sensitive records by a court will often 
involve the production and disclosure of documents containing Rumsfeldian unknown 
unknowns.
182
 
Scullion’s point is a salient one. The prosecution is charged with investigating a crime, during 
which they must gather relevant evidence, including evidence which may undermine their 
own case or strengthen that of the accused. Medical records may provide such evidence, but 
this is impossible to confirm until they have seen it and before reviewing the records one 
cannot  fully anticipate the sensitive information they might contain. This uncertainty was 
referred to by Lord Glennie in the WF ruling, in which he noted the difficulty posed to the 
Sheriff when deciding whether to grant an order to recover documents by way of commission 
and diligence: 
How was the sheriff to know whether there were any particular sensitivities within the 
medical records which would weigh more heavily in the balance in this case as 
compared with other cases?
183
 
If Crown disclosure is not forthcoming or the defence are unsatisfied with the extent of 
material provided, they can petition the court for recovery. This is usually done by way of 
petition for commission and diligence, the principles governing which are the same in civil 
and criminal proceedings’.184 When complainers’ sensitive records are requested under a 
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petition for commission and diligence, judges must balance complainers’ privacy rights under 
article 8 with the article 6 rights of the accused to a fair trial.
185
 Unlike disclosure through the 
Crown, there is formal court scrutiny of this process. The defence must justify their reasons 
for obtaining records and the information sought must be ‘relevant’ for the purpose of the 
trial. Justification does not need to be based on information already provided by the Crown, 
just as refusal by the Crown to disclose medical records does not necessarily give the defence 
grounds for disclosure. In domestic abuse trials, the accused is able to influence this process 
by asserting the existence of relevant records, providing their counsel with what Raitt 
describes as ‘inside knowledge’, gained through their relationship with the complainer.186 
The Crown recognises the potential of the accused to influence disclosure:  
References by the defence witnesses, including the accused (for example in police 
interview) to any belief in any specific social work or medical fact relating to the 
complainer relevant to their state of mind or reasons for their conduct or the conduct 
of the complainer in connection with the offence (for example: “he’s had sex with me 
in the past and gave me V.D.” or “she told me sex was a bit uncomfortable because 
she recently had an abortion” or “she said was ok to do it without a condom because 
she was sterilised last year” or “ she said she was very upset that day because her 
children were still in care and she had hoped to get them back”.187 
2.4.2 Medical confidentiality and Rape Shield Legislation  
Using an individual’s medical records in domestic abuse trials risks infringing their right to 
privacy and confidentiality, an outcome that other researchers have posited can affect not 
only their faith in medical and legal systems, but on their health and wellbeing.
188
 In her 2011 
assessment of the disclosure of personal records in rape cases, Raitt argued that ‘the Scottish 
complainer has few distinct entitlements to privacy’.189 To an extent, this is true, and, as 
already noted, the complainer’s privacy rights are tied to the disclosure responsibilities of the 
Crown and the accused’s right to a fair trial. The complainer’s role in a criminal trial lacked a 
formal definition until the Victims and Witnesses Act 2014 mandated that rather than acting 
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as any other witnesses, survivors of rape and sexual assault should have the ability to present 
evidence in different ways and receive information about their case.
190
 
However, the 2014 Act gave complainers no right to resist the disclosure of their records, 
which in any case, they were only able to do to a limited extent by refusing consent to Crown 
access. As Lord Glennie noted in WF, a complainer’s privacy rights were already protected 
under article 8 of the ECHR, which enshrined every citizen’s right to private and family life.  
If a judge grants a petition for commission and diligence, or information is disclosed by the 
Crown, this does not guarantee its entry into court. Under the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) 
Act 1995 s.274, legislators attempted to restrict sexual history evidence in trials for sexual 
offences. Section 275 of the 1995 Act however, provided that an exception to these 
restrictions would apply if:  
(a) the evidence or questioning will relate only to a specific occurrence or occurrences of 
sexual or other behaviour or to specific facts demonstrating— 
(i) the complainer’s character; or 
(ii) any condition or predisposition to which the complainer is or has been subject.191 
It is almost impossible to consider the use of medical records in cases involving allegations of 
rape without referring to sections 274/5 (the “rape shield” legislation), as the type of medical 
information sought in such cases often refers to the prior sexual conduct of the complainer 
and thus requires recourse to these statutory obligations.
192
 ‘Rape Shield’ legislation of this 
type has been in place in Scotland in one form or another since 1985, enacted to reduce 
questioning over irrelevant aspects of a complainer’s personal life, with the hope that this 
would encourage more women to report rapes.
193
 While the use of section 274/5 attracts 
criticism and scrutiny from scholars, there is a lack of research investigating how frequently 
medical evidence is used to justify 275 applications.  
As outlined already, medical evidence can refer to past sexual history.
194
 Analysis of 
clinicians’ court experiences tends to focus on their role as expert witnesses, the individuals 
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hired by the defence or prosecution to provide opinion on the medical elements of a case.
195
 
The role of the professional or ‘everyday’ witness is less studied, despite the likelihood that 
medical professionals in multiple specialities will have to appear in this manner several times 
throughout their career. As Burman noted in 2007, when considering applications under 
s.275– the court can call for evidence from doctors to help ‘assist in its decision’.  196  
Clinicians who provided medical care to survivors are then obliged to serve the interests of 
the court and may be expected to reveal sensitive information about their patient, sometimes 
without their consent. While a clinician’s duty does not extend to assisting their patient in 
such circumstances, there is occasional evidence of uncertainty in these differing roles. 
Indeed, medical organisations - in their guidance to practitioners - argue that treating 
clinicians should not usually appear as expert witnesses in order to retain objectivity in their 
opinion.
197
 No scholars explore clinicians’ views of these experiences.   
As a professional witness, a clinician is expected to provide evidence of fact and will often 
have treated the complainer and/or accused in some capacity, i.e. an A&E consultant who 
treated them following injury or a forensic pathologist who examined them after death.
198
 The 
expert witness has a larger role and is able to give their opinion. They do not have to have 
treated the patient themselves and do not even need to have any direct contact with them, but 
may refer to medical records, imaging etc. Expert witnesses provide reports giving their 
opinion on health matters in criminal cases.
199
 
Most rapes are committed by partners or ex-partners.
200
 In Burman’s 2007 research for 
example, approximately 1 in 20 accused had previous domestic abuse convictions.
201
 Proving 
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rape in the context of domestic abuse however, is often more difficult than in cases where 
there was no prior relationship between complainer and accused.
202
 This may continue to be 
the case even with a specific domestic abuse offence. In 2018, Forbes addressed concerns that 
the newly created Domestic Abuse Act, despite attempting to encompass a range of offending, 
‘from breach of the peace to rape’, may in fact risk conflating individual aspects of 
significant offending under one single charge, something that would risk the complainer’s 
faith in the justice process as they would see their experience of serious criminal acts 
recorded as ‘just a domestic’.203 Trials involving ‘domestic rape’ often involve intrusive 
questioning into the complainer’s character, as Lord Glennie noted from the comments of 
Rape Crisis Scotland in WF: 
It was already well-known that women were deterred from making complaints about 
being raped by someone with whom they had had a relationship, because of the risk of 
humiliation by questions directed to their previous sexual history and the risk of 
further humiliation if the case resulted in an acquittal.
204
 
When discussing medical confidentiality and domestic abuse, I will often refer to rape cases 
in which confidentiality issues were apparent, including those which did not feature domestic 
abuse. These are worthy of inclusion given the overlap in courtroom experiences and 
practicalities of the common law system, as they could result in case law affecting domestic 
abuse cases. I will highlight instances where there was no prior relationship between 
complainer and accused.   
2.5 Potential issues in current systems 
Medical records can offer an unfiltered insight into the most sensitive details of an 
individual’s past, and when recounted in court, (outside the context in which they were made), 
there are numerous opportunities for embarrassment and misinterpretation. This is why 
protection of medical confidentiality is recognised as being ‘crucial to ensuring public 
confidence in the health service’.205  Raitt aptly described the significance of the medical 
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record, noting that they ‘capture and reflect a personal history that goes to the heart of their 
[the complainer’s] identity and their most intimate experiences’.206  
In 1998, Temkin demonstrated how differing views over medical confidentiality could lead to 
the disclosure of confidential information that might otherwise not have been available, or 
indeed relevant.
207
 Her conclusions found support in the Scottish context by Burman’s work  
which highlighted the potential for harm caused by the use of sensitive medical 
information.
208
 Canadian research bolstered the case for investigation into the use of medical 
records in this context.
209
 Nonetheless, few scholars - when addressing medical 
confidentiality and the legal use of medical records - have sought out the views of the 
survivors’ they concern, the clinicians who create and describe them and the lawyers who 
seek to use them in court. This project provides key insights into this neglected topic. 
Debates over the use of medical records in these cases continue. In a 2018 assessment of the 
Domestic Abuse (Scotland) Act, Burman and Brooks noted that while the new legislation 
removed the requirement to prove specific harm, this did not necessarily make cases more 
likely to succeed, arguing that lawyers may well seek to question a complainer’s credibility 
through the use of their medical records.
210
 In making this argument, the authors referred to 
the corroboration requirement in Scots law, noting that establishing a ‘course of conduct’ 
would require evidence which could include medical and psychiatric records’.211  
There has been considerable debate among the legal profession, in government and survivors’ 
groups about abolishing the corroboration requirement in cases of domestic abuse and sexual 
crime.
212
  Recent efforts by Scottish women’s charities have argued that corroboration should 
be abolished, contending that while it remains in place, proving rape (either by a partner, ex-
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partner or other party) is particularly difficult.
213
 This position has found support from many, 
including the now Lord Justice General, Lord Carloway in his corroboration review.
214
  
However, others have noted that removing corroboration may in fact lead to greater pressure 
on survivors, in terms both of their own witness testimony and/or their sensitive medical 
records. As Scottish Women’s Aid noted:  
Unintended consequences could arise in relation to the treatment of victims in 
domestic abuse and rape and sexual assault cases; removal of corroboration, 
particularly in rape cases, would likely place a greater emphasis on their testimony, 
character, sexual history, medical history, etc, with the defence arguing that 
questioning has to be more ‘robust’ and probing.215  
The difficulties relating to new legislation and corroboration are not the only issues in this 
area. Before WF confirmed a complainer’s right to independent legal representation (ILR) 
when their confidential medical records were sought, in 2011 Raitt argued that without ILR, 
‘one can imagine that disclosure of certain types of personal records will become routine as 
there is no-one to advocate the specific concerns of the complainer’.216 Describing the 
position of the complainer further, Raitt noted:  
They cannot control what the Crown releases to the defence, nor what it redacts. They 
cannot require the Crown to oppose a defence application for disclosure, nor can they 
influence the nature or strength of any opposition to disclosure. They are entirely 
dependent upon the Crown to identify, categorise, and defend their privacy interests. 
They cannot even review the information disclosed (for errors) and they will not 
know exactly what is being disclosed.
217
 
With the ink dry on Lord Glennie’s judgment, there is little evidence of any substantial 
uptake of legal aid for ILR in domestic abuse and/or rape cases and between February 2016 
and July 2019, there were only twenty-five requests for legal aid to oppose applications for 
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sensitive documents through commission and diligence in all criminal proceedings.
 218
  There 
is also no mechanism for assessing the number of occasions in which medical records are 
requested, despite comments by Lord Glennie and Duff that just such an assessment would be 
useful.
219
  
Given the lack of certainty in this area, it is imperative that there is a comprehensive review 
of current systems and processes governing the use of medical information in domestic abuse 
cases, with input from some of the parties concerned, namely survivors, clinicians and 
lawyers. Given the dearth of research in this area – with little published since Burman’s 
assessment in 2007 - it is vital this review accounts for the views of those at the coalface in 
this context. It is only through exploring their conceptions of medical confidentiality that we 
can identify and understand where potential issues arise in how these medical records are 
made and used. 
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Chapter Three: Methodology  
The first three sections of this chapter relate how I used my research questions to develop an 
appropriate methodology, focussing on three key stages to explore the relationship between 
medical confidentiality and domestic abuse.   
Confidentiality: Creating the record, describes how, by focussing on the occasions in 
which survivors and clinicians came into contact and the medical record was created, I was 
able to develop a system of in-depth interviews to accurately reflect how perceptions of 
confidentiality shaped, and were shaped by these encounters.  
Confidentiality: The pre-trial stage, focusses on how perceptions of confidentiality are 
affected by the presence of legal services investigating allegations of domestic abuse.   
Confidentiality: The trial, addresses how views of confidentiality are shaped through the 
use of sensitive medical information in court.  
I then proceed to a description of my sampling methods, referring to the variety of individuals 
and organisations who helped in refining this approach, and outlining how participants were 
identified and recruited, then describing the techniques I used in interviewing each group. 
Importantly, I also identify the various issues I encountered throughout this process including 
the difficulties in recruiting rape survivors and Crown Counsel and the subsequent threat of 
sample bias this caused.  
Continuing, I address the various ethical considerations this research required. From a 
practical perspective, this included the difficulties of working with large public-sector 
organisations, (in this instance the NHS and criminal justice system) as well as the academic 
complications of conducting mixed-methods research. Given the inherent sensitivity of the 
topic, I also describe the measures designed to guarantee the safety, confidentiality and 
wellbeing of participants. When discussing survivors, I outline the issues associated with 
research involving vulnerable interviewees and the strategies I put in place to mitigate any 
trauma that involvement in this project may have caused. I include discussion of the gendered 
nature of domestic abuse and how this reconciled with my position as a male researcher.  
Considering the status occupied by medical and legal professionals, I also refer to the various 
difficulties associated with interviewing ‘elites’, again referring to the extant literature in this 
area.    
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3.1 Confidentiality: Creating the medical record  
The primary purpose of this research was to investigate how perceptions of medical 
confidentiality among survivors, clinicians and lawyers were affected by the current 
processes governing the creation and use of medical records in cases of domestic abuse. To 
begin answering this question, it seemed pertinent to first explore the creation of the medical 
record itself. In paper or digital form, the record offers a physical report of an individual’s 
medical history and can contain particularly sensitive information. In the context of domestic 
abuse, while designed for medical use, the record can become an object of legal interest. As 
such, the circumstances surrounding the creation of the record offered novel opportunities to 
explore conceptions of confidentiality.  
A specific focus on the record itself would have been fairly straightforward, relying mostly 
on secondary literature concerning hospital policies and the advice of medical regulatory 
organisations. Because of the uncertainties around the scope of confidentiality identified in 
the last chapter, I instead wished to explore how perceptions of confidentiality shaped the 
clinical encounter when the record was created, including the views of both survivors and 
clinicians. I believed this approach would take account of how information about 
confidentiality was communicated between patients and clinicians, while also considering the 
expectations of confidentiality that both groups held. This would then allow me to investigate 
whether the views of survivors and clinicians were complimentary, would uncover where the 
potential for misunderstandings and deviations existed and indeed, would confirm whether or 
not confidentiality had any kind of settled meaning.  
To gather the relevant data to answer these questions, it became clear that the views of both 
survivors and clinicians were required. Given the scarcity of existing empirical research, the 
need for a substantial qualitative component to the methodology was indicated. In contrast to 
a quantitative exploration, qualitative research relies less heavily upon testing existing 
understandings, and allows theories to emerge from generated research data.
1
 By developing 
a framework of semi-structured interviews, I was able to draw a hypothesis from participants’ 
responses, supported by the views of a population with an intimate knowledge of the use of 
medical information in the context of domestic abuse.     
As the research material was inherently sensitive, I dispensed with the idea of conducting any 
focus group style interviews. Among the clinician population, this would have risked 
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participants being less willing to discuss situations in which they perceived themselves to 
have not acted correctly. Among survivors this would have potentially discouraged 
participants from taking part at all, as it would have required imparting potentially distressing 
information to not just an unknown researcher but other unknown individuals. I decided that 
in-depth, semi-structured interviews offered the best chance for gathering relevant data. By 
discussing clinical encounters with survivors, I hoped to explore the circumstances in which 
they decided to use health services, and both the importance of confidentiality - and the 
importance of their expectations of confidentiality - in these circumstances.  
This research used both medical and legal research methods. Historically, the viability of a 
qualitative approach to medical/healthcare research was questionable.
2
 Critics pointed to a 
perceived lack of reliability and deductive reasoning at a time where medicine was 
increasingly being viewed as scientific and evidence based.
3
 However, these arguments have 
been challenged in more recent times with an increasing number of researchers valuing the 
novel understandings that qualitative research can yield, particularly when tackling domestic 
abuse as a health concern.
4
  As Kelly noted, researchers ‘have come to realize that in-depth 
understanding of the behaviours of caregivers and clients is critical for improving care and 
informing health policy’.5 Qualitative research also has a large potential for policy impact, 
mostly because of the level of detail and the individuality of responses. As Fielding argued, 
‘qualitative case studies can bring alive policy issues with an immediacy sometimes lacking 
in quantitative data’.6 I was therefore able to reconcile the healthcare aspects of this research 
with a qualitative approach.  
Given the potential for low participation rates among survivors, I decided to also develop a 
questionnaire, exploring survivors’ views of confidentiality in relation to health services. This 
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questionnaire was designed to allow participants to take part in the research anonymously, in 
the hope that this would increase involvement.  
3.2 Confidentiality and the investigation of crime 
Before a criminal case proceeds to trial, survivors (and clinicians) will come into contact with 
legal services, including police, prosecutors and defence advocates. In these circumstances, 
the contents of the medical record can be sought by lawyers, either to support or challenge an 
alleged offence. If the contents of records are deemed to be legally relevant for these 
purposes, then the likelihood they will be recovered increases.
7
 As I noted in chapter 2, both 
the complainer and the accused can be involved in alerting lawyers to the existence of 
potentially relevant information in this context.
8
 Yet restrictions are placed on the amount of 
information that can be recovered, enforced through the Crown’s practice guidelines, through 
statute, and the courts.
9
 If information is deemed sufficiently relevant to overcome these 
restrictions, then medical records can be recovered from a health board and passed, either in 
paper or digital form, to the party requesting them.
10
 As medical information moves from 
clinician control, to legal professionals, it is important to consider how perceptions of 
medical confidentiality affect this process, whether these change as medical information 
becomes the property of non-clinicians, and how relevance is determined.  
I therefore wanted to assess how survivors, clinicians and lawyers addressed confidentiality 
when alleged abuse was investigated and medical information sought by counsel for potential 
use as evidence in the construction of a legal case.  
The Crown Office can seek the permission of complainers to recover and disclose their 
medical records, but the circumstances in which consent is sought are not reported and the 
subject has not received a great deal of scholarly attention beyond Raitt’s argument that 
consent is obtained through the implication that non-acquiescence will negatively affect 
                                                             
7 Crown Office and Procurator Fiscal Service, Policy on Obtaining and Disclosing Sensitive Personal Records in 
The Investigation and Prosecution of Sexual Crime Cases, (April 
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prosecutions.
11
 It was clear therefore that I should seek to explore these ideas with lawyers, 
assessing what information is sought and at what points, how survivors are informed about 
what information is required, and why the details of the consenting process are not widely 
discussed or recorded. I could then speak to survivors, assessing their experiences with this 
process, the circumstances in which their consent was sought and how they were told what 
this would mean as a case was prepared for court.  
Though not always part of the record recovery process, clinicians can play a bridging role in 
the investigation stage of a domestic abuse prosecution, as sensitive medical information is 
transferred to lawyers. As such, it seemed important to also discuss the investigation stage 
with clinician participants during interviews. 
As no accurate data existed on how often medical records were sought, I also decided to 
develop a way to capture medical record requests in domestic abuse cases. By so doing, I was 
able to investigate which legal authority was seeking records most often (Crown, court etc) 
and to what extent both survivors and clinicians were involved in this process.  
3.3 Confidentiality: The trial  
The trial itself was the final assessment stage in this research, where medical information (in 
the hands of prosecutors and/or defence agents) is presented in court. The court stage 
provided the opportunity to explore how views of confidentiality were shaped by the legal 
processes governing the use of this sensitive information, how these processes were 
negotiated and the impact this had on those actors involved.  
As lawyers and other court agents are responsible for how medical information is used at trial, 
it was clear that I would require a great deal of input from legal practitioners. This would 
allow me to explore what value legal practitioners attached to medical confidentiality when 
sensitive information had already been recovered by the prosecution or defence. By 
discussing the trial process with lawyers through a series of in-depth interviews, I was able to 
explore how perceptions of medical confidentiality shaped what information could be 
admitted into court, how these decisions were made and what restrictions (if any) medical 
confidentiality placed on this process.  
Given that the information concerned related to survivors, it was essential that I be able to 
discuss confidentiality and the trial process with survivors themselves. I decided that, through 
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the use of in-depth interviews, I could assess how they perceived medical confidentiality 
when their information had been obtained and used as evidence. I was then able to investigate 
the effect this process had on their trust and confidence in both medical and legal systems, 
ultimately assessing how their experiences affected their attitude towards seeking treatment 
and disclosing abuse in future.  
Though not always required to attend court, clinicians often appear as witnesses, to answer 
questions about treating survivors and/or to speak to the medical records in domestic 
abuse/rape cases. I therefore decided to include discussions of the trial process during 
interviews with clinician participants, to assess how their courtroom experience – or lack 
thereof - affected their perceptions of confidentiality. This then allowed me to explore how 
interactions with the criminal justice system affected their relationship with survivors, as well 
as their future practice in addressing and treating domestic abuse patients.  
As a summary question, I was also able to ask survivors, clinicians and lawyers what medical 
confidentiality meant to them, in light of our previous discussions.  
To mitigate the risk of low levels of recruitment among survivors, it also seemed appropriate 
to include some minor questions concerning the trial in the survivor questionnaire. 
3.4 Qualitative sampling  
The recruitment process was varied and required engagement with several public and third 
sector groups. In designing this research, I envisaged that the optimal approach would use a 
Glasgow focus in sampling, in an attempt to follow a survivor through engagement with a 
particular health board and the legal services in a particular city. In this way I hoped to gather 
a sample that would emerge as a city case study that could then be used as a reference point 
for research in other Scottish and British cities.  
It became clear early on in this process however, that focussing on a single city for sampling 
in all aspects of the project was impractical, not least because it would restrict participants. It 
would have been contrary to the aims of project to exclude survivors from discussing their 
experiences because of the areas in which they were based.  
Accordingly, my sampling approach generally extended Scotland-wide. This was either 
through engagement with third party organisations which spanned the country - i.e. Rape 
Crisis Scotland and Scottish Women’s Aid – or more informally, through the ‘snowball effect’ 
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in which participants introduced me to colleagues who then became interviewees themselves. 
This latter approach was particularly evident among legal interviewees.  
3.4.1  Interviews  
It was important, given the expansive nature of the research, that I did not pursue 
unmanageably large sample sizes for each participant group.  In the interest of achieving a 
workable quantity of data, the number of interviewees was deliberately restricted. I initially 
planned to recruit a maximum number of individuals from the following categories:  
 20 clinicians  
 10 abuse survivors 
 10 Crown prosecutors  
 10 defence advocates 
Clinicians made up the largest group if sampled populations were divided above, however, 
when split into clinicians, lawyers and survivors, the two professional groups were designed 
to be the same size.  
In her 1998 assessment, Temkin noted the variety of confidentiality practices among 
clinicians treating rape patients, even those in the same specialty in the same geographical 
area.
12
 Accordingly, within the clinician group, I aimed to interview a diverse population, 
giving myself enough ‘space’ to include doctors, nurses and dentists, with subdivisions by 
practice area, i.e. sexual health, maxillofacial surgery, A&E). This was later extended to 
include psychologists.  
I deliberately restricted the sample population of lawyers to defence advocates and members 
of the Crown Office and Procurator Fiscal Service (COPFS). This was not to diminish the 
role that judges, and solicitors have in the subject of this research, but was instead designed to 
gather a workable amount of data. If judges and solicitors were added to the target population, 
it would have risked the overall sample becoming too large for me to adequately process or 
would have led to a reduction in other participants, yielding broader but less definitive 
conclusions. By interviewing both prosecution and defence lawyers, I hoped to reflect a range 
of perspectives in the profession, with each group given the opportunity to discuss 
confidentiality and the use of medical records in court. Unfortunately (as I discuss later) the 
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Crown were not willing to take part in individual interviews and instead provided me with a 
list of written responses to questions.  
The relatively lower number of survivor participants was not an attempt to minimise 
survivors’ participation in this project. It was instead a reflection of the specificity and 
sensitivity of the research. Informal discussions with partner organisations indicated that the 
number of likely volunteers for interview would be low, given that I was looking at a distinct 
aspect of medical and legal processes. 
A larger survivor population was included in the questionnaire study, detailed later in this 
chapter.  
3.4.1.1 Clinician interviews 
In total, I carried out sixteen in-depth interviews with multi-specialty clinicians, almost all in 
Scotland, with one interview taking place in Northern England.  The practice areas of this 
group are outlined below: 
 3 A&E doctors 
 2 sexual health nurses 
 4 sexual health doctors 
 1 maxillofacial surgeon 
 1 restorative dentist 
 1 oral surgeon   
 1 forensic pathologist 
 1 forensic psychologist 
 2 general practitioners 
 
Clinicians were recruited using several different strategies, my aim being to locate as diverse 
a participant pool as possible. Accordingly, before seeking ethical approval, I contacted 
several medical organisations with an interest in tackling domestic abuse and/or sexual health 
issues.  
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Medics Against Violence (MAV) is an established organisation of healthcare workers across 
Scotland, focussed on reducing levels of violence across the country.
13
 On-going contact with 
MAV facilitated contact with several interviewees. 
The sampling process was also assisted by one of my supervisors, who was able to put me in 
contact with several medical directors in an NHS board, who then promoted my research 
among staff.  
When interviews began, I was also able to rely on the ‘snowball effect’ of participants 
leading me to colleagues interested in taking part themselves. It was through this process that 
I became aware of organisations like the Deep End GPs, who operate in 100 different 
practices in some of the most deprived areas in Scotland.
14
  
Given the cross-over between clinicians and lawyers in this field, I was in some instances 
also able to identify clinical participants through introductions made by legal practitioners.  
In using this approach, I was exposed to the risk that only ‘interested’ clinicians (those with a 
specialised knowledge of addressing domestic abuse) would get involved in the project. By 
contacting medical directors and MAV for example, I risked bias among participants who 
already had considerable knowledge of individuals experiencing abuse. This risk was 
addressed in two ways.  
Firstly, it was important not to discount clinicians simply for being ‘interested’ in the topic at 
hand. There has been a tendency in the existing literature to discount clinicians from certain 
specialties in domestic abuse research, because of the perception that they rarely if ever 
encounter abuse survivors. It was therefore necessary to include clinicians from a range of 
specialties that might only have become involved because they already had considerable 
knowledge of treating domestic abuse patients, but had vital contributions to make to the 
topic, from practice areas that are rarely included in this kind of research. Secondly, to reduce 
the risk of respondent bias, I attempted to sample the widest possible population of clinicians, 
with no restrictions placed on potential interviewees, based on their knowledge or 
understanding of the topic. While a minority of participants were members of specialist 
groups, most of the clinicians who came forward were not and simply wanted to reflect 
practice in their own specialty.  
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It must also be remembered that this thesis arose from new research in the area, and a range 
of perspectives were required, despite the risk of sampling bias. Future researchers may wish 
to sample more purposefully for participants among practitioners on the ‘front-line’ in order 
to further reduce the risk of bias.  
The eventual make-up of the participant group was largely determined by circumstance. After 
identifying recruitment gaps in the existing literature, I then considered (in consultation with 
my supervisors) what specialties would likely encounter abuse survivors. The outcome of this 
process was that most if not all specialties would see survivors as patients (though this may 
not always be apparent from existing research). Accordingly, I decided to target as many 
specialties as possible. Contact with medical directors was deemed to be helpful in this, as 
advertising within hospitals would then be available to all specialties. The ultimate 
population of participants was largely determined on which individuals came forward and 
who was then suggested through the ‘snowball’ effect. After the initial recruitment strategy 
was implemented and the number of participants rose to a level approaching the target 
population (n=20), I did not seek to interview further individuals.  
While the total sample size of sixteen was satisfactory, and many practice areas were 
represented, I experienced issues in recruiting psychiatrists. This was particularly problematic 
as psychiatrists, more than any other specialty (perhaps excluding forensic psychologists and 
pathologists) are often engaged in court work, particularly in cases involving sexual violence, 
when – as already noted – complainers’ mental health records are often sought.15 Indeed, for 
both survivors featured in this research, it was the use of their psychiatric records that caused 
them the most distress. It was therefore disappointing not to recruit any psychiatrists for this 
project, though their absence was slightly mitigated by the involvement of a forensic 
psychologist with significant court experience in this context.  
I endeavoured to recruit psychiatrists primarily through the snowball effect of interviewing 
other medical and legal practitioners. This even involved one practitioner making email 
contact with a mailing list of all consultant psychiatrists in a health board, asking if they 
would participate, but unfortunately this was unsuccessful. In a future study, I would attempt 
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to alleviate this issue by directly approaching relevant mental health organisations including 
the Royal College of Psychiatrists and the directors of specialist psychiatric hospitals.  
 
3.4.1.2 Survivor interviews 
In total, I carried out two in-depth interviews with rape survivors, in different parts of 
Scotland.  
Given the safety concerns associated with interviewing survivors of domestic abuse, it was 
essential that the sampling method I used did not compromise the safety or wellbeing of 
participants. Accordingly, before seeking ethical approval, I was in close contact with the 
established charity, Rape Crisis Scotland (RCS), to organise procedures which would enable 
survivors to volunteer to take part in interviews, without exposing them to physical or 
psychological harm. It was agreed that I, as lead researcher, would have no direct contact 
with participants before or after interviews took place. Instead, RCS promoted my study 
internally and any survivors who wished to take part could then make staff aware. Interviews 
were conducted in the secure offices of different RCS branches.  
The number of survivor interviewees in this study is low and it would have been instructive if 
more individuals had taken part. However, I believe this is less a reflection of issues in the 
recruitment strategy and is instead indicative of the inherent sensitivity of the research.  
3.4.1.3 Lawyer interviews 
In total, ten defence advocates participated in in-depth interviews in this project, with two 
senior High Court judges agreeing to informal discussions. No Crown Office practitioners 
were interviewed. The ten participants were composed of 6 junior and 4 senior counsel, all 
with substantial experience at the Scottish criminal bar.  
In order to recruit defence advocates, I was advised by the Scottish Courts and Tribunals 
Service to contact the Glasgow Bar Association (GBA) who, (upon receipt of ethical 
approval) agreed to display posters advertising my research on message boards in the High 
Court in Glasgow. The GBA also agreed to email members with details of the research. 
The snowball effect of recruitment was most evident among lawyers, with participants 
regularly introducing me to colleagues who then became involved in the project themselves. 
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My supervisor was able to introduce me to the first advocate interviewee and after this, every 
subsequent participant was introduced by another interviewee.  
I initially envisioned sampling ten prosecutors and ten defence advocates, to fully explore 
their perceptions of medical confidentiality and the use of medical records in cases of 
domestic abuse. This would have allowed me to identify any differences in attitude and 
practice.  Both procurators fiscal and advocates depute would have been included.  
I made early contact with the Crown Office, inviting them to discuss strategies for involving 
prosecutors. After a protracted correspondence, ultimately, the Crown Agent declined to 
allow Crown staff to take part in in-depth interviews. A senior Advocate Depute instead 
provided me with a list of written responses to questions. Several staff members had input 
into these responses.  
Numerous efforts were made to involve Crown Counsel in the interview study and while 
anecdotally it appeared that individual procurators fiscal would have been willing to take part, 
overall staff participation was declined. This left a considerable knowledge gap in the project, 
as I risked not just over-emphasising the views of the defence but also of failing to 
understand how the Crown approached medical confidentiality in domestic abuse cases in 
practice.  
To a certain extent, I was able to alleviate the risk of respondent bias, by relying on the fact 
that all defence interviewees had experience working for the Crown Office. Several had been 
integral in instigating substantial reforms within the Crown and were able to comment in 
detail on Crown practice and how it differed from that of the defence.  
Nonetheless, on several occasions, it became clear that a paucity of prosecutorial perspectives 
risked limiting the reliability of the project data. As a result, I contacted the Lord Justice 
General and requested permission to speak, informally to several members of the judiciary, 
both on points of law concerning disclosure and on judicial attitudes to the use of medical 
records in domestic abuse/rape cases generally. Lord Carloway granted permission for these 
informal discussions and I was able to speak to two senior judges who sit regularly in the 
Court of Justiciary. These interviews were very helpful in gaining a deeper understanding of 
the processes underpinning medical record use in court.  
Even with these caveats, I cannot discount the fact that an absence of prosecutors’ testimony 
is problematic. The Crown’s offer to provide written responses, while helpful, ultimately 
85 
 
made accounting for the attitudes and practice of the prosecution almost impossible, with 
none of the nuance and insight arising from the responses of defence counsel.  
3.4.2 Interview preparation  
All participants were given a copy of themes for discussion, consent forms and the participant 
information sheet before interviews took place. Given the sensitivity of the topic, this was 
partly to allow volunteers sufficient opportunity to withdraw from participation, though it 
was also designed to improve the quality of the interviews themselves, as through engaging 
with the study literature, participants arrived with a clear understanding of the topic for 
discussion.  
3.4.3 Interview techniques  
When addressing domestic abuse, many researchers have adopted in-depth interviews as a 
useful method of developing greater understandings of the issues faced by survivors.
16
 In 
preparing for interviews, I discussed various techniques and approaches with other 
researchers and advocacy workers with experience in this field. These discussions focussed 
on the importance of ensuring interviews were conducted sensitively, while at the same time, 
preserving the autonomy of the interviewee concerned. When interviews were then conducted, 
these considerations took the form of not shying away from difficult topics, particularly in the 
survivor interviews, but instead allowing the interviewees to drive the direction of 
conversation.  
As Campbell and Dienemann noted in their 2001 assessment, Ethical Issues in Research on 
Violence Against Women, the sensitivity of the issue under discussion poses the risk of 
causing emotional distress in participants.
17
 I therefore adopted the practice of only 
interviewing survivors in safe and familiar surroundings, in this instance, Rape Crisis 
Scotland’s offices. I also ensured that a member of RCS staff was present for the duration of 
my contact with the survivor. All interviewees were assured that they could refuse to answer 
questions, pause or stop the interview recording, or terminate the interview without giving a 
reason.  
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Given the open-ended nature of the interviews, it was always possible that sensitive or 
distressing stories would arise from the line of questioning and participants’ responses. 
Before beginning, I outlined the general interview themes, with the focus on perceptions of 
medical confidentiality. However, giving participants space to discuss their experiences on 
this emotive topic often led to them discussing particularly traumatic incidents. This was 
most prominent among survivor interviewees, in speaking about when they were raped.. 
While attacks were not the focus of this research, both participants talked about their 
experiences in the course of interview, including repeated references to and identification of 
the offenders.   
Among professional interviewees, traumatic experiences often manifested in the discussion 
of cases of child abuse, which clinicians and lawyers both used as analogies for domestic 
abuse.  
3.4.4 Transcript review  
Early discussion with COPFS’ policy division indicted that prosecutors would only be able to 
participate in interviews if they would be able to review their transcripts before use.    
Given the sensitivity of the research, it seemed appropriate to extend this opportunity to all 
participants, particularly the survivors, who were discussing intensely personal aspects of 
their lives. I therefore applied for ethical approval on the basis that all participants would be 
provided with their interview transcript and the opportunity to make amendments. In the case 
of lawyer and clinician participants, this was possible through providing them with an 
anonymised copy of the transcript directly. In the case of survivor interviewees, in order to 
maintain their safety and to ensure they had support when they accessed the transcript, it was 
sent in anonymised digital form to the member of staff who sat in on the interview at the 
Rape Crisis Centre in which the interview was conducted.  
While transcript review is useful in promoting participants’ autonomy, it is not without 
drawbacks in the potential for bias it allows. As Hagens et al have argued, by providing 
interviewees with the opportunity to view and amend their transcripts, you also risk them 
removing useful data.
18
 The potential for bias in this research was perhaps increased by my 
use of verbatim transcription, as it raised the possibility for participants to be unhappy not 
just with the content of their responses, but also the language they used in expressing them. 
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Hagens for example found that reviewing verbatim transcripts made participants 
uncomfortable, even just by noticing grammatical mistakes in their speech.
19
 This drawback 
was observed in this research, particularly among legal participants, with several expressing 
their dissatisfaction with verbatim transcription. Ultimately however, only one individual 
(JC4) changed their responses. These changes were agreed following consultation with my 
supervisors.    
3.5 Quantitative sampling  
A quantitative approach involving survivors was useful in enabling me to sample populations 
that might otherwise be excluded from research, given their remote location. By sampling 
across Scotland, I also raised the possibility of examining any regional differences that arose 
in responses. Quantitative survivor data could then be analysed alongside interview responses 
to triangulate findings.  
The quantitative medical records study allowed me to assess whether Crown practice - as 
outlined by their 2013 manual on obtaining sensitive records - translated to practice. By 
measuring a small number of discrete variables, I was able to discern how frequently the 
Crown obtained medical records in connection with domestic abuse, who oversaw this 
process and the extent of the records requested.  
3.5.1 Survivor Questionnaire  
Similar safeguarding measures were necessary in the survivor questionnaire study as in 
survivor interviews.  
In preparing the study, I contacted Scottish Women’s Aid to facilitate distributing 
questionnaires to service users. To protect their identity, I removed the requirement for 
participants to sign a consent form. Instead, return of a completed questionnaire to Women’s 
Aid staff indicated consent to take part in research. This was detailed on the participant 
information sheet.  
All questionnaires were completed on Scottish Women’s Aid’s premises and no research 
material was allowed to be taken away, to protect knowledge of survivors’ involvement.  
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In total, seven questionnaires were completed by abuse survivors, across Scotland.  Scottish 
Women’s Aid agreed to advertise the study internally, to all centres in the country. Six 
centres then approached me to discuss taking part and five eventually did so. 
The questionnaire study included the largest sample population, with all service users in 
Scotland included. This comprehensive strategy was adopted for two reasons. Firstly, by 
increasing the sampling location, there was a better chance of achieving a sufficient quantity 
of data for analysis to proceed.  It is often difficult to recruit abuse survivors for research, 
with participants understandably reluctant to take part in sensitive studies conducted by an 
unknown researcher.
20
 If the focus remained in Glasgow, it is likely that the yield of 
completed questionnaires would have been even lower than the seven received.  
Secondly, increasing the sampling location enriched the generated data. By involving centres 
across the country, including in remote and rural areas, it was possible to involve participants 
typically absent from abuse research. This in turn made it possible to assess whether 
responses changed significantly based on the location in which they were completed and 
where health and criminal justice practices may be different. This was of particular interest in 
the context of comparing responses from rural and urban settings, assessing for example 
whether disclosure to medical services was less frequent in small communities in which it is 
more likely that practitioners would treat both survivors and abusers.
21
 
In designing the questionnaire, significant issues arose over defining domestic abuse. 
National crime surveys have been criticised for relying upon a narrow, legally defined 
concept of violence, resulting in situations where survivors might not judge themselves to 
have suffered abuse, despite suffering various forms of violence.
22
 It was of essential 
importance that the definitions of violence included in the questionnaire were appropriate 
given the separation between participants and researcher when the questionnaires were 
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completed, as misunderstandings or misinterpretations could not easily be corrected. 
Accordingly, any errors in definitions risked underestimating the frequency and severity of 
abuse among the sample population.  
The questionnaire therefore began with a broad definition of domestic abuse, developed in 
concert with the advice of the ASSIST network in Glasgow and Scottish Women’s Aid.23 The 
definition was developed to be easily understood and gave examples of what constituted 
abusive behaviour. Further definitions were included in the questionnaire, including a plain 
language description of disclosure. This was an important concept to highlight, as despite 
being a relatively common term in the context of discussions with criminal justice services, 
not all participants may have associated disclosure with interactions with healthcare 
professionals or indeed friends and family. Technical definitions for healthcare professionals 
and strangulation were also included. As the questionnaires were completed in women’s aid 
centres, it was possible for any questions on terminology to be raised with charity staff.  
3.5.2 Medical record requests  
Given the lack of available data, I initially planned to conduct this aspect of the research in 
collaboration with the Scottish Courts and Tribunals Service (SCTS). Having approached the 
Lord Justice General for permission to begin assessing record requests, discussions with 
SCTS staff indicated that very few requests were made through the court and instead arose 
from requests by the Crown. As both the Crown and NHS were unable to provide data 
themselves, I developed a protocol with both partners to enable medical record requests to be 
recorded and filtered for domestic abuse, without requiring me to have access to their secure 
systems. This protocol involved NHS partners gathering all record requests and passing these 
to the Crown to confirm which cases involved domestic abuse. NHS staff then completed a 
data table (see appendix H) I had designed for these cases only and transferred completed 
tables to my secure University email system. I was then able to analyse this anyonymised 
data. Given the sensitivity of the information involved, at no point was I provided with any 
identifiable information regarding the patient/complainer/accused. Instead, NHS partners 
labelled each request by its procurator fiscal reference. 
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In total, sixteen record requests were logged over a six-month period. This aspect of the 
project was the most difficult to implement an there were numerous practical issues to 
contend with before data could be obtained. As there are no formally recorded statistics on 
the number of medical record requests in criminal trials, it was almost impossible to predict 
how many would be uncovered. It was therefore difficult to design an appropriate study 
period which would adequately reflect everyday practice. Eventually, following consultation 
with both NHS and Crown Office partners, a six-month study period was selected so as to 
allow for a representative sample to be gathered, without the burden on partner staff being too 
onerous.  
Early discussions with NHS managerial staff indicated that this study should be restricted to a 
single health board. This focus meant the return of cases might be so low that it would 
prevent any analysis. Nonetheless, this was deemed to be the most appropriate research 
strategy, as involving multiple boards would have increased burdens on collaborative staff in 
the NHS and the Crown and could have resulted in an unmanageable quantity of data. Even 
with a single health board focus, the potential for usable data was not considered unrealistic.
24
  
It would have been theoretically possible to collaborate with other NHS partners (than staff in 
the health records department alone) in the record request study, as requests can be made to 
NHS staff in various ways. For example, clinicians could be approached by the police, 
procurator fiscal or the defence (though this is not supposed to occur), or a health board’s 
legal team (or indeed other departments in the hospital) could be approached by any of these 
groups directly. Investigating requests made to these groups would however, have required a 
different approach to that ultimately adopted. Locating individual clinicians who received 
medical record requests for example would have been difficult to achieve, relying on 
voluntary participation on the part of clinicians, and the gathered data may not have reflected 
the true number of requests. Given the lack of existing research in this area, and the fact that 
the medical records department at the selected hospital board already temporarily held 
request data month to month, they were chosen as the most effective partners for the request 
study, both in terms of providing the most reliable data, and in being the least burdened by 
the research protocol.  
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An issue in classification arose in determining which medical record requests related to 
domestic abuse cases. When the study was designed, no specific domestic abuse offence 
existed in Scotland, making the filtration of relevant cases difficult. This omission was, in 
part mitigated by the geographical location of the research. The definition of domestic abuse 
varies across the UK, and the Scottish Government’s accepted version is distinct from that 
adopted by Westminster. In Scotland ‘domestic abuse’ denotes a form of abuse done by, or to, 
an intimate partner or ex-partner.
 25
  In England and Wales, there is no statutory definition of 
domestic abuse. An accepted cross-government definition however, includes abuse between 
intimate partners and/or family members.
26
 
The Westminster definition, while broader in terms, would have created practical difficulties 
in assessing medical record requests. Without the Scottish terminology, cases of domestic 
abuse between partners and between family members would have been indistinguishable. 
Police and prosecution services in Scotland have accepted the devolved government’s 
definition and include a domestic abuse marker on cases in which violence (physical, 
psychological, sexual) is perpetrated against a partner or ex-partner.
27
 This made it possible - 
despite the absence of a specific offence – to discern which cases included domestic abuse. 
I initially planned to include medical record requests relating to charges of sexual assault and 
rape, even when these lacked a domestic abuse marker. Certainly, the case for including these 
offences is strong. Much of the literature addressing the use of sensitive records in criminal 
cases of violence against women focusses on cases involving rape, and charities supporting 
rape survivors have been instrumental in raising awareness of legal practices is this area. 
28
  
Inclusion of these cases however, would have caused significant practical issues. 
Identification would have been relatively straightforward, as unlike domestic abuse, at the 
time of designing a methodology, specific offences existed for both rape and sexual assault, 
making it relatively easy to discern which requests were related to which charges. The 
difficulty would instead have arisen in eliminating cases of child sexual abuse. The inclusion 
of rape and sexual assault had the potential to involve cases of this type, and though a kind of 
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validation process was discussed to screen these cases out, given my necessary distance from 
raw data, it would have required additional work from research partners at the Crown and 
NHS. While research into the use of medical information in this context is undoubtedly 
worthwhile, it was not the subject of this enquiry and lay outwith the scope of ethical 
approval.  
The omission of rape and sexual assault offences (in the context of domestic abuse) was, to a 
certain extent mitigated by the other arms of the project, in particular the interviews with rape 
survivors, sexual health clinicians and lawyers. 
3.6 Ethical review 
I carried out field research between September 2017 and September 2018. Prior to this, 
ethical approval was granted by the NHS West of Scotland Ethics Committee, and the 
University’s ethics committee in the College of Medicine, Veterinary and Life Sciences.    
3.7 Data Analysis 
I transcribed all interviews personally, ascribing a pseudonym to each participant. After this 
process was complete, I returned transcripts to participants for review, during which they 
were able to remove or amend comments. I did not amend any of my own speech.  
Transcripts were then analysed using NVivo qualitative software. This began with initial 
phase of open coding, where I read all transcripts thoroughly, using a line-by-line analysis to 
identify emergent ideas and themes from the content of interviews.  
While the qualitative aspects comprised the bulk of the project and were invaluable in 
providing real insight into how medical records can be used, the two quantitative arms of the 
project yielded impressive data.  
At the end of the data collection period, completed questionnaires were returned to me by 
Women’s Aid staff. Using Minitab software, I then began quantitative analysis of the data, 
eliciting the descriptive statics used in subsequent chapters.  
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3.8 Considerations 
3.8.1 Self-reporting and sampling bias  
Sampling bias refers to a situation in which ‘a sample statistic does not accurately reflect the 
true value of the parameter in the target population’.29 The various aspects of my research 
project were all vulnerable to self-reporting and sample bias, albeit it in different ways and 
despite employing measures to mitigate these risks they remained a threat, particularly among 
survivor and lawyer participants.  
Excepting the medical records request study, all aspects of this project relied on participants’ 
volunteering to take part. Given the sensitivity of the topic, it was inappropriate for me to 
contact professional participants’ cold. Instead, most professional interviewees were recruited, 
either in response to advertising material or through introduction by colleagues.  
In the case of survivor participants, it would have been inappropriate for me to make direct 
contact in any circumstances, given that doing so had the potential to cause psychological, 
emotional or physical harm. Accordingly, interviewees were recruited through Rape Crisis 
Scotland (either in response to posters or staff), with whom they already had a working 
relationship. This had a dual role of ensuring that appropriate safeguarding measures were in 
place, while also reassuring survivors of their autonomy in the process. Those taking part in 
the questionnaire study were recruited in a similar fashion, electing to take part in response to 
promotional posters displayed in participating women’s aid centres and following discussions 
with Women’s Aid staff.  
Given the voluntary nature of recruitment, there was the obvious risk that I would not obtain 
a representative sample of participants but would instead only recruit those who already had 
an interest in the topic. As Rosenbaum et al noted, the risk of self-selection bias is lessened 
by using large sample populations.
30
 The survivor questionnaire study should therefore have 
been most resistant to the issue arising. By aiming to achieve 100 responses, from across the 
country, and by ensuring participant anonymity, it was hoped that the potential for sampling 
bias among respondents was substantially lowered. Unfortunately, these processes did not 
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yield a large number of volunteers and the anonymity of participants prevented any follow-up 
to assess any biases in their responses.  
The questionnaire study was however, not the only aspect of the project in which a large 
sample of participants was targeted. In the clinician interviewee study, I recruited 
practitioners from a wide range of specialties and advertised the research project to a large 
sample population. For example, contact with several medical directors allowed me to 
advertise the study to all A&E staff in four separate hospitals, and a psychiatrist contact 
advertised it to all consultant psychiatrists in a large Scottish city.  
I intended to mitigate the risk of sample bias among legal participants by recruiting from both 
prosecution and defence backgrounds and while this was ultimately not possible, I did 
succeed in interviewing defence advocates with both prosecution and defence experience and 
with varying levels of seniority.  
Ultimately, given the nature of the research, there was the risk that both clinicians and 
lawyers would amend their responses to reflect on their own practice in the most positive 
light, i.e. they might have reported how they thought they should be acting rather than how 
they actually acted. This risk was increased by the fact that participants were aware of the 
interview subject and were provided with template themes illustrating the general discussion 
topics ahead of time. The semi-structured interview approach was adopted in order to 
mitigate this risk, as while clinicians and lawyers were aware of the interview subject, they 
could not anticipate all the questions I asked as an interviewer, which were often determined 
by their responses and which differed significantly between interviews.  
The potential for sample bias was greatest among survivor interviewees, given the small 
number of participants. However, I did sample the survivor population across Scotland. Rape 
Crisis has sixteen sites across the country and so the targeted population was considerable. 
The small response rate is defensible given the topic under discussion and reflects the fact 
that many rape survivors do not make a report to the police and among those that do, not all 
of them will have their medical records used, nor would choose to become involved in 
research. 
I took further measures to reduce the risk of sample bias in the interviews themselves. Over-
reporting of abuse from survivors is an infrequent occurrence in domestic abuse research, 
though the opposite is true for under-reporting and participants may choose not to disclose 
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certain experiences to researchers for a variety of reasons.
31
 Smith argued that a reticence to 
report was especially prevalent when abuse had been particularly traumatic, with participants 
unwilling or unable to recall events.
32
 It is clearly impossible to assess whether the two 
survivor interviewees held back particularly relevant information in our discussions, but by 
ensuring that relevant safeguards were in place and by relying on participants to volunteer to 
take part, I hope that this risk was reduced.  
3.8.2 Mixed-methods research  
Despite its noticable growth in recent years, Bryman argued that the amount of ‘combined 
research’ has likely been increasing since the 1980s.33 However, the effectiveness of mixed-
methods research (MMR) is still subject to debate and in 2010, Fielding noted that it ‘cannot 
yet be described as orthodoxy’ with many continuing to disavow the approach as 
unfocussed.
34
 Selecting a mixed-methodology for this research was not driven by theoretical 
considerations but instead arose out of practical necessity. As Fielding argued, this is often 
the case in the context of applied research, where: 
There is less concern with justifying methods in abstract academic terms and it is 
assumed that different research questions and policy evidence requirements 
necessitate different methods.
35
 
This emphasis on practicality is evident among proponents of mixed-methods health research, 
where, O'Cathain argues, MMR is used to address ‘the perceived deficit of quantitative 
methods alone to address the complexity of research in health care’.36 There is a smaller 
literature addressing the use of MMR in legal research, recognition, perhaps of an aversion to 
quantification, that Nolasco argues, legal researchers historically viewed as ‘foreign and 
perplexing’.37  
Describing MMR as peculiar to pragmatic, applied research however is reductive. As Feilzer 
notes, ‘Pragmatism does not require a particular method or methods mix and does not 
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exclude others’.38 This research was after all, not distinctly applied research and I did not 
identify a problem that required solving as such, but instead recognised that views of medical 
confidentiality among practitioners and survivors of abuse were understudied. To classify this 
research as using a mixed-methods approach, it was essential that the various arms of the 
project were interconnected. As Tariq and Woodman argued in 2013, ‘central to the 
definition is the use of both quantitative and qualitative methods in one study (or a series of 
connected studies)’.39  
The benefit of a mixed-methodology in this project was in enabling the triangulation of 
findings.
40
 As I have already argued, when approaching the topic, there little existing data 
against which to develop and test a hypothesis. While this encouraged a certain sense of 
academic freedom in research design it also risked generating novel but ultimately unreliable 
results. This risk would have increased by using a single research methodology. If, for 
example, I had chosen a wholly qualitative approach, generating data from in-depth 
interviews alone, then I would have had to rely upon much smaller sample sizes and any 
conclusions applied to larger groups would be tenuous. 
Given the potential policy impact of this research, one could argue that a wholly quantitative 
approach would have been appropriate. Quantitative data after all, is almost always drawn 
from larger sample populations and can therefore be expected to be more representative and 
generalisable than the data yielded through qualitative analysis.
41
 The prevalence of 
quantitative research (in medical research in particular) also meant that I would have a rich 
literature on which to draw in designing my own approach.  
A single focus on quantitative research would have been no less problematic however. 
Lacking the requisite knowledge and experience of frontline practice, I would have been 
unable to design satisfactorily accurate surveys or questionnaires to test the responses of 
clinicians and lawyers on their views of confidentiality and the use of medical records. The 
idiosyncratic experiences of survivors would have been similarly impossible to predict, as 
shown by the close consultation with charity staff and other experienced researchers required 
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for the questionnaire design. The questionnaire was also implemented to complement 
interview findings rather than to supersede them, fitting with Palinka’s argument for MMR 
and complementarity: 
Whether used simultaneously or in sequence, the complementary use of quantitative 
and qualitative methods is used to answer related questions for the purpose of 
evaluation or elaboration.
42
 
This research made use of a ‘convergent parallel design’ in which qualitative and quantitative 
approaches were implemented at the same time.
43
 Using this approach allowed me to obtain 
distinct data from each sample population simultaneously. The questionnaire and medical 
record request studies ran for an initial six-month period, during which I completed the 
majority of the professional and survivor interviews. This study period was then extended to 
accommodate an additional Women’s Aid Centre in the questionnaire study and to allow 
further survivors and professionals to take part in interviews. 
The adoption of a mixed-methodology was occasionally problematic, and it was important to 
consider what would be done if each approach yielded contrary results. When this happens, 
some researchers choose to instinctively favour the results of one medium over the other but 
as Bryman argues, this arbitrary process is unhelpful and realistically undermines the 
justification of using the rejected method, when both are at least nominally considered to 
have equal weighting.
44After all, as Hanson points out, the differences between the two ‘are 
more apparent than real’.45 
Other authors have commented on the potential for MMR to yield ‘valuable scientific insight’ 
in the study of violence against women.
46
 I used both qualitative and quantitative research 
methods in the hope that they would prove ‘mutually illuminating’ as described by Bryman.47 
Used together, these distinct but complementary approaches allowed the development of my 
own research hypothesis, arising from the project data. Lacking extensive resources, by 
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employing a mixed-methods approach, I was able to gather a large amount of viable data 
from several different sample populations, yielding results that are not only authentic but 
generalizable, with significant research impact.  
3.8.3 Interdisciplinarity  
The interdisciplinary nature of this thesis can be considered from two distinct viewpoints; the 
interdisciplinarity of having medical, legal and survivor participants, and the 
interdisciplinarity of medico-legal research generally. I will discuss both viewpoints as they 
applied to this domestic abuse research.  
There was no obligatory requirement for me to consider medical, legal and survivor 
understandings of medical confidentiality. An assessment of the use of medical information 
in cases of domestic abuse could have been of considerable benefit if analysed from a single 
perspective. However, a clear issue arises when attempting to analyse the underlying 
processes governing uses of medical information through a myopic lens. Focussing entirely 
on a single perspective suggests that there are clear lines of demarcation between disciplines 
in this context and that the use of sensitive information is finite and well defined. This is 
clearly problematic when understandings of medical confidentiality appear to change as 
sensitive information moves from patient control to medical and/or legal control.  
As Vick has argued, ‘disciplines are not inter’ but are instead in a state of fluidity, with 
crossovers between different practitioners.
48
 My research topic supports this argument, with 
the use of medical information affecting numerous groups who interact with each other 
frequently. There is a tangible quality to medical information that stems from a survivor’s 
interactions with a clinician, before it is recorded and then identified, sought and disclosed by 
legal services. Approaching an assessment of views on confidentiality from a single 
perspective would therefore be counterintuitive.  
In 2003, Robertson et al suggested that interdisciplinary researchers were deliberately opaque 
when addressing their methodological approach, though they qualified this charge of opacity 
by arguing that an inter-disciplinary methodology was – at least in part – determined by the 
‘process of collaboration’. 49 In the context of my own research, this last point is justified. 
Numerous actors (at both the organisational and individual levels) were involved in helping 
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to develop the final research approach, a reflection both of the sensitive nature of the topic 
and its interdisciplinarity.   
In developing a methodology, I was able to rely - in part –on the long-standing tradition of 
medico-legal research. Collaboration in the two fields has been extensive, as evidenced by 
the many cross-disciplinary organisations in which practitioners from both professions are 
included.
50
 From a practical perspective, this is not difficult to understand as the two must, by 
necessity often come into contact. The two disciplines collaborate so frequently in the course 
of everyday practice that researchers do not often subject this relationship to substantial 
scrutiny. It is quotidian, and therefore expected. 
As Roth et al pointed out however, it can be difficult to conduct research across disciplines 
which at face value appear to have considerable similarities.
51
 And it was essential when 
undertaking this interdisciplinary work to avoid what Vick termed as ‘traps for the unwary’, 
in misunderstanding the disciplines you are attempting to work across.
 52
   
This research required focus on the everyday aspects of practice relating to medical 
confidentiality and domestic abuse. As already argued, scholars tend to avoid empiricism in 
their assessments of confidentiality from a single discipline, and cross-disciplinary work is 
not automatically more practice driven. As Vick argues, interdisciplinary research involving 
law tends to focus on theoretical analysis rather than more applied investigations, and this is 
particularly true in the typically theory driven area of confidentiality research.
53
 I could not 
rely upon a substantial body of extant literature, in which an interdisciplinary, medico-legal 
approach was used to gather empirical data. 
 Keeping these issues in mind, I attempted to make my approach as interdisciplinary as 
possible, while avoiding the pitfalls associated with medical and legal research. Accordingly, 
while I explored certain key themes with both medical and legal interviewees, there were 
distinct elements I approached with each group individually.  
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When discussing abuse with clinicians, I included questions exploring the health effects of 
abuse and how these varied by speciality, i.e. between oral surgery and general practice. 
While health effects were discussed with legal interviews, it was from a different perspective, 
as lawyers’ experiences of survivors’ injuries were generally determined by the relevance of 
those injuries in a trial setting.  
Similarly, precise discussions of legal procedure, while appropriate with lawyer interviewees 
did not form a substantial part of interviews with clinicians. I was, undoubtedly interested in 
exploring clinicians’ experiences with legal services in the context of domestic abuse and 
medical confidentiality, but I typically avoided discussion of what could be considered the 
more theory driven aspects of legal research, in particular the discussion of prominent legal 
cases or development of statute laws, to which they were not party.  
Interestingly, perhaps given their position at the ‘end of the process’, lawyers were typically 
more able to opine on matters lying within medical authority than was true in reverse. This 
was most evident in the discussions of medical confidentiality itself, where legal participants 
all had clear ideas over what confidentiality meant, (both as members of the public and in 
their professional capacity) and how this compared to legal professional privilege. Clinical 
participants were typically more hesitant in comparing the two and on several occasions 
either argued that they couldn’t comment or asked me for further information over what legal 
privilege constituted.  
Survivor interviews, to a certain extent helped to bridge the ‘gaps’ left by clinician and 
lawyer interviewees, spanning the process from health to legal interactions. In discussing 
confidentiality and legal privilege for example, survivors were more likely to describe the 
two as at least roughly equitable. Unfortunately, this effect was limited by the comparatively 
lower participation rate among survivors, which reduced the generalisability of conclusions. 
Importantly, all groups had strong opinions on what medical confidentiality meant to them.    
Adopting an interdisciplinary approach also required a working knowledge of medical and 
legal terminology in the context of domestic abuse. From the legal aspect of this project, this 
meant referring in part to relevant case law and statute, although this was not the primary 
basis for research. As Baldwin and Davis noted when describing empirical legal research: 
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It is not purely theoretical or doctrinal; it does not rest on an analysis of statute and 
decided cases; and it does not rely on secondary sources. What empiricists do, in one 
way or another, is to study the operations and the effects of the law.
54
 
Accordingly, while this information was considered, it was more important to analyse the 
practice of lawyers in using medical information in the context of domestic abuse, something 
I did through a series of in-depth interviews, though I was able to refer to important legal 
decisions – i.e. the case of WF v Scottish Ministers – as part of this process.   
In the health aspects of the project, it was important to consider a range of sources in 
developing my own research. Case reports and therapeutic studies helped me to understand 
the health effects caused by domestic abuse, providing key insights on the clinical encounters 
which survivors have. This helped me to develop lines of enquiry for survivor and clinician 
interview as well as situation-based questions in the survivor questionnaire.  
Literature based on non-therapeutic research was useful in determining the overall project 
structure. By assessing the methods employed by other domestic abuse researchers and 
identifying the current gaps in understandings, I was able to design a protocol which gave the 
best chance of achieving representative data.  
I was also able to refer to the extensive range of advice given to both medical and legal 
practitioners concerning confidentiality, comparing this to the attitudes I recorded in my 
empirical research.   
3.8.4 Confidentiality  
The WHO, in providing advice on conducting domestic abuse research, indicate the 
importance of protecting participants’ confidential information, particularly when 
confidentiality breaches threaten the physical, emotional and psychological wellbeing of 
those involved.
55
 They outline this position in stark terms:  
Much of the information provided by respondents will be extremely personal. The 
dynamics of a violent relationship are such that the act of revealing details of violence 
to someone outside the family could also provoke another violent episode. For these 
                                                             
54
 John Baldwin and Gwynn Davis, 'Empirical Research in Law', in The Oxford Handbook of Legal Studies, Mark 
Tushnet and Peter Cane eds., (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), p. 880 
55 Ibid, pp. 6-7  
102 
 
reasons, the confidentiality of information collected during a survey or from in-depth 
interviews with survivors of violence is of fundamental importance.
56
 
Though primarily driven by safeguarding concerns, confidentiality also had an important role 
in improving the quality of research data. Unfortunately, few studies account for the effect of 
confidentiality and privacy procedures on the quality of participant responses. In 2006, 
Rosenbaum et al argued that there had been an inadequate exploration of the relationship 
between methods of data collection, sensitivity of the topic concerned and the social 
acceptability of responses.
57
 As Kaiser then noted in 2009, these issues are often ‘not 
adequately addressed in the literature on research ethics and research methods’.58  It remains 
impossible to quantify the level of material a respondent provided versus what they held back, 
and researchers have tried numerous strategies to encourage participants to be as frank as 
possible.
59
 This absence from the literature is part of a wider problem in which researchers do 
not adequately consider ethical issues before undertaking studies on domestic abuse. As the 
UN notes in its advice on the subject:  
less attention is usually paid to the sensitization of interviewers to violence-related 
issues during their training, the need for interviewers to develop a rapport with 
respondents, privacy and confidentiality issues surrounding the interview and other 
ethical and safety issues, all of which can have a significant negative impact on the 
willingness of respondents to report violence.
60
 
Rosenbaum argued that research approaches where confidentiality was perceived as weaker 
by participants were associated with less reliable responses, something which then affected 
the study data as ‘factors that affect participants' willingness to report honestly also affect the 
representativeness of the sample'.
61
 Those methods in which direct contact with researchers 
was reduced were associated with less ‘socially desirable’ responses than those in which 
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there was greater contact.
62
 These issues are particularly relevant in domestic abuse research, 
as studies often rely on engagement with survivors or perpetrators discussing sensitive 
subjects, who feel pressured to respond in ‘socially desirable ways’.63 
When discussing ‘socially undesirable’ topics then, research methods must be selected 
carefully, to encourage participants to be as frank as possible in their responses. There is a 
risk in conducting face-to-face interviews, that reluctance to disclose unfavourable 
information may be exacerbated.
64
  However, this risk must then be compared with the 
potential benefits that such interviews offer. As Rosenbaum notes:  
'Methodologies that involve an actual person afford the opportunity for the researcher 
to build rapport with the participant, possibly facilitating the disclosure of personal 
information'.
65
 
In my own research, I made use of both face-to-face interviews and anonymous 
questionnaires, hoping to gather more reliable data though both methods than one alone. By 
using enhanced confidentiality procedures in both approaches I hoped to encourage 
participants to be as open in their responses as possible.  
I could perhaps argue that confidentiality issues were less of a concern to my professional 
interviewees. After all, our discussions did not require them to provide particularly personal 
information. Interviews with clinicians and lawyers instead focused on practice and even 
when participants were required to express feelings or opinions, these were almost always on 
aspects of their professional lives, i.e. the professional relationships between doctors and 
lawyers or lawyers and judges. Several professionals even noted that they were not concerned 
if their involvement in the research was identified.  
However, it was still essential to ensure that professionals’ confidentiality was protected. In 
part this was to protect them from reputational damage, preventing any institutional fallout 
that may have occurred if they expressed negative opinions about certain individuals or 
organisations, i.e. an advocate discussing a particular judge they may appear in front of in 
future. It was also in recognition of the risk of emotional harm should their involvement be 
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revealed. Several professionals volunteered personal information in the course of interview, 
including abuse they had experienced. Given the emotive nature of the topic, it was 
unsurprising to discover that multiple participants also had extremely distressing experiences 
of treating patients and defending or prosecuting individuals in court. By protecting their 
confidentiality, I gave these individuals the space to discuss these situations freely, something 
that then improved the researcher-participant relationship and the quality of responses.  
Practical considerations made maintaining participant confidentiality difficult however. 
Interviews with both professionals and survivors, while anonymised, all contained 
information that could have allowed others to discover the identity of participants. This 
process, described as ‘deductive disclosure’ by Kaiser, when ‘traits of individuals or groups 
make them identifiable in research reports’ is particularly an issue for qualitative research.66 
The risk of deductive disclosure was increased in this research through the choice of topic 
and participants. McPherson, when discussing her research on self-defence killings by 
women, noted the difficulties of ‘law in action’ research in a small jurisdiction like Scotland, 
where almost inevitably, interviewees would know one another and may come to know of 
each other’s participation.67 This phenomenon was useful from a recruiting perspective as it 
helped in locating future participants. However this did lead to a situation in which many of 
those who took part in this research were aware of one another’s involvement.   
Similar issues were evident among the medical community. This was in part a reflection of 
the collegiate nature of medicine, where it is common for clinicians to have contact with a 
large number of practitioners and to work in different geographical locations throughout their 
careers.
68
 In a similar manner to legal interviews, this phenomenon was useful as a developed 
network already existed in which to begin framing the research and advertising the study, 
though it made protecting participants’ involvement from colleagues difficult.  
There was a delicate balance in ensuring participants’ confidentiality while also reflecting the 
positions from which they gave their opinions. Among clinicians, it was my intention 
throughout the thesis, to explore attitudes towards confidentiality from multiple specialities, 
to assess how these were affected by relationships to survivors and legal services. In order to 
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do this, I interviewed some individuals who worked from what I will term ‘uncommon’ 
practice areas, by which I mean, specialised areas of medicine, dentistry, nursing or 
psychology in which there are limited pool of individuals to sample from, particular in a 
small country like Scotland. While these interviews were very useful, it was difficult to 
protect the identity of those from ‘uncommon’ practice areas from discovery, which in turn 
limited the details that I could reveal about each individual. Specialists in forensic 
psychology and pathology for example, are sufficiently rare to make inclusion of any 
personal details problematic. While dispensing with information like their age or 
geographical location did not remove any key insights from their interviews, failing to make 
any account for their level of experience could have done. I therefore decided to remove 
details of their length of practice, beyond simple descriptions of seniority, i.e. consultant. 
Only clinicians with several years of post-qualification practice were permitted to take part in 
the research, given the sensitive nature of the project and the desire to reflect contemporary 
confidentiality practices in relation to domestic abuse and rape. There was no particular 
restriction in terms of the grading of the clinicians involved, though those at higher levels 
tended to make up the majority of participants. Among doctors for example, five of eleven 
were consultants in secondary and tertiary care centres, and the two general practice 
interviewees worked as a GP partner, and senior academic respectively. Of both nurse 
interviewees, one worked as a nurse practitioner, and both the forensic psychologist and 
restorative dentist interviewed also worked at a consultant grade.  
These issues were not limited to professional interviewees and similar considerations had to 
be made in respect of survivor participants, even with the enhanced confidentiality measures 
already in place. The small number of survivor participants increased the potential for their 
identification through seemingly innocuous details from their cases, i.e. the High Court in 
which a trial occurred. These omissions were most problematic as I had to decide whether to 
include information that the survivor concerned may have consented to using but which I 
feared may allow their identification. One survivor interviewee in fact wanted to waive her 
right to confidentiality in order to speak out publicly about the issues associated with the 
legal use of her medical information. This was refused on the basis of upholding the 
safeguarding procedures outlined in the application for ethical approval.  
I attempted to further mitigate confidentiality issues by using verbatim transcription, 
redaction and participant transcript review.  
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3.8.5 Consent  
As O’Neill argues – albeit from a medical context - ‘intransitive: complete, wholly specific 
consent is an illusion’.69 However, in a project in which the notion of informed consent was 
under scrutiny, it was essential that participants were fully aware of what their involvement in 
this research meant. Ensuring informed consent required careful planning. As Miller and Bell 
explained: 
gaining 'informed' consent is problematic if it is not clear what the participant is 
consenting to and where 'participation' begins and ends.
70
 
Overcoming misunderstandings in the consent process is not limited to ensuring participants 
are told what the research will entail, and is instead a much more holistic exercise. In 
discussing the difficulties of achieving full informed consent, Bryman refers to the ‘relatively 
minor transgressions’ that very likely occur throughout social research, giving the example of 
the deliberate underestimation of time commitments required from participants, with 
advertised interview durations frequently proving incorrect.
71
  In making this point, Bryman 
highlights a wider issue of scholars over-stepping  ethical boundaries and transgressing 
notions of consent in their attempts to encourage participation in research. This issue that is 
especially prevalent when target populations are small or difficult to reach (as is the case with 
domestic abuse survivors). 
An open, informed consent process was essential to mitigate the potential for distress among 
participants in this project. Accordingly, all interviewees were given a period of at least 48 
hours before meeting, to consult with detailed study literature and to ask any questions. On 
the day of the interview itself - before signing a written consent form - I met with participant 
and discussed the research, my choice of methodology and their rights for withdrawing from 
the project. They were then, once again, given the opportunity to ask questions. It was only 
after this process that I asked them to complete the consent form.   
Written consent was ultimately not required for participation in the questionnaire study. I 
made this decision for several reasons. Full written consent clearly empowers participants, 
giving them tangible proof of their decision to take part in research and makes withdrawing 
their data a relatively simple bureaucratic exercise. The benefits of a written consent process 
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are not limited to the participant and the researcher also profits from having evident proof 
that an individual consented to their data being used as described. This helps to support the 
researchers’ position should there be any disagreements over a participant’s involvement at a 
later date.  
However, the reliability of the written consent form has been criticised by some researchers. 
Ogloff and Otto challenged the readability of consent forms among participant populations, 
concluding that the reading level of forms designed by academics commonly exceeded those 
of participants.
72
 Bryman pointed to the potentially negative effects that written consent could 
have on recruitment, where the formality of written consent could serve to increase concerns 
among participants rather than allaying them.
73
 
My primary motivation in eschewing the requirement for written consent was safeguarding. 
By requiring survivors to complete consent forms, I would have required them to retain a 
copy, a clear issue given the potentially large number of participants. Unlike the survivor 
interview process, which was small in scale (with up to ten participants), the questionnaire 
study was open to all survivors using Women’s Aid centres in Scotland. Given the risk to 
their safety if study material was discovered, participants would have been unable to remove 
consent form copies from the Women’s Aid centre in which they completed them. These 
copies would instead have to be held by Women’s Aid which would have been a burden on 
staff.   
In removing the need for written consent in the questionnaire study, I also hoped to mitigate 
the aversion to research among abuse sufferers. It was essential that participants were not 
discouraged from participating over concerns about privacy and confidentiality. By requiring 
survivors to sign a written consent form, I was also asking them to disclose their identity to 
me as recipient of those forms. The process of giving this information to an unknown 
researcher would have linked their identity to the personal questions the questionnaire 
contained and may have increased the potential for distress or prevented their taking part 
altogether. By removing the written consent requirement, I hopefully reduced these concerns.  
Unfortunately, this decision came at a price. In removing written consent, I denied 
participants a formal record of their decision to allow their responses to be used. In doing so, 
it could be argued that consent, already a fluid and inconstant concept, was further diluted.  
                                                             
72
 James R.P. Ogloff and Randy K. Otto, 'Are Research Participants Truly Informed? Readability of Informed 
Consent Forms Used in Research', Ethics and Behaviour, 4 (1991), PP. 239-252 
73 Bryman, ‘Mixed-methods research’, p. 131 
108 
 
In removing the written consent form, I also removed any proof that participants had read the 
participant information sheet and understood what the research concerned. This in turn risked 
introducing a further level of distance between myself as the researcher and the participants, 
given that I was unable to oversee the consent giving process. Perhaps more importantly, it 
removed any fixable moment in time to demonstrate the participants’ autonomy.  
I attempted to mitigate these issues by providing participants with as much information as 
possible. From the outset, I designed clear and accessible research literature which provided 
participants with a thorough breakdown of what their involvement entailed. This was written 
in plain language, contained useful definitions and was approved by senior Women’s Aid 
staff before use, thus meeting Ogoff and Otto’s recommendation that the information 
essential for consent should be presented ‘in a manner that is understandable to potential 
participants’.74 Women’s Aid staff were then available to all participants to discuss any 
questions they may have had.  
Clearly, this research project required me to take account of participants welfare at all times.  
But ethical considerations did not begin and end through seeking the appropriate level of 
consent among those involved in the project, nor did it constitute the full discharge of my 
duties as the researcher, to the participants.  
3.8.6 Interviewing ‘elites’ and ‘vulnerable groups’  
Scholars have discussed the power imbalances inherent in the researcher-participant 
relationship.
75
 The potential for these imbalances to arise is arguably increased through the 
use of one-on-one, in-depth interviews in which the researcher determines the topic, sets the 
recruitment strategy and analyses the data.
76
 Clearly, the hierarchical nature of this dynamic 
can affect interview data, with the potential for the researcher’s own biases to undermine or 
influence the participants’ position. However, this outcome is not a foregone conclusion, and 
some scholars – particularly those working in health research – have argued that qualitative 
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research offers a useful, more egalitarian research strategy than rigidly hierarchical 
quantitative options.
77
 
This project was complex in that it featured groups who could be considered elites and 
groups that could be considered vulnerable. Clinicians (doctors in particular) and lawyers 
could both be considered to occupy privileged positions, with many used to leadership roles 
that could affect the hierarchical nature of the researcher-participant exchange. Survivors 
however, with individual experiences of abuse, could be considered as vulnerable individuals, 
particularly when discussing their experiences of domestic abuse. This in turn may affect the 
dynamics of the researcher-participant exchange.  
To separate the two groups into ‘vulnerable survivors’ and ‘elite professionals’ would 
however, be reductive. Labelling the former as all particularly vulnerable would risk 
undermining their autonomy in deciding to participate in this research. Similarly, categorising 
professional interviewees as a wholly elite group is unhelpful. Firstly, as some scholars have 
argued, the term ‘elite’ does not necessarily refer to any individual with high economic or 
social standing, but instead signposts an individual chosen because of who or what they are.
78
 
The place of clinician and legal interviewees in this is tricky. All professional participants in 
this research were chosen because of ‘what they are’, that is, by their profession. Some 
individuals were also chosen according to who they were, in that they were recommended by 
their colleagues as particularly adept and experienced individuals. This was particularly the 
case among legal interviewees, and all senior counsel were recruited on these kind of 
recommendations, mostly by other advocates or clinicians, but on one occasion by a senior 
High Court judge.  
These circumstances would seem to support the suggestion that most, if not all professionals 
taking part in this research had characteristics of ‘elite’ interviewees. However, myopic 
labelling leaves little room to explore the effect that the emotive nature of the topic discussed 
had on the researcher-interviewee dynamic, (among professionals as well as survivors). There 
were in fact, several occasions in which professional interviewees could have been 
considered vulnerable given both their personal experiences and their emotional involvement 
with other cases.  
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3.8.7 Gendered nature of domestic abuse and the male researcher  
The gendered nature of domestic abuse could not be ignored when designing this project. 
Physical, emotional and psychological abuse is overwhelmingly perpetrated by men against 
women.
79
 My position – as a lone male researcher - was therefore significant. There is some 
criticism of men working with female domestic abuse survivors, showcased by some abuse 
charities that have have shied away from male involvement in managerial roles.
80
 
Campbell et al have highlighted the importance of researchers respecting survivors’ wishes 
when conducting research. In their 2009 assessment, when asking rape survivors what they 
thought constituted a good interviewer, survivors responded that interviewers needed to be 
‘knowledgeable about rape and its impact on victims’ but that even then, without sharing 
similar experiences, there were limits to the researcher’s understandings.81 It was also 
important, they suggested, for survivors to recognise the difference between ‘personal 
knowledge and learned knowledge’.82  
As a male researcher, without experience of rape or domestic abuse, there were clearly limits 
to my understandings, similar to those referred to by the survivors in Campbell’s study, and 
there were risks that this lack of understanding could have led to a furthering of participants’ 
trauma, through flaws in the research design.
83
 I attempted to mitigate survivors’ concerns by 
working in close partnership with established abuse charities; Scottish Women’s Aid and 
Rape Crisis Scotland. Staff from both institutions were able to advise me on study design and 
implementation, interview techniques and measures to encourage survivors to participate.  
Practical limitations prevented me from including male survivors of domestic abuse. At the 
time the research was undertaken, there was no specific domestic abuse centre for men in 
Glasgow, though Abused Men in Scotland (AMIS) offered support online and over the phone. 
Without the infrastructure of a charity addressing violence against men, that included a 
physical space where survivors met with support workers, interviews or questionnaires with 
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male survivors would not have been ethical. In addition, this project explored conceptions of 
medical confidentiality from several different perspectives. This required a review of 
individual practice and processes and required input from professionals as well as survivors, 
something which yielded a large amount of data. I decided that by seeking to include 
including male abuse survivors, I would increase the amount of data gathered to an 
unmanageable quantity. Furthermore, the capacity of the thesis would have limited the 
meaningful assessment of any similarities or differences in practice when female or male 
survivors were concerned.   
3.8.8 Engaging with large public-sector organisations  
Another aspect of this project which achieves relatively little attention elsewhere, concerns 
the attempts of a lone, doctoral researcher to engage with large public-sector organisations. 
Despite the numerous difficulties that can arise, there is very little published literature on 
engaging public sector organisations in sensitive research, with more of a focus on the 
corporate context. This may reflect a hesitation on the part of researchers to engage with 
multiple public-sector organizations at once, especially when these organisations may be 
required to work together as part of the research.   
While engaging large organisations in research projects is not without issue, complexity is 
increased when the data sought is of a particularly sensitive nature. In this project, there was a 
substantial amount of negotiation needed with both health and criminal justice institutions to 
begin field research, including but not limited to NHS Greater Glasgow and Clyde, the 
Scottish Courts and Tribunals Service and the Crown Office and Procurator Fiscal Service.  
The medical records requests study required collaboration with both the Crown Office and 
the NHS simultaneously, while other elements of the research involved each organisation 
individually. It was therefore this element of the project which became the most contentious 
and it took over one calendar year before a protocol could be agreed.  
The initial issue with engaging with these organisations involved identifying the appropriate 
staff members to discuss and authorise research. Given that medical record requests are not 
formally recorded by health or legal services, I was obliged to establish a protocol for 
capturing relevant data. This in turn required an understanding of how the NHS and Crown 
processed medical record requests, what identifiable information was included and how this 
could be protected.   
112 
 
I experienced numerous difficulties in navigating both the NHS and Crown Office 
employment structures. There are of course managers responsible for budgetary and legal 
concerns, and administrative staff responsible for the processing of information, but 
additionally there are practitioners who handle legal cases and provide care for patients as 
well as engaging in managerial decisions. When designing this research, it was possible that 
while administrative staff received medical record requests, senior doctors or nurses were 
responsible for determining the validity of the request and identifying which elements of the 
requested records were suitable for release. It was only through an arduous process of trial 
and error that I eventually identified relevant staff with the authority to design and implement 
a research protocol.  
This is not to say that collaborations with public sector groups cannot be of mutual benefit. In 
2006, Currie and Suhomlinova described the relationship between University researchers and 
NHS institutions, arguing that practitioners, academics and policy makers were increasingly 
interested in knowledge exchange and how this could shape policy changes.
84
 Despite the 
potential for forming beneficial research relationships however, Currie and Suhomlinova 
argued that while researchers and policy-makers retained belief in open exchange of 
knowledge between groups, this was unrealistic in practice given the ‘significant power 
differentials in the NHS’.85 They even suggested that health institutions like the NHS were 
wont to ‘hoard’ information, determining what was suitable for exchange with other 
interested parties.
86
 This obviously creates a situation in which it is hard for researchers to 
design and implement their own projects using data generated from the NHS.  
While I experienced issues in collaborating with NHS staff, Currie and Suhomlinova are at 
risk of over-simplifying the issues of working with public sector institutions like the health 
service, particularly in their focus on the ‘institutions’ as the only group with the power to 
implement meaningful change, and researchers and policy makers portrayed as being 
generally dependent on existing institutional set-ups.
87
 In my experience in this project, 
clinical staff were generally very open to research and helpful in recruiting others to take part. 
This was less obvious with administrative and managerial staff, who were concerned with the 
potential risks associated with exchanging information in the medical records study. While 
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this experience cannot be said to represent that of the wider research community in the UK, it 
does challenge Currie and Suhomlinova’s argument that the NHS in general has a culture of 
resisting information sharing with outside agencies.  
My position as an academic had an impact on the process of information exchange. Research 
collaboration between academics and healthcare organisations have been described as 
potentially problematic, given the possibility of divergent research practices.
88
 Batunek et al 
highlighted the concerns among healthcare practitioners that academics created publications 
designed to be read solely by other academics.
89
 In order to facilitate an easier exchange – to 
‘bridge the gap’ -between the two groups, Currie and Suhomlinova suggested that academics 
should place a greater focus on more practical, applied research.
90
 This research project did 
exactly that, though this had little to with merely increasing co-operation between academia 
and health services but was instead borne from a desire to elicit meaningful change in an 
under-researched area. These efforts were strongly supported by all clinical staff involved, 
who consistently donated their time and energy for participation.   
It remains to comment on the critical nature of some of the findings in this project. Given the 
subject matter, this research retained a capacity for criticising large and powerful institutions, 
particularly in reviewing how survivors were treated by the criminal justice system. As a lone 
researcher, the risks of external pressure were felt before data collection began, with senior 
staff at the NHS and Crown Office keen to influence the project to avoid reputational risk.  
As already noted, I planned to interview prosecutors but after protracted discussion, it 
became clear the Crown were unwilling to allow staff to comment on practice on an 
individual basis. Further issues then arose over the delays in receiving written responses from 
the Crown and these were eventually received – after continual contact via email – one year 
after they were originally meant to be sent.  
Senior Data Management staff in the NHS shared similar concerns to the Crown and were 
very hesitant in discussing the medical records request study. Numerous scandals concerning 
the loss of sensitive patient data have, understandably, led to the adoption of strategies to 
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reduce the potential for data breaches.
91
 However, this attitude led to significant difficulties in 
designing a workable protocol between myself, the NHS and the Crown. In practical terms, 
this meant that the Information Governance Manager for NHS Greater Glasgow and Clyde 
frequently failed to respond to written communications or pulled out of meetings. When 
contact was made, they listed requirements for progressing, however when these 
requirements were met, they argued that further changes were needed, thus manipulating the 
research approach. Given their role as gatekeepers to the data required, there was often little 
option but to comply with their demands. These issues were eventually overcome through 
greater collaboration with the Crown and the support of the NHS research ethics committee. 
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Chapter Four – Confidentiality and the health service  
4.1 Introduction 
In chapter two, I demonstrated that clinician and patient perceptions of confidentiality 
remain poorly understood, particularly within the context of domestic abuse. Without 
having more information about these perceptions, it is impossible to properly address 
consistently low levels of abuse disclosure. There has similarly been little consideration of 
the confidentiality factors that may affect survivors’ decisions both to seek medical care, 
and to disclose abuse when they do, particularly beyond those in A&E and GP services.  
This chapter will examine these issues, exploring understandings of confidentiality on the 
frontline in the health service. I argue that when the definition of confidentiality comes into 
contact with reality, the certainties seem to break down, and the potential for future legal 
proceedings has tangible impacts on the way confidentiality is perceived by both clinicians 
and survivors, something that in turn affects every day medical practice.   
Medical confidentiality allows patients to be forthright when consulting with clinicians and 
as such, numerous protections exist to support it.
1
 However, in the context of domestic 
abuse, when patients may be victims or even perpetrators of crime, confidentiality can be 
challenged. This chapter explores perceptions of confidentiality in the context of a clinical 
encounter, when survivors require treatment for physical, sexual and psychological abuse 
and come into contact with healthcare professionals. It is within these first interactions that 
conceptions of confidentiality are constructed and tested.  
In the first part of the chapter, I explore confidentiality from the perspective of clinicians. 
As those responsible for creating medical records and protecting their patients’ information, 
clinicians’ understandings of confidentiality are reinforced through everyday practice. 
Drawing information from a range of sources, (including surveys and questionnaires), I 
assess what medical confidentiality means to healthcare professionals and how these views 
are affected (if at all), in the context of treating patients experiencing domestic abuse. This 
assessment extends across multiple aspects of every day practice, and transcends 
specialties, assessing the potential for differences among clinicians in perceiving, 
discussing and breaching confidentiality, as well as in documenting and reporting abuse.  
Ultimately, this exploration allows an understanding of how clinicians’ perceptions of 
confidentiality are formulated and the effect this process has on treating patients in practice.   
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In the second part of the chapter I analyse perceptions of confidentiality among survivors. 
Using a combination of interviewee responses and data from questionnaires, I assess how 
survivors’ understandings of confidentiality are shaped by the circumstances in which they 
require treatment, how they discuss confidentiality with clinicians (if at all) and why, and 
the outcome this has on their healthcare experiences. Ultimately, I examine the disclosure 
process itself, relating survivors’ experiences and the barriers they face, alongside the 
factors that would affect them from disclosing abuse in future.  
Ultimately, in this chapter, I argue that while confidentiality may appear as a standard 
definition in theory, in practice this is often not the case, with diverse opinions of what 
confidentiality means, and how these meanings are affected by the occurrence of domestic 
abuse. I suggest that these diverging views of confidentiality are apparent among all those 
involved in the creation of the medical record, beginning with the clinicians who survivors 
first interact with, when seeking medical care.  
4.2 Clinicians 
In this section, I explore confidentiality in the health service from the perspective of 
practising, multidisciplinary clinicians. Here, I will assess how clinicians perceive 
confidentiality, particularly in the context of their interactions with domestic abuse 
survivors. By so doing, I will be able to discern how confidentiality is understood and 
negotiated with patients in practice, accounting for how the occurrence of domestic abuse 
then changes these practices, if at all. Interviewees are referred to by an acronym denoting 
their area of specialty, as described in table 1 below.   
Interview code Specialty 
SHD Sexual Health Doctor 
SHN Sexual Health Nurse 
AE A&E Doctor  
GP General Practitioner 
FP Forensic Pathologist 
FPsych Forensic Psychologist 
RD Restorative Dentist 
OS Oral Surgeon 
MF Maxillofacial Surgeon 
Table 1: Acronyms for Clinician interviewees by specialty 
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4.2.1 What does medical confidentiality mean? 
Despite the semi-structured interview method, there was one question included in all 
interviews. By asking “what does medical confidentiality mean to you?” - usually toward 
the end of each interview – participants had time to reflect on their personal and 
professional understandings of confidentiality, benefiting from having already discussed 
everyday practice and domestic abuse.  
Perhaps unsurprisingly, some participants referred to professional guidelines when 
describing confidentiality. On several occasions – and despite being aware of the interview 
topic beforehand - clinicians expressed discomfort with the confidentiality question 
precisely because they felt unable to provide an appropriate definition i.e. as laid out by the 
GMC.  For example, A&E doctor AE2 and Forensic Pathologist FP1:  
  
AE2:  Oh God. I should have read up on this.  
 
FP1: Oh God, asking me difficult questions now. Erm, not having read the GMC 
guidance on it because we’re turned slightly off it, it is about respecting the privacy 
of the individual and only having access to and only having knowledge of, and 
certainly not disseminating anything, that’s not, er, absolutely relevant to the work 
that I’m doing. 
 
When describing confidentiality five clinicians cited regulatory guidance. The most 
commonly referenced body was the GMC, with the Royal Colleges and defence unions 
also noted. GP1 referred to both the GMC and the Royal Colleges, praising their advice as 
comprehensive. She qualified this statement however by highlighting the role of practical 
experience and learning, revisiting these concepts at several points in the interview:  
GP1: So confidentiality is a qualitative term I would suggest, and really I think the 
issue with confidentiality is a). that you understand your professional responsibility 
as laid down by the, we have very comprehensive guidance from the GMC and the 
Royal Colleges, but also your professional experience. You have to learn how to be, 
how to use that confidentiality I think, when it’s appropriate. 
118 
 
Those individuals referring to regulators or defence were almost all doctors. OS1 was the 
only non-medical participant to refer to “guidelines” in her answer and then did not specify 
which guidelines she was referring to: 
OS1: I would say that you have to keep things confidential unless there’s a very 
good reasons not to do that and obviously there are some guidelines on when you 
would be expected or perhaps allowed to break confidentiality and I would tend to, 
I would tend to stick with those.  
As noted in section 2.1, advice on confidentiality is available for most healthcare 
professionals, issued by their professional organisations. Despite this SHN1, SHN2, OS1, 
RD1 and FPsych1 did not explicitly refer to any of these organisations. As to why this was 
the case is unclear. Non-medical participants’ responses to the confidentiality question 
were not markedly distinct from those of medical participants. It could be argued that 
medical practitioners are heavily regulated by the GMC and might therefore be expected to 
be aware of confidentiality guidelines in order to prevent any infringements which could 
result in disciplinary procedures. It is equally true however, that both the NMC and GDC 
place similar obligations on their members, with punishments meted out to individuals 
breaching regulatory guidelines without cause.
2
  
The best explanation for these responses is that doctors made up the majority of clinical 
participants. Out of a sample size of sixteen, eleven were medical practitioners, with only 
five clinicians representing other disciplines, and while the pool of doctors contained 
individuals from a number of specialties, they, by virtue of being doctors, were all subject 
to the regulation of the GMC. A greater number of medical participants likely just 
increased the chances that several would mention the GMC or another medical body in 
their response. Notably, of the eleven clinicians who mentioned privacy in interview (five 
during their descriptions of confidentiality) three were not medical practitioners. As 
outlined in chapter two, privacy and confidentiality are often used interchangeably by a 
range of clinical organisations. The fact that this was observed among medical and non-
medical clinicians, further suggests that the latter made equal use of advice on 
confidentiality from their respective regulatory organisations. Another source of agreement 
                                                             
2 General Dental Council, 'Principle Four Maintain and protect patients’ information', 
<https://standards.gdc-uk.org/pages/principle4/principle4.aspx>, [accessed: 14th June 2019]; Nursing and 
Midwifery Council, 'The Code: Professional standards of practice and behaviour for nurses, midwives and 
nursing associates', (10th October, 2018), < https://www.nmc.org.uk/standards/code/ >, [accessed: 14th 
June, 2019] 
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across the clinician group arose in discussions of information sharing between healthcare 
staff, the subject of the next section.   
Despite reference to these organisations in describing confidentiality, no participants 
mentioned the Caldicott Guardian, the individual in each hospital (or any organisation 
providing social care) tasked with ensuring service users’ information is used appropriately. 
As noted in section 2.1, part of the Caldicott Guardian’s role is to advise clinicians on 
confidentiality concerns, and all participants would have been aware of the existence of the 
Caldicott Guardian within their organisation as this is an element of training. The reason 
why no participants referenced the Caldicott Guardian in their confidentiality descriptions 
is therefore unclear, though this omission was consistent throughout the rest of the 
interviews and among all participant groups and Caldicott Guardians were not mentioned 
by participants at all during the research project. Based on their willingness to refer to 
other groups/organisations supplying confidentiality advice however, the lack of 
consideration given to Caldicott Guardians may suggest that clinicians do not consider 
their advice as immediately available in formulating their ideas of confidentiality, nor in 
guiding responses where it may have to be breached.   
4.2.2 Information sharing with other clinicians  
Most clinicians, when describing confidentiality, included a caveat for sharing information 
with other healthcare professionals. In doing so, they often asserted a firm commitment to 
confidentiality before almost undercutting this by noting that information could be shared, 
provided this was with colleagues involved in the patients’ care. SHD1 and GP2 articulated 
this position:   
SHD1:  I suppose that everybody has a right to confidentiality and to be able to 
safely disclose something within a medical setting and know that that will remain 
private with, between myself and themselves and with other clinicians obviously 
who are going to view their notes and that they understand what that means. That’s 
obviously a really important part of medicine that people feel they can speak freely.  
 
GP2: That anything that I say to my doctor will be treated with, with confidence, 
meaning within a confidential environment, it will be documented in my records 
but the only people that will read my records are the people who are looking at me, 
after me at that time, or having reason to be in my records, that it’s not just there for 
anyone to anyone to open up and pick and read like a novel. 
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These comments suggest that discussion of patient information among treating clinicians is 
fairly uncontroversial. As noted in chapter 2, this position is consistent with the advice of 
regulatory bodies and confirms the findings of other relevant studies.
 3
 In fact, this position 
appears, largely, to chime with the expectations of patients and several clinicians in this 
research, who noted that patients were often surprised to find that information about their 
treatment was not automatically available to other clinicians (for example if stored 
separately, as mental health records are).
4
 
The extent to which patients expect relevant information to be shared when they have 
disclosed domestic abuse is more difficult to answer, with little information available from 
existing research. Attitudes towards information sharing in this context will be explored in 
the survivor section of this chapter (4.3). Among clinicians, MF1 alone explicitly 
expressed the view that confidentiality sometimes meant not discussing a patient’s case 
with anyone else, including other healthcare workers:  
MF1: To me it means not telling anybody anything about anyone unless they, the 
person it’s about, has asked you to. So, you will get people who you say “you’ve 
got this injury, this is what” and you can see them going, “ooh, can you explain it to 
my partner, my mum or dad?” Perfectly happy with that. But other than… outwith 
the circumstances they themselves being content to have that information released 
to a third party, then it’s absolute. 
Alongside this finding, a recurring thematic link between confidentiality and trust also 
emerged from clinicians’ confidentiality descriptions. In total, seven of sixteen clinicians 
talked about the concept of trust when discussing confidentiality – something repeated by 
both survivor interviewees, as I demonstrate later in this chapter. SHN2 talked about 
confidentiality and trust as symbiotic and vital in everyday practice, reassuring patients 
that their consultation took place in confidence in order to quickly build up a trusting 
                                                             
3
 See for example; General Medical Council, Confidentiality: good practice in handling patient information, 
(January 2017), available at < https://www.gmc-uk.org/-/media/documents/confidentiality-good-practice-
in-handling-patient-information---english-0417_pdf-
70080105.pdf?la=en&hash=2F39E0A8258FE82F573040DBB14617D5DB9E84C1>, [accessed: 16
th
 July 2018], 
p. 22  
4
 Ipsos MORI, Exploring patient and public attitudes towards medical confidentiality: Findings from 
Discussion Groups and In-depth Interviews 2016, (April 2016) , available at <https://www.gmc-uk.org/-
/media/documents/Exploring_patient_and_public_attitudes_towards_medical_confidentiality_FINAL_2704
16.pdf_65939141.pdf>, [accessed: 3rd July 2019], Pamela Sankar, Susan Mora, Jon F. Merz, and Nora L. 
Jones, 'Patient Perspectives of Medical Confidentiality: A Review of the Literature', Journal of General 
Internal Medicine, 18 (2003), p. 666 
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relationship. The benefits of this approach were evident as SHN2 described being able to 
attain – often in single consultations - the kind of trusting relationship described by GP1 
and GP2 (later in this section), which is built over longer periods of time:  
SHN2: So you need kind of the time you know. You need to think that the person’s 
gonna listen to you and believe you. So you need to build up a bit of a trusting 
relationship in the first place. So that they’re not kind of saying “Well that’s a load 
of rubbish” or something…Yeah it does take some time. And we sort of do it very 
quickly because I suppose that’s what we do you know and by saying kind of this is 
personal, this is sexual health you know we’re here to help you, confidential blah 
blah blah you know we’re gonna be asking this, here we go. Yeah you kind of yeah 
do try and build up trust really quickly.  
The utility of confidentiality in engendering trust was also discussed by another sexual 
health nurse, SHN1, who described trust as quantifiable when referring to patients’ 
perceptions of confidentiality in sexual health services and how this made clinicians in that 
specialty more trustworthy:  
SHN1: Confidentiality is, the importance of that is […]. You know it’s something 
that’s discussed in lots of consults and I think it’s… I think most people are aware 
of, of how important confidentiality is in sexual health so they maybe have a 
greater trust in it here. 
In a similar manner to both sexual health nurses, AE3 described confidentiality in 
utilitarian terms, with trust, like confidentiality, an essential component of ensuring he 
could provide patients with the best possible medical care:  
AE3: What the confidentiality aspect of it means is that I need as much high-
quality information and trust from that person as is humanly possible, because the 
more of that I can get the better a job I can do for them.  
AE3 was also keen to stressing the holistic benefits of trust in confidentiality, referring to 
both the medical and non-medical advice that was facilitated by an open and honest 
discussion, a sentiment echoed by SHD1, who argued that confidentiality was essential for 
her everyday practice. When speaking about domestic abuse survivors specifically, AE3 
noted:  
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AE3: The victim should feel they can tell me everything they can, because the 
more information I have the better the medical care is going to be and the better the 
medical and non-medical advice and outcomes that we can provide for them. And 
without that trust ... I'm not as able to do my job.  
GP1 argued that a relationship of trust was particularly prevalent in general practice given 
the greater chance of repeated interactions:  
GP1: I think, you know, the essence of general practice is the, the serial encounter 
with patients. So no matter what a patient's coming down to tell you, whatever it is 
to do with, I think that relationship of trust that's built over, because we've got 
continuous care, is really important. So a patient might book an appointment for 
something seemingly innocuous and tell you something quite profound that's 
nothing to do with their physical complaint, maybe something else that they're 
concerned about, whatever.  
Interestingly, despite AE3 and GP1 both referring to trust as particularly relevant to their 
practice area, GP1 argued that patients’ agency was lessened in more acute specialties:  
GP1: Obviously if you attend A&E where there's been a domestic assault where the 
police have been involved and you've been taken to A&E you've really kind of, 
you're not really in control of that situation. But a patient coming to see us is 
different and because it, they can come and see us whenever they want to and 
because there is that continuous relationship and we know a lot about the family 
health dynamics then that's why we get disclosure in that way. 
GP2 suggested that the concept of trust extended beyond a belief in confidentiality and was 
instead rooted to more complex ideas around the patient-clinician relationship.   
GP2: I think it's not just trust in the confidentiality aspect of that, that they trust 
you to keep it secret, it's trust that you'll listen to them and not judge them and trust 
that you're the right person to even talk about it with. Sometimes they don't want to 
do anything about it they just want to have talked about it with someone. 
Doctors, in particular, often referred to confidentiality in this way, extending beyond the 
protection of informational privacy, into a key, symbiotic feature of their relationship with 
patients. In this way, confidentiality became something that helped them define their own 
professional responsibilities, something explored in more detail in the next section.  
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4.2.3 What it means to be a doctor  
Though most clinicians’ descriptions of confidentiality were formal, either rooted in the 
definitions of professional regulators or at least strongly correlating with contemporary 
medico-legal expectations, several doctors did refer to it as a moral duty intrinsic to 
healthcare professionals. In some cases, these comments were depicted through what 
would be regarded as a traditional lens, with confidentiality viewed as a sacred obligation 
necessary to protect patients. These descriptions were often rooted in medical education 
and accordingly were used by doctors alone.  
AE1: Well essentially, you more or less brought that up with it while you’re getting 
involved into medicine, right from the beginning I have a feeling that when you’re 
a medical student one of the first things you learn is you have to be very discreet 
and confidential and that goes into the sort of vague background of your mind…  In 
the beginning. But it also has to do with the formal kind of issues of developing a 
mentality to be respecting or respectful to confidentiality. You do realise that you, 
basically to treat a patient you invade their personal kind of bodily and sort of 
mental and sort of psychological background. So therefore it’s something that is 
carried with you throughout your career and it’s progressing with you throughout 
your career. So it’s a readily available kind of virtue that you develop to respect the 
confidentiality to develop confidentiality and respect peoples kind of privacy.  
GP2, who was involved in medical education, described how respect for confidentiality 
was taught to students, alongside awareness of its limitations:  
GP2: We write the handbook and we talk about, you know, that confidentiality is at 
the core of being a doctor and these are the occasions on which you are allowed to 
breach confidentiality. 
Others (as outlined in the previous section) focussed on confidentiality as something that 
bound clinicians and patients together. These individuals promoted patient autonomy, with 
participants describing the clinician-patient relationship as that between equals, both 
parties constructing and upholding it. In these descriptions, clinicians referred to concepts 
of respect and control:  
SHD2:  I spose it’s an agreement between the patient and the doctor. And it’s quite 
a deep agreement isn’t it. You know in terms of people divulging concerns, fears… 
symptoms. You know chest pains might be easy but other symptoms or concerns. It 
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should be a deep bond really shouldn’t it, between the doctor and the… I think it’s 
something that’s’ really important. 
 
GP1: In terms of [coughs] confidentiality with patients, you know, it’s a two-way 
process with a patient, it’s a negotiation you have with patients all the time.  
The notion of patient control over confidentiality actually related to a wider concern with 
patient autonomy and these concepts emerged repeatedly throughout interviews, 
particularly when discussing confidentiality breaches, as I outline later in this chapter. 
4.2.4 Movability  
Arising from many clinicians’ descriptions of confidentiality were ideas of its plasticity, 
with participants supporting the notion that a fixed concept of confidentiality is difficult to 
support. AE2 and RD1 described confidentiality using terms that suggested attempts to 
give fixed definitions were problematic:  
AE2: There are some grey areas, I don’t think there’s definite answers to every 
situation.  
 
RD1: I suppose it means that… whatever is discussed between the patient and the 
professional is not to be disclosed to anyone else… unless they are either at risk of 
serious harm or injury. Or someone else is, as a result of … but that’s where it’s 
very difficult with this isn’t it? Because it’s such a blurry line. It is such a blurry 
line.  
SHD3 began by describing confidentiality in absolute terms, as something which could be 
easily determined. This changed when she then considered obligations for disclosure 
outside of medical services, when confidentiality became ‘a bit fluid’.  
SHD3:  Well to me it means not talking outwith, not taking the patient’s 
information and sharing it unnecessarily with people who have no role to play in 
their care. That’s it. It has. It can be a bit fluid as we’ve sort of described in that if 
there is actual harm being perpetrated against someone we may on best interests or 
as a duty of care have to breach that confidentiality and I’ll feel comfortable doing 
that in certain situations.  
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Others referred to confidentiality as idiosyncratic, with patients’ individual circumstances 
forcing clinicians to renegotiate and adapt over time.  
FP1: I think it’s possibly an ever-changing, or almost an ever-changing, dilemma at 
the minute. I suspect there’s no way a clinician cannot be acutely aware of the 
importance of confidentiality.  
 
SHD2: There’s a balance isn’t there between the very greater good of people not 
saying anything to doctors, nurses, clinicians because they’re seen as leaky. It’s not 
just that immediate case, it’s overall isn’t it and if people won’t come because they 
think that. This is a tricky balancing act that I think you have to constantly be 
reviewing. 
These varying perceptions of confidentiality then became even more pronounced when 
participants spoke about practice in their own specialty.  
4.2.5 Confidentiality and specialty 
While clinicians from differing specialties did not express hugely variant conceptions of 
confidentiality, some of their responses were rooted to their practice area. Typically, when 
specialties were mentioned, it took the form of either arguing that confidentiality was 
particularly well protected or important in certain services, or that those services faced 
unique confidentiality difficulties.  
Sexual health clinicians were the most likely to describe confidentiality as particularly well 
protected in their specialty, arguing that this increased engagement by patients. SHN1 
spoke in detail about the importance of confidentiality for practitioners in sexual health. 
After explaining that confidentiality protected information from being accessed without 
permission, she noted:  
SHN1: In terms of sexual health I think it’s particularly important. I think it’s 
important in all aspects but in terms of sexual health it’s, yeah there’s a lot of 
emphasis on confidentiality. 
The perceived autonomy of sexual health, was, SHN1 argued, a key reason that patients 
felt able to share particularly sensitive information, i.e. sexual orientation or exposure to 
sexually transmitted diseases. She stressed this autonomy to patients in consultation:  
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SHN1: So I think people. Yeah I think they must be reassured by conf – I hope 
they are about confidentiality in sexual health. Although there’s been things in the 
media in the past that would perhaps worry some people but, on the whole, we do 
everything we can to/ we’re completely separate from hospitals and things. 
Although people come and say “oh you can, I’m sure you’ll be able to see my 
record, I was at my GP last week”. So you do remind them quite often that we’re 
separate. 
SHN2 was of a similar opinion, arguing that protection of patients’ medical information 
was particularly essential in her specialty:  
SHN2: Especially if they’re particularly worried about confidentiality we say you 
know “we see a lot of people like we see people off the telly, footballers and all sort 
of”. Especially sexual health, confidentiality is kind of vital then you know. It’s 
personal things, you don’t want that, it’s different. I mean medical, medical records 
are, should be confidential anyway but particularly in sexual health. 
SHN2’s assertion that confidentiality was ‘vital’ and ‘different’ in sexual health, reflected 
the attitudes of clinicians in her specialty. These arguments lead to the notion that 
confidentiality is less static than might be supposed. That instead, there are different levels 
of confidentiality applied by practitioners, both by specialty and in reference to individual 
patients. The perception of a ‘higher’ level of confidentiality might help to explain why 
sexual health practitioners were so vocal in linking ideas of confidentiality to their 
specialty, rather than discussing them in abstract terms. By contrast, and despite the 
circumstances in which he consulted domestic abuse patients, FPsych1 disputed the idea 
that his speciality required a distinct form of confidentiality. Speaking briefly about why 
others may perceive mental health specialties as ‘more confidential’ he noted:  
FPsych1: I suppose there’s often a bit of pressure because it can be seen as an 
exciting area to work in or because, you know, these are things that are widely 
reported in newspapers. People might, might want to know aspects about a 
particular case or might want you to dis-discuss it or something, but of course, 
that’s a 100% no-no. 
Concerns about identifiability were also raised by MF1 and FP1, given the likelihood that 
they too would end up treating patients injured or killed in circumstances that were 
reported in the media. Unlike MF1 or FP1 however, FPsych1 went on to argue that his 
duty of confidentiality was no different to a practitioner in any other area of the health 
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service, even when pressed on the superficial differences between his work and that of 
other clinicians:    
FPsych1: I would have the same confidential rules were I a GP or were I a nurse 
doing community visits or working in a pain management clinic. I mean, you just, 
in the NHS it’s-it’s a 100% rule that you don’t discuss these things. There is 
pressure, I suppose to, when people ask you about your job, that they want to know, 
you know, a few bits and pieces about an interesting case or something, you know. 
Even when considering that the comprehensive confidentiality discussions he had with 
patients would be unnecessary in other specialties, FPsych1 continued to argue that 
confidentiality was not distinct in forensic psychology:  
FPysch1: But I still think, you know, as an NHS practitioner you’re bound by rules 
of confidentiality so, even if you were seeing someone for two minutes, the same 
rules would apply as you were seeing them for, you know, a two-hour assessment. 
As a senior forensic pathologist, FP1’s patients are usually deceased, making her 
confidentiality obligations different to those of other practitioners in the study, something 
she noted herself:    
FP1: I guess it's something, confidentiality to us is probably quite, is quite different 
because the individual's health records are not confidential to the individual any 
longer and they have all been, you know, legally sourced from the fiscal. And the 
Data Protection Act, for example, doesn't [pause] what's the right word? Doesn't 
apply to deceased individuals. So our confidentiality more is we're focused on that 
anything that we find is confidential to the [pause] Crown and or the police. So it's 
very much being aware that, erm, it is part of the criminal justice system and our 
findings and our opinions need to fall within that? So if anything our confidentiality 
- the bits where what one would think of as normal medical confidentiality are 
more probably in the non-murder work, 
 
At several points during interview, FP1 noted that she had a closer professional 
relationship with lawyers than with other clinicians. While the importance of this 
relationship is discussed in later chapters, it is worth noting that FP1 felt that legal services 
helped shape what confidentiality meant. To her, patient confidentiality also required 
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information be disclosed to police and prosecutors, something she acknowledged as 
distinct from ‘normal medical confidentiality’.  
4.2.6 Factors affecting disclosure  
Some participants (particularly A&E doctors) focussed on particular issues with 
maintaining confidentiality in their specialty. AE2 for example, described the physical 
space of the emergency department, stressing how this impacted the clinical decisions he 
was able to make, particularly when consulting with patients showing indications of having 
suffered domestic abuse:  
AE2: I would never generally discuss anything of a personal you know and abuse 
type nature in a standard cubicle because there’s no privacy at all. So you try, you 
try your best to make, make room and I have many, many times taken one like 
swapped patients from rooms and cubicles to make that happen. So that’s doable, 
that’s the minimum you should expect, is a private conversation. 
AE2’s comment here echoes advice given by medical organisations.  In their guidance on 
domestic abuse, the BMA stress the importance of confidentiality in the emergency 
department, where a substantial number of domestic abuse survivors seek treatment. An 
absence of physical privacy is described as likely to stymie disclosure, with clinicians 
advised that ‘methods of providing an enabling environment include consultations taking 
place in a private room, and patients being seen without the presence of a family 
member’.5As Olsen and Sabin noted in their 2003 study however, maintaining 
confidentiality and privacy is often ‘easier said than done in a busy and crowded ED’.6  
Triage in A&E offers - in theory - a private and confidential space where survivors may 
feel comfortable in reporting abuse. AE1 stressed the utility of triage in identifying 
survivors: 
AE1: We have a very effective system because obviously patients don’t walk into 
A&E like that [without any healthcare contact]. They’re getting triaged. So 
nurses who do the triage or occasionally doctors who are involved in the triage plus 
that we have in my workplace which is [HOSPITAL NAME]. They are 
experienced people so, patients do not turn up flat into the main department. They 
have gone through a first kind of filter or selection so therefore except for triaging 
                                                             
5 British Medical Association, Domestic Abuse Report, (2014), available at 
<https://www.bma.org.uk/collective-voice/policy-and-research/equality/healthcare-for-vulnerable-
group/domestic-abuse-report>, [accessed: 20th May, 2019], p. 61  
6 Jon C. Olsen, Brad R. Sabin, 'Emergency Department patient perceptions of privacy and confidentiality', 
The Journal of Emergency Medicine, 25 (2003), pp. 329-333 
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categories there are remarks on what they’re expected to be in. We’ve got, three 
rooms that they’re shall we call it private rooms that, walled rooms they’re well 
kind of insulated so there’s not kind of interaction from the outside environment. 
And if one had been missed inadvertently, they would be moved to something like 
that, they wouldn’t stay there. Like behind curtains.  
AE3 disagreed, arguing that patients were unlikely to disclose abuse to the first clinician 
they saw, an issue exacerbated by what he perceived to be an increasing emphasis on 
reducing clinician-patient contact:  
AE3: Right, let's say, I'm gonna, I'm gonna make an analogy, let's say you going to 
ask someone out on a date or you're going to ask someone to marry you, the first 
thing that pops in to your head you're probably not going to do. So the first 
encounter with the A&E staff is triage, so it's sitting right there but they're not 
going to say it. So you've got a modern emergency department care that's based on 
as few interactions with healthcare staff as possible and having all the waits joined 
together so you might only see me once whereas historically you might see me four 
times. So if there's patients and we think the more interactions we have the more 
likely they might be [to report abuse] you gotta be senior enough and experienced 
enough to try and do that without, you know, waving a flag over someone's head. 
Specialty-related confidentiality issues were not limited to A&E participants, and GP2 
discussed an obstacle in general practice; treating both the victim and perpetrator of 
domestic abuse:  
GP2: I think particularly again when as a GP when you’re in a, sort of, small 
community people can be worried of course their husbands, or their partner, or 
whoever it is who’s abusing them is also my patient. Or that their mother-in-law or 
someone is a patient, I think, although they know about confidentiality, I always 
make it explicitly clear in the consultation 
As GP2 notes, this issue is particularly prevalent in general practice, where both 
individuals are likely to have the same doctor, and this can prove to be a significant barrier 
to disclosure, something affirmed by the BMA
7
 While describing confidentiality in their 
                                                             
7
 The BMA acknowledges the problem in its domestic abuse guidelines, stating:   
‘It is not uncommon for the perpetrator to be registered with the same GP as the domestic abuse victim. It 
is stated in the GMC’s Duties of a doctor that a doctor must ‘Respect patients’ right to confidentiality’ and 
this would mean that following a disclosure of domestic abuse from a patient the doctor would be 
breaching confidentiality, and potentially increasing the risk of further abuse, by initiating a discussion 
about the abuse with the perpetrator.’ BMA, Domestic Abuse, p. 57  
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own specialty, several clinicians referred to other practice areas, with A&E and general 
practice often mentioned. While these comparisons were on occasion favourable, 
comments were generally rooted in negative perceptions of confidentiality in a certain 
service. A&E in particular was often criticised for less robust standards of confidentiality. 
Sexual health clinicians were, again, the most likely participants to make these kinds of 
remarks, commenting on perceived deficits in confidentiality in other areas on several 
occasions. When discussing disclosure, SHN2 referred to the difficulty for both A&E and 
GP patients:  
SHN2: Well you couldn’t do it [disclose] in A&E could you? [Laughing] You 
could hardly sit in A&E, exactly. Yeah nobody’s gonna say anything in A&E. 
Might as well be in a shopping centre or something, probably better in a shopping 
centre. Even in the GP surgery I mean you’re only in for such a short time and 
they’re just gonna focus on what you’ve come in with, they haven’t got time to go 
into anything else. 
The negative perception of confidentiality in emergency care was not uniform among 
sexual health practitioners however, and SHN1 – who had experience as an A&E nurse - 
was more neutral, even suggesting that patients may select A&E over sexual health in 
some cases due to the greater sense of anonymity. She was however clear in noting that her 
A&E experience saw confidentiality issues hamper efforts to treat abuse survivors on 
occasion:  
SHN1: I think if you’re in A&E then you can be there for anything. So in a sense 
that gives you some anonymity but it depends. The disclosure that I had in A&E 
was very very very difficult to get out. Because, the, the patient decided to stop 
talking so and there was police there and there was nurses and there was doctors 
and it was a really busy place and it was a really difficult disclosure because there 
had to be a lot of… a lot of extra work had to be done to ensure that/ and that meant 
actually shutting everybody out and just being with her on her own and making 
sure she felt safe and understood what was going on and what was going to happen.  
SHN1 referred to the anonymity of A&E on multiple occasions, arguing that it could 
encourage patients fearing identification. In doing so she referred to the perceived social 
stigma associated with sexual health: 
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SHN1: So I think A&E some people would prefer to be there than the be seen here 
because there are stigmas still about sexual health and about sitting in that waiting 
room and I know people say to me “I’m so worried I’ll see someone I know” erm. 
So I actually think the waiting room scenario in a sexual health clinic may be a 
barrier.  
SHD4 was critical of the idea that the physical environment of sexual health services 
provoked more disclosures than other specialties however, arguing that it was instead 
related to the time clinicians were able to take in encouraging individuals to disclose:  
SHD4: In hospitals you’ve still got the reception area, the seating area all 
consultations are done individual rooms anyway so, because it’s a similar set-up. I 
think it’s just the attitude and asking the question more frequently taking the time 
then take it further if somebody does disclose something. 
SHD1 and SHD2 – who had prior experience as GPs before working as sexual health 
doctors and FMEs - made similar comments to GP2 regarding time constraints and the 
presence of an abusive partner in general practice. SHD1’s views are outlined below and 
were closely echoed by her colleague:  
 
SHD1: It’s very difficult in General Practice you know. People are used to coming 
in with other people with them erm. You may be hearing two completely different 
stories from both partners and you know that somethings not quite adding up but if 
somebody know that you also see their partner and you know their family and 
things that it’s much more difficult for them to be open whereas here you know we 
have a conversation about confidentiality before we start.  
 
Comparisons with other specialties were expressed by other clinicians and GP1 and RD1 
also referred to A&E when describing confidentiality in their practice areas:  
 
GP1: You have to, you have to, you know, nurture that process, I think. Which you 
can do in general practice because you can see them again. We're not A&E, you 
know, it's not a revolving door, we're not kicking them out again, we're actually just, 
you know come down next week when you're ready and that's what people do. 
 
RD1: Plus our surgeries, they’re always seen in a, it’s not like an A&E department 
where it’s an open plan clinic with just a curtain roundabout, we’re in a room with 
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door. And the dental nurses are very chatty and good at, I mean that’s where our 
dental nurses are great is, and they sit with the patients whereas in A&E, I would 
imagine, having been in A&E a couple of times myself, you, they’re so busy.  
The frequency with which clinicians used other specialties as examples of poorer standards 
of confidentiality was a key finding. There was a willingness among many participants, 
from across a range of practice areas, to argue that A&E, in particular (and to a lesser 
extent GP services), faced significant challenges in maintaining confidentiality. In making 
these arguments, participants often stressed that survivors would be more likely to report 
abuse to a clinician in their specialty. Personal experience of working in A&E fed into 
these descriptions on occasion but was not required for participants to hold these views.   
4.2.7 Clinicians’ perceptions of patient views  
In concluding their review into female patients’ views of confidentiality, Jenkins et al 
argued that while patients and doctors shared many beliefs about confidentiality, the 
potential for divergence and miscommunication did exist, increasing the risk that patients 
would feel their confidentiality needs were unmet: 
Patients share a basic understanding of confidentiality as protection of information, 
but some might have expectations that are likely not met by current practice nor 
anticipated by doctors. Doctors should recognise that patients might have their own 
medical confidentiality models.
8
 
Several clinicians were open to the idea of discussing what medical confidentiality might 
mean to patients, reflecting on previous discussions, considering their own position as a 
patient, or both. Their responses were generally more diverse than when simply describing 
confidentiality as an abstract concept, independent of context. RD1 argued that patients 
lacked trust in promises of confidentiality and that this absence of faith was one of the 
barriers to disclosure. In her description, she argued that patients rarely believed in the 
notion of absolute confidentiality, a correct assumption as demonstrated by my survivor 
data later in this chapter:  
RD1:  I think it means that they… oh I don’t know, I was gonna say I think it 
means that they, they were more likely to talk about things, but I don’t think it does. 
Because I think the, I think patients automatically assume that you’ll, that you’ll 
                                                             
8 G. Jenkins, J. F. Merz, P. Sankar, 'A qualitative study of women’s views on medical confidentiality', Journal 
of Medical Ethics, 31 (2005), p. 499 
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tell. Or that something will happen. I don’t, I don’t think they automatically assume 
that whatever they say doesn’t leave the room. 
These assumptions, RD1 stated were the result of a lack of knowledge from patients.  
RD1: I don’t think it’s always, I don’t think patients are very well informed about 
confidentiality. 
Interestingly, this belief was not widely shared by other clinicians, and most participants 
stressed that patients had a pragmatic understanding of what confidentiality meant. Two 
A&E doctors (AE1 and AE2) argued that confidentiality was readily understood by their 
patients, including where the limits to it lay. AE1’s comments are outlined below, to 
demonstrate these arguments:  
AE1: Obviously they do realise that anything they disclose to you is confidential to 
the point where they have got the capacity to understand their personal wellbeing 
and who they are and make the choices but there is a limit to it where it comes to 
criminal action.  
Consultant forensic psychologist FPsych1 discussed what confidentiality meant to patients 
in more emotive terms, straying from knowledge of specific laws and regulations and 
instead focussing on how confidentiality concerns affected their real-life interactions with 
health and legal services:  
FPsych1: Confidentiality’s probably something that worries most complainers, that 
I'm asking them personal details, they are, some of them are petrified that what 
they're telling you is going to be reported in, you know, The [NEWSPAPER], or 
something like this, or a local newspaper and then everybody in the town will know. 
So, I think, my sense would be that prevents a lot of individuals going to court or 
disclosing or reporting to the authorities because they would be so worried about 
finding themself in that situation. So it would be the shame of, you know, being 
associated with something, would prevent them disclosing in the first place. 
FPsych1’s argument  illustrates clinicians’ beliefs of the potential impact poor perceptions 
of confidentiality can have on patients - particularly the patients he commonly deals with; 
the victims of crime. FP1 provided the most nuanced response of all participants, stressing 
that ideas and awareness of confidentiality were idiosyncratic: 
FP1: I think it will mean different things to-to different people depending on their 
personal views, how much they know about it. Me as a patient? [Pause] To me it 
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just means I am entirely happy for anything to be shared between medical 
professionals but would not want it shared outwith that unless there was a very 
good reason to do so. But I think there's probably, there is a broad spectrum of 
opinion within public, some of which will, want it to be more restrictive than that. 
 
AE3’s view supported FP1’s and moved away from his emergency department colleagues’ 
argument that confidentiality was inherently understood in a certain way by patients - 
though he did concede that it was of secondary importance to most individuals. 
Involvement with legal services, he stressed, had a tangible impact on its importance:  
AE3: I think it means different things to different people and I think that, erm. 
Most people, so most patients that I see don't give it any thought at all and unless 
the reason that they're there involves around something fiscal it probably doesn't 
actually matter to most of them. Erm, I think what they might equate it to is privacy. 
Two clinicians, (GP1 and AE2), linked patients’ understandings of confidentiality to 
factors outside of the patient-clinician relationship or health service interactions generally. 
GP1 highlighted the role of social media in particular, though she stressed that the 
emergence of forums for sharing information did not detract from the importance of the 
clinical relationship.     
GP1: I don't know. We live in a, we live in a world of Facebook, what's another - 
Snapchat? People put up things all over the place. I think though that people still 
hold, there's something held that's quite special about the relationship with patients 
and doctors. 
Despite elevating the importance of this relationship however, GP1, when considering her 
feelings as a patient herself was more pragmatic in her descriptions of confidentiality:  
GP1: I think in terms of, you know, I go to my doctor and talk - but I don't go and 
expose my life story to my doctor, I'm not going to the doctor for that, I'm going for 
very specific medical things. So, the confidentiality is just bound about that very 
specific medical thing that's all. 
 
Social media and class featured in AE2’s responses, when he argued that patients become 
aware of medical confidentiality through engaging with media sources rather than directly 
through medical interactions:  
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AE2: I think patients know [about confidentiality], they know probably through 
TV and you know patients know often what their rights are and often people of a 
more lower socio-economic class know what their rights are. You know their police 
rights, legal rights you know because maybe they need to know more than you 
know maybe, I don’t know. So people generally, maybe it’s social media, maybe 
it’s the TV and TV programmes they know. People inherently know that you know 
patient lawyer interactions are confidential and patient doctor, you know they’re 
confidential agreements. You know, do they know that we have to break that at 
times? I’m sure many do, maybe not all do. But I would assume there’s a common 
sense you know they would know that we maybe have to break it at times.  
Several individuals referred to a cultural shift in attitudes towards privacy and 
confidentiality, with young people and social media users in particular seeing less 
importance in them.  This theme was repeated in interviews with legal professionals as will 
be seen in later chapters, with some even legitimising the use of sensitive medical 
information as part of this wider trend. Ideas around confidentiality and society/class were 
also referenced by AE3 who argued that perceptions of hierarchy influenced views around 
confidentiality while stressing again how these attitudes were entirely idiosyncratic: 
AE3: The people that don't want to risk the information going anywhere at all, I 
think just won't tell you it. So, if you're a perpetrator of a crime you're going to say 
nothing. If you're the victim but you're also the perpetrator you might not say much, 
but - so I think it means different things to different people. And I think some 
sections of society are just absolutely reluctant to share information with anyone 
they see in a position of authority and we do fall into that camp 
That both AE2 and AE3 referred to class is noteworthy. Their colleague AE1 too made 
numerous references to class (and the growth of social media) throughout the course of his 
interview, arguing that a more open attitude to data sharing made a doctor’s role more 
‘delicate’. Undoubtedly, A&E clinicians will deal with large volumes of patients suffering 
injuries caused by criminal behaviour (either as victims or perpetrators), alongside other 
health complications and many of these will be associated with poverty.
9
 This is a result of 
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 Chris Giacomantonio, Alex Sutherland, Adrian Boyle, Jonathan Shepherd, Kristy Kruithof and Matthew 
Davies, Injury surveillance: using A&E data for crime reduction Guidance for police analysts and practitioners, 
(December 2014), 
<https://www.college.police.uk/News/archive/January2015/Documents/CoP_AE_Guidance_report_final.pd
f>, [accessed: 14th July 2019], pp. 9-10; Richard Cookson, 'England’s A&E crisis is fuelled by inequality', The 
Conversation, (19th January, 2016), <https://theconversation.com/englands-aande-crisis-is-fuelled-by-
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A&E being one of the most accessible specialties, where individuals are able to access 
medical aid without a scheduled appointment and with relative anonymity. As I outlined 
earlier in this chapter, these circumstances affect the context of clinicians’ interactions with 
the patients they treat, and this could then affect how clinicians working in this specialty 
perceive confidentiality. The role of clinicians in shaping patients’ perceptions was 
addressed by senior sexual health doctor SHD3, who argued that patients’ trust in 
confidentiality was often rooted in a misplaced faith in its absoluteness. Her view was 
therefore opposite to RD1’s:   
SHD3:  I think it’s very much more black and white, I think they think they can 
come in here and that anything they say can, is, is totally confidential, we won’t 
share a thing. Often, you know we do have to break that down. 
SHD3’s view supports the findings of Jenkins et al, that patient confidentiality 
expectations are often higher than can reasonably be met by the clinicians that treat them. 
It also finds support from Cory et al, who observed that often, survivors of abuse perceived 
the level of confidentiality between themselves and a clinician to be of a sufficient level to 
prevent disclosure to third parties:  
Many women request that records not be kept about disclosures of abuse. They put 
their trust in a health care provider, assuming that all communications with their 
health care provider are privileged and will not be disclosed. Women may be led to 
believe that the record keeper is someone who is obliged to keep confidential 
information about the harms they have endured. The health care provider may not 
fully understand or be explicit about the limits to confidentiality.
10
 
The last sentence suggests that clinicians have a responsibility to inform survivors about 
confidentiality in consultations, to ensure that they are adequately informed about how 
disclosures will be handled. SHD3 is responsible for conducting consultations with patients 
who have recently suffered rape and/or sexual assault, often by an individual they know. 
Her assertion that patients’ views of confidentiality regularly have to be amended by 
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clinical staff – ‘we do have to break that down’ - is instructive and suggests that Cory et 
al’s findings might apply elsewhere. The extent to which other clinicians have these kinds 
of discussions with patients, how these vary by specialty and how the decisions to discuss 
confidentiality are made is the subject of the next section of this chapter.  
4.2.8 Discussing confidentiality with patients   
Clinicians are not required - either by law or the advice of regulatory groups - to discuss 
confidentiality at the outset of a consultation (though they are advised to do so in all but 
exceptional circumstances if they decide to share patient information for reasons beyond 
that patient’s care).11 Given the time pressure experienced by practitioners in most 
specialities, a nuanced discussion with every patient would prove to be impossible. 
Nonetheless, several participants reported making time to discuss confidentiality with 
patients at some point in consultations, particularly when they suspected those patients had 
suffered domestic abuse. Reflecting a lack of available guidance, it was unsurprising to 
find that these discussions varied both in frequency – some clinicians spoke about 
confidentiality in nearly every consultation, some only when they wanted to reassure a 
patient – and in detail.  
There was also a substantial amount of variation in how confidentiality was described by 
clinicians within these discussions. Some practitioners were keen to stress ideas of 
absoluteness, that nothing the patient said would “leave the room”, while others preferred 
to include descriptions of when they might have to report something a patient said.  The 
likelihood of clinicians discussing confidentiality varied depending on their area of 
practice, with those most likely to treat the victims of crime the most likely to discuss 
confidentiality regularly.  
A minority of individuals discussed confidentiality routinely, with most sexual health 
clinicians and FPsych1 often including these discussions at the beginning of a consultation 
– though this was also evident among general practitioners and A&E doctors. Of the six 
sexual health clinicians (four doctors and two nurses), five routinely discussed 
confidentiality during consultations, whether working as FMEs or in routine sexual health 
appointments. For SHD1, an initial discussion of confidentiality was useful in the event 
that breaching it became necessary:  
                                                             
11 The GMC also note that explicit consent is not required for information sharing for the purpose of local 
clinical audit, see GMC, Confidentiality, p. 14 
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SHD1: I think that’s why the discussion at the start with people about 
confidentiality and the limits of that is very very important so that if I am going to 
break their confidentiality I can refer back to it and say “well look when we started, 
when we had that chat around, you know confidentiality. “Here’s the reason why I 
need to discuss this with somebody else”. And how that’s going to happen. I think 
people knowing that their confidentiality is going to be broken, that they’ll be told 
first, I think that’s really important.  
SHN1 began her account of practice in this regard, with a note on the meaning and general 
scope of confidentiality, particularly as it related to patients’ suffering some form of abuse:  
SHN1: I’ve never really had a problem with confidentiality. I think people are 
aware maybe not of its limitation but it’s not as if anybody’s disclosing that they’re 
doing things, it’s normally somebody looking for help so they understand that in 
order to, to get that, it’s not breaking confidentiality but it’s just using the 
information they’ve given to protect them so. 
She went on to note that these meanings should be explained to patients, both to reassure 
them and encourage a discourse but also to inform them about where the limits of 
confidentiality lay. This dialogue, she argued, could promote better interactions and better 
care. As noted in the specialty section, many sexual health participants described 
confidentiality as particularly important in their field, and SHN1’scomments above suggest 
the benefits of emphasising this to patients. She qualified her remarks however by noting 
the potentially adverse reaction that confidentiality discussions could have at the beginning 
of a consultation, particularly when boundaries of confidentiality were mentioned. This did 
not discourage these discussions she argued, but meant instead that clinicians should use 
this opportunity to reassure:   
SHN1: It’s hard though because I sometimes think if you start with that, they might 
immediately hold back and you don’t want to take away the, an opportunity for 
them to disclose and for you to help them but. Yeah so it’s reassuring through 
explanation I think, is really important.  
In making this argument, SHN1 suggests that despite being engineered to encourage 
frankness and treatment, when the limits of confidentiality are described, they can impede 
disclosure and the potential for treatment, though on balance concluding that reassuring 
patients through discussion is an effective practice. AE3 made a similar argument, though 
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also noting that potential legal involvement did cause patients to ask about the limits of 
confidentiality more frequently, in turn requiring him to outline these limits in a way that 
didn’t prevent them from ‘talking’. Of the two GPs interviewed, only GP2 discussed 
confidentiality routinely during a consultation. She noted that she instigated these 
conversations rather than patients:   
GP2: They don't bring it up. I always bring it up - maybe because I specifically 
bring it up. [Pause] And again I'm sure it's because I've been there for so long and 
they know me and they trust me. That for them, because they'll go, "well I know 
that, you don't need to tell me that." I'm just going, "I know, but I'm just saying."  
GP2 makes a point of routinely discussing confidentiality with patients, even when they 
have a long-standing relationship. This practice seems to have arisen in part, from being 
asked to provide medical records by legal authorities and a concern for the level of 
informed consent patients have in this process. FPsych1 was one of the only practitioners 
to routinely discuss confidentiality at the beginning of every consultation with abuse 
survivors.  His protocol for discussing confidentiality was also the most comprehensive 
and included recording the confidentiality discussion in his notes, something the Royal 
College of Psychiatrists note is completed by a minority of practitioners.
12
 He went on to 
describe his confidentiality practice in detail:  
FPsych1: If you're using 'patients' to define people that I would see for court issues, 
complainers, or accused or something, then I would always state at the start of the 
interview that, erm, "I'm going to be writing things down, I will be taking notes as 
we go along and I cannot keep anything confidential. So anything I write down 
may be disclosed in open court or other forum. So, are you ok with that?" Generally 
they'll say yes and then I will ask them, you know, "what do I mean by what I just 
said?" And they say, "well, you're gonna write things down and you can't keep any 
secrets because it's going to court." You know, that's fine. 
If the complainer or, is maybe, their intellectual functioning is not so great, I'll give 
that and then I'll give an adapted version of that and I'll go through the bits and the 
elements, just to make sure, yes, they are giving consent. I think, er, some 
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practitioners might use a form or something  and just get somebody to sign a form, 
but my experience is at very early stage of an assessment if you give somebody a 
form they'll probably just sign it without reading it, so it's much better that I have a 
conversation with them about that. So every time, always in my notes, the first 
thing beyond their name and date of birth, would be that I have explained to them 
the limits of confidentiality and that everything will be written down and that 
they've agreed and that they've accepted that and we proceed on that basis. 
The parameters of these discussions were fundamentally distinct from all other participants 
as they were conducted as a function of ongoing legal proceedings. Unlike for example, an 
A&E clinician, by the time of having a consultation, FPsych1 would already be aware that 
his patient had suffered (or was alleged to have suffered) domestic abuse. Accordingly, 
FPsych1 would not need to make assurances about confidentiality to encourage disclosure 
to allow treatment in the same sense. FPsych1 pointed out this distinction himself:  
FPsych1: So, when I say about the confidentiality to them it's because I don't want 
them to be under the impression that they're going to have a private chat with me in 
the same way that you might go along to your family doctor and assume that that 
person's going to keep that a private discussion, when they don't because they take 
a note of it and, you know, it's an electronic record and they may have to inform 
others. But I don't want anyone to be under the illusion, and that's an accused or a 
complainer or victim, that this is just a private chat with me. So I don't want them 
to be surprised then when they see the results in a report and perhaps, in a court 
case, you know, people are making inferences, you know, based on something 
they've told me in a report inside a packed courtroom. So I just want them to be 
100% informed that I do not have a confidentiality when it comes to matters for the 
court. 
FPsych1’s assertion about confidentiality and the court implies that his confidentiality 
discussions must be totally distinct from those of other practitioners, as his practice is 
much more directly linked with legal proceedings. However, it is worth comparing his 
practice with the sexual health clinicians in this study, particularly those that have forensic 
medical experience. While not routinely acting on instructions from defence advocates, 
FME’s often conduct examinations at the behest of a patient accompanied by police or 
where future police involvement is anticipated. As such, they are required to accurately 
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record what a patient tells them, in the knowledge that this will later be used in court. 
SHD1, reflected on the difficulties of this obligation: 
SHD1: Even when you’re doing the examination you know if this comes to court 
you know somebody might tell you something that you know has just wiped out 
their entire case and I have a duty, a responsibility to record that and I think “you’re 
never going to get a guilty conviction” and that’s really hard, it’s really difficult  
Given the proximity to legal proceedings of clinicians in both specialties, it is instructive to 
note that their discussions of confidentiality are generally more robust than those given by 
practitioners with less court experience and suggests that dealing with victims of crime 
increases the chances of such discussions taking place. A similar argument could be made 
for A&E clinicians, who frequently treat crime victims and may often be aware that cases 
will end in court proceedings i.e. serious assault, rape or murder. There is an important 
distinction however between participating A&E clinicians, FMEs and FPsych1 in that the 
latter two will always be consulting with the victims of crime, whereas A&E clinicians will 
deal with a variety of cases.   
While AE2 was aware of the importance of confidentiality to victims of physical and 
psychological violence, his assurances regarding confidentiality were generally more 
reactive than proactive, seeking to put patients at ease and encourage disclosure after 
already using his clinical judgement to determine whether such assurances were warranted:  
AE2:  I would usually say to, to a patient if, if it’s of, I wouldn’t say it to all 
patients, I don’t say it to all patients, I think people inherently know that there’s a 
patient but if I think that, if I’m asking something and if I sense a hesitancy or, or a 
you know then I will re-enforce that this is private and it won’t, you know it’s 
between… them and I. So yeah. But I wouldn’t say I do it all the time, but if I feel 
that there’s a sensitive topic or, or any hesitancy then yes I will always say to them 
you know, you know this is completely confidential.  
This practice was distinct from that of his more senior colleague, AE3 who often discussed 
confidentiality at the outset of a consultation. In a similar manner to RD1 earlier in the 
chapter, AE3 conceded that patients did not necessarily believe assurances of 
confidentiality, which may indeed be the correct position to take given the circumstances:  
AE3: Right off. So, talk to them about two things, talk to them about duty of 
candour, which is, you know the legislation which needs tightening up, talk to them 
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about that, and talking to them about confidenti-confidentiality. Where I think it's 
appropriate. If you come with a sprained ankle and you're just going up the round, 
it's probably not that relevant, but, yeah. So if it's interaction with police or other 
people, very much about saying, do you know what, everything you say here, it's 
totally between you and I. Doesn't go anywhere else. Yes, it's written in your notes, 
but those notes are legal documents and they are entirely protected and you don't 
get access to them unless it's you. [Pause] I think sometimes people don't really 
believe you though 
It is notable that AE3 decided to include descriptions of the duty of candour in his 
confidentiality discussions. Serving something of a reciprocal function to confidentiality, 
the duty of candour encourages clinicians to be open with patients following issues with 
their care. As such, when presented in a discussion that also includes the duty of 
confidentiality, AE3 highlighted the collaborative relationship he tries to build with abuse 
survivors, encouraging them to be open and honest with him and affirming that he will do 
the same. Despite the duality of confidentiality and candour, and their potential to improve 
openness in the patient-clinician relationship, AE3 was the only participant to highlight 
both during interview, though this might simply reflect its infancy in practice.
13
While it 
was generally true that those treating crime victims were likely to discuss confidentiality 
with patients, this was not uniformly the case and in contrast to both AE2 and AE3, AE1 
believed that patients were generally aware of what confidentiality meant and the limits to 
it, seeing no reason to discuss it with them as a matter of course. MF1 too, as a consultant 
maxillofacial surgeon frequently treats the victims of crime - and even suggested this was 
the bulk of his practice.  Nonetheless, he didn’t discuss confidentiality with patients, 
arguing that his exacting confidentiality standards (as noted in section 4.2.1) made such 
discussions unnecessary: 
MF1: No, I don't actually [speak about confidentiality]. You're not ... not 
specifically because I have an absolute, I don't talk to anybody about what I do in 
terms of, or at least I'm very, I'm very reticent about mentioning even what I do at 
work. It's interesting, you know, if you're out, certainly as a doctor trying to 
socialise, and we-we tend to talk about work and you tend to talk about cases, I 
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probably talk about cases far less than most people. And if you meet me socially 
and you're not medical, I will talk about very, very little. And part of that is an 
absolute confidentiality thing. 
The fact that MF1 was the only maxillofacial surgeon in this study makes any direct 
comparison with other specialties difficult. His comments can be compared somewhat, to 
RD1 and OS1, as senior clinicians specialising in treating injuries to the head and neck - 
especially since OS1 had worked in a maxillofacial unit. OS1’s comments exhibit 
similarities in practice on the question of discussing confidentiality with patients.  She too 
did not routinely discuss confidentiality:  
OS1: Not specifically, I mean I suppose I assume that they appreciate that our 
consultations are that our consultations are confidential. I’ve never really had 
patients ask me about that and actually most of them if I do ask them about 
domestic abuse are quite happy to, to tell me about it, nobody’s ever questioned 
that it wouldn’t be confidential. And I obviously treat it as a confidential thing.  
RD1 meanwhile expressed frustration with available confidentiality training, noting that 
while she did not routinely discuss confidentiality with patients, she wasn’t sure if she 
should introduce some level of discussion in future:   
RD1: I mean I suppose to be honest, I would like more training in this because 
maybe we should be saying at the very start of the consultation for… for every 
patient “You do realise that anything you say in this room is, is confidential unless 
something you were to disclose is needs to be shared for your own protection or the 
protection of another person”. Maybe we should be saying something like that at 
the start of every consultation. We don’t at the moment and I, I’ve never been in a 
consultation where that was the case. But maybe for trauma we should be doing 
that.  
The cases of MF1 and OS1 notwithstanding, the link between practitioners treating crime 
victims and discussing confidentiality was noticeable. Those who came into contact with 
these patients most frequently largely supported the idea of discussing confidentiality 
during consultations, either on every occasion, or based upon indications that this was 
warranted (i.e. in cases of suspected abuse). Among sexual health clinicians this practice 
was particularly well established.  
The practice of discussing confidentiality was not explored with FP1 due to the rarity in 
which she encountered living patients.  
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4.2.9 Breaching confidentiality  
In the preceding chapters, I outlined the lack of available information for clinicians 
regarding confidentiality and domestic abuse, particularly over what constitutes a serious 
crime that would allow its breach. In this section, I assess participants’ responses to 
breaching confidentiality and how this should be dealt with. As was the case in deciding 
when to discuss confidentiality, there was variation among interviewees, though there was 
almost unilateral agreement on one particular circumstance in which confidentiality had to 
be broken – when child protection concerns were involved.  
Despite the focus of this research being domestic abuse between adults, almost all 
clinicians spoke of their disclosure obligations in cases involving children, either when 
they suspected children were being abused or that they were witnessing domestic abuse 
inflicted on a parent. Fourteen of sixteen participating clinicians mentioned child 
protection concerns as a reason for breaching confidentiality. Of the two remaining clinical 
participants, one (FPsych1) encountered patients in the context of ongoing court 
proceedings and was obliged to disclose consultation notes to the court in any event. As 
such, he was speaking from a position in which medical records had already been made 
available to him and legal services were aware of alleged criminal acts. The other, (MF1), 
while not speaking about disclosure relating to specific child protection concerns, did talk 
about a general obligation to breach confidentiality if there was a risk to harm of any third 
party. 
For the remaining fourteen clinicians, child protection disclosure obligations were used as 
a point of reference, occasions in which they felt comfortable in breaching confidentiality - 
even against a patient’s express wishes. This certainty reflects the greater emphasis by 
medical regulators on identifying child abuse, as outlined in chapter two.
 14
 While opinion 
was almost unanimous when children were perceived to be at risk, there was less of a 
consensus when the patient was an adult and asked a clinician not to report abuse. Despite 
their familiarity in treating victims of crime, both AE2 and AE3 experienced difficulties in 
determining the limits of confidentiality in these circumstances.AE3 explained where these 
issues lay:  
AE3: I think that, you know, there are rules and regulations around knife crime and 
gun crime, so, somebody being shot for example [laughs], seems unlikely that the 
police won’t know, but I'm going to have to tell them. Stabbed, probably as well. 
                                                             
14 BMA, Domestic Abuse, p. 52  
145 
 
That isn't to say that we do, but we probably should. The involvement of children. 
So, there's obviously child protection issues around about some, erm, domestic 
violence. But that's about the only times. So a woman living with a man, either of 
them assaults the other, no children involved, no knives, no guns, it's really difficult 
to justify, you know, breaching that person's confidentiality when they've voiced a 
desire not to involve the police, to go on and do it. You're on pretty shaky ground. 
MF1 also articulated these concerns, referring in part to what he perceived as a convoluted 
mass of differing regulations on best practice:  
MF1: I don't know how much you know about these sorts of things, but the 
regulation, the volume of regulation round these things, I genuinely don't think, you 
know, if you said to me, what are the regulations in detail? I can't tell you. In broad 
principles I don't tell anybody anything about a third party unless I had their 
permission to do so. The guiding principle is, well don't disclose anything about 
somebody unless you know that they're happy to do so. Or you've got some sort of 
overriding, sort of need to breach that principle. 
 
Four clinicians (three doctors and one nurse) referred to guidance - either provided by their 
place of work or a professional regulator - when discussing whether they would breach 
confidentiality. SHD1 began by arguing that GMC guidance was comprehensive and 
useful in guiding decisions on breaching confidentiality. However, as her answer continued, 
(in a manner reminiscent to RD1 discussing confidentiality) she expressed frustration at a 
lack of practical training available, targeted at situations that were likely to occur in her 
everyday practice. She also bemoaned the lack of advice for clinicians when faced with 
ethical dilemmas over a breach:  
 
SHD1: I have a legal responsibility to maintain that confidentiality this is not an 
option it’s not like a thing that we just bandy around and there’s very clear 
guidance about if and when confidentiality needs to be breached and in what way 
that can be, even just patients like requesting their case notes and things like that, I 
can’t just print off a copy of their case notes and give it to them you know it’s, 
there are very very clear guidelines and I think sometimes although we all have a 
lot of training and there’s lots of GMC guidance about confidentiality and how to 
maintain it and when to break it and whatever, I don’t know that people are really 
given the practical hands on you know like exact scenarios “when would that occur, 
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what do you do in that situation”. You know it’s all very well having sort of vague 
guidance “oh refer this on to whoever you’re” but it’s like what does that actually 
look like in this setting. You know. “Oh refer it on to like the such and such team” 
it’s like “how do I do that, do I write them a letter, do I pick up the phone, who do I 
speak to” you know. I think those, the real practicalities of if you’ve concerns about 
whether you need to break confidentiality, how you sort that out on that given day 
is not often clearly, people are not trained in that way. And I think that’s when it’s 
really important is when the patient’s’ sitting in front of you and you’re thinking 
“Oh my God I think I need to break this person’s confidentiality. What do I say, 
how do I do it” you know. Having all the wee booklets in the world or “discuss it 
with your defence body” you can’t just slip out the room “Oh just wait there for a 
half an hour while I go and like have a chat with someone, find out what I’m 
supposed to do”.  
Several clinicians expressed concern over what constituted a legitimate reason for 
breaching confidence, both in a clinical setting, and when the topic moved to 
confidentiality and legal investigation (as will be seen in the subsequent chapters). GP2 
highlighted these concerns in a manner that was repeated among colleagues: 
 
GP2: [on guidelines for breaching confidentiality] it evolves and changes all the 
time. Erm, and what we would always say with students is if you're ever in any 
doubt speak with a senior colleague for advice or speak to your defence union. 
 
OS1 spoke about the importance of giving the patient control in confidentiality breaches, 
stressing that she would only break a patients’ confidentiality against their will if there was 
a ‘clear and present danger’ to them or others:  
OS1: I mean my thoughts on domestic abuse really are that many people are living 
with it as a chronic, situation over many, many years and it might have taken them 
a while to actually tell anybody about it, they might have suffered many injuries in 
the past. And I think they need to be given some control back, to decide when and 
if they want to do something about it. But the other thing is you know, we know 
and you’ll know as well that the most dangerous time for somebody is when they 
choose to leave so the last thing you want to do is cause more harm by precipitating 
that. So I think that needs/ is much better done in a planned way, than it is done in, 
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in the heat of the moment because somebody like me has decided to take it into 
their own hands and phone the police, I don’t think that’s helpful at all. So I would 
tend to think that’s the way I would approach the situation. I think patients’, the 
best person to know about their situation and how dangerous it is.  
As outlined in chapter 2, clear guidance over disclosure exists when patients are suspected 
to have suffered knife or gunshot wounds. However, only five clinicians in this research 
referred to these obligations, relatively surprising given the prevalence of weapon use (of 
knives in particular) in domestic abuse. Among those five, there was a general lack of 
certainty over whether such injuries would prompt them to breach confidentiality as a 
matter of course. Two out of three participating A&E doctors expressed doubt over 
disclosure in these cases, particularly in cases of knife crime. As noted in the breaching 
confidentiality section, consultant AE3 suggested that stab wounds would not necessarily 
cause him to breach confidentiality. However, he later nuanced this response by arguing 
that confidentiality couldn’t readily accommodate patients admitting to attacking others:   
AE3: Medical confidentiality doesn't mean that you can stab someone and then you 
come in and tell me, I've stabbed someone, and I just go, well that's doctor-patient 
confidentiality, I do nothing with it  
 
His colleague AE2 gave examples of situations where he had struggled to deal with 
confidentiality and knife crime, reporting one case where he initially refused to pass on a 
patient’s name to police, asking the patient themselves to make contact. When asked 
whether he had ever breached confidentiality without consent, he noted:  
 
AE2: I don’t, I can’t think in my memory, I’m sure I’ve been doing this for long 
enough, I’m sure I’ve probably had to at some points but I can’t think of any 
immediate cases where they’ve said I don’t want you to and I’ve said I’ve had. 
Although there are some. There are some yeah, knife crime is one of those ones. 
Yeah no there are sorry, there are a few cases of knife crimes, that young guys have 
said I don’t want the police to know and we’ve said look we actually have to, its’ 
the law. Knife crime there’s a risk to others. So yeah, no it has happened a few 
times.  
OS1 meanwhile, noted that incoming regulations had caused her to amend practice:  
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OS1: Well at the time when I was seeing more of those there wasn’t a, there wasn’t 
a duty to disclose use of knives so, that’s something that’s come in relatively 
recently so I would now. But at the time no because there wasn’t a requirement to 
do that yet.  
While drug and alcohol abuse are also often associated with domestic abuse, clinicians are 
not obliged to breach confidentiality when patients disclose addictions. Only one 
participant referred to disclosure obligations and the use of illegal drugs (OS1) and this 
was purely to describe a situation in which she would not feel obliged to breach patient 
confidentiality. 
Having now thoroughly assessed how clinicians address confidentiality in essentially 
abstract, theoretical terms, the next section will begin to explore how these ideas of 
confidentiality translate into practice, through the creation of the medical record.  
4.2.10 Recording abuse and what is written down  
Given their medical - and potential legal - value, the information clinicians record is of 
considerable importance. On the subject of record keeping in cases of suspected abuse, the 
BMA notes:  
Keeping accurate documentation of successive consultations with a patient who has 
disclosed domestic abuse, or who it is thought may do so in the future, is crucial. A 
healthcare professional’s record of the domestic abuse may be required as evidence 
in several scenarios, such as during the prosecution of a perpetrator… Healthcare 
professionals do not need permission to record the disclosure of domestic abuse or 
their findings from an examination, and this must be explained to the patient.
15
 
This section explores the practice of multispecialty clinicians in deciding what to record in 
medical records, and when, with a focus on cases in which domestic abuse is suspected. 
Despite the assertions of the BMA and others that accurate and detailed records should be 
kept, this was not always the practice in this study, with participants often prioritising the 
wishes of their patient in deciding how much information to record. On occasion, some 
clinicians stated that they made promises to not record certain information as a means to 
encourage patients to discuss issues in more detail. AE3 made such promises in order to 
gather the information from the patient that allowed appropriate treatment: 
                                                             
15 BMA, Domestic Abuse, p. 91 
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AE3: I need them to understand that they should tell me anything and everything 
and that, with virtually all the information they tell me, it's never going to go 
anywhere else. And it's probably not even all going to be written down in the notes. 
But it is also important to say to people that where, if something they think is very, 
very private is very, very relevant then I am going to have to share it with other 
healthcare professionals  
As can be observed in the sections above, AE3 generally prioritises frankness in his 
patients over reporting domestic abuse to legal services, arguing that this increases his 
capacity to do his job and provide better care. Accordingly, while he did later acknowledge 
the importance of clear notes for clinicians to use as witnesses in court, he stressed that the 
information written down in a patient’s records was for medical use. Notably, despite 
noting their primary importance as medical artefacts, AE3 expanded on the importance of 
making notes as clear as possible for when he may later have to refer to them in court, 
something Cory et al also observed among the clinicians in their research.
16
 
While AE3 spoke about recording information for mostly medical reasons, other clinicians 
did prioritise the future use of the record in court when deciding how to document a 
consultation, though the reasons for doing so were varied. SHD2 for example, a senior 
sexual health doctor with extensive involvement with legal services in cases of domestic 
abuse and rape, argued that the potential for legal proceedings informed all recording 
practice:  
SHD2: We just have to assume that whatever we write is disclosable. So we work 
on that premise.  
AE3’s colleague was similarly convinced that when a case was likely to involve legal 
services, he would amend his recording to make it more detailed:  
AE2: I mean there’s definitely cases when you’re dealing with cases like, knife 
crime, physical assault, you know those types of cases are likely to go to court so 
you probably in some ways, not that you don’t keep good records anyway but you 
know, “I’ve got to keep even better records here”. So you’ll draw the injuries and 
you’ll make a point of just, because you know you might be asked to call upon your 
notes a year, sometimes these are a year, two years down the line you end up in 
court and you have no recollection of the, of the interaction. So you rely on your 
                                                             
16 Cory et al, Reasonable Doubt, p. 11  
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notes, so you definitely know in certain situations “right I’m gonna make even 
clearer notes and even more detailed documentation”. 
The utilitarian aspect of AE2’s argument highlights the reliance many clinicians’ have on 
medical records when required to give evidence in court. Anticipating that their testimony 
may be required, several clinicians reported adding as much detail as possible to the notes 
in case they had to use them in future:  
SHN1: I would document … as much information as I could because if that, 
everything we write down is legal, can be used in court so, needs to be as accurate 
as possible. So anything that that person can remember, that they’re telling me, I’ll 
document.  
These views came from clinicians wanting to be prepared should they have to give 
evidence in court. Many participants noted that clear records were essential given the 
distance in time between treating survivors and the trial and the subsequent issues in 
recalling events. In this my findings were supported by Cory et al, who observed the same 
responses among clinicians.
17
 
SHD1 also reported considering future legal proceedings when deciding what to write in a 
patient’s medical notes. However, rather than concentrating on including more detailed 
information, she focussed on determining what information was entirely relevant and 
excluded any extraneous detail which may harm the patient’s case:  
SHD1: We don’t go into lots of details about someone’s past history or things like 
that.   So very specific to that particular assault and what we need to know you 
know we don’t need to write down all these because if I’ve written down lots of 
things about someone’s medical history or previous gynaecological history or 
whatever it means that if I’m asked in court I have to answer those questions 
whereas if I don’t have that information its kept confidential. 
SHD1’s position was largely in the minority, with most clinicians, (even those in the same 
specialty) arguing that anticipation of court would lead them to write more detailed patient 
records. SHN2 spoke about how the prospect of legal proceedings would even affect 
whether she would discuss the details of a domestic abuse attack with the patient:  
SHN2: In fact we don’t tend to ask a lot of detail about what actually happened 
with the violence. You know because we tend to ask more about you know. 
                                                             
17 Cory et al, Reasonable Doubt, p. 84 
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Because I suppose if it’s not, going to court, we would sort of, you know they say 
they’re not telling the police or something, I don’t know if it would really help if 
you were asking all the detail about what happened. I mean you try to get some 
because it’s on the notes and then if they do want to do something in the future it’s 
there so they can use it as evidence... So, we would I think more if it was sexual 
assault but if it’s violence, less so…. Yeah. We’d probably you know, they would 
say “Oh he was violent” but they wouldn’t, we won’t ask “What did he actually 
do?”. Yeah or whatever. Yeah, that’s interesting, I’ve never thought about that 
before. 
SHN2’s prioritisation of recording further detail in sexual assault cases rather than physical 
violence cases is notable and would seem to run contrary to the advice of organisations like 
the BMA and even to that of her colleagues. She went on to describe how her practice 
would change if the patient had been sexually assaulted, with an emphasis on recording 
information that would be seen as more legally relevant than medically relevant:  
SHN2: If somebody has been [sexually] assaulted we do try and get sort of as 
much detail as we can you know when it happened, where it happened, who was 
there you know what they can remember you know just so that if it did go to court 
then you know there’s a bit of information there. 
While SHN2’s practice does vary in this regard it is important to note that she did describe 
recording extra detail as a future resource for patients, should they decide to take part in 
prosecutions. GP1 described a recording process that was perhaps most similar to that 
advised by the BMA, where she was keen to offer the patient support but made sure to 
document what they disclosed:  
GP1: So, if a patient tells you something, as long as you're sure it's not a child 
protection issue for example, which is what we've already decided can be over-can 
override just about anything, if it's just about a distressing experience and they don't 
want anyone else to know and they're just coming to tell you and that is their 
method of disclosure and then moving on, then there's no dilemma about that, you 
know. It's not something you go and blab about or talk about with somebody else. 
You will document it though because it's relevant. 
Her colleague GP2 by contrast stressed that her own recording practice was to negotiate 
with the patient what she noted down: 
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GP2: I will ask them as well. You know, “we're talking about this, you know we're 
talking about this, are you happy for me to make a wee, sort of, note in your records 
that this is happening, no one has to access to this apart from the other doctors who 
would only open your notes if they were seeing you.” So again, I will always ask 
about that. Occasionally people will go “no I don't want you to put that”, so I'd say, 
“would you be happy for me to just say 'problems at home with husband’ and that 
we've discussed that”, and they'll go, “I'm ok with that”. 
 
When asked why domestic abuse patients did not want this information added, GP2 
suggested it was fear of this information being uncovered by partners/ex-partners. As 
already noted, fear of a disclosure being discovered by the perpetrator, and this leading to 
further violence, is a barrier to survivors discussing abuse with clinicians.
18
 Despite this 
assertion however, GP2 was clear that detailed notes with a comprehensive record of a 
patient’s injuries was desirable:  
GP2: And the advice is always when someone comes in with something like that is 
you've got to make clear, contemporaneous notes and document whatever injuries 
you have seen, I will always advise, now, in the days of smart phones, if patients do 
have injuries, look take some photos of that on your mobile phone as well, I think 
it's important that we have that.  
Both GPs therefore essentially complied with the advice given to those in general practice 
by the Medical Defence Union (MDU), who stressed that doctors should ‘Be alert to the 
possibility of domestic abuse in any patient and make careful records of any concerns’.19 
RD1 also spoke about discussing what was written down with the patient, though she noted 
that she did this after the information was recorded:  
RD1: But when it was the domestic abuse ones I just pointed them in the right 
direction and told them that the information that they’d given me was confidential 
but obviously it might be sought as part of a, their medical records might be sought 
                                                             
18
 See for example, Loraine Bacchus Gill Mezey Susan Bewley, 'Women's perceptions and experiences of 
routine enquiry for domestic violence in a maternity service', BJOG: An International Journal of Obstetrics 
and Gynaecology, 109 (2002), p. 14; Jessica Drinkwater, Nicky Stanley, Eszter Szilassy, Cath Larkins, 
Marianne Hester, Gene Feder, 'Juggling confidentiality and safety: a qualitative study of how general 
practice clinicians document domestic violence in families with children', British Journal of General Practice, 
67 (2017), p.437;  
19 Medical Defence Union, ‘Domestic abuse: your legal and ethical duty’, (30th July 2019), 
<https://www.themdu.com/guidance-and-advice/guides/domestic-abuse-your-legal-and-ethical-duty>, 
[accessed: 26th September 2019] 
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if they were, and that’s why I’m very careful what I always write in the records, it’s 
always a statement of fact, I would never express any sort of opinion in the notes.  
While many respondents reported deciding what information to record in anticipation of 
future legal proceedings, this was not always the case, even among clinicians with 
extensive contact with legal services. As a maxillofacial surgeon, MF1 often deals with 
patients suffering injuries caused by violence and reported receiving dozens of citations for 
court or to complete medio-legal reports on a monthly basis. Despite this, he was clear that 
the likelihood of a case proceeding to trial had no impact on his recording practice:  
MF1: I don't know, when we're seeing patients and writing down there is an 
awareness that there is an awareness that there might be                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      
a medical-legal aspect, but you don't write the notes with the information to, with a 
half a mind to what-what does the lawyer want to know later on.  
Likewise, senior oral surgeon OS1 spoke about recording detailed and comprehensive 
notes as a matter of course, though noting that this was useful if a case proceeded to court, 
especially if a significant time period elapsed before it did so: 
OS1: Well I usually just try and write fairly comprehensive notes. And I think if 
you do that, you’ll probably be OK in terms of you know. Because obviously you 
can’t remember stuff like six months down the line, you’re not gonna remember 
every single patient. But I think if you write quite good notes that stands you in 
quite good stead as far as that goes.  
An assessment of clinicians’ recording practice is an essential step in analysing their 
perceptions of confidentiality and once again, suggests that patients who have either 
perpetrated or been victims of crime often elicit different confidentiality practices among 
those that treat them. As was suggested in the clinicians’ discussions of confidentiality 
section, it appears that contact with criminal action caused participants to change practice.  
To determine the survivors’ place in these decisions however, as well as their own 
perceptions of confidentiality, it is now necessary to move onto an in-depth analysis of the 
completed survivor interviews and questionnaires.  
4.3 Survivor attitudes  
Both Survivor 1 (S1) and Survivor 2 (S2) experienced their medical information being 
used in court in a way they found harmful. S1 experienced years of physical and sexual 
abuse from an ex-partner. During this time she had numerous interactions with medical and 
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legal services. Given the severity of abuse, she required medical treatment from a number 
of specialties including A&E, maternity and mental health services. S2 was raped by an 
acquaintance and required medical treatment from forensic medical services, A&E and 
mental health services. In the course of the subsequent legal cases, both survivors required 
in-patient psychiatric treatment.  
As I discussed in chapter 2, numerous medical organisations have outlined the importance 
of confidentiality in the identification and reporting of domestic abuse.
20
 There remains 
however, a dearth of research analysing survivor perceptions of confidentiality and how 
these influence decisions in healthcare use. This section includes excerpts from interviews 
with S1 and S2, describing their views of confidentiality and their experiences with the 
NHS.  Questionnaires data from survivors using Scottish Women’s Aid services augments 
the interview findings.  
4.3.1 What is medical confidentiality? 
The experience of having medical information used in court heavily influenced both 
survivors’ perceptions of confidentiality and it was difficult for them to speak about it as a 
clinician-patient encounter without referring to the perceived intrusion of the police, 
lawyers and the court. Instead, their discussions centred on the impact that confidentiality 
breaches had, including on their trust in clinicians and the health service generally.  
To S1, the experience with legal services irreparably damaged her perception of 
confidentiality, so that it was impossible to distance a clinical consultation from potential 
legal proceedings. This led S1 to reject the concept of confidentiality in practice. When 
asked what medical confidentiality meant to her, she replied:  
S1: [laughs] Now, nothing. Truly, I'm not over exaggerating, I truly believe that 
medical confident - there's nothing confidential. People, people can access [pause] 
anything they really want to now and for me to be, again, forced my medical 
records. It now shows me confidentiality means diddly squat. It's, there's nothing 
confidential. 
S2 described confidentiality as a lost asset, something that was taken from her. In this 
description she referred to this loss as akin to an attack on her person, a violation:   
                                                             
20 See for example, BMA, Domestic Abuse, p. 52; David Lauder, 'Safeguarding vulnerable patients', Dental 
Defence Union, <https://ddujournal.theddu.com/issue-archive/autumn-2017/safeguarding-vulnerable-
patients>, [accessed: 26th September 2019]; MDU, 'Domestic abuse: your legal and ethical duty'. 
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S2: Yeah, I think it’s really important like I say. You know I’ve experienced it first-
hand what it’s like to have that violated and it sort of just emphasises more how 
important it is for me.  
Based on these two descriptions, S2 had the more positive conception of confidentiality, 
where her legal experiences had re-emphasised its importance rather than destroying her 
faith in it entirely. However, earlier in the interview, S2 had described how loss of trust in 
confidentiality affected her use of the NHS:  
S2: I finished doing a year of CBT in [MONTH] and it was only then that I really 
trusted being able to go to a doctor and speak to them and again… I was really 
concerned about confidentiality and stuff like that because I wasn’t you, you, you 
lose that sort of trust because when you go to the doctor you think, you don‘t think 
they’re just gonna be speaking about it on the bus or something obviously but it’s 
just, that’s how it feels you know and, because to see like your medical history in a 
newspaper, it’s just a bizarre feeling. 
This lack of faith in health services was similar to that expressed by S1, who noted that her 
experiences caused her to alter the volume of information she is willing to share with 
clinicians:   
S1: But, again, with the NHS I'd be very wary of what I said. And to know that 
they could [pause] your private life isn't your private life. Your health and your 
mental health, nothing's private, it's all out there and they might say, "yeah, it's 
locked away and it's stored and" - it's not. People - it's not. So what you want to 
keep to yourself you keep to yourself, because you never know, this sounds bad 
[laughs], you never know when it's going to bite you in the ass, because it'll come 
back and people can use it as a weapon.  
This outcome, where both survivors felt less able to engage with healthcare practitioners 
runs contrary to the aims of organisations like the BMA and highlights the importance of 
confidentiality in facilitating treatment.
21
That both participants had amended their 
interactions with the NHS is concerning, and closely mirrors the conclusions of Sankar et 
al, who found that:  
                                                             
21 BMA, Domestic Abuse, p. 52 
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 ‘A significant minority of patients distrust confidentiality protections, leading 
some to report that they delay or forgo medical care. If doubtful that confidentiality 
will be upheld, patients will act independently to protect information'.
22
 
While Sankar’s research was limited mostly to studies involving adolescent patients or 
patients with HIV, the steps taken by S1 and S2 suggests these conclusions may be 
applicable to domestic abuse patients. S1’s argument actually supports SHD2’s argument, 
that if doctors are seen as ‘leaky’ it will prevent patients from discussing their concerns.  
S2, unlike S1 did periodically discuss confidentiality in more general terms, without 
explicit reference to her experiences with legal services. When doing so, she tended to use 
more emotive language in her descriptions than was evident in the clinician interviews. For 
example, when reflecting on what her medical records meant, S2 referred to them as ‘part 
of her’:  
S2: You know I’d probably never even thought about it before that but… (sigh) I 
dunno it feels, it’s like part of you, it’s, it’s you know if someone, you don’t want 
them shared with everyone. It’s really private. 
This description evoked the argument of GP2 when describing the importance of medical 
records to patients:   
GP2: - there's stuff in there that shouldn't be for other -for anyone to look at. 
S2 however expanded on this point, by noting that while medical records were personal 
and private, she had little awareness of what they contained, suggesting a perceived lack of 
control in how they were created:  
S2: I don’t think anyone knows what’s in their medical records unless they’ve 
requested them. You know. I have no idea what’s in there.  
These perceptions, that survivors lack sufficient autonomy over creation and use of their 
records, support the findings of other studies.
23
 These ideas were to recur frequently 
throughout interviews with all participants, particularly as legal services began determining 
these decisions.  
 
                                                             
22 Sankar et al, 'Patient Perspectives’, p. 659 
23 Fiona Raitt, ‘Disclosure of Records and Privacy Rights in Rape Cases’, The Edinburgh Law Review, 15 
(2011), pp. 45, 50, 52; Cory et al, Reasonable Doubt, p. 105 
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4.3.2 Discussing confidentiality with clinicians 
As noted earlier in the chapter, clinicians did not have standard protocols for discussing 
confidentiality with patients and their approaches varied, largely based on the specialty in 
which they practiced. Given S1’s interactions with different specialties, it was instructive 
to discuss whether her treating clinicians mentioned confidentiality. S1 noted that in 
several cases they did, though she highlighted the difficulty in having these conversations 
when she was in distress:   
S1: My psychiatrist Dr [NAME], she did, she was really good. Dr [NAME]the 
psychia - psychologist - psychiatrist stroke psychotherapist, he did. My doctor, my 
GP did. But I was maybe, again, so unwell and maybe myself in denial that it even 
happened, any of what I'd been through that I thought, “No. Like it, won’t be”, I 
didn't realise how [laughs], this sounds bad, not trying to be, the law's an an/ it's 
brutal, it's cold, it's just hungry for what it wants . I and I was a bit like, "oh!" I was 
living in a bit of cuckoo-fairyland, "No they won't, they'll be a bit nicer,". 
 
It is initially surprising that three separate clinicians spoke to S1 about confidentiality, 
however, it is important to note that only her GP discussed confidentiality before the legal 
case was underway.  The psychiatrist and psychotherapist S1 referred to were only 
consulted after this point. Despite these experiences, S1 suggested that confidentiality 
discussions would help her to negotiate the information she decided to disclose to 
clinicians in future:  
S1: Oh a hundred percent. Because there's a lot of things - I wear my heart on my 
sleeve, I'm an open book and that's probably got me, it's not been to my, it hasn't, 
it's been detrimental to me so if the, if the psychiatrist or doctors were saying to me, 
"[SURVIVOR’S NAME], anything you say it will - it could be used." I would 
[sighs] I would hold back, it would be like, "woah horsey, I’m, there's certain 
things I will not be saying."  So one hundred percent. I felt they weren't 
forthcoming with the truth. I felt like it was all cloak and dagger and a bit - I was in 
complete shock [pause] so, I was just reeling off everything and everything, so, 
again, wasn't good. 
S1’s experience aligns with the findings of the Cory et al, who observed that ‘many women 
make disclosures not thinking about how the statement might be used in other 
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proceedings’.24 S2 did not address whether clinicians spoke to her about confidentiality in 
a general sense. This was partly because of what she considered to be her limited 
interactions with health services. Instead, given that the records used at trial involved 
medical care she had received almost a decade prior to being raped, she focussed on the 
process of consenting to disclosure without full awareness of what this would entail. 
Despite this, S2 did stress that clinicians could do more to explain the limits of 
confidentiality to patients, though acknowledging some of the difficulties expressed by 
some clinicians earlier in the chapter:   
S2: Yeah I feel like that should definitely be explained more. Again it’s hard 
because you know, like I say I was a child when I did this you know. To, you know 
to explain you know before you tell me, anything, you know I don’t know if you 
can get that sort of, I don’t know at what stage in the process they can explain that 
sort of to you.  
As to why S2 did not have any confidentiality discussions, she herself noted that some of 
those treating her were surprised at the level of information subsequently used in court: 
S2: But like I said, I didn’t really have much, beyond forensic examination there 
wasn’t much medical intervention apart from being in the psychiatric hospital and 
certainly I don’t think they were aware that that was something you know, and 
when I’d spoke to my psychologist last time, she certainly, she found it to be 
profoundly wrong that they’d used that. She wasn’t aware that that was something 
that they could even do and you know, she’s a clinical psychologist. 
4.3.3 Disclosing abuse and what prevents disclosure  
In order to better understand the factors affecting disclosure of abuse in healthcare, it was 
essential I recorded survivors’ use of medical services, something I did using the 
questionnaire outlined in chapter three. Figure 1 below illustrates the results of this process. 
Research generally focuses on the interactions between survivors and general practice, 
mental health and maternity services. As shown in figure 1, while a number of individuals 
reported using these services, their healthcare experiences were generally more varied, 
with surgery, ear nose and throat and ambulatory care also required. This bolsters the 
argument by the IRIS commissioning group, who found that domestic abuse survivors 
                                                             
24 Cory et al, Reasonable Doubt, p. 111  
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interact with a wide range of health services.
25
 These findings help to broaden 
understandings of survivors’ interactions with clinicians, which in turn may affect their 
perceptions of confidentiality. While seven survivor patients completed the questionnaire, 
several reported using more than one medical service.  
 
Figure 1: Survivors’ use of medical services 
Despite their engagement with medical services however, further enquiries on the 
questionnaire indicated that suffering injury did not always result in accessing healthcare, 
and that survivors may not disclose the reason for their injuries or may avoid healthcare 
services altogether. Figure 2 outlines the number of occasions that questionnaire 
respondents avoided seeking medical assistance, despite suffering physical or mental harm. 
Among the entire population, only one participant indicated that they had never done this. 
                                                             
25 Annie Howell and Medina Johnson, Commissioning guidance: The IRIS solution – responding to domestic 
violence and abuse in general practice, (2011), 
<http://www.niaendingviolence.org.uk/perch/resources/1330960159iriscommissioningpack.pdf>, 
[accessed: 23rd November 2018] p. 10 
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All other survivors completing the questionnaire had avoided healthcare on at least one 
occasion, with two individuals having this experience on six or more occasions.    
 
 
Figure 2: Occasions medical help avoided by survivors following abuse 
Figure 3 highlighted the number of occasions in which survivors had sought out medical 
assistance. Five out of seven respondents had required medical services, supporting the 
finding of the SafeLives project (outlined in chapter 1.3), that domestic abuse survivors 
have frequent interactions with healthcare services.
26
  
                                                             
26 Safe Lives, A Cry for Health Why we must invest in domestic abuse services in hospital, (November 2016) 
<http://www.safelives.org.uk/sites/default/files/resources/SAFJ4993_Themis_report_WEBcorrect.pdf >, 
[accessed: 14th August 2019], p. 11  
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Figure 3: Occasions medical help sought by survivors following abuse 
 
 
 
Even when medical help was sought however, questionnaire respondents in this research 
reported frequently telling clinicians their injuries were caused by other factors, with 71% 
of participants describing this experience. Among those who reported discussing abuse 
with clinicians, all described suffering subsequent mental health problems. Three suffered 
further physical health problems, and one individual experienced sexual, physical and 
mental health issues. The motivations for non-disclosure are complex and varied, though 
confidentiality has been identified as a key factor.
27
 In explaining what prevented her from 
disclosing instances of physical and sexual abuse to clinicians, S1 referred to her A&E 
experiences, describing similar confidentiality issues to AE2 and AE3:  
S1: Even going into A&E, I said, "I don't really want to talk about it, you know, 
with the whole waiting room hearing." And they didn’t, they weren't mindful 
enough to say, "well", you know, "come into a side room" or "we'll wait 'til we 
have one free and then you can talk about it, then we can write it down."  
S1 also reported that despite knowing about her young children, those treating her did not 
report the abuse to legal services – something which stood in stark contrast to the 
comments of clinician interviewees:   
                                                             
27 BMA, Domestic Abuse, p. 52; Cory et al, Reasonable Doubt, p. 110 
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S1: I would say A&E were really bad, they [pause] they didn't take on at all what I 
was saying. Even, erm, gynaecology - like, not erm, when you're pregnant even the 
hospital they [pause] didn't do anything. Erm, my GP listened and, yeah, she was 
kind and caring, but - and the psychiatrist listened - but when you're physically 
presented with someone bleeding and bitten and bruised and beaten and babies, like, 
serious. They - the NHS were supposed to contact other services, they did nothing, 
they did nothing. So, yes, A&E and the hospital terrible, terrible. 
Non-identification of abuse was discussed in detail by AE3, who noted how this could 
damage patients’ trust in clinicians:  
AE3: I think the challenges [to identifying abuse] are what we've laid out. Again if 
the patient doesn't really want ya to know, you're not going to know. I think the 
benefits are, I think everyone will understand that, if you break the cycle of 
violence, you break the cycle of violence. So, if I, you know again… if I see you 
and you've been the victim of domestic violence and you come up and I don't really 
pick that up, later when I discharge you with no real input, your perception of that 
healthcare is, well they didn't do much for me, so you're probably not going to 
come back even if you didn't actually want to tell me you're not going to come back 
anyway. And that violence is going to continue and continue and continue.  
S2 didn’t disclose abuse to a clinician in the same way - reporting her attack to police in 
the first instance before engaging with medical services - and as such did not experience 
the same barriers to disclosure as S1. Nonetheless, she was able to talk generally about 
confidentiality issues in the NHS, also noting that she felt unable to discuss the use of her 
medical records with clinicians:   
S2: I actually saw some staff like reading about the case in the newspaper while I 
was sitting in the room and I just, found that like… weird. I didn’t feel comfortable, 
at all. But you know the staff were, some of the staff were really nice, you know 
one of the women she walked me to court and stuff and she was amazing. But… 
you know psychiatric hospitals, like it’s, it’s like emergencies, so it’s not, they’re 
not really giving you like holistic support I suppose as the time, it’s just sort of 
trying to make sure you’re alive, that’s it really. 
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The questionnaire study also explored factors affecting disclosure in healthcare facilities. 
In one section, participants were asked to rate how several scenarios involving 
confidentiality would affect the chances of them disclosing abuse to a clinician. These 
situations ranged from the presence of an abusive partner (or ex-partner), to being treated 
in a curtained ward (as may be expected in A&E). All seven respondents completed this 
section of the questionnaire, the results of which are detailed below in figure 4.
28
 
 
 
Despite the small sample size, there were several observable trends from the case study 
data. Firstly, all respondents noted that if their partner/ex-partner attended hospital with 
them, this would definitely prevent disclosure. The potential to trigger child protection 
measures (which could then result in removal of the survivor’s children) was the next 
factor most likely to prevent disclosure. These findings largely vindicate the findings of 
other researchers.
29
 Also of interest however, was the clear majority reporting the negative 
effect of certain features of the healthcare system.  Being treated on a curtained ward, 
being overheard by others and hospitalisation were all situations that six out of seven 
survivors thought would or might prevent them disclosing. These circumstances actually 
                                                             
28 A full list of the questions can be found in Appendix B. 
29 See for example, Diana Rose, Kylee Trevillion, Anna Woodall, Craig Morgan, Gene Feder and Louise 
Howard, 'Barriers and facilitators of disclosures of domestic violence by mental health service users: 
qualitative study', The British Journal of Psychiatry, 198 (2011), p. 193 
Figure 4: How threats to confidentiality affect disclosure 
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had a stronger negative effect on disclosure than the information sharing with 
family/friends or the presence of police officers.  
One surprising finding was the relative lack of concern survivors had about abuse being 
included in the medical record. Of all the potential scenarios, recording abuse was the least 
likely to prevent survivors making a disclosure.  
An open question over what prevented disclosure to healthcare workers was also included 
in the survivor questionnaire.
30
 One survivor listed fear as the biggest barrier, with another 
noting a specific fear of children being removed by social services. Three out of seven 
described feelings of shame and/or embarrassment as having an effect on disclosure, with 
one participant also noting issues in being understood.  The remaining participant who 
completed this question stated that finding the right person to go to for assistance would 
prevent her from disclosing.  
Shame was also a listed as a common barrier to disclosure in some of the clinician 
interviews (FPsych1, SHN1 and SHD1), with ideas of shame often linked to confidentiality 
as patients didn’t want others to find out they had been abused. S1 articulated the link 
between the two:  
S1: I remember, I didn't want to have to go in and say to the receptionist what had 
happened to me and everyone else hear, the whole world hears, "well I've been 
beaten again. I've been raped again. I've been sexually assaulted again.". Why do I 
want people that might know me, or know of me, to hear? It's the shame; it's the 
embarrassment. And then to be taken into a side room, eventually after five hours 
of waiting, to be pretty much felt like you're not believed. Pretty much, it's another, 
erm, argument between a couple [pause] and then to be taken through and you're 
that traumatised you can barely even speak, and again the curtain, and you're in 
with other people, you're just treated as a - it's like a barcode, you're just in a shop, 
just another one. 
 
Discussions with survivors on confidentiality in the clinical encounter raised several 
important considerations. S1’s assertion that confidential medical information could be 
weaponised by legal services is powerful and hints at the significance of confidentiality to 
survivors. This notion, supported by the comments of S2, also suggests that experiences 
with legal services can have a notable effect on survivors’ interactions with health services, 
                                                             
30 See Appendix B. 
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with clinicians perceived to be gathering information under a pretence of confidentiality 
only for that information to then be disclosed to outside parties. This conclusion implies 
that while clinicians may not be acting in the same way, survivors may continue – on 
occasion – to view them as the ‘handmaidens of the defence’, as Temkin described.31 
4.4 Conclusions  
The fundamental finding from the data in this chapter, is the amount of variation in 
conceptions of confidentiality.  
4.4.1 Variation among doctors and by specialty  
Among clinicians it is evident that perceptions of confidentiality differed substantially. 
These differences were detectable not just across differing specialties but among 
practitioners in the same practice area. Many participants spoke about confidentiality in 
terms that were rooted to their chosen specialty. In doing so, they inherently challenged the 
notion that confidentiality is a fixed concept that applies equally in all circumstances, with 
the same level of protection afforded to all patients. Participants speaking in these terms 
often described confidentiality as having additional importance in their field, or as being 
better protected for their patients. There was a certain amount of departure from what was 
perceived to be the ‘standard’ understanding of confidentiality, and this was most often 
expressed by references to other specialties, with participants arguing that practice in their 
own area of work was much more sensitive to patients’ confidentiality requirements.  
Interestingly however, there was also a contingent of practitioners who, acknowledging the 
singular aspects of their practice area, and what would appear to be their own unique 
confidentiality requirements, then went on to argue that in effect, confidentiality was a 
unitary concept, that applied across all aspects of the healthcare system. This picture of 
conflicting opinions allowed senior practitioners working in the same specialty, to have 
completely contrary views of the place of confidentiality in their interactions with 
survivors, for example, with AE1 and AE3 offering opposite assessments of how 
confidentiality in the triage process affects the chances of detecting domestic abuse.  
One identifiable trend was between exposure to crime victims and perceptions of 
confidentiality. Individuals in specialties that commonly encountered abuse survivors were 
more likely to discuss confidentiality with their patients, either to reassure them on the 
privacy of their clinical encounter or to warn them when confidentiality had to be breached. 
                                                             
31 Jennifer Temkin, 'Medical Evidence in Rape Cases: A Continuing Problem for Criminal Justice', The Modern 
Law Review, 61 (1998), p. 847 
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This was evident among interviewees from A&E, sexual health and forensic psychology 
backgrounds. Importantly however, this finding was not universal among participants and, 
despite their interactions with crime victims, MF1 and OS1did not approach confidentiality 
in this way.  
Differing practice among clinicians was also discernible in the manner in which clinicians 
recorded domestic abuse, and while it may be tempting to argue that clinicians treating 
crime victims wrote clearer, more detailed information in a patient’s record, the true 
picture is more complex.   
The majority of practitioners certainly favoured comprehensive note taking, with the 
anticipation of legal proceedings heavily influencing the amount of information clinicians 
recorded. This was evident among several individuals and crossed specialty boundaries. 
From the data presented in this chapter, it would be possible to argue that treating victims 
of crime increased the chance of practitioners amending their usual recording practice, 
with confidentiality a key concern in these decisions. But this analysis does not yet have 
enough support. It is instead necessary to question why practitioners chose to write more 
detailed notes, the motivations behind these decisions and the role of their patients’ best 
interests. It is also essential at the same time, to investigate why other clinicians chose not 
to record information in this way, and indeed even excluded certain details. These issues 
will be explored in greater detail in the upcoming chapters, with the relationship between 
confidentiality and legal proceedings under further scrutiny. 
What appeared plainly among a majority of interviewees was frustration with the lack of 
available guidance and/or training in confidentiality practices. There was a widely held 
belief that while regulatory organisations provided some resources, there was little clarity 
on how confidentiality principles could be reconciled with everyday realities in frontline 
health services. This was exemplified by SHD1’s comment that ‘it’s all very well having 
sort of vague guidance […] but it’s like what does that actually look like in this setting’. 
The absence of standardisation would help to explain the divergence in beliefs and 
practices among the interviewee contingent.  
 
4.4.2 Survivors vs clinicians  
The most striking observation emerging from this chapter is the divergence between 
participants in perceptions of confidentiality and confidentiality practices. Most clinicians 
were sensitive to the general issues involving confidentiality and domestic abuse and 
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offered nuanced responses on how they believed patients perceived confidentiality. This 
was apparent from clinicians’ understandings of how confidentiality facilitated relationship 
building between healthcare professionals and survivors and was reinforced by both groups’ 
linkage of confidentiality and trust, with individuals keen to stress the symbiotic 
relationship between the two. For example, both S1 and S2 discussed the fact that their 
experiences had led to them to be more mistrustful of confidentiality in the health service 
and that this in turn had made them (temporarily in S2’s case, permanently in S1’s) less 
likely to be open with clinicians in future. This was recognised by clinicians like SHD2 
who noted that being perceived as ‘leaky’ would prevent survivors speaking to them, and 
by AE3 who articulated the importance of explaining the limits of confidentiality in a way 
that didn’t cause survivors to be less forthcoming in consultation.   
In general, however, there was often divergence between clinicians and survivors over 
what confidentiality means and its role in their interactions. Unsurprisingly, most clinicians 
discussed confidentiality in professional terms, articulating how they reconciled it with 
their duty as healthcare professionals. There was a clear understanding of issues affecting 
survivors’ and a willingness to vicariously consider what confidentiality meant to patients 
when asked. But these efforts did not substantially detract from clinicians’ understandings 
of what confidentiality was. For survivors, the picture was much more complex and 
fundamentally tied to experiences in the criminal justice system. There was encouraging 
evidence of the trust that survivors place in the health service, for example with the lack of 
concern survivors had at the idea of abuse being recorded following disclosure (outlined in 
section 4.3.3) and support for confidentiality discussions with clinicians. But more broadly, 
because of the subsequent behaviour of legal services, medical confidentiality, to survivors, 
was something that was no longer controlled by patients and clinicians.  
Moving from the clinical consultation to the criminal investigation of suspected domestic 
abuse, in chapter 5 I will thoroughly address how survivors came to these conclusions, 
exploring how perceptions of confidentiality are affected when legal services first contact 
survivors and clinicians. In doing so, I will also provide key insights into the ways in 
which the criminal justice system shapes how medical records can be sought and obtained.   
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Chapter Five – Confidentiality and legal investigation 
5.1. Introduction 
The previous chapter outlined how survivors’ and clinicians’ conceptions of confidentiality 
are formulated and tested by a clinical encounter, exploring how these conceptions varied 
by the practice area concerned. This in turn indicated that clinicians with greater 
experience of legal services were more likely to discuss confidentiality with patients, in 
anticipation of future legal proceedings. This chapter explores how ideas of medical 
confidentiality are further shaped by lawyers as a case moves from a purely clinical context, 
into the investigation phase of a suspected criminal offence.  
Before the Crown can begin prosecuting suspected abuse, they are required to seek and 
examine relevant evidence. This often includes medical records and the testimony of 
clinicians, even if these are not in dispute at trial.
32
  
As lawyers are involved in obtaining and using survivors’ medical information, I begin by 
examining their perceptions of medical confidentiality, both as individuals and 
practitioners, exploring the extent to which their familiarity with sensitive medical 
information in a legal context shapes their own views on what confidentiality is and what it 
means to the patients who become complainers in criminal proceedings. This examination 
will rely on ten in-depth interviews with practising defence advocates and will include 
relevant comparisons with legal professional privilege. Senior counsel (or Queen’s 
Counsel – those who have “taken silk”) are referred to as SC (number) and junior counsel, 
JC (number).  This section also explores how lawyers identify and obtain medical records 
using a combination of advocate testimony and written responses provided by the Crown 
Office. This includes an assessment of how counsel determine the relevance of information 
in a complainer’s medical file and how they obtain that material through negotiation with 
the Crown and/or through application to the court. It takes account of the ways in which 
complainer consent is sought in this process, where individuals are asked to agree for their 
records (or certain elements of their records) to be disclosed. There is space to consider 
whether lawyers’ perceptions of confidentiality affect the kind of information they seek, as 
well as explore the forces that drive these decisions (including issues over resources).  
                                                             
32
 Crown Office and Procurator Fiscal Service, Policy on Obtaining and Disclosing Sensitive Personal 
Records in The Investigation and Prosecution of Sexual Crime Cases, (April 
2014), <https://www.copfs.gov.uk/images/Documents/Prosecution_Policy_Guidance/Guidelines_
and_Policy/AMENDED%20POLICY%20_sensitive%20records_%20April%202014%20as%20sent%2
0to%20PF%20Eye%20-%20website.pdf>, [accessed: 22nd August, 2018], p. 1 
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After this, I then assess the position of healthcare professionals, analysing clinicians’ 
experiences in handling record requests, as well as any impacts this has on their practice.  
Finally, I explore the process of obtaining records from survivors’ perspectives, 
investigating their experience of the consent process, and assessing the extent to which 
expectations surrounding consent are wedded to the desire for a successful prosecution, 
while also considering how survivors perceive lawyers’ determinations of relevance. 
5.2. Lawyers 
5.2.1. Views of confidentiality  
As with survivors and clinicians, all legal participants were asked to describe medical 
confidentiality and what it meant to them. Despite not being involved in the creation of 
medical records, it was important to asses lawyers’ views of confidentiality, considering 
their role in obtaining and using sensitive medical information. In order to identify the 
relationship between confidentiality and the use of medical records in domestic abuse trials, 
it was essential that I discern how lawyers perceived it, and how these understandings 
aligned with how sensitive information was used in court. By including lawyers’ views, I 
was also able to assess whether their personal and professional understandings of 
confidentiality were equal, or whether lawyers expected a standard of medical 
confidentiality for themselves that they did not support for complainers.  
While only two legal interviewees referred to their own specific healthcare experiences, a 
majority described confidentiality as an important but qualified right, in a similar way to 
several clinicians observed in chapter 4. As might be expected, the reasons provided for 
legitimately breaching confidentiality often related to the investigation of crime. SC3’s 
description below is notable, as she ascribed the duty of protecting confidentiality to the 
court rather than to healthcare systems. This argument was popular among advocates, who 
tended to view confidentiality primarily through the lens of legal proceedings:  
SC3: It’s a human right. You have a right to confidentiality that should only be 
breached in appropriate circumstances. You may waive that right er, but it should 
be protected…. By the courts. 
JC6 espoused a similar view, noting the tensions between describing confidentiality as a 
patient and as a lawyer involved in the use of complainers’ medical records. Ultimately 
however, JC6 accepted that confidentiality needed exceptions in order to facilitate a 
functioning criminal justice system:  
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JC6: Alright well to me as an individual, I think that… the… contents of my 
medical files should be confidential, obviously. And probably, I would want that to 
be an absolute, an absolute right on my part. But I accept that any rights that you 
have in a civilised society, have to take into account other people’s rights as well 
and so I suppose then if you make an allegation against someone, which is 
investigated by the authorities, then part of, you making that allegation involves 
you, a balancing exercise between their rights to be prosecuted fairly and your 
rights you know, to make a complaint. 
Several advocates expressed the view that confidentiality concerns did not typically feature 
in their consideration of a criminal case. They did not articulate this as due to a lack of 
interest or even as a disregard for confidentiality generally. Instead they reasoned that 
when questions arose over the use of records, confidentiality had either already been 
broken (i.e. if the complainer has consented for records to be accessed), that the breach of 
confidentiality for a criminal trial was lawful and not controversial, or that their client’s 
rights to a fair trial superseded individual rights to the privacy of medical records (often 
qualifying the last reason as only applying to medical records that were relevant to the 
case). Among those sharing these perspectives, (and in a similar manner to SC3’s assertion 
that it was for the court to protect confidentiality), there was an impression that other actors 
in the legal service (namely the court or the Crown) were responsible for ensuring that 
medical confidentiality was properly upheld on behalf of the complainer. This was despite 
comments by Lord Glennie and the interveners in WF, that a complainer’s confidentiality 
and privacy interests would not always be advanced by the Crown, and that without such 
advances it would be difficult for the court to protect these rights either.
33
  Nonetheless, 
many advocates defended this position. JC4 for example, referred to confidentiality as 
subordinate to his clients’ fair trial rights under article 6 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights
34
:  
JC4: Again from my perspective my interface with medical records, other people’s 
medical records, is only in the context of my duty as the advocate for the, for the 
accused, so… my only worry about confidentiality of medical records is the interface 
of that with them, with the legal case I’m representing. And it’s back to the article 6 
argument isn’t it, but that’s my overriding duty. So I couldn’t let my worry about 
                                                             
33 WF v Scottish Ministers [2016] CSOH 27 at [24] and [35] 
34 European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) art 6, available at 
<https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Convention_ENG.pdf>, [accessed: 4th July 2018], pp. 9-10 
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medical confidentiality in any way impact on my article 6 responsibilities and I can 
ride that horse comfortably because I know the there is a, what did you call that phrase 
about that gateway? Rape shield, gosh. Well there’s a rape shield apparently in place 
where High Court judges are going to ensure that medical confidentiality is upheld by 
the court, from an article 8 point of view, independently. 
Despite this assertion, it would be incorrect to argue that participating advocates felt 
complainers had no right to protect their medical information, as a majority of legal 
interviewees were supportive of ILR for survivors whose records were at issue (something 
that will be discussed in more detail in the next chapter). To some degree, lawyers’ views 
towards confidentiality were similar to those expressed by healthcare professionals. 
Clinicians, perhaps unsurprisingly, often referred to confidentiality through a professional 
lens, as a concept that allowed them to treat patients effectively and they were – on the 
whole – less likely to speak about it in personal terms. Lawyers to a certain extent shared 
this position, and even spoke about their own professional obligations for a respecting an 
individuals’ medical confidentiality, some even describing the data protection measures 
they employed for the purpose. This position was actually summed up succinctly by GP1, 
giving her opinion on what confidentiality meant to lawyers:  
GP1: I think lawyers are patients as well and everybody values their confidentiality, 
but I think they've got a job to do. So of it's useful to their case and used as 
evidence, they will do that 
Two advocates listed their experiences as patients in their confidentiality descriptions. In 
the first example, JC3 referred to a situation in which her medical confidentiality was 
compromised during doctors’ rounds on a nightingale ward. She then compared her 
perceptions of medical confidentiality in hospital to her confidentiality responsibilities as a 
lawyer: 
JC3: Medical confidentiality means to me that any information about my health which 
has been given to third parties, ought to be protected by those third parties and not 
passed on to anybody else. Put short. I was in hospital last Christmas, to get a back 
operation. And when I was there, I was placed in a room with four or five very nice 
ladies. We chatted about our health and wellbeing. We came in and out for our 
operation. And on the morning after my operation, the doctor came in, with a group of 
people around him – presumably people that were handing over, this was a senior 
doctor…and he was either handing over or letting people know “this is what this 
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person’s all about, this is what they’ve had, this is what we’re looking out for”… I was 
very surprised that that happened. I was sort of sitting there thinking, because we live 
in a world where we have to ensure, insofar as we can, that we protect the privacy of all 
parties: the accused, witnesses, complainers.  
In his description, JC2 referred to a situation in which he believed his contact details had 
been passed to a third-party organisation by his GP surgery. This incident, he believed 
spoke to a wider lack of concern among healthcare workers for upholding confidentiality, 
something he revisited later in the interview:  
JC2: I wish clinicians, I wish medical practitioners were more precious about it 
[confidentiality]. Not just personally but their surgeries, they shouldn’t be so casual 
about… breaching it, about disregarding it, as I say from my own limited experience of 
these matters, I’m very, very angry actually that my, my doctor has, has given my 
name over to the state. As, as a patient of that practice, that probably would require my 
consent and… I think it would be a concern if we have some kind of NHS database or a 
national database that becomes very joined up. I prefer atomised medical practices 
where medical records are, are ring fenced, they’re not readily passed on to other 
agencies, even within the NHS…I’m also concerned about what insurance companies 
can do with, do with certain information. You know for example if I smoke, I don’t see 
what business it is you know of anyone else. Why that information should be shared 
with other agencies with other bodies in the context of criminal prosecution, criminal 
investigation.  
Advocates ultimately focused on medical confidentiality in terms of their responsibilities 
to the court and legal profession, expressing their opinion from a position of professional 
detachment. SC2 outlined this generally held view, even referring to medical 
confidentiality as ‘legal confidentiality’:  
SC2: I don’t think we, we think too much about legal [sic] confidentiality because it’s 
all part and parcel of, of what’s been disclosed in the case. You will have the doctors’ 
listed as witnesses, you will have statements from the doctors’ who have been treating 
the person, GPs – and going through the records, so it’s all there, the only question that, 
the time that we start to address confidentiality is if, if we are wanting to pursue… a 
line where the doctor hasn’t been cited by the Crown. So. Normally we don’t really 
think about that.  
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One clear expression of the difference in confidentiality perceptions between participant 
groups, came in advocates’ comparisons of medical confidentiality and legal professional 
privilege (LPP). LPP protects communications between lawyers and clients. It is similar to 
medical confidentiality in several respects, not least in allowing  individuals seeking legal 
advice to be honest in discussing their circumstances with a legal professional, allowing 
lawyers to exercise their professional duties to the best of their ability on behalf of their 
clients.
35
 While numerous circumstances allow medical confidentiality to be breached 
however, LPP can typically only be overcome if an individual is seeking advice on how to 
commit a criminal offence.
36
 In describing medical confidentiality, several advocates made 
comparisons with LPP, often referring to both duties as vital to professional efficacy. Here 
JC1desbribed the two as having equivalent importance:    
JC1: I think it means exactly the same thing in both cases. You know, I think that 
it’s paramount. It’s paramount. Because otherwise you can’t do your job properly. 
You have to… Confidentiality is extremely important to allow a person that’s 
relying on professionals for help to be able to speak openly and to get the help that 
they require. And you know I think in terms of ethical, all ethical standards I think 
are really important because you have a lot of power. Or you’re in a powerful 
position if you’re representing people’s liberty or their healthcare etcetera. Because 
you can have a huge influence on how their life is going to proceed from that point 
onwards. 
JC6 expressed a similar opinion, describing the two as broadly comparable (though she did 
not quantify the relative importance of each) and suggesting that lawyers’ familiarity with 
LPP helped inform their attitude towards the medical information they dealt with in court:  
JC6: I suppose they’re very similar legal privilege and medical confidentiality are 
very, you know are very similar, and just as lawyers do,  I think take legal privilege 
very seriously, and don’t discuss – although they might discuss the generalities of 
cases with other people, you know, we don’t discuss what we’re told by clients. 
Yeah I suppose we expect the same from doctors. And certainly I think that lawyers 
possibly because of… because we can’t discuss and don’t discuss what happens 
                                                             
35
 The position of LPP in Scotland is outlined in Narden Services Ltd v Inverness Retail and Business Park Ltd 
& ors, [2008] CSIH 14, at [11] 
36 It must also be noted that privilege only applies in respect to a lawyer’s client and a survivor/complainer 
is not a client of anyone in the same way. See, Lindsay MacNeill, 'Legal professional privilege in Scottish 
criminal proceedings', Lexis Nexis, 
<https://www.lexisnexis.com/uk/lexispsl/corporatecrime/document/391423/5S1F-DRY1-F188-30XY-00000-
00/Legal_professional_privilege_in_Scottish_criminal_proceedings>, [accessed; 20th June, 2019] 
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when we’re discussing things with clients, you would be, you would take medical 
confidentiality of records that you came into contact with in a legal context very 
seriously. You wouldn’t discuss them with anyone outwith you know the confines 
of the case that were involved in you know.  
SC4 meanwhile, was more circumspect in his comparisons, and while arguing that medical 
and legal confidentiality were broadly similar, seemed to suggest that the ramifications of 
breaching the latter were more significant: 
SC4: I suppose there's no logical reason why they should be different. [Pause] I 
suppose it depends what you're being asked. You know, generally speaking as a 
lawyer if somebody is telling you something it is, at least arguably, going to 
something, which if it gets into the public domain is going to be detrimental to their 
interests. But with medical you're going to see your doctor to have a particular 
problem treated and discussed, or whatever it may be, and unless that problem is 
one that is precisely related to something you're complaining about, I suspect that it 
shouldn't be disclosed. 
SC1 shared JC6 and SC4’s position, and while he first acknowledged how essential 
medical confidentiality was in ensuring a successful clinician-patient relationship, he later 
qualified this statement by noting that LPP was given more protection:   
SC1: Ordinarily medical privilege is clearly extremely important and it’s only - 
similarly I suppose to legal professional privilege – it’s only by having that 
privilege that you, that a professional can get as much information as they need in 
order to, to make the best diagnosis and to suggest the best treatment  
……… 
SC1: It’s [confidentiality’s] an important principle but it, because of my job, I see 
where it is trumped by something else. Legal professional privilege is massively 
important and isn’t, isn’t trumped really in the same way. The, I think legal 
professional privilege is wider than the medical privilege. I think the system 
probably wouldn’t work… I mean most of the time it doesn’t, it probably doesn’t 
make that much of a difference, but in, in some cases it makes a, a big difference. 
Several advocates were more strident in their assertions that LPP was of superior 
importance to medical confidentiality, a significant finding as it may inform the extent to 
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which they are able to value confidentiality in court. JC3, referring to the experience of 
having her own medical confidentiality breached, noted that legal privilege was generally 
more protected than confidentiality though she noted that this was likely due to the 
pressures on staff in the health service rather than failures to uphold confidentiality among 
clinicians:  
JC3: You wouldn’t imagine me being able to get away very, for a very long period 
of time by going around speaking to all the different people about their cases when 
everyone else could overhear them. But I suppose when it, the world that doctors 
and medics inhabit are, are more specifically to do with the health of that person 
and the importance of information to them and to others being as good as possible 
in order to preserve their health. And the fact that because one doctor can’t sit with 
you 24 hours a day, that information has to be passed on has to sometimes be done 
in a relatively brief fashion, that the way that that has developed is simply they do 
as they do. It also means for example that medical documents and records that sit at 
the bottom of the bed as to how people are doing, can be seen by anyone. Now, 
most people aren’t interested and most people don’t want to, to read them but, you 
can see operations, what you’re in for. So the….. the purpose of the doctor’s 
treating, you privacy is a very secondary consideration. In the context of a bustling 
working hospital in a ward round. Where they are obviously it seems to be better, is 
the protection of documents that lie in files and that it would seem to be, I have no 
concern that those on a daily basis would be being looked at by the wrong person or 
passed about wards or anything.  
JC5 argued strongly that LPP was of greater importance than medical confidentiality:  
JC5: I think legal privilege is far greater than medical confidentiality to be honest 
with you. I mean, medical - legal privilege is pretty much absolute. You're medical 
[pause] privilege would extend to you being able to show a relevance to that being 
introduced or sought. Whereas legal privilege, there's no, there's no way around that. 
The opinions espoused by JC3 and JC5’s were incidentally, referred to by the second 
survivor interviewee (S2), who stressing her own belief that medical confidentiality and 
LPP should be equated in importance, argued that medical confidentiality was currently far 
less protected:  
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S2: I feel like they should be the same. Yeah… Especially when you, I guess we 
were talking about GDPR before you know, about the special categories of data and 
it’s because, you know health condition is there because it’s something that can be 
used to discriminate against you, that’s why it’s there. So, the idea that your 
medical records are just treated like you know a piece of evidence that’s shared 
with everyone is… you know like I keep saying, such a violation.  
While participants were divided on the relative importance of confidentiality and LPP, 
there was consensus on the responsibility for determining the boundaries of confidentiality 
resting with the justice system. It might therefore appear surprising that many lawyers 
expressed support for protecting complainers’ medical confidentiality in a general sense, 
even extending this to support for independent legal guidance in the courtroom. However, 
this support was set firmly from an understanding that confidentiality would readily be set 
aside if required by the criminal justice process. With that in mind, I now proceed to an 
assessment of how the justice system facilitates the recovery of complainers’ medical 
records.   
5.2.2. Obtaining medical records 
Records sought to investigate potential psychiatric conditions often prove more 
controversial than those used to support (or dispute) an allegation of physical injury.
37
 As I 
noted in chapter two, this is because mental health records can be used to impugn the 
credibility and reliability of a complainer and allow questioning over their sexual history.
38
 
For both survivors in this research, there was extensive reference to past mental health 
conditions in court, a process that had a deleterious effect on S1 and S2’s faith in the 
medical and justice system.   
Both the police and prosecutors are involved in the recovery process, where records are 
screened for relevance before disclosure to the defence. In many cases, the actual screening 
process appears to be completed by a police employee, though the exclusion criteria they 
use remains poorly understood. In their response to written questions over how medical 
records were reviewed, the Crown noted:  
Medical records should be physically recovered by the police either at their own 
instance or at the direction of the prosecutor. 
                                                             
37 For analysis of use of mental health records in court see, Louise Ellison, 'The use and abuse of psychiatric 
evidence in rape trials', The International Journal of Evidence & Proof, 13 (2009), pp. 28-49 
38 See for example, HM Advocate v Ronald (No. 1) 2007 S.L.T. 1170 
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After the police have assessed the records for relevancy, they will submit the 
relevant parts of the records to the prosecutor. 
Thereafter, the prosecutor will review the records for materiality within a COPFS 
building.
39
  
On the specific question of how relevance was determined and the restrictions on obtaining 
records in domestic abuse and rape cases, the Crown noted only:  
The police have a duty to assess the relevance of all information obtained or 
generated during the course of an investigation. Only relevant evidence should be 
submitted to the prosecutor by the police.  
Relevant information is any information which appears to an investigator to have 
some bearing on the offence under investigation, or on any person being 
investigated, or on surrounding circumstances, unless it is incapable of having an 
impact on the case.
40
 
This description highlights the role of the police in determining the relevance of medical 
material on behalf of the Crown, even suggesting that it is the responsibility of the police 
to ensure that irrelevant material is not passed to prosecutors, and thus is kept within NHS 
control. It does little however to clarify how police officers actually determine what 
material evidence is, the definition of relevance above being remarkably wide and 
nebulous, as showcased by the scope for including any information capable of ‘having an 
impact on the case’.41 In the case of S2, the police visited her in hospital, asking her to sign 
a consent form for the release of her medical records. She noted that they were mostly 
unable to answer her questions on the subject. Their ability to determine the relevancy of 
records is interesting, given that they are not medically trained, nor do they prosecute 
alleged perpetrators in court. Despite their role in obtaining records from health boards, 
there has been little assessment of police interactions with survivors and clinicians in this 
context. In discussion, SC2 described the effect of records being obtained in this way:  
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 See appendix A. 
40
 Ibid. 
41
 A similar role is completed by a commissioner, a court appointed lawyer, who, with reference to the call, 
in commission and diligence proceedings determines whether particular information is relevant for entry in 
court. For example, they may look through the record, selecting all entries that refer to the complainer 
suffering from a particular medical condition that may affect their reliability and credibility, i.e. paranoid 
schizophrenia and only these entries will be permitted as evidence. See Archibald MacSporran and Andrew 
R.W. Young, Commission and Diligence, (Edinburgh: W. Green & Sons Ltd, 1995), 5.46-5.48 
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SC2: Well the police are, they form part of the prosecuting authorities. But, but it 
arises from, from the police saying to the complainer, “will you permit us to, to 
contact your doctor” “Yes, that’s fine”. So they get the records and just sift through 
them. And then, as part of, of their disclosure to the Crown, what they say is then 
complying with the disclosure obligations, they just give them the edited version. 
And as I say the local offices can be quite happy for them to carry that exercise out 
but I would hope now that they’ve been criticised often enough for that to have - 
judges have been appalled when they’ve discovered that in, in court - that I would 
like to think that doesn’t happen… Anymore. That if, the prosecution do obtain 
records, the police do obtain records, that they’re handed over, complete to the, the 
Crown and then we have to take them at their word that what they have disclosed is 
relevant. Not only to them but to us as well. And as I say you trust some parts of 
the country more than you trust other parts of the country in their definition of 
what’s relevant and what’s not. 
In 2011, Raitt argued that the range of medical records which the Crown or the defence 
might seek to recover in cases involving sexual abuse can be very broad, something 
supported by both WF and JC.
42
 The Crown’s responses in this project suggest that 
similarly broad recoveries continue to occur. SC1 described the mechanics of how records 
are reviewed, noting the idiosyncratic approach among practitioners: 
SC1: Someone in the Crown Office would go through the records, it might not be 
an advocate depute, the case preparer has probably gone through the records and 
made redactions. And different people seem to have different approach to redaction, 
some people err on the side of leaving things in, some people err on the side of 
taking things out.  
This informal strategy and the underlying relationship between the Crown and NHS in the 
context of retrieving medical records is notable. SC1’s argument that different approaches 
to redaction often determine how much information is disclosed is powerful and supports 
arguments elsewhere, that the definition of relevance is too wide and subjective.
43
 JC2 
described the potency of requests from the Crown, with health boards disclosing medical 
records upon the Crown’s request and without sight of either patient consent or a court 
order:  
                                                             
42 Fiona Raitt, ‘Disclosure of Records and Privacy Rights in Rape Cases’, The Edinburgh Law Review, 15 
(2011), p. 47  
43 Findlay Stark, ‘Legislating the Duty of Disclosure’, The Edinburgh Law Review, 13 (2009), pp. 494-495 
179 
 
JC2:  They [the Crown] don’t have to jump through the same hoops as the defence, 
it might surprise you it might even shock you that the Crown can phone up a 
doctor’s surgery and some hapless medical secretary can send out, without taking 
the, without securing the patient’s consent, they’ll quite happily make disclosure 
without a court order, without consent.  
This practice of mistaken disclosure by health boards (lacking a court mandate), was 
highlighted in 2016 by Chief Medical Officer for Scotland, Catherine Calderwood. 
Through an internal letter, Calderwood stressed the circumstances in which records should 
be released, following a ‘recent case in which they were disclosed without a court 
mandate’:  
There may be circumstances where either the prosecution or the defence legal team 
in a criminal case may seek to obtain (“to recover”, in legal language) a person’s 
medical records, to be used as evidence in a criminal case. They must apply to the 
courts for “an order for their production, or for their recovery” (by what is called 
commission and diligence). If the court agrees that the records should be made 
available, it will issue an order. It is important to note that although neither the 
prosecution nor the defence teams should request such records without express 
permission from the court, which may happen on occasion. In these circumstances, 
the records should not be released and the requester should be informed that a court 
order is required.
44
 
Despite the relative ease with which the Crown can recover records, in their written 
responses, they referred to issues in retrieving them from individual practitioners (perhaps 
those with practices similar to GP2). Replying to a question over what current issues 
existed in the use of medical records in domestic abuse cases, the Crown replied:  
On occasion, COPFS encounters resistance from medical professionals when 
seeking to obtain medical records even if the complainer has consented to his/her 
medical records being obtained.
45
 
                                                             
44 Catherine Calderwood, Sharing of Personal Sensitive Information (Medical/Clinical Records) for Court 
Proceedings, (2016), available at <https://blogs.gov.scot/equally-safe/wp-
content/uploads/sites/18/2016/11/SHARING-OF-PERSONAL-SENSITIVE-INFORMATION-MEDICAL-CLINICAL-
RECORDS-FOR-COURT-PROCEEDINGS.pdf>, [accessed: 11th July, 2018], p. 1 
45 Crown also noted that ‘Obtaining medical records which are held out with Scotland is often challenging 
and can lead to delay’. See Appendix A.  
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This comment indicates that individual clinicians are willing to challenge the recovery and 
disclosure of patient records, despite health boards as a whole being reluctant to engage in 
legal proceedings on these points.
46
 It is particularly important that these challenges 
continue to occur when requests are made by the prosecution, and when confidentiality has 
already been waived, through provision of complainer consent. This practice was in fact 
observed among clinicians in this research and is outlined in greater detail later in the 
chapter (section 5.3).  
Among advocates, several expressed the opinion that reporting allegations meant survivors 
should expect access to their medical records.  JC2 for example - though supportive of the 
principle of ILR for complainers - argued that participation in prosecution meant medical 
records could be fairly sought.  
JC2: I suppose if you put a complaint to the police of having been the victim of an 
assault then well you are putting your medical condition in issue and I think it 
comes with the territory. The other, that there is implied consent to, to disclosure or 
a limited disclosure of your medical records relating to that course of treatment and 
the follow up of that and disclosure of your own medical records well, some people 
are precious about that kind of thing, others less so….    
Though he did then stress that ‘fully informed consent’ was essential to the process of 
disclosing records: 
JC2: But that doesn’t mean that that … those who, those who retain their medical 
records should make assumptions about others who are happy to consent to 
disclosure, I think we’ve got to be very precious about ensuring that their consent, 
their fully informed consent is taken in appropriate form, just like I’ve signed a 
consent form here.  
JC2’s senior colleague, SC4, was of a similar opinion, noting that a complaint of a criminal 
offence warranted the exploration of a complainer’s medical records and that the Crown 
would ensure that only strictly relevant information was sought: 
SC4: I'm assuming that, that my doctor wouldn't just tell anyone, well not just, not 
the Crown, wouldn't tell anybody about my medical background without my 
permission.... But I think if you have a, if you have an adequately funded 
                                                             
46 WF v Scottish Ministers [2016] CSOH 27 at [39]  
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prosecution service who's truly prosecuting in the public interest, then there 
shouldn't be an issue with them having access to your medical records, because 
they should only be having access to them for the specific purpose of dealing with 
some complaint or other that you as a citizen have made. So I suppose that's where 
I would think that medical confidentiality would, kind of, not necessarily fall off, 
but would certainly be varied to allow the investigation of your complaint to 
proceed. 
SC4’s argument again stressed the role of the prosecution in protecting the privacy and 
confidentiality rights of the complainer, only infringing upon them to the extent that was 
purely necessary for a fair trial. The belief that the Crown could properly fulfil this role ran 
contrary to the arguments advanced in WF, and was even undercut by SC4 himself, in his 
comment that only an ‘adequately funded’ prosecution could discharge these duties, as he 
later noted that funding issues continued to affect disclosure practice among Crown staff.  
The notion of complainer consent for recovery of records was discussed by several 
advocates. JC2 explained the power of gaining consent as it allowed practitioners access to 
records without reference to the court:   
JC2: Somebody signs consent, they sign a consent form, and that slices through the 
Gordian knot, that’s… you don’t need a court order where there’s consent, when 
that’s forthcoming, it makes it easier for everyone if the complainer does consent. 
This proposition is important and JC2’s assertion that consent makes the process easier ‘for 
everyone’ will be assessed in more detail as the chapter progresses, using the input of 
clinicians and survivors. The idea that achieving consent was uniformly in the interest of 
the complainer was however challenged on occasion, even by other advocates.  In 
describing his concerns with the process, SC1 noted that even when consent was discussed 
with a complainer there remained the question of how informed it would be in reality:  
SC1: Yeah, I guess that that is the situation where people might well say yes and I 
mean it might  be even if everything was fully explained to them that would still be 
their answer, I suppose most of the time it would be but the full implications of it 
wouldn’t necessarily be covered and I suppose it’s quite difficult for the police 
depending on the person’s particular state of mind and condition at the time to do 
that but that’s actually another reason why you would need to wonder whether it, 
how informed the consent is if someone is particularly upset you know, if they’ve 
182 
 
just been a victim or they’re saying they’ve been a victim of something then it’s 
probably not the best time to be asking them. But it might be in terms of the 
investigation you have to, to do it at that point. 
If consent is not obtainable but the Crown still want access to patient records, they can 
achieve this without a court order, through the petition warrant (as noted in chapter 2.4).
47
 
Five advocates spoke about the petition warrant as a particularly powerful tool, used by the 
Crown to obtain medical records - though one of these advocates noted that its use fallen 
out of favour in recent years. In their descriptions, these advocates often described the 
petition warrant as a tool for obtaining records in a quick and easy manner. When detailing 
her experience in the Crown Office for example, JC6 noted:  
JC6: So it was relatively easy… when you work for the Crown, to get medical 
records for people who are complainers in criminal proceedings. And certainly, in 
serious cases where proceedings have begun by way of a petition, I presume you 
know the various ways that criminal proceedings can be taken – so in petition 
proceedings, the petition warrant would give you authority to obtain medical 
records and … although you could get the police to go and seize the records, 
effectively there was really a system in place where you simply wrote to the 
medical records department of the hospital saying that you wanted the records for 
so and so and they knew obviously if it was on headed note paper from the fiscal’s 
office, that you held the warrant to do that. You occasionally sent the police to get 
them but not very often.  
The Crown do not commonly provide information on the frequency with which the petition 
warrant is used to recover medical records and whether they still pursue the tactics outlined 
above is unclear.
48
 JC6’s comment on writing letters to hospitals on ‘headed paper’ 
however, is telling, as this practice actually prompted the Chief Medical Officer to send a 
warning letter to NHS staff about disclosing patient records without clear court orders.
49
  
In response to a written question asking how often the petition warrant was used, the 
Crown responded:  
                                                             
47 COPFS, Policy on Obtaining. pp.15-16 
48 James Chalmers, 'Independent legal representation for complainers in sexual offence cases', in: Post 
Corroboration Safeguards Review Report of the Academic Expert Group, Chalmers, J., Leverick, F. and Shaw, 
A. (eds.), (Edinburgh: The Scottish Government, 2014), p. 187 
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The authority of the petition warrant confers authority on the Crown to recover medical 
records for the purpose of precognition and evidence where that is deemed necessary. 
Obtaining medical records in this way would require the Crown to cite for precognition 
a person from the organisation holding the medical records. This method of recovering 
medical records is discouraged and hence rarely, if ever, occurs.
50
 
 
The disparity between the Crown responses and defence advocate interviewees on this 
point is clear and came to characterise the responses received, with a majority of defence 
advocate interviewees regarding the Crown as able but unwilling to seek appropriate 
disclosure of records. The extent to which these assertions are correct is debatable. 
Certainly, there is little reason to suggest that the Crown widely use the petition warrant, 
and while defence advocates were keen to stress that prosecutors had considerable power 
in this regard, they did not mention recent circumstances in which the warrant had been 
used in this way. JC2 argued that the accessibility of the complainer gave the Crown 
immense power in seeking medical evidence, though he noted that this placed a duty upon 
clinicians to ensure that consent for recovery of records was freely given:  
JC2:  If the patient is in a position to give consent, they have a real capacity to 
consent then consent should be canvassed by the medical practice before they 
disclose to the Crown. But I think you’ll find the Crown are able to get this medical 
information, secure medical evidence much more easily than the defence. And 
again of course if somebody’s a victim of crime, a victim of a violent assault then 
you would expect them to be co-operating in, in the disclosure or the limited 
disclosure of the medical evidence relating to that course of treatment and I 
suppose not to make that kind of disclosure could almost be regarded as obstruction, 
an offence on the Police Scotland Act or an offence conceivably against the course 
of justice.  
Other advocates noted that the Crown resisted actively seeking medical records to avoid 
provoking disclosure obligations:  
SC4: My understanding with the Crown these days, in relation to medical records 
and social work records, is unless they actually think it will be of positive value to 
them they just don't bother recovering them because if they recover them they 
                                                             
50 See Appendix A 
184 
 
know they have to give them to us. And so, it's, it's an easier position for them to 
adopt to say, "oh, let's just not bother."  
There were indications that disclosure practice had changed over time, and several legal 
participants expressed the view that disclosure by the Crown had become more restricted 
over their careers. JC5 described this perceived change:  
JC5: When I started at the bar what happened was, if you had a complainer who 
you thought had any psychiatric, psychological, or for example hadn't reported at 
the time when the offences were alleged to be on-going, the Crown would obtain 
the records more often than not and then disclose those. They could work through 
them, I had cases where you were getting 15,000 sheets of records and things. 
There's now a move away from that, they don't routinely get records. So the way to 
access them now would obviously be to do a specification of documents. And when 
the Crown do recover the records now, on the occasions that they do, obviously 
they are heavily redacted. And they have a process whereby they speak to the 
complainer before the records are given out, all that sort of, background. But in 
terms of the defence obtaining them now, it's very, very hard. I haven't had a 
specification of documents granted. They are granted when a commissioner is 
appointed more often than not, because you're being specific about what exactly 
you're looking for in the records, so I think it makes the judge much more 
comfortable. 
This view was supported by individuals arguing that the legal system generally had 
become more resistant to ‘over-disclosure’ of complainers’ medical records: 
JC6: I personally, have never engaged in any kind of fishing expedition, when it 
comes to trying to obtain complainer’s medical records. It is something that I think 
most practitioners are aware the court will grant only in exceptional cases and it is 
in exceptional cases and as a result, we only make these applications in exceptional 
cases, and it is something that I do despite the fact that I do loads of these cases, it’s 
something that I do very, very rarely. Very rarely. You know. And when I was 
looking at the, I re-read the WF case before I came to meet you today and I know 
that the interveners suggested that this was something that was becoming more, 
more common. I’m not sure that statistically, that would be borne out if I’m honest.  
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Despite arguing that as a defence practitioner, she did not often seek medical records in 
such cases, JC6 argued the Crown commonly did so, though also stating that they very 
rarely obtained the large tranches of records as occurred in WF.  
JC6: The Crown do it all the time! All the time is the answer to that.  
D: But the huge ones are what you’re talking about, the extensive amount is very 
rarely?  
JC6: Yeah.  
JC6 was not the only practitioner to critique the view expressed by Rape Crisis Scotland as 
interveners in WF, that the use of medical records was becoming increasingly common in 
rape cases. In describing the ‘balancing exercise’ between a complainer’s right to privacy 
and an accused person’s right to a fair trial, JC4 argued that the court had always protected 
the confidentiality rights of the complainer:  
JC4: So the court has, my point is never mind F [sic], the court has always been, 
cautious to preserve that balancing exercise. And I read with interest the written 
submissions of Rape Crisis and obviously Lord Glennie factored those in. But it 
would be wrong I think for anyone to think that the courts in Scotland generally 
didn’t really care about the complainer. We’ve got a balancing exercise between 
article 6 and article 8, I suppose. And I see that, I suppose the effect of F [sic] is 
that a decision maker now is making specific reference to article 8, and article 6 in 
the balancing act. But it’s always taken place is my point. In my opinion.  
Several interviewees discussed why they believed the Crown had reduced the amount of 
medical material it retrieved and disclosed, with the principal reasons given as cost and 
time:  
SC4: I think the Crown then decided that rather than recover them, I suspect for 
two reasons, principally cost, is that the time involved in going through these cases, 
you know, you sometimes have, if you've got a lot of children the social work 
records and the medical records in relation to all of that literally are 1000s and 
1000s of pages. And as well as having to go through them and examine them and 
decide what is to be disclosed and what is not to be disclosed, you also have to go 
through the physical process of copying them, somehow or other disclosing them. 
And I think, partly because they considered, they weren't really getting great 
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benefit from it and partly because of the cost element, and the general resources 
element, that they just said, "let's just not bother", you know. If the defence want 
them they can recover them. In the odd case they will recover them because, you 
know, almost because they couldn't not do it, but I think as a general policy, don't 
think they're keen. 
Despite many advocates arguing that there was decreasing co-operation on disclosure, this 
opinion was not universal and some mentioned the Crown and defence working together 
on occasion to gather relevant medical information, describing the kind of ‘shared 
understandings’ mentioned by Raitt in which both parties knew what information could 
reasonably be sought and disclosed, through a process of close discussion.
51
 Here SC1 
describes this process:  
SC1: In my experience it, you’d usually get it from the Crown and occasionally it’s 
if you explain to them “Look this is what we’re wanting or we’ll have to make an 
application” then sometimes they will find it out for you. It’s easier for the Crown 
to do it and… also I think that it’s probably easier for the Crown to do it in 
conjunction with the complainer so that things are explained as opposed to simply 
having a petition served on them….. So doing it through court while that introduces 
perhaps a level of safeguard in terms of the complainer being represented, it’s also 
a court hearing and brings the stresses and strains that that, that does so 
occasionally, I think if complainers have it explained to them “Look this is what 
they’re looking for and we think we should give it to them” then reluctantly 
perhaps they will agree to that and it just means that the case is, is dealt with or can 
be dealt with slightly more easily or without an additional layer of complication or 
bureaucracy. 
SC1’s description suggests a level of collaboration supporting Raitt’s assertion. His 
reference to the welfare of the complainer in this process is also worthy of note and SC1 
seems to suggest that active engagement between the Crown and defence could reduce 
harm to the complainer, through averting the associated bureaucracy of court oversight. In 
further discussion of these negotiations, SC1 highlighted the role of the accused in guiding 
the decisions over what information to recover: 
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SC1: It may be a process that develops as a result of discussions, the defence might 
see redacted records, speak to the accused about it, usually if there’s been a 
relationship, if you’re talking about that sort of background then the accused will 
have a far greater knowledge about the, the medical history of the complainer 
anyway. And they will be able to say well there’s, this thing happened that is 
relevant, and isn’t there, so you can go back to the Crown and say “well here’s 
something that we want to see, here’s why it’s relevant and we know about it 
because the accused has told us and he knew about it because he went to the 
doctor’s with the complainer”. So it’s a tricky process, I think the, it’s an area 
where pressure of resources means that it, I’m not sure that everyone has as much 
time to, to do, to make these assessments as they would like to. And mistakes can 
be made then. 
JC2 also highlighted the role of the accused in disclosure decisions, with information on 
the complainer’s health offering the defence a legitimate means of recovery:    
JC2: But a lot of hoops to jump through to get there and as I say, without you 
know an appropriate evidential basis, this line of enquiry is futile and you know we 
don’t just do it on our own initiative, we need, we need an in, we need our client to 
tell us something about the relationship dynamic that makes you think, OK well 
that, that’s something that suggests that this woman has mental health issues.  
As noted in chapter 2, in their 2013 guidance on retrieving sensitive records, the Crown 
highlighted that the accused could provide information that would require examination of 
the complainer’s sensitive medical records.52 While it is undoubtedly true that a previous 
relationship can give the accused knowledge of a complainer’s health, sufficient to warrant 
disclosure, there is evidence that the court may be amending its attitude to the scope of this 
role. In the recent case of JC Petitioner, the court ruled that the accused (as a previous 
partner) would have had sufficient information regarding the complainer’s health to restrict 
his request for medical records to those relating to specific instances in which the 
complainer supposedly displayed the lying behaviour he alleged would impact her 
credibility and reliability.
53
 As he could not refer to any of these instances, nor any 
examples of how this condition manifested itself, the court ruled that his request for the full 
disclosure of the complainer’s entire GP records was unjustified.  
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JC5’s comments on commissioners are noteworthy, in that she argues that even when a 
commissioner is appointed, records are difficult to obtain. Several legal participants spoke 
positively about the increasing use of commissioners, suggesting this was a way to support 
complainers’ concerns about confidentiality while still obtaining relevant information. Yet 
in JC, the use of a commissioner in the first instance trial did not satisfy the appeal judges 
on the relevance of the information eventually obtained.
54
 It is the subject of relevance and 
its definition by legal professionals that concerns the next section of this chapter.  
5.2.3. Determining relevance 
In WF, the interveners referred to the lack of formal arrangements for complainers to 
challenge the Crown on decisions of relevance.
55
 When interviewing defence advocates, 
relevance was often discussed, participants keen to stress that only material information 
would be sought and/or used.  
JC2: You can’t just go on a fishing expedition. The courts don’t like this concept 
of defence lawyers fishing when you go fishing you do expect to catch something 
and you need some kind of in, you need your client or, or some witness to tell you 
that, that that there may well be some kind of mental health issue so far as the 
complainer’s concerned to give you that in, before you can go to the court and get 
and order for disclosure. 
JC4: It’s certainly not my practice nor any of my instructing solicitors’ practice 
that we get the medical records and then sit and thumb through them and say “oh 
by the way did you know this?”, we don’t do that. So, it’s all, all taken terribly 
seriously and, protected to the hilt. And because, I suppose the, the answer is I 
would be outraged if I thought my medical records were kicking about the place, so 
I would protect somebody else’s medical records in the same way I’d protect my 
own medical records. 
Among legal practitioners holding the view that excessive and irrelevant medical records 
were rarely, if ever sought, the conclusions drawn in WF were seen as largely unnecessary. 
JC4, who spoke repeatedly of the stringent controls applied by the court on the use of 
medical information, argued there was no need for a change in practice. In this passage, he 
notes that while WF obliged legal services to intimate to a complainer when their records 
were sought, this was superfluous as he already took on this responsibility. He then went 
                                                             
54 Ibid. 
55 WF v Scottish Ministers [2016] CSOH 27 at [24] 
189 
 
on to argue that though Lord Glennie had confirmed a complainer’s right to be heard in 
applications concerning their records, this right already existed. He went on to undermine 
his own point by noting that no complainer or Health Board had been represented 
independently in his experience - likely a symptom of the lack of legal clarity and legal aid 
funding that Lord Glennie was referring to in his judgement:
56
 
JC4: So the short answer is I don’t think F [sic]makes any difference, doesn’t 
make any difference to me because we have always intimated it [notice for 
petition and diligence to recover medical records] to the complainers and I’ve 
always been aware that they have a right to turn up and argue against the 
application. In actual fact, I don’t think it’s ever been done. I can’t remember a 
complainer being represented. I suppose that it would only be somebody who had 
the means to instruct an advocate privately, that would be able to do that, or have a 
contrary point of view put up. And with the NHS or the GPs, again I can’t think of 
a situation where they’ve objected to it. 
JC4’s conclusion joined other legal participants who argued that the system at present was 
largely effective, the court controlling the admission of information and preserving 
survivors’ privacy rights. Among those supporting this point, a majority argued that where 
faults existed, they were almost entirely due to resource issues and affected the prosecution 
more than the defence. SC4 argued that the Crown had to scrutinise records anyway as this 
duty could not be passed on to other professionals, or medical professionals in particular:  
SC4: I suppose in theory, the doctor could be the guardian of your medical records 
in the sense of only disclosing stuff that is only relevant to whatever the complaint 
is, but I'm pretty sure doctors wouldn't want to have that thrust upon them. I'm sure 
they feel they've got enough to do without somebody trawling through your 
medical records saying, "oh there's nothing here that's of any interest." So I would 
suppose they'd rather leave that to somebody else. But I think it's all down to 
having a state prosecutor doing its job properly. 
In making this argument, SC4 was adopting the opposite position to that espoused by JC2 
earlier in the chapter, where he argued that medical practices should be involved directly in 
the process of disclosing records – though his comments referred more specifically to 
consent than actual determinations of relevance. Other advocates, concerned with the 
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notion that irrelevant information was ever sought, described their approach as entirely 
reasonable, several noting they did not pursue “fishing expeditions”, obtaining large 
medical files. SC2 outlined this view, which was shared by a number of colleagues: 
SC2: If I’m looking for records, I’ll always make it clear what the boundaries are 
within which I want to examine the records, I’m not interested in whether they had 
measles at five or whether they wet the bed up until they were sixteen. It all has to 
be based on what the evidence is that I’ve/ or the instructions that I’m being given 
in relation to, to the disclosed evidence. And it’s restricted as much as possible. 
While these advocates were keen to describe their disinterest in extensive record requests, 
they were often unable to outline how they determined what information to recover. This 
omission is important as when considering relevance, it is worth assessing what medical 
information would actually be useful to lawyers at trial as only through answering this 
question can one discern the role of confidentiality in these decisions. In a response to a 
request over how the Crown identified and obtained records in domestic abuse cases, they 
noted:  
Medical records may be recovered in cases in which the complainer indicates that 
they: obtained medical treatment as a consequence of the alleged offence or 
disclosed abuse by the accused to a clinician. Therefore, cases involving physical or 
sexual violence are those which are most likely to involve the recovery of medical 
records. If there is reason to believe that the complainer has a psychiatric condition 
that could impact upon his/her credibility or reliability medical records relating to 
that condition may be recovered.
57
 
The credibility and reliability issue seemed a key concern in advocates’ decision-making 
process when recovering records. JC1 spoke about records being used to undermine 
credibility as it was now ‘nearly impossible to mount a positive defence’, often as a result 
of the long time periods between alleged offences and the trials themselves.  Below JC5 
gives an example of the information found in medical records that might be relevant to 
advocates:  
JC5: So, an example would be if you have somebody who alleges that he is being 
violent and sexually abusive and perhaps they have reported the violence but not 
the sexual abuse. So they've gone to their doctor and said, you know, I have had a 
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black eye because he's assaulting and make no mention of sexual assault, then that 
would be the kind of thing that is important because that's someone who can 
disclose but isn't disclosing the full-story until much later on. On occasion I've had 
to use them from a psychiatric aspect…. It turns in every case. But they are 
extremely difficult to get hold of now.  
Many advocates referred to medical records as useful in facilitating the introduction of 
otherwise restricted information, i.e. that concerning the complainer’s sexual history. This 
feature of record use will be discussed in more detail in chapter six but, in the course of 
interview, SC3 alluded to this idea, when discussing sexual character evidence and sections 
274/275 of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995
58
: 
SC3: And often, the access to medical records, informs a defence practitioner as to 
whether or not to make an application to lead the type of evidence that 274 
prohibits.  
As a result of the lack of available figures, I developed a protocol (outlined in chapter 3) to 
measure medical record requests in domestic abuse cases. The results, detailed below in 
figure 5, reflect a study period of six months from October 2017 to April 2018 in which all 
requests were logged by the NHS and passed to the Crown for confirmation of domestic 
abuse before being passed to me.   
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Figure 5: Medical record requests October 2017 - April 2018 
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Even a cursory glance at figure 5 demonstrates some of the flaws in this protocol. Due to 
the unavailability of partner staff at certain points in the study period, results for December 
were not confirmed and there was no delineation between requests for February, March 
and April. This in effect leaves reliable data for October, November and January. Across 
these three months, sixteen medical record requests were made by the Crown. On the basis 
of this information, and using October, November and January as examples, it is possible 
to draw some conclusions.  
In all cases received, it was the Crown requesting data, rather than the court or the defence. 
Similarly, in all cases, it was complainers’ records that were sought. No redaction of any 
records was ever completed and none of the records requested were reviewed by a clinician, 
instead being obtained and transferred by managerial staff in the NHS. In all but one case, 
the records requested related to a single date. Importantly, the requests made here relate 
only to acute medical records and do not contain mental health or general practice data. 
The fact that they appear to be made with the ‘degree of regularity’ referred to by the court 
in JC Petitioner is therefore interesting and supports the notion promoted by some lawyers 
in this research that records are more useful in proving or disproving physical abuse than 
sexual abuse – discussed in more detail in chapter six.59 The way in which they were 
obtained was also important, with clinicians having no involvement in the process. This in 
turn highlights the potential for clinicians to be side-lined in cases where records are 
sought, something which has achieved little interest from other researchers.   
However, this interpretation is flawed as numerous researchers and charities continue to 
argue that it is mental health records in particular that are frequently sought and used 
against complainers.
60
 The fact that both mental health and general practice records were 
not included in this study therefore makes any inference regarding the frequency and 
extent of requests difficult. As noted above, only on one occasion did the period of data 
requested exceed one day. Given the reasonable sample size, it would be tempting to argue 
– as several advocates in this study did – that large volumes of records are rarely sought. 
However, the fact that all the available data refers to acute records challenges this 
assumption. Acute medical services, by definition, are likely to provide treatment for more 
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60 See for example, Raitt, ‘Disclosure of records’, pp. 33-56; Elizabeth Charlotte Adamson, (2016) ‘A Critical 
Exploration of the Use of Mental Health Records in Rape Trials’, (Unpublished PhD Thesis: Durham 
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limited time periods than would be the case in general practice or mental health services. 
The records from acute care are therefore likely to be more limited in scope. A&E records 
for example, might be used to prove or dispute whether a complainer received treatment on 
a specific date and whether they disclosed abuse on this occasion, the ‘I went to the doctor 
and told them it happened’ evidence referred to by JC5 above. In the case of mental health 
records however, it is likely that medical records covering a greater period of time would 
be sought.
61
 This is evident both in the available evidence of other researchers and through 
the testimony of mental health experts in this research, namely FPsych1 who noted that 
large volumes of records were often sought in order to give a picture of an individual’s 
mental health, rather than a single snapshot.
62
 
There is further reason to suppose that the number of requests recorded is lower than the 
reality. This is because the study was conducted before the introduction of domestic abuse 
as a distinct criminal offence in Scotland.
63
 Accordingly, Crown partners could only 
identify a relevant case if it contained a domestic abuse aggravator, but this was added at 
the discretion of prosecutors rather than as a requirement in every case and instead 
functioned to give a wider context to the alleged offences and as a sentencing consideration 
if guilt was determined.
64
 There may therefore have been cases which did involve domestic 
abuse that were not recorded. 
It is therefore reasonable to assume that the numbers in figure 5 do not reflect the average 
monthly record requests made to the health board. For October, November and January, 
there were a minimum of four record requests. This suggests that requests are made with a 
‘degree of regularity’, that there is little involvement from clinicians and little chance for 
redaction in this process. It also highlights the potential for complainers to feel ostracised 
throughout. Over the short period assessed, sixteen complainers’ records were sought and 
yet, through consultation with the Scottish Legal Aid Board, it is clear that there were only 
twenty-five applications for legal aid to oppose applications for commission and diligence 
for all sensitive records (medical, educational, social work etc) in all criminal proceedings 
between 1 March 2016 and July 2019.
65
 As SC4 noted, there appears to be few cases in 
which ILR is accessed:  
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 Raitt, ‘Disclosure of Records’, p. 45 
62 See chapter 6.  
63 Under the Domestic Abuse (Scotland) Act 2018 which received Royal Assent in the latter months of this 
study, though the relevant provisions of the Act did not come into force until 1st April 2019. 
64 These could now be better determined by using the 2018 Act to screen for the specific offence.  
65 Correspondence with author.  
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SC4: I must confess I've never seen it done, but I think it was Lord Glennie wasn't 
it who made a judgement saying that they were entitled to be represented. As I say, 
I've never been involved in a case where somebody has been represented or has 
come to along to argue that you shouldn't get them. 
While tracing the medical record requests was useful, it did not provide any insight into 
what motivated the Crown to obtain records on some occasions and not in others. Some 
reasons for this behaviour were however provided by legal interviewees. Resource 
considerations in particular were highlighted as essential to these decision-making 
processes, with underfunding identified as driving poor disclosure decisions and 
undermining the autonomy of complainers, which was then supported – needlessly 
according to SC4 and JC4 – by the provision of ILR. SC4 was not alone in arguing that an 
adequately funded prosecution service would increase complainers’ autonomy and lead to 
less dissatisfaction with medical record requests:  
SC3: If it was done with care, precision and in a supportive and informed way, in 
meetings with the complainer, through VIA [Victim Information and Advice 
Service], and in discussions with the procurator fiscal with the immense support 
that these people need, there was no need for it to become a problem. There is no 
reason for it to be a problem. The problems arose where the complainers were not 
supported, the issue was not explained, and, they were coming into court not 
knowing that their records had been accessed. Just unforgivable. And it undermined 
the way in which the Crown were prosecuting these very difficult cases, 
unnecessarily. And from my perspective I put it down to lack of resources[…]. It 
can’t be done on a shoestring.   
The sheer volume of material for consideration was also stressed by legal interviewees. 
This, they argued, coupled with funding concerns led to situations in which correct 
procedures were not adhered to. SC1 described a situation in which evidence of a 
complainer’s termination was passed to him in error by the Crown:  
SC1: I’ve seen examples where something has been left in that wasn’t relevant and 
became… in fact this was after an application to the court for the records and there 
was access to the record which the defence got hold of and there was a reference in 
it to a termination, which wasn’t, wasn’t relevant at all. So we, we had to basically 
leave that out of account, that it didn’t, it didn’t affect our planned defence. I’m 
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sure it’s something the client would have wanted to know about but it wasn’t 
relevant to his defence, so it didn’t feature as part of the case.  
He went on to describe why this situation arose:  
SC1: I think those who are involved in the process of deciding what to disclose, 
don’t have an unlimited amount of time and they don’t just have one case that 
they’re dealing with and you can even in a single case be talking about hundreds or 
even thousands of pages and in particular now with social media, I’ve had cases 
recently where you’re talking about thousands and thousands of messages, all of 
which had to be considered by someone and you know sometimes you could see 
that things were maybe left in that probably should have been redacted but it’s 
understandable where one person who’s also got a dozen other cases to prepare, is 
reading thousands of pages.  
SC1’s comments bolster Raitt’s prophetic argument, that if resource issues continued to 
blight the Crown, then ‘one can imagine that disclosure of certain types of personal records 
will become routine as there is no-one to advocate the specific concerns of the 
complainer’.66 A majority of advocates stressed that increasing workloads on the Crown 
has affected their disclosure practice. Even JC2, who repeatedly stressed that the 
availability of resources actually benefitted the Crown position conceded that time pressure 
caused difficulties and changes in practice, with prosecutors avoiding recovery on the basis 
that it would be a substantial investment in labour. This, in turn, increased the burden on 
the defence to pursue requests for records through the court:  
JC2: But getting back to what do the Crown actually do well… I think the Crown’s 
tendency is well, despite having all the resources of the state at their disposal, they 
only have limited resources in time and, well it’s not our job to get this but I 
suppose if the defence flags up - as the defence are now required to do in terms of 
preparing a defence statement of indictment proceedings both in the High Court 
and Sheriff Court - defence flags up this is exculpatory evidence, we want the 
Crown to assist in its recovery, is the Crown then under a duty to do so? It may 
well be but how far do you, do you push that duty? They can write a letter I 
suppose… but the reality is if the defence wants medical records you’ve got 
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understand that the defence has to pursue that intuitively, the defence has to exhaust 
that line of enquiry. No one’s going to help them. 
Despite the apparent frequency with which medical records are used however, there was 
divided opinion over how much impact they had on a case. JC1 thought they were 
particularly important given the growing number of historical abuse cases:   
JC1: In the context of sexual offences and domestic abuse, medical records are 
extremely important. And that’s largely because the majority of cases that are in 
court now are historical cases. So there are still current cases but they tend not to be 
quite so common. And in historical cases, there tends to be a heavy reliance on 
Moorov, the Moorov doctrine.
67
 
JC2 however argued that records were probably better conceived as occasionally essential 
but mostly merely additional evidence:  
JC2: Or maybe, maybe it’s, it’s something that might make a difference in a 
marginal case and it’s maybe something that can make maybe three, four, five 
percent of a difference and if you think well you’re already 80% there… we don’t 
really need this medical evidence. Not that you’re saying it’s a distraction, you 
know it, it’s an essential aspect of proving the case but they, they, they don’t need 
to accentuate it they don’t need to amplify it they don’t need to go in with all guns 
blazing on every single aspect of the Crown case so. Clearly their trial strategy 
there was vindicated, if I were prosecuting I, I might just take the view well you 
know I would like the medical evidence to be presented through the medium of a 
doctor, I mean consultant who’s been involved in this case. 
SC1 shared JC2’s opinion noting that medical records were mostly neutral:  
SC1: It may be that the defence would commission an independent expert to have a 
look at the records to say, “Does this description in the witness’s statement, the vic/ 
the complainer’s statement coincide the injuries which have been found?”  in 
relation to sexual matters, “what are the implications if any of an absence of 
injuries?” and the answer to that would very often, would usually be, “It doesn’t tell 
you anything”, the  evidence is not great, there’s no substantial benchmark of 
women who’ve had consensual intercourse and then gone to see their doctor, 
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afterwards.  So, but the experts tend to say “injuries in different people, some 
people might be injured where others wouldn’t be, injuries heal at different rates, 
there can be consensual activity which has injury, there can be non-consensual 
activity which has none”. So actually a lot of the time, medical evidence ends up as 
being neutral, properly understood, but occasionally there’s something in it that, 
that is of particular assistance to the Crown and occasionally there’s something in it 
that’s of particular assistance to the defence.   
These comments are initially surprising, given the documented use of records by 
participants in this research and elsewhere. The advocates making them often appeared to 
be downplaying the intrinsic worth of medical records, while also asserting the probity of 
their own disclosure practices. The reasons behind these arguments, are explored in greater 
depth in chapter 6, when advocates talk in greater detail about how records are used in 
court.  
While not a major feature of this research, all advocates were asked about the role of the 
Domestic Abuse Act 2018 on the use of medical records, given that it recognises 
psychological as well as physical and sexual abuse as offences. Several participants 
(including a majority of senior counsel) criticised the act from an evidential perspective, 
arguing that allegations of psychological abuse in particular would be difficult to prove and 
would require increasing recourse to both health records and clinicians’ opinions. Here 
SC3 describes these issues in a manner that was also expressed by other participants:  
SC3: I think the new legislation has challenges, particularly around the 
psychological abuse, and the ability to prove that such behaviours have taken place 
and have impacted psychologically. I think that’s going to be difficult. But I do 
predict that a major consequence will be further requirement for the analysis, 
medically, of a woman or a man complaining of psychological abuse, because 
inevitably, it will require, I would have thought, the support of expert evidence. I 
don’t know what the Crown have decided about that, in terms of their preparation 
of these cases, whether or not they’re going to go down the route of requiring 
expert evidence in each of these cases, before they mark it. I think you’d really 
need to ask them about that, because the inevitable consequences, rather than less, 
there will be more, analysis of medical evidence, in these types of cases.  
As already noted, there is little evidence to suggest that the petition warrant is routinely 
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used by the Crown to retrieve medical records.
68
 There is even less data supporting the 
notion that the defence are increasingly required to obtain medical records through the 
courts as a result of reluctance by the Crown. Indeed, correspondence with the Lord Justice 
General (see appendix I) and discussions with the Scottish Courts and Tribunals Service 
suggested that preliminary hearings for recovery of records occurred infrequently, at least 
in High Court cases.
69
 Taken in concert with the available figures on medical record 
requests seen earlier in the chapter, it would instead appear that it is the Crown that most 
frequently obtains records in domestic abuse cases.  
A more nuanced argument would instead be that while the Crown can seize records when 
required, without jumping through the same ‘hoops’ as the defence, they do not have to do 
so. Instead, as several defence advocates noted, the proximity between the Crown and the 
complainer allows prosecutors and/or police, to obtain the consent of abuse survivors for 
records to be retrieved. This approach, while distinct from those observed in WF and JC, 
does at least have some supporting evidence among survivors and scholars – both 
survivors in this study had this experience after all.
70
  
It is still difficult, using this argument, to explain why a large number of the defence 
advocates participating in this study contended that disclosure from the Crown has 
decreased over time. Given the concomitant increase in judicial scrutiny of applications 
through the court, to fully accept the position of these advocates would be to accept that 
medical records were rarely used in domestic abuse and rape cases. It is difficult at this 
point, to provide a conclusive answer as to why many advocates in this research were so 
convinced that this was indeed the case.  
What is evident however is that the advocates in this research believed that when medical 
records were obtained, this was done appropriately, with fishing expeditions rarely - if ever 
- undertaken. Crucially, those making this argument also believed that it was for lawyers to 
determine what medical information may be relevant in court and that compared to these 
decisions, medical confidentiality was of secondary importance. In doing so, they devalued 
the control over confidentiality held by survivors and clinicians. In the next section of this 
chapter, I explore how these perceptions reconcile with those held by the latter group, as 
the producers of medical records.  
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5.3. Healthcare position 
In the previous chapter, several clinicians referred to circumstances in which the potential 
for criminal proceedings caused them to amend their confidentiality practices, both in what 
they recorded in a consultation and/or in how they discussed confidentiality with patients. 
It is therefore helpful to consider how clinicians handled requests for medical information 
from legal services in anticipation of future proceedings. There was a wide variety of 
responses among interviewees in these discussions, with participants having varied 
experiences of dealing with Crown requests and court mandates for survivors’ medical 
information. Accordingly, there was a variance of opinion over a clinicians’ role in 
discussing the involvement of legal services and medical record requests and with their 
patients.  
GP2 was unique in the lengths she went to in discussing these topics with patients. She 
spoke in detail about how they asked her for legal advice, describing this as indicative of 
the trusting relationship between them. In cases where she received legal letters with a 
patient’s consent for disclosure, she still always contacted the patient directly to ensure that 
they understood exactly what they were consenting to. This was twinned with a less 
sympathetic attitude towards legal involvement than many of her colleagues, which may 
have motivated her to amend her practice. On the topic of having to interact with police 
and lawyers in the context of medical record requests, GP2 opined:  
GP2: Oh, it's a nightmare [laughs]. Incredibly time consuming. We're busy enough 
as it is, it is part of our job, it's very important. I always like to - the girl I’ve just 
spoken about with the rape who'd had the child, they'd contacted for me for the 
notes, and I went, “ok I know you're the police but I want to chat to this girl first”. 
So I actually phoned her and went, “look I just want to check that this is happening” 
and she went, “yeah, I'm absolutely fine with that. I spoke to the police, I told them 
to contact you, I'm happy.” And I went, “ok what do you want me to give them? 
This is exactly what they're asking for”, and then I spoke with her and said, “look 
they just want stuff that's relevant, but I think that all these other problems that 
you've had, a lot of it's anxiety, mental health related, probably stems back to this, 
you happy for me to send that too?” She's going, “yeah that's ok…..” But again, it 
means printing out her notes, they wanted the last ten years of her notes, and I then 
have to physically go through working out what she wants to go and what she - it's 
incredibly time consuming to do that during your day.  
200 
 
GP2’s practice in this regard is notable and builds on her descriptions in the previous 
chapter of discussing confidentiality with every patient as a general rule. When addressing 
medical record requests, she not only discussed applications with patients but actually 
helped them in negotiating the disclosure of further information which she deemed relevant 
to a future criminal prosecution. She reported also noting these decisions in the medical 
record: 
GP2: - I tend to personally give them a wee phone. I don't think that's something to 
get the reception staff to phone them about, because often that's their fear that the 
whole world knows what's going on. To be honest a lot of our patients who have 
these problems are in anyway, so they'll maybe be in and say to me, “oh by the way 
you're going to get a thing through from my lawyer about such and such.” And I'll 
just check with them, “ok you're happy for me to give the report on things we've 
spoken about”. “Yeah, that's fine”, and I'll make a wee note in the record. 
This in-depth approach contrasted with that of MF1, who stated that he tended to provide 
records when asked by police without contacting patients directly, though stressing that he 
did this infrequently:  
MF1: I have on occasion [contacted patients], but it's not very often, because 
when I talk to police, by and large, I think they're right in saying that if they're 
investigating something they have a right to the information. Very occasionally, we 
check that, very occasionally you just want to make sure that the person the police 
are acting on behalf of is happy for that information to be released, but largely 
speaking the police are investigating on behalf of that person.  
In making the argument above, MF1’s position was not entirely dissimilar to that 
expressed by several advocates in the previous section, that is that investigation of a crime 
meant that the police and lawyers had a right to certain aspects of the complainer’s medical 
record. MF1’s position differed however, in his reference to ensuring that the 
patient/complainer had actually consented for that information to be released.   
GP2’s colleague, GP1 didn’t discuss whether she contacted patients concerning medical 
record requests, but did describe the process of receiving record requests:  
GP1: We do, but with all the Data Protection stuff and everything, lawyers quite 
often just ask for the whole medical records now photocopies, so, even that's not 
a … You know, the chances of us being asked to provide a specialist report are 
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probably virtually nil because we're not forensic medical examiners. When it's 
obviously evidentially led process, we might be asked to provide a medical report 
an instance that happened when a patient went to A&E and then they came to us 
and, you know, what, “how were they when they came to us?”. But that would 
really be the extent, I think, of our input into something like that. 
She was however initially unsure whether the case concerned was in relation to a criminal 
or civil claim but noted that most requests usually came with patient consent:  
GP1: Yeah, usually yes, it would yes, it would do, it would do, it would do, yeah. 
We wouldn't release the records unless we had a separate patient consent form. I 
mean most of them are civil cases, you know, somebody tripped a pavement and 
they're suing the council it's that kind of thing, you know. Or, you know, but we're 
not often, I would say we're not often involved in criminal matters of that kind. It's 
infrequent. 
FPsych1’s position was more clear-cut, his frequent interactions with the court driving his 
distinctions of who had a right to accessing patient information. In describing how he 
handled requests for confidential records, he noted:  
FPsych1:So, very sensitively. So, generally, I wouldn't give out any information 
unless it was court mandated or court appointed. Unless there was something that 
had been, you know, something specific that the court was seeking and that there 
was the proper authority to give that. Otherwise I am a 100% closed book on, you 
know, even if someone phones up to say, "oh, such and such, I'm a social worker I 
wanted to ask about, whatever", I'll say, "Oh that's" - I'll neither confirm or deny 
whether I'll know that person, but I would ask them to demonstrate their bona fides 
by, perhaps, a secure email with the person's details asking for information and then 
if so mandated I can provide or have a discussion with them. 
FME interviewees had a novel perspective as their patients are often required to sign 
written consent forms for the disclosure of records relating to the consultation. In 
discussion, SHD1 described the kind of information typically recorded in a consultation 
with a survivor alleged to have suffered rape and/or sexual assault, detailing her own 
practice of restricting the scope of information later disclosed to legal services:  
SHD1: I mean [HOSPITAL NAME] has a very specific pro forma that is filled out 
so we don’t go into lots of details about someone’s past history or things like that.   
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So very specific to that particular assault and what we need to know you know we 
don’t need to write down all these because if I’ve written down lots of things about 
someone’s medical history or previous gynaecological history or whatever it means 
that if I’m asked in court I have to answer those questions whereas if I don’t have 
that information its kept confidential. There’s no reason for me to be disclosing that 
within court it’s not relevant to the particular assault, there are some things that 
would be relevant, but, but by and large that person although they’ve been sexually 
assaulted they have the right to confidentiality about other aspects of their life. It’s 
a terribly rough situation and you know if they get to court that’s you know it’s not 
an easy situation for someone to be in without having their private details discussed 
that have got nothing to do with it you know and I think that really puts people off 
you, know their whole life is going to be discussed in court.  
SHD1’s practice of refusing to discuss aspects of her patients’ medical history is 
informative and stands in stark contrast to the approach adopted by many of the clinicians 
in Temkin’s study, outlined in chapter 2.71 Rather than ‘mining’ in the way Temkin 
described, SHD1 instead chose to actively avoid discussions that may elicit irrelevant 
information from patients, which she would then have to write down. Interestingly, SHD1 
also noted that the potential use of sensitive records had a decisive impact on survivors’ 
willingness to participate in prosecution.  
Several clinicians expressed uncertainty over the question of consent and disclosure of 
medical records, having little to no involvement with the process of record requests, which 
were made to other senior clinical or managerial staff. The position is relatively unclear 
elsewhere, and while the Crown appear to recover records and provide these for clinicians 
in court, the MDU advises clinicians to take ‘the contemporaneous medical records’ with 
them.
72
 RD1 expressed uncertainty on handling such requests, referring to a perceived lack 
of control over the process:  
RD1: Basically when, when we’re approached to provide medical records, the 
request goes to management I think. And they deal, they’re, they know exactly 
about how to do that so when we were, I was asked to provide medical records I 
basically took the request to management and they, they dealt with it…..  Because 
                                                             
71 Jennifer Temkin, 'Medical Evidence in Rape Cases: A Continuing Problem for Criminal Justice', The Modern 
Law Review, 61 (1998), pp. 821-848 
72 Medical Defence Union,' Giving evidence as a witness of fact', <https://www.themdu.com/guidance-and-
advice/guides/consultant-pack/giving-evidence-as-a-witness-of-fact>, [date accessed; 25th June, 2019] 
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to be honest, I’m not sure of all the legal requirements about that. So I know there’s 
forms to be completed and basically they just asked me if I was happy for my notes 
to be shared. And I was. Although I don’t think you get much choice in that matter 
really. 
Her colleague, OS1 was similarly unsure about this process, noting that when she had to 
appear in court, records were provided by the Crown (a view that was also espoused by 
AE1):  
OS1: In terms of getting notes and things, usually somebody’s already asked for 
copies of them so I’ve never, there’s never been a problem with that, I’ve never had 
to actually take the notes with me or anything, usually the PF’s got a copy of 
everything/….Yeah, yeah. Yeah I’ve never had to, it’s always a photocopy but it’s 
usually, it’s always been there, I’ve never had an issue. 
D: And is it usually just related to the index case or do/ 
OS1: Yeah uh huh, not it’s usually uh huh just the bit related to that. 
Importantly, unlike her colleagues in other, non-acute specialties, OS1 noted that the 
medical records she had to discuss in court mostly referred to the index case, that is to say, 
the injuries she treated relating to the alleged crime, This is distinct from the experience of, 
for example GP2 and some of the sexual health doctors who were asked to speak in more 
detail about patients, for example on occasion being required to include reference to 
elements of their medical history.  
SHN1 and SHN2 had not yet had to attend court to give evidence relating to any of their 
patients. SHN1 however had experienced the police accessing her patient notes, something 
that was then dealt with by a senior colleague: 
SHN1: I think the police had to look at my notes for one patient but that would 
have been arranged through the consultant, that I got on board to help so, no.  
FP1, despite their frequent interactions with legal services, also expressed confusion at the 
process of obtaining records, specifically in the case of the few living patients she 
consulted at the behest of the Crown (usually in attempted murder cases).  
FP1: [Sighs] Again, I guess our input to that is so limited that the confidentiality 
issue doesn't really arise. I mean I would have the medical records, the medical 
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records would have, I don't know how they get to the fiscal, but I get them [laughs] 
get them from the fiscal. So presumably the complainer must have agreed to access 
to them. But I don't directly have to do that so it's just what is being provided as 
part of the prosecution case, because it's almost always for the prosecution, these 
instances. And then, so from that perspective it's just making sure that we have is 
stored confidentially and, you know, not, erm, at risk. 
Given the potential for disclosed medical information to damage a complainer’s credibility 
and/or reliability at trial, SHD4 stressed the importance of obtaining survivors’ consent 
before beginning the consultation: 
SHD4:  That's part of the, when we, when we, consent them, that is part of consent 
as well. So I do tell them that, yes, you know, the evidence is going to be handed 
over to the police and I am going to write a report that gets handed over to police as 
well, so the patients do know that.  
Interestingly, JC2 and SC4’s argument that complainers should be expected to allow 
access to their medical records if requested, were echoed on occasion by clinical staff. OS1 
for example, emphasised the material importance of medical evidence for ensuring a 
prosecution: 
OS1: I mean I think if somebody’s chosen to report a situation to police, if they 
have if they themselves have chosen to do that, I think they probably accept in that 
situation that all the evidence available needs to be taken into account…. And 
actually, possibly without your evidence, they might not get the prosecution that 
they hope for. So I think they probably understand it better in that situation, I 
certainly don’t feel that when I’m talking about patients in court, I’ve been coerced 
into doing that, I think it’s you know they’ve signed a disclosure usually for your, 
for their notes to be viewed by other people. And all you’re doing is going along to 
talk to those notes and explain what they mean to the jury. 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, nearly all of FPsych1’s patients were involved in 
legal proceedings. His view on participation in prosecution and the use of medical records 
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was broadly similar to both OS1 and JC2, noting that the court had ultimate power over 
disclosure
73
:   
FPsych1: I certainly, from the perspective of here, yes, absolutely, we're very, very, 
thorough about protecting that, yeah. In the courts, as I say, difficult to know. 
Because you may have to dip into someone's personal history, but if they're making 
an informed choice about being a complainer and knowing that some of those 
aspects might be discussed then at least they'll know that that's a, potentially going 
to happen. 
………..  
FPsych1: I would imagine that the complainers consented to disclosing their 
records, but of course the court can decide that they want to see those records if 
they're going to be relevant. Let's say someone has made multiple complaints 
against multiple persons and that's in the records, maybe that's something that we'd 
want to know.  
SHD4 argued that clinicians had a role in expressly indicating that information would be 
shared, with a default position of confidentiality applying to doctor-patient exchanges:  
SHD4: You kind of just assume that patients know, you know, when you come to 
see your doctor it's between you and your doctor. You know, and if you have to, to 
share the information, you'd be saying something explicit about that. Because in 
hospital medicine I don't ever remember asking a patient's permission to write to 
the GP because they were GP referrals. You know, so you kind of assume it was 
understood that you would be communicating with the GP regarding the outcome. 
Whereas here, we do actually ask permission right at the start, about who the 
information can be shared with and some people don't give permission for the 
information to go to the GP, so I have now got into the habit of actually saying to 
the patients at the end of the consultation, I will write to your GP about what we 
have done today, or I will write to the GP with the results of the scan so they know 
what's going on [pause] which I never used to do [laughs], would just be, yes, ok, 
I'll let your GP know and, you know, that would be it. 
                                                             
73 He went on to note examples of cases in which he perceived this disclosure to be excessive, as is 
discussed in greater detail in chapter 6, section 6.2.  
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SHD1 was one of the few clinicians interviewed who regularly discussed confidentiality 
with patients, as detailed in chapter 4. When talking about patients referred to her by the 
police for forensic examination however, she stressed that it was not necessarily the 
clinician’s duty to warn them about how information they gave in consultation may be 
used, this duty instead resting with the police:  
SHD1: Well no not really there are a few bits and pieces that are make quite clear 
to them but you know they’ve already involved the police. In terms of 
confidentiality really it’s the polices’ responsibility at that point to kind of carry 
that out. The only person that I’m sharing you know just making sure that they 
know we discuss with them if they want info shared with their GP who the 
information will be shared with….  But you know obviously it’s very, we have to 
be very clear about, do you or do you not want, are they happy to have that 
information sent to your GP? And often people are and that’s fine so they need to 
know that that’s ok although they’re pursuing a police investigation from our point 
of view against the need to be very clear and make sure that patients give 
permission for any information that they do, that we do share. 
This was at odds with the view promoted by SHD1’s colleague, SHD2, who argued that 
the opaque nature of the process of obtaining records made it difficult for survivors to 
make an informed decision about disclosure, despite her own efforts to warn them about it:   
SHD2:  I think it’s probably quite difficult if you see somebody for an acute 
forensic medical examination. They're tired, might be very frightened, lot’s going 
on. I’m not too sure how much they really remember. We’re babbling on, lots of 
people are asking them questions. I think it’s probably quite difficult. I think they 
just put their trust in the doctor, really. I’m not sure what the level of true consent is 
at that moment in time. You know, we’re very focussed on you know mental 
capacity assessments and stuff like that but you could almost argue that if you have, 
let’s assume that you have just been raped. That your brain is sort of all over the 
place. Can you really be consenting to anything at that point… They just wanna get 
home. You know they’re worried about the kids. They’re worried about this they’re 
worried about that. How much are they really focussed on what you’re saying. And 
you get them sometimes saying you know we’re there trying to, can I just go 
through this consent form and they’re just like “just get on with it”. They can get 
irritated with you. “Just do it”. They just want you to do it. Sometimes, you know 
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there’s also the thing, do we take a role? And for some of them and just do it like in 
their best interest. So there’s, there’s a lot of things going on. 
These questions over the level of possible consent for the use of records were also 
discussed in detail, by SC1, as noted earlier in this chapter. He expanded upon this point 
later in the interview, with special reference to the role of medical professionals:  
SC1: I do sometimes wonder about questions of consent. I’m not… I suppose 
maybe my approach to that is perhaps unrealistically demanding, that the, I, I like 
the idea of properly informed consent and I think a lot of the time when consent is 
sought or given, it’s not on the basis of someone being fully informed. There might 
be questions of the person’s capacity just in, I mean in a, I don’t mean in a legal 
sense of someone you know lacking capacity but just generally being able to grasp 
some of the issues. And you know doctors are working under incredible pressure as 
well, so the amount of time that might be required for discussing things is maybe 
limited.  
SC1 here raises an important point, in discussing the capacity to consent to the use of 
medical information. His reference to the possibility that survivors might not have capacity 
when attending hospital (while being legally recognised to have capacity) is also worth 
further exploration. It is indeed possible that capacity could be lost in the acute setting, 
when a survivor has experienced the emotional turmoil of physical and or sexual violence. 
While the legislation defining capacity differs throughout the UK, the broad principles are 
the same and for a patient to have capacity, they must be able to:  
 understand the information relevant to the decision (including the reasonably 
foreseeable consequences of whatever decision is made or of failing to make a decision) 
 retain that information in making the decision 
 use or weigh the information available, and 
 communicate the decision by any means, including speech, sign language, or 
simple muscle movement.
74
 
Both SHD2 and SC1 noted that survivors of abuse may not reach the thresholds outlined 
above, and that as a result, while they may meet legal definitions of capacity, the consent 
that they give may not count as truly informed.  
                                                             
74 Medical Defence Union, 'Assessing capacity', (27th June 2019), <https://www.themdu.com/guidance-and-
advice/guides/assessing-capacity>, [accessed: 17th September 2019] 
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SHD2 and SC1’s interviews highlight the role of clinicians in discussing confidentiality 
with patients while also critiquing the effectiveness of these discussions. To both, the 
reality of the clinical encounter, where a survivor is seeking medical aid as a result of 
abuse fundamentally challenges the possibility of truly informed consent. This makes an 
exploration of the consent process itself seem valuable. SHD2, while acknowledging the 
flaws in trying to achieve informed consent, favoured a situation in which survivors signed 
a consent form at the start of a consultation:  
SHD2: So what happens is if somebody comes here for an examination. They sign 
consent right at the very beginning that the notes are disclosable you know. I will 
be using these notes to write a statement or reports, you know social services, 
police etcetera and that all the notes are disclosable. And that includes images. So 
that’s the other issue, is, because the images can be highly sensitive. So we get 
asked for a statement then what we do is we write our statement and we will 
enclose with the statement a photocopy of all the contemporaneous medical records. 
So it goes as a package.  
In making this argument, SHD2 was echoing JC2 who referred to seeking fully informed 
consent in written form, though FPsych1 criticised this process as inadequate, arguing that 
patients often didn’t fully absorb the implications of what they were consenting to when 
providing written consent. As SHD2 noted, it can be difficult to ascertain the true level of 
consent possible when a complainer is asked to disclose their records. This issue is not 
simply overcome by consent being written rather than verbally given. Similarly, even if 
informed, written consent is possible, the potential remains for the involvement of legal 
services to cause survivors to disengage from medical treatment. As SHD4 notes:  
SHD4: There was one girl who self-referred and she wasn't, she was kind of, very, 
very uncertain about whether she wanted to engage with the police so, [HOSPITAL 
NAME] nurse actually arranged for police officers to come to [HOSPITAL NAME] 
to speak to her on another day, just so they could talk to her about what they would 
be doing and what would happen after that, so that she could then choose whether 
to engage or not. She didn't engage, in fact, she didn't engage at all, she just kind 
of ... dropped off the face of the earth. Women's Aid tried to phone her, she wasn't 
answering. She just cut off all contact completely. 
In her practice, GP2 pursued a policy of ensuring informed consent that went beyond the 
level seemingly expected by legal counsel. Not only did she ensure that patients knew 
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when their records were requested but also checked with patients that they knew what they 
had consented to when signing mandates for disclosure. In this way she was almost 
advocating for her patient’s legal interests. On the opposite end of the spectrum, there were 
those who had almost no involvement in the process of obtaining records, even when they 
had considerable experience of speaking to them in court.  
While clinicians in this research took different approaches to the question of consent for 
record disclosure, their responses often did not fully account for the perspectives of their 
patients in this process. The next section of this chapter considers those perspectives in 
detail, accurately recording the lived experiences of the two participating survivor 
interviewees.  
5.4. Survivors’ perspectives 
Both survivors interviewed for this research were told that if they did not provide consent 
for their medical records to be recovered and disclosed it would negatively affect the 
chance of prosecuting their attackers. S2 described a situation where, following her 
hospitalisation, two police officers were sent to obtain her consent to recover her medical 
records. While her overall experience with the police was generally positive, S2 noted that 
when asking for consent, the two officers gave her no indication of the scale of material to 
be recovered, though they did inform her that non-compliance would result in the 
prosecution being terminated:  
S2: OK a few days after I was attacked, I wasn’t emotionally handling it well and I 
tried to kill myself…. And I was taken to hospital so I was in A&E getting like, I’m 
not sure of the name of the medication but I was in there for a couple days but I 
think it was the first day… so I was on this medication  that was making me 
projectile vomit everywhere and I was really unwell like mentally and physically 
and… two police officers came in and one of them was a solo officer but one 
wasn’t and… you know they had this form you know and they said that I needed to 
sign it, this was consent for medical records. There was no explanation of like, I 
was just told that if I didn’t sign it, they wouldn’t be able to proceed with the case 
essentially. And you know at that time I didn’t really consider the implications of 
“What am I signing?” because I was pretty traumatised. You know and… you 
know, I don’t even think I read the paper, I just signed it.  
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S1 had a similar experience, though in her case it was a procurator fiscal who discussed 
retrieving her medical records. At the time her consent was sought, S1 was receiving in-
patient psychiatric care:  
S1: So I was put in on a section [Advocacy Worker: Yeah]. A very short-term one 
and then erm, the - are they called doctors in [HOSPITAL NAME] The, don't know 
what they're called [Advocacy Worker: Yeah, they're doctors]. Yeah, the doctor 
said, well, I knew how unwell I was so I stayed in [HOSPITAL NAME], the 
psychiatric hospital on a voluntary basis because I was being abused by a different 
man, unfortunately, this time. And, I knew, throughout that stay something, I won't 
go into it, something happened but [pause] I had been taken to [DOCTOR’S 
NAME’S] office during my stay and told that they were going to, erm, use my 
medical records but then I was saying to her I didn't want them to because it's my 
whole life, my private life, my whole, I didn't want that for [ABUSER’S NAME] or 
his defence or anyone to know. And they said, [SURVIVOR’S NAME], it's going 
to look really dodgy if they say no, because it'll look like you've got something to 
hide." So I had to - I was pondering for a long time over this and I was thinking, I 
don't want them to think I'm hiding anything from them, because that will make me 
look deceitful and I've got nothing to hide. But then I thought, I don't want my 
private life out there. So, it went on to be that they then said, "will you comply or 
will we get a court order?" 
S1 was not offered access to independent legal counsel, despite her case occurring after 
WF. Instead, Crown agents obtained consent for the recovery of her records on the basis 
that her non-acquiescence would be perceived negatively by the jury. The case of WF v 
Scottish Ministers asserted a complainer’s right to be heard before the court on the subject 
of the recovery of their medical records under a petition for commission and diligence.
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Despite this ruling, as noted earlier in this chapter, there is relatively little evidence to 
suggest a large uptake of ILR by complainers in these circumstances. The reasons for this 
seem to be twofold.  Firstly, there remains a degree of uncertainty over the question of 
intimation, i.e. who is the party responsible for informing a complainer that their medical 
records are sought and advising them of their right to independent legal advice. This 
confusion was highlighted in the discussion with several advocates. As noted by Lord 
Glennie, at the time of WF, there was no formal mechanism for intimation (though the 
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court service now appears to be responsible).
76
 When asked what effect the case of WF had 
had on the process of obtaining records in domestic abuse/rape cases for the prosecution, 
defence and the court, the Crown responded:  
COPFS and SCTS have agreed that in High Court cases, where the defence lodge a 
petition for the recovery of medical records, SCTS will intimate the petition 
timeously on the complainer. 
COPFS will work with SCTS with a view to establishing a similar method of 
intimation in the Sheriff Court if possible. At present, on receipt of a defence 
application, the prosecutor should write to the complainer informing him/her of his 
right to be legally represented during any hearing in which recovery of his medical 
records is being considered.
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Secondly, there is the possibility that complainers may be consenting to the use of their 
medical records in the belief that non-compliance could harm the chance of a successful 
prosecution. As noted in chapter 2, Raitt argued in 2011 that access requests made by 
police and prosecutors in these circumstances are likely to encourage consent purely 
because survivors may fear this is the only way of continuing a prosecution.
78
 Cory et al 
also observed that survivors are rarely informed about the extent of the information they 
are being asked to disclose, and may give consent simply to cooperate with legal 
services.
79
 This built upon the wider argument for challenging the notion of consent in the 
context of a request by a legal agent in the case of R v Therens, which found that 
compliance with a request by a police officer was not ‘truly voluntary’, as there was a 
perceived lack of choice for the citizen involved, even when the police lacked ‘statutory or 
common law authority’ to justify the request.80 These arguments are borne out by the 
experiences of both survivors interviewed in this research, who described feeling 
concerned that refusing to consent to disclosure would reflect badly on their position in 
court and who never considered the use of records would be so extensive. Raitt and Cory’s 
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not informed of his right to consult with a lawyer and subsequently gave a breathalyser test at the direction 
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arguments were raised before WF but the potential for complainers to feel obligated to give 
consent remains.  
The importance of complainer consent in the disclosure process, lies in its ability to allow 
access to medical information without requiring either a court order or petition warrant. As 
JC2 noted in section 5.2.2, complainer consent ‘slices the Gordian knot’ of regulations 
restricting access to such material.  It is therefore not unreasonable to argue that obtaining 
complainer consent for disclosure can be advantageous to both Crown and defence.  When 
asked how they involved survivors in the process of reviewing and obtaining records, the 
Crown replied:   
In terms of the draft COPFS policy on obtaining sensitive personal records prior to 
records being obtained COPFS will make contact with a witness to advise of the 
intention to recover sensitive personal records. The witness will be advised of the 
reason why records are required and the information that it is believed that the 
records contain. The witness will be asked to consent to seizure of their records.
81
 
SHD2 and SC1 noted their concerns with how the consent process reconciled with the 
realities of experiencing physical and sexual attack. Taken in concert with the experiences 
of S1 and S2, there appears to be a demonstrable gap between how the Crown believes the 
process works from a policy perspective and how it works in practice. This argument is 
borne out by the survivors’ perceptions that lawyers are merely seeking access to medical 
evidence to bolster their case without consideration to the position of the complainer. This 
in turn drastically affected the survivors’ opinions of medical confidentiality and led to a 
position where the legal system felt untrustworthy: 
S2: I certainly felt like doctors would respect my confidentiality more because, you 
know when you go to the doctor you know you’re, it’s about you but again the 
Procurator Fiscal you know you’re almost, it feels like “OK you’re at the centre of 
it because you’re the victim” but really when you’re in it, you’re not, you know 
you’re almost like a side thing, like an afterthought to a lot of people because you 
know all they want is witness evidence you know you’re not like a person in some 
ways, it feels like. And they don’t – and they shouldn’t  - but they don’t have your 
best interests at heart and that’s why I believe that you should have access to 
someone, to be able to give you that sort of advice, at the very least.   
                                                             
81 See appendix A.  
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S2’s feelings of re-victimization through the legal process were repeatedly stressed 
throughout interview. The way in which her consent for disclosure was obtained, 
undoubtedly contributed to these feelings, leaving her with the opinion that the 
complainer’s interests are completely absent from the consideration of the Crown. Her 
argument that the Crown were not representing her confidentiality interests also strongly 
chimes with the court authority stressing the importance of complainers’ being allowed to 
make representations in domestic abuse and rape cases.
82
 
The question of relevance was also discussed by survivors, with S2 in particular concerned 
at the role of legal services in making the determination of what relevance meant, 
particularly in the context of mental health records. On this subject S2 noted:  
S2: I’m not sure that, you know, you know someone doing paperwork in the 
procurator fiscal is an expert at mental illness so I’m not sure whether they, 
whether it would be helpful to have someone who understands and they can say, 
“This has got nothing to do with”. I’m not sure that you know lawyers should be 
trying to act like doctors. 
S1 described how evidence of her receiving a termination was sought and disclosed by the 
Crown, something she considered to be totally irrelevant to the index rape charges. She 
went on to note how this experience made her doubt the protective effect of confidentiality:  
S1: Which was [pause] nowhere near relevant to what he had done. It, it literally 
was, erm, my private, like, there's no privacy [and you don't want everything out, 
like, strangers, his mother, like whoever, you just, it's just all out there and open. 
You may as well say, right, there's no secrets, there's - not that I want secrets - but 
there’s your whole life is laid bare and you’ve got no privacy, that's what it is. It's 
not "I've got a secret" I've got, I should - my privacy should be respected. 
 
Earlier in this chapter there were a number of lawyers and clinicians who argued that 
involvement in legal proceedings meant survivors should expect their records to be sought 
if needed. Despite their experiences, neither S1 or S2 argued that records should not be 
used at all, but instead challenged the processes governing their recovery and the measures 
used to determine what was considered relevant. Survivors’ concerns at these 
                                                             
82 See R(B) v Crown Court at Stafford [2007] 1 WLR 1524; WF v Scottish Ministers [2016] CSOH 27. 
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determinations of relevance will recur in more detail in chapter 6, as information obtained 
by the defence and prosecution is used in open court.   
5.5. Conclusions  
Chapter four highlighted the potential for different understandings of confidentiality 
between survivors and clinicians in the context of a health consultations following 
domestic abuse. This chapter saw the introduction of testimony of a third group of 
individuals – prosecution and defence lawyers – as they became involved in the criminal 
investigation of domestic abuse, with the potential to assess how beliefs in confidentiality 
among the three groups were affected in these circumstances. 
5.5.1. Understandings of confidentiality  
It is clear legal interviewees shared some understandings of confidentiality with clinicians, 
describing it respectfully and recognising its importance in the context of everyday medical 
care. Two advocates even provided examples in which their medical confidentiality had 
been broken as patients, recognising the potential harm this can cause to others with 
similar experiences. There was also awareness among both groups that confidentiality was 
not absolute and could be broken for the investigation of crime.  
There were, unsurprisingly, few similarities in the conceptions of confidentiality held by 
lawyers and survivors, with the only commonality being that their descriptions were both 
irreparably connected to the legal system in a way that wasn’t evident among clinicians. 
Beyond this superficial observation, survivors and lawyers’ perceptions of confidentiality 
were markedly different, with survivors arguing that confidentiality was not sufficiently 
respected by legal professionals or the court. This position was in marked contrast to that 
put forward by legal interviewees, who argued vociferously that confidentiality was 
protected appropriately and was only breached when required to prove or dispute guilt.   
Unlike clinicians, lawyers often expressed confidentiality through a legal lens, as 
something which was paramount in a medical setting, but which quickly became 
subordinate to other considerations during criminal proceedings. This was evident in their 
descriptions of LPP as more absolute than medical confidentiality. Clinicians, by contrast 
were on occasion willing to respect their patient’s wishes if they did not want a criminal 
offence reported to police, as evidenced by the information SHD1 chooses not to record in 
medical notes or AE3’s assertion that stabbing injuries are not always reported.  
While SHD4 and others made sure to discuss disclosure of records with their patients, 
there is clearly a limit on how much information they would be able to provide about how 
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those records would be used in court proceedings, including the total extent of the records 
eventually recovered and disclosed. This does not mean that legal participants had no 
interest in protecting complainers’ medical confidentiality, indeed, several advocates spoke 
at length of their responsibilities for ensuring sensitive medical information was handled in 
a confidential manner. But there was evident belief that the legal system was ultimately 
responsible for judging the range and extent of medical confidentiality, rather than the 
healthcare practitioners making the records, or the individuals whom they concerned. 
While this view is perhaps unsurprising, given the source, it is worth noting as it indicates 
a differing attitude to confidentiality from both survivors and a number of clinicians in this 
research. Chapter 6 explores how these beliefs over confidentiality are further tested, when 
a case enters the courtroom.  
5.5.2. Relevance 
This chapter highlighted the discrepancy between interviewees over what information was 
relevant for recovery. It was the opinion of a majority of advocates that the boundaries 
outlined by statute and through the courts ensured that only information relevant to the 
prosecution of the alleged offences would be sought. In making these arguments, advocates 
were keen to stress the infrequency of wide-ranging ‘fishing expeditions’, where lawyers 
proactively sought broad volumes of complainers’ records in order to uncover information 
to attack credibility. Where problems occurred, they were mostly ascribed to resource 
issues, with defence agents and prosecutors having to scrutinise increasing volumes of 
information in a landscape where adequate funding was unavailable, and more work was 
being done by a decreasing pool of individuals.  
While many advocates stressed the power of the court to supress the use of extraneous 
information, they also asserted their own understandings of what relevant information was. 
This was articulated by participants like SC2, who stressed that she was not interested in 
whether a complainer ‘wet the bed up until they were sixteen’ but chose material based on 
instructions from their clients. This view was completely rejected by survivor participants, 
who asserted the vagueness and opacity surrounding relevance decisions, in a similar 
manner to that suggested by Rape Crisis Scotland in WF.
83
 Both S1 and S2 experienced the 
use of medical information which appeared to have little bearing on the case at hand. As 
S2 noted, there was a perception that legal professionals were overstepping the boundaries 
of their knowledge in deciding what medical information affected a complainers’ 
credibility, particularly when this information involved mental health conditions.   
                                                             
83 WF v Scottish Ministers [2016] CSOH 27, at [24] 
216 
 
The view among all clinician participants was difficult to determine, as any comment on 
relevance was restricted to a small number of practitioners. Among those that discussed the 
issue, a majority argued that irrelevant information was unfairly sought in cases of 
domestic abuse and/or rape. This view was shared across specialties, with practitioners in 
sexual health, general practice and forensic psychology all referring to situations in which 
they had witnessed lawyers seeking information the clinicians deemed irrelevant to the 
legal case.  
Ultimately, on the question of relevance a dichotomy emerged, with lawyers asserting their 
ability to determine relevance, while at the same time acknowledging they lacked the 
requisite experience to judge what particular conditions effect an individual’s behaviour in 
a way that might be of legal interest -something noted by survivors. This phenomena hints 
at the wider relationship between clinicians (particularly doctors) and lawyers in this 
context, as lawyers require medical opinion (often in the form of experts) to justify 
information being used in court. While acknowledging their dependence on medical 
expertise in this regard, those same lawyers argue that medical confidentiality, while 
undoubtedly important in a clinical context, is ultimately maintained or broken at the 
discretion of legal professionals.  
Lawyers are fundamentally responsible for determining the relevance of medical 
information in court, a process in which the involvement of survivors and clinicians is not 
required, and indeed can continue even in the face of their active opposition. To discover 
that most lawyers in this study actively asserted this right ultimately has the effect of 
indicating that they believe their perceptions of confidentiality to be dominant, necessarily 
sublimating the perceptions held by survivors and clinicians.  
This attitude then suggests that sensitive medical information may continue to be used in a 
way that survivors in particular find distressing. As the experience of S1 and S2 illustrates, 
the collision between competing understandings of relevance can leave the individuals 
whom the information concerns trapped in the middle, with complainers agreeing to 
disclosure in the belief that only relevant information will be used, while those individuals 
determining relevance hold vastly different understandings of what information is valid for 
recovery and use in court. 
5.5.3. Consent 
The findings of this chapter highlighted the essential role of consent in perceptions of 
medical confidentiality. Interestingly, concerns about consent in the record recovery 
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process were not limited to survivors but extended across the full range of participant 
groups (albeit not among all individual participants).  
Both survivors argued that the situations in which they were asked to allow record 
recovery and disclosure did not constitute truly informed consent, and in fact relied on an 
element of coercion on the part of legal services. They were then supported in critiquing 
this process by several clinicians and one member of senior counsel.  
There was a wider discussion among participants about how truly informed consent was 
possible in the immediate aftermath of domestic abuse and/or rape. S1 and S2 described 
being asked to provide consent for disclosure when they were intensely traumatised, noting 
that if they were aware of the subsequent use of their records, they would have refused to 
do so and that they felt these requests were forced upon them.   
SHD2 and SC1 made a similar point, arguing that survivors who have suffered an intensely 
traumatic event are not well placed to decide on disclosure. These conclusions, supported 
by Raitt and Cory et al, indicate the potential for inadequate levels of consent to be given. 
Twinned with misunderstandings over what information is relevant for recovery, issues of 
consent further increase the likelihood that survivors will undergo negative experiences 
involving the use of their medical records in court. These experiences are the subject of the 
next chapter. 
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Chapter Six: Confidentiality and the court 
6.1 Introduction  
In the previous chapters, I explored how understandings of confidentiality were developed and 
shaped in the context of treatment in the health service and the subsequent investigation of alleged 
domestic abuse and/or rape by legal services. This chapter addresses the courtroom itself, where 
survivors, clinicians and lawyers interact as a case proceeds. To properly assess how confidentiality 
is understood in this context, it will be necessary to examine several different aspects of the process.  
Firstly, I consider how clinicians present medical evidence in court and how they view these 
experiences, also assessing how they perceive their duty towards the complainer in question (who 
was previously their patient). I then proceed to describe lawyers’ perspectives on the use of 
sensitive medical information in court. As we move into ‘their’ domain, this section will contain 
some technical references to how records are introduced in court and lawyers’ perceptions of the 
fairness of this process, as well as their attitudes towards the usefulness of medical records in 
supporting or challenging allegations. Continuing, I refer to survivors’ experiences at trial, 
analysing how they are informed about the use of their medical records, the way their records are 
then used and the effect this has upon the individuals concerned. I conclude with a summary of the 
chapter, drawing together the immediate findings before preparing to move on to the final chapter 
for my overall conclusions and recommendations.   
For records to be admitted as evidence in a criminal trial, they must first be considered relevant. 
Crucially, this determination of relevance is made by legal professionals rather than the individuals 
the records refer to (survivors in this instance), or those that create them (clinicians). Initially, in a 
pre-trial hearing, the court agrees for information to be recovered following submissions by legal 
professionals – though most commonly the defence.1 If the Crown recovers medical information 
and discloses it to the defence, this does not mean that all that information will be used at trial and 
the court will still have to be satisfied that the evidence either party seeks to lead is not collateral.
2
 
Even then, in theory, the fact that the material may be relevant does not guarantee its entry into 
court. As Lord Glennie noted in WF, despite the potential relevance of certain records, the court 
                                                             
1
 Archibald MacSporran and Andrew R.W. Young, Commission and Diligence, (Edinburgh: W. Green & Sons Ltd, 1995), 
pp.127-129 
2
 Established in common law in Brady v HMA 1986 JC 68 at [73]; additional restrictions on collateral evidence in 
sexual offence cases apply under section 274 of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995 
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may refuse ‘an application for recovery on grounds of the complainer’s Article 8 rights’.3 Quite 
how often evidence is refused at this stage on that basis is, unclear, though in Raitt on Evidence, the 
case of WF was noted as a striking example of the progressive direction of travel’ in the ‘greater 
recognition of the rights flowing from the ECHR to complainers and other witnesses in terms of 
arts 3 and 8’.4 
If no court order is received – i.e. if the material is recovered by the Crown, with the complainer’s 
consent or under the petition warrant – the court can still refuse for certain elements (or indeed the 
records in their entirety) to be led in evidence. As noted above, any information deemed to be 
collateral at common law will not be admitted into court and in recent years, the court has affirmed 
the primacy of this rule even in domestic abuse and rape cases, with evidence being inadmissible, 
even if other requirements for disclosure are met, when it is judged to be of a collateral nature.
5
  In 
the context of domestic abuse and/or rape trials, another common reason for excluding sensitive 
information at this stage concerns section 274 of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act, which  
restricts evidence that may relate to sexual character or sexual history.
6
 As noted in chapter 5, these 
restrictions can be overcome through section 275, which allows questioning on a ‘condition or 
predisposition’ deemed to be of relevance to the complainer’s credibility and reliability.7  
Academic and third sector opinion continues to suggest that section 275 applications remain 
relatively easy to obtain in rape cases, with defence advocates in particular able to ask complainers 
about intimate aspects of their physical and mental health.
8
 There is little evidence to suggest that 
these assessments are incorrect. Indeed, in 2016, the Cabinet Secretary for Justice noted that, across 
a three-month period, section 275 applications were granted fully in 42 out of 52 High Court cases. 
These findings were then bolstered – albeit it on a smaller scale - by an Inspectorate Report the 
following year.
9
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 Michael Matheson, ‘Letter from Michael Matheson to Margaret Mitchell, MSP’, available 
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 June, 
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This chapter helps to explore this issue further, using the testimony of survivors and legal 
professionals in particular to assess whether in practice, medical evidence in court is used as a 
vehicle to attack survivors’ sexual character, credibility and reliability. 
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6.2 Clinicians in court  
Clinicians are mostly unable to oppose medical record requests as the records themselves typically 
belong to the relevant health authority, who rarely challenge legal authorities when records are 
sought.
10
 This ‘hands-off’ approach extends to the courtroom, where health authorities rarely, if 
ever, choose to participate in proceedings concerning whether an individual’s medical records can 
be disclosed. This hesitation to engage with the process was referred to in both WF and JC, and in 
the Chief Medical Officer’s advice regarding the disclosure of records. In the latter, hospitals were 
warned not to hand over records without authority, but there was no suggestion of them seeking to 
delay or arrest disclosure through the courts.
11
  
 
And yet, as I outlined in the previous chapter, the Crown do report experiencing occasional 
‘resistance’ from individual clinicians when patients’ records are sought, even if their consent has 
been given.
12
 They may in fact play a key role in limiting (or at least curtailing) the extent of 
medical information passed to lawyers, as Tranberg and Rashbass argued that when healthcare 
providers do not intervene, speculative requests for medical information have a greater chance of 
succeeding.
13
 Unlike the health boards that are so rarely represented in these cases, clinicians are 
sometimes compelled to attend court to give evidence relating to patients suffering physical or 
sexual violence.
14
 Unsurprisingly, the frequency with which clinicians are called as witnesses 
varies with specialty, and those most exposed to injuries resulting from crime are the most likely to 
attend.  
A minority of the clinicians in this research had never had to attend court at all. Many had but not 
in cases involving domestic abuse. A few had attended multiple abuse trials. All three A&E doctors 
had appeared as witnesses in criminal court on several occasions and forensic pathologist FP1 and 
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July, 2018], pp. 1-3 
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forensic psychologist FPsych1 appeared regularly, as did SHD1, 2 and 3 (who all had FME 
experience).  
When discussing the actual use of medical records in court, most clinical participants were 
relatively sanguine over the concept of disclosure, arguing (as they had done when discussing when 
records were initially sought) that the court had authority over confidentiality. This position fits 
with the advice given by medical regulatory bodies in matters of confidentiality and the court.
15
  
Within this group, multiple clinicians stressed the importance of deferring to the authority of the 
court on medical record use. This took two major forms. Most commonly it was expressed by 
clinicians who simply did not question how records actually arrived in court. OS1 for example, 
noted that she never had to take copies of records to trial herself as they had already been obtained. 
She also expressed the view that she did not feel coerced into giving evidence but merely saw this 
as part of her wider professional obligations. This position was similar to that promoted by AE1 
when he noted that confidentiality had already been breached when legal services obtained records, 
that ‘anything that is disclosable has been disclosed anyway’. The other form in which this 
deference was expressed saw clinicians emphasising the importance of using a complainer’s 
records to ensure a fair trial. FPsych1 reflected on his position of structured neutrality in the 
process, arguing that it was not appropriate to allow concerns over complainers’ reactions to record 
use to affect his obligation to the court:  
FPsych1: I mean I'm sure it's an uncomfortable process, sitting there going through 
someone's records while there's perhaps, well a jury there for sure, and perhaps members in 
the public gallery and you're commenting on, you know, someone's intimate clinical details. 
Previous relationships, addictions, alcohol problems. So, to be honest, I don't process it like 
that when I'm doing it but I can appreciate why that might seem uncomfortable. When I'm, 
when I'm asked to do those I'm certainly just very tasked focused, I'm not focused on how 
the impact of that might affect the complainer who's not going to be there at the time 
anyway…  
 
                                                             
15
 General Medical Council, 'Doctors giving evidence in court', <https://www.gmc-uk.org/ethical-guidance/ethical-
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As already noted, FPsych1’s interaction with medical records is distinct from the other clinicians in 
this research and this is particularly apparent in his description of patients’ ‘intimate clinical 
records’, containing for example detailed evidence of previous relationships. While of relevance to 
fields like psychology, psychiatry, sexual health and general practice, this information is unlikely 
to be of relevance to most other treating clinicians.  Despite his engagement with records, FPsych1 
expressed the view that medical records were often not available, even when they might be 
necessary.: 
 
FPsych1: I think what my experience has been that mostly records aren't available. When 
they are available they're limited to a certain period of time, so it's a wee bit, seems a wee 
bit of an artificial exercise to comment on someone's mental health just based on, let's say, 
the last two years of their records. In the ordinary world you would take someone's full 
records and you would work out the onset of the issue, when they started having problems, 
when they were first diagnosed with something, how that's progressed and been treated. So, 
I think in the cases I've worked on, you get a small segment of er, case notes to work on. It's 
always more helpful to have those than having nothing, but they're often quite limited. 
 
FPsych1 was the only clinician to promote the opinion that access to records might be more limited 
than has been suggested so far in this project – where every indication has been that substantial 
access is often given. In advancing this position, FPsych1 instead found support from legal 
interviewees - something explored in greater detail in later sections of this chapter - though he did 
qualify his remarks later in the interview. When asked whether he could suggest any changes to 
current practice in the use of medical records in court, he moved away from his earlier response, 
remarking that he was on occasion concerned at the extent of the information he was given by 
either the Crown or defence:  
FPsych1: I have seen myself looking through pages and pages and pages of records and not 
finding anything relevant at all to that case, but learning a lot about their medical history or, 
you know, various other issues, but you know, zero, zero, relationship to the case and it will 
be zero help. 
…….. 
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FPsych1: There's often a term you'll hear, "it's a fishing exercise", have you heard that one 
before? Yeah, so, you will sometimes hear that they hope this is not a fishing exercise, in 
that you get the records and, you know, 500 pages to look through to see if there's anything 
relevant. It does feel a bit like a fishing exercise that you're going through there, maybe, 
you know, looking at something at 17, they're coming in, this is a 47 year old complainer, 
looking at their records, at 17 they went along to their GP with their mother and said that, 
you know, was accused of lying about something and it caused much maximum upset. Now, 
that is then something you would have to take out and put into your report because it might 
be relevant to that case, but it does seem like a fishing exercise when 30 years down the line 
somebody told a fib about something.  
One common feature in clinicians’ discussions of court was their dislike for the legal process and 
their obligation to be involved in it. In this, my findings strongly mirror those of Cory et al, who 
noted that among clinicians, ‘many want to do everything possible to avoid involvement in legal 
proceedings and court cases’.16 Almost all clinical interviewees - whether they had court 
experience or not - expressed negative feelings over appearing as witnesses in trials. Common 
among complaints was the associated time expenditure. This was in fact such a regular occurrence, 
that a majority of those who frequently appeared in court had arranged with court clerks to be 
notified if a trial was proceeding a few hours beforehand – a measure designed to reduce the time 
spent waiting, only for a case to be delayed or cancelled.GP2 outlined how court duties affected 
everyday medical practice: 
GP2: All GPs hate the dreaded summons to court. One, trying to find a locum because 
there's such a shortage of GPs, knowing that it will inevitably be cancelled and then there 
will be another day where you have to go through the whole palaver again. 
 
She then spoke in more detail about her perceptions of the legal system more generally:  
 
GP2: It seems archaic and labyrinthine and an enormous waste of public money that often 
we'll get at a fax from a lawyer at nine o'clock on a Friday morning saying that there's a 
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 Jill Cory, Olena Hankivsky, Gisela Ruebsaat and Lynda Dechief, Reasonable Doubt: The Use of Health Records in 
Legal Cases of Violence Against Women in Relationships, (2003), available at<bccewh.bc.ca/wp-
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court thing that afternoon, can we have an entire detailed report faxed to them within, you 
know… No! If you'd known that this was happening for months why are you contacting us 
now? It always seems to be that, it never seems to be particularly joined up, or sometimes 
you'll get different lawyers contacting you, presumably from prosecution or defence or 
police, and you want to know exactly who are you, why are you wanting these notes and 
what authority do you have for that? This is on top of working in a very deep-end practice 
with all the demands of our patients, when we're under doctored, underfunded, it's - adds a 
huge amount of stress to the day.  
 
Several clinicians also spoke about concerns regarding how their evidence would be received and 
whether they would make themselves appear foolish through their unfamiliarity with legal practice. 
This also manifested in participants describing court as austere, or intimidating, with practitioners 
particularly unhappy with the perceived negative attitude that lawyers expressed towards clinicians. 
GP2 described this concern:   
GP2: I suppose there's that fear that someone's going to ask you a question, or tie rings 
around you and make you look like an idiot, isn't it? We've all seen dramatic representations 
of people being cross-examined in court and made to look utter numpties so there's always 
that fear, isn't there?  
AE3, Fpsych1 and FP1 alone referred to appearing in court as a positive or at least neutral 
experience. For FP1 and FPsych1 this was mostly just in recognition of how routine these 
appearances were, simply a reflection of the particular specialty they worked in. AE3, while 
appearing less frequently, enjoyed the adversarial nature of the trial:   
AE3: Court's a really interesting thing. So, I enjoy going to court, but when you start going 
to court at first, as a doctor, it's a completely foreign concept to you. It's very unpleasant, 
very daunting. Once you work out what it is, it's a sport, because it is a bit of a sport and it's 
a bit about jousting. Medicine's very much non-confrontational and court's very 
confrontational. Your view of court changes. 
In noting the differing approaches between doctors and lawyers, AE3’s comments add to the 
evidence that it is the adversarial nature of the courtroom that makes clinicians’ experiences so 
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uncomfortable, though curiously, in his case it has had the opposite effect.
17
 These arguments often 
centre on the idea that the court is a lawyers’ domain, or ‘unfamiliar territory’ as GP and lawyer 
Adam Sandell describes it.
18
 Despite her familiarity with the process, this was an impression shared 
by FP1: 
FP1: I think a key element for any medical professional, anyone that's not a lawyer, is that 
the courtroom is not, is not our arena. I mean, it is the arena of the lawyers and it is where 
their skillset lies and I think it's always got to be very mindful of that, but just be prepared 
and know the limitations of your evidence. 
Indications emerged of clinicians performing an advisory role, in which they sought to in some 
way account for their patients’ interests in the criminal justice process. This was perhaps a result of 
the lack of information provided by the Crown - as described by S1, S2 and others, noted later in 
this chapter - which could in theory lead survivors to seek guidance from clinicians as other 
individuals involved in proceedings, particularly when aware of the use of medical records.
 
In 
interview, several clinicians reported patients discussing upcoming legal proceedings with them, 
even to the point of asking for legal advice. When asked directly whether patients had sought her 
opinion on legal proceedings, GP2 noted: 
GP2: - All the time! Well we're free aren't we, and easy access and again it's that trust thing 
of not wanting to speak to - they'll see, sort of lawyers in their suit, and we're very informal 
in the practice and they know us, so I think there's that fear of asking stupid questions, or 
appearing stupid, well I've not been to court about this before, they'll just want you to tell 
the truth and to talk about what has happened and how many times it's happened and what 
the injuries are, maybe how you felt. The only thing that I'm going to give them is your 
records which has just got everything, and sometimes I'll put it up on the screen and go, 
look that was the day you were in and this is exactly what I have written and what's likely 
to go. They're usually more terrified of the thought that their partner who's attacked them is 
going to be sitting there staring at them and intimidating them. And their kids, it's usually 
their kids that they're worried about. 
                                                             
17
 Janet L. Murphy, 'When Clinicians Are Summoned to Testify in Court: Orientation to the Process and Suggestions on 
Preparation', SAGE Open Nursing, 4 (2018), pp. 1-5 
18
 Adam Sandell, 'Law note: giving evidence in court', British Journal of General Practice, 65 (2015), pp. 599-600 
227 
 
When asked whether specific advice relating to the use of medical records was ever sought 
however, GP2 replied negatively, suggesting that this was due to a lack of awareness over what 
consenting to disclosure entailed. As a result, she often called patients to confirm they were happy 
for records to be shared. FPsych1 however, with the bulk of his practice relating to criminal cases, 
noted that patients did on occasion discuss concerns over the use of their medical records with him: 
FPsych1: Sometimes, yes. So, they're maybe worried that they have been on anti-
depressants for a long time or they've previously had addiction problems or something, so. 
Yes, they're worried about that. But then, then they're also phenomenally open about their 
difficulties. 
When asked to attend court to give evidence, clinicians are bound – as is any witness – to answer 
any questions the court deems to be relevant to the case.
19
 Nonetheless, the relationship between 
clinicians and patients is bound by confidentiality in normal circumstances, and even in court, 
clinicians are obliged to consider their patient’s confidentiality.20 While several medical 
participants were not concerned about disclosure of medical records, others expressed dismay over 
how information they were obliged to record would then be used in court. As such, it was 
instructive to question clinicians over how they viewed their relationship with survivors when they 
became complainers, and how they balanced this relationship with responsibility to the court. Once 
again, attitudes varied with the specialty of the clinician concerned, and correlated roughly with the 
amount of time spent with each patient. AE1 for example, rooted his feelings in an idea of 
impartiality, arguing his duty to the court was paramount:  
AE1: I never had any kind of sort of reservation about answering questions because by 
definition my position is entirely impartial. So I do not hesitate on any occasion to express 
my opinion according to the best of my knowledge and belief and that’s not having to do 
with anything like with the victim or the perpetrator. I’m not there to judge them, I’m there 
just to provide the expert opinion.  
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This opinion was broadly similar to those expressed by his A&E colleagues, who both saw 
themselves as impartial and acting in accordance with requirements for justice:  
AE2:  No would say pretty much, I’m finished with them [patients] when they leave the 
hospital. Unless, unless they had any likely ongoing issues but we never see patients back 
so I think, I think in A&E you can’t build up this you know ongoing concern for patients. I 
don’t mean that in a heartless way but you’ve just so many new patients to get through…. 
So even when it comes to the court cases I mean we won’t have even seen the patient again 
so it will be the accused who’s there in the court and I won’t have ever met them before so 
I’m literally you know and sometimes I don’t even remember the patient, I’m literally 
reading from my notes and saying what I did. So I don’t feel like I’m re-engaging with the 
patient themselves again more with just the injuries and not them, as people if you know 
what I mean  
 
AE3: I think what you've got to do, when you go to court, this sounds really bad here right, 
but, if you've seen a victim of violence, be it domestic or otherwise, you're not there, in 
court, to champion that person and act for them, what you're actually there to do is support 
the process of justice and allow justice to be done.  
 
MF1, as a trauma specialist who engaged with survivors of abuse in similar circumstances to A&E 
doctors - providing acute care for violent injuries – seemed to share their opinions, though he had 
more courtroom experience than his emergency colleagues:  
 
MF1: Well, a lot of the time, because again when you get the citation you don't get the 
patient's name, it's the law vs and a name you don't recognise because that's the assailant. I... 
very often would not be able to tell you whether the person was or wasn't in court who was 
the patient. But do I, I don't see myself as an advocate of the patient necessarily, no I see 
myself as trying to help a group of people determine what happened. You know, and to that 
end you're just giving the best answer you can to the questions you're being asked. 
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The position was similar for FPsych1 and FP1, as both saw their overwhelming duty to the court, 
though they were distinct in that court work made up the bulk of their practice. FPsych1 spoke at 
length about his feelings on this matter:  
FPsych1: I'd always see my primary duty to the court so, that can create difficulties. So, 
let's say you have admissions made to the expert witness, ok. So, someone hasn't yet 
admitted to something, might say to you, "you know what doctor, I did that." You know, "I 
did it, I regret it. You're the first person I've told [laughs]" you know, and of course you've 
got to write that down and that creates some problems and so I've been asked, you know, by 
the defence to take something out of a report, and I've totally refused to do that. 'Cause if 
they're making an admission, I've already given them the choice that they're, you know, I've 
already explained the limits of my confidentiality so if they're admitting something to me, 
then I am duty bound to put that in the report. I'm sorry, but, and that's it. But I have had 
irate defence lawyers say, "please take that bit out, because that's, he's telling me he didn't 
say that" [laughs]. So, of course, you can't do that, you can't just set time back and say, "Oh, 
I'll pretend you didn't tell me that."  
Sexual health clinicians and GPs were by contrast the most likely to feel an ongoing sense of duty 
toward their patient. This was most pronounced in SHD1 and SHD3 and manifested in a sense of 
fatigue and disappointment when a not guilty or not proven verdict resulted from a case where they 
perceived the evidence to overwhelmingly support a conviction. These impressions were also 
related to a general tendency among clinicians to feel pressured to deliver their evidence properly 
so as not to negatively affect the trial. In SHD1’s case, these feelings became so pronounced that 
they influenced her decision to withdraw from further forensic work:  
SHD1: I think you have to think about how it affects you and just say do you know what I 
need a break from this right now because it just.  Yeah I think the last when I found out the 
last case that I testified at that that wasn’t a guilty conviction that really affected me a lot. 
Not that I thought it was my fault but just I thought I don’t know what anyone else could do,  
how you would get a guilty conviction if that girl if that obviously we’re meant to be 
impartial but there’s sometimes when you know  that what someone has told you is true 
there is a lot of forensic evidence, and that’s the thing so much of the time there’s not really 
much by way of forensic evidence and people think that means that sexual assault didn’t 
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take place and actually that’s not true at all but when there’s very clear cut when there’s 
CCTV evidence and very clear cut forensic evidence and still not proven verdict I think I 
just though “oh I can’t I can’t keep doing this just now I just need to take a break” .  
SHD3 was of a similar opinion, and while she did not necessarily think of the complainer as a 
patient, she still felt a tangible duty of care towards them in court, something that again manifested 
in a desire to see a certain outcome from the legal proceedings:  
SHD3: In the sexual assault side of things, it is really difficult. Perpetrators will plead guilty 
to physical abuse, because it’s obvious and you know, maybe people have heard screams. 
But the number of cases that I’ve been to where the sexual side of things is not proven, is, is 
absolutely disgraceful, actually. I really don’t know why that is, I cannot see how a jury 
cannot see what pressures that that women is under, and cannot sort of convict him but 
they’re you know, obviously it’s hard.  
SHD4 was more circumspect in not speaking about obtaining particular penalties.  
SHD4: I mean obviously once you've spoken to someone and you've seen what's been done to 
them, or heard what's been done to them, you do take sides, obviously. You know, for the vast 
majority of these people you're on their side, not on the other guy's side, so, you know, you'd 
want to do everything you could to help. But, at the same time, you know, it's your job to just 
stick to the facts. So, you know, I suppose you just have to be professional about it. 
 
SHD2 was the most strident of her colleagues in stressing the importance of maintaining neutrality 
in cases, arguing that without being able to distance themselves from proceedings, clinicians could 
be of no use to the justice process:  
 
SHD2:  I think that’s really, really important. That we are independent because we only ever 
hear one side of the story. And I’m very, very aware of that so in our paperwork you know we 
don’t refer to victims, clients or complainants. It’s alleged assailant not assailant or the 
defendants, not perpetrators. The language does sneak in but I try and challenge it erm. And it’s, 
you know the way I feel is that you see somebody and you treat them with respect and you’ll 
you know hear some horrible stories but at the end of the day you’re there for a particular 
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reason and you know in terms of the system, the court, you’ve got to be independent because 
otherwise you’re no… you’re not assisting anybody in the end.  
Opinion was divided among GP participants. GP1, when asked whether she still thought of patients 
as patients, or whether her primary duty to the court, replied:  
GP1: Oh no, I think it's the patient, yeah the patient, I think that's an overriding thing, yeah. 
 
GP2 was more nuanced in her response, and while she stressed that the patient would still be a 
patient, she chose to qualify this remark by restressing her impartial role in telling the truth.  
GP2: I can only tell the truth which is what patients have told me and if it's going to court 
because of domestic violence and it is going there, I'm assuming that the patient has told me, 
I've documented it all, they know that it's going to court, so, I just have an obligation to tell 
the truth as represented to me and what I've witnessed. 
When asked directly whether the patient was still a patient in court, GP2 noted:  
 
GP2: - Yeah, yeah, they would still be. But that wouldn’t mean that I would lie. Chances 
are that the person who's assaulted them is also my patient too. 
FP1’s position was unique. As a practitioner investigating the cause of death in individuals who 
died in suspicious circumstances, she probably had the most courtroom experience of all clinician 
interviewees. Despite the ‘normal’ doctor-patient relationship being absent in her everyday work 
(in the sense that the ‘patient’ is not alive, and no formal treatment is given) FP1 reported feeling 
an ongoing sense of duty in terms of wanting to ensure the deceased and their family achieved 
some form of closure:  
FP1: Are they my patient? Yes, I guess they are. Ultimately we are doing it for them and 
for their families and I can almost, if I'm talking about, intermingle, it is for them, but they 
are no longer there. So what can we do? Well we can bring answers to those that are left 
and we can try and bring someone to justice for it. So in that sense they are, albeit it's 
indirect in that they are.  
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Beyond these examples, the attitudes of clinicians in other specialties generally fell somewhere in 
between. RD1 for example, with no court experience, said that she would consider a complainer a 
patient but stressed that this would not affect her feelings over the guilt or innocence of the 
accused:  
RD1:  I would feel a duty to them in that I would want to make sure that I accurately 
conveyed their injuries. But I wouldn’t feel a duty to them in that I wouldn’t, I wouldn’t be 
trying to obtain a certain penalty…. Because it’s not my place to decide that, that’s the 
jury’s decision and the judge’s decision[…] I wouldn’t feel a duty as in like I needed to be 
the one to get this person imprisoned [laughing] …. I would feel a duty to make sure that 
I’d provided comprehensive evidence, notes and photographs and whatever else. And done 
my job properly essentially. But, the rest of it’s up to the court to decide. 
Her colleague OS1 by contrast, with extensive court experience, felt more in common with her 
patient in court, drawing comparison between their clinical relationship and her relationship (or 
lack thereof) with the accused: 
OS1: I mean I would still think of them as my patient. I would still feel, between them and 
the person who’s in the dock I would feel more loyalty towards the patient I suppose. But I 
wouldn’t know the other person. At all. So. I mean that, going to court is usually the first 
time you see them.  
She elaborated her position further, arguing that she felt obligated to speak in the patient’s support: 
OS1: I think when I go to court, I just think, you have to just stick to the facts. I mean I 
always do feel I suppose I’m there to speak more for the patient. But I, but as I’ve said I 
don’t know the other person, I don’t know the full details of the circumstances, you don’t 
get to sit through the, the case, so you’re only there for your part. And you know I just feel 
the least I can do for the patient is to, is to try and give a full and accurate account of what I 
saw.  
While there is clearly no consensus among clinicians over their perceptions of patients in the 
courtroom environment, it is important to include their views on this topic as they have a bearing 
on perceptions of confidentiality. Clinicians are required in court to provide and translate medical 
evidence for the jury. As specialists in their field, they are often important witnesses and give the 
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Crown or the defence legitimacy in using medical information, as observed in notable cases like 
HMA v Ronald, outlined in chapter two.
21
 Several lawyers spoke about the potency of having 
doctors in particular testifying over survivors’ medical records. This, to a certain extent, is simply 
an extension of what Raitt describes as a symptom of the Scottish adversarial system, where ‘the 
best evidence has traditionally been regarded as evidence which is delivered “live” under oath or 
affirmation from the witness in the witness box’.22 
It is therefore worthwhile considering how clinicians perceive their responsibilities in trial 
proceedings. They are record makers, using the information imparted to them by survivors in 
combination with their own professional findings, to create medical files designed for use by other 
healthcare professionals, providing the ‘rational reconstruction of the past’ described by Berg and 
Bowker 
23
 However, records are also available to non-medical professionals for the investigation of 
crime, which may affect how clinicians approach their documentation practice. As earlier chapters 
have shown, there are wide variations in how they approach this task in the context of domestic 
abuse and rape, with individual practitioners modifying what is recorded by amending the 
information they seek from their patients.  
One could argue that clinicians simply obey the will of the court when providing or discussing 
otherwise sensitive information and this is, to an extent, true. None of the individuals in this study 
indicated that they would ever wilfully amend or remove information that would be of material 
importance in a trial, even those that were personally concerned with the outcome of particular 
cases, and this continues a general historical trend. Beyond dramatic collisions between doctors and 
lawyers in the early twentieth century, the right of the court to determine the limits of 
confidentiality is generally uncontroversial among clinicians.
24
 Few, if any individuals would risk 
contempt of court to prevent a patient’s information being obtained, and given that clinicians are 
not generally defined as owning patient records such an outcome would be unlikely.
25
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However, as the interviews in this study show, clinicians’ perceptions of confidentiality and their 
relationship to abuse survivors can affect how they engage with legal services, which combined 
with the apparent reticence to attend court, can then affect how this information is presented when 
it reaches the trial stage. This principle is recognised by medical organisations, with the Academy 
of Royal Medical Colleges, for example, suggesting that treating clinicians avoid acting as expert 
witnesses in order to maintain their impartiality, noting that ‘the expert witness will not, other than 
in highly exceptional circumstances, have been personally involved with the patient in the case and 
must declare any potential conflicts of interest’.26 As noted in recent advice by the Royal College 
of Psychiatrists, this conduct can cause both a ‘risk of lack of objectivity or the perception of such 
lack’.27 As the College notes however, a clinician’s ability to follow this advice varies with the 
specialty in which they are employed, with sub-specialties that may require treating clinicians to 
appear as experts witnesses in court, sometimes simply because of the scarcity of other available 
practitioners.
28
  
Court attendance was often a negotiated process among clinicians, with senior practitioners 
‘stepping in’ on behalf of younger staff on occasion and testifying to their notes, though this was 
not a process that these individuals generally enjoyed. This reliance on colleagues was stressed on 
multiple occasions, with clinicians often learning how to behave in court through the advice of 
more experienced practitioners, rather than through the formal training structures that many felt 
were lacking. In his notable 1988 work, The Rise of Professionalism: England Since 1880, Harold 
Perkin noted that 'lawyers and doctors respect one another only if they maintain respectful 
distance'.
29
 In the clinician interviews in this study, this was not always the case, and taking a literal 
interpretation of Perkin’s comment, one could instead argue that the more frequently clinicians and 
lawyers worked together, the better the clinicians’ opinion of the legal system, or at least the less 
likely they were to feel an ongoing duty to their patients when they became complainers in court. 
These individuals tended to be those who most frequently appeared in court in criminal cases. This 
                                                             
26 Academy of Medical Royal Colleges, Acting as an expert or professional witness:  Guidance for healthcare 
professionals. (May 2019), <https://www.aomrc.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/Expert_witness_0519-1.pdf>, 
[30th June, 2019], p. 4 
27 Keith Rix., Nigel Eastman and Gwen Adshead, Responsibilities of psychiatrists who provide expert opinion to courts 
and tribunals, (Royal College of Psychiatrists, 2015), <https://www.rcpsych.ac.uk/docs/default-source/improving-
care/better-mh-policy/college-reports/college-report-cr193.pdf?sfvrsn=c0381b24_2>, [date accessed: 23rd June 
2019], p. 13 
28
 Ibid, p. 13 
29
 Harold Perkin, The Rise of Professionalism: England Since 1880, (London: Routledge, 1989), p. 398 
235 
 
appeared to be true even when those practitioners reported regular confidentiality discussions in 
cases of suspected abuse (i.e. AE2, AE3, SHD2, FPsych1) and indeed, when they reported negative 
experiences with the legal system (i.e. MF1, AE2). Equally, those with less court experience tended 
to be more likely to report an ongoing sense of duty to the patient (i.e. RD1, GP1).  
This assessment was not universally true however, and there were several examples of clinicians 
who had considerable court experience and yet still described the complainer as a patient (OS1), in 
some cases even reporting disappointment at the failure to secure a conviction (i.e. SHD1, SHD3). 
Even the individual with the most courtroom experience (FP1) continued to view their patient (in 
this case usually murder victims) as such when a case came to court.  
To most clinicians, the court felt alien and significantly removed from their everyday practice. As 
several individuals noted, it was a domain for lawyers. With that in mind, I will now progress to 
analysing the responses of legal participants, as the agents who drive the recovery and use of 
medical records in court, and whose conceptions of confidentiality have the largest impact on how 
that information is received and presented at this final stage in the process. 
6.3 Lawyers in court 
Based on the project data analysed thus far, it appears that medical records are used regularly by 
both prosecution and defence lawyers in cases involving domestic abuse and rape. As the previous 
chapter demonstrates, legal practitioners have numerous strategies for obtaining medical records 
and seem to value them as sources of evidence to either support or undermine complainers’ 
allegations. On the fundamental utility of medical records in court however, many advocates were 
surprisingly ambivalent, expressing a view that challenged the emerging picture that medical 
records are often sought, usually disclosed and widely used. Instead, there was a common argument 
that while records – and medical evidence generally – could be useful in domestic abuse cases, it 
was not sought or used routinely. Indeed, some participants suggested that they were often happy to 
agree medical evidence or leave it out of trials entirely. This impression is initially very surprising 
and warrants further analysis in this section of the chapter.  
In interview SC1 described how medical records could be used to establish a course of violent 
conduct but that this was often inferior – at least from a prosecution perspective – to testimony 
from the complainer:  
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SC1: The impact [of medical records] can be, can be significant if, if it’s all entirely 
consistent you know if it’s, if it’s a bad injury, if the, if the person has been encouraged by 
the doctor to report it to the police but said I can’t do that because you know he’s sitting out 
in the waiting room. Occasionally, occasionally someone who’s accused of, of the violence 
will attend the doctors with them if things have got so bad… You know say for example the 
complainer comes in with a broken nose, says I fell, but the doctor is aware that the partner 
is sitting outside and when she’s going back out to him, seems very upset. That sort of thing 
could be quite, quite powerful. But usually, the medical evidence isn’t going to be decisive. 
In the case where one of the allegations was the abusive partner, with the last of his partners 
pulled several of her teeth out… and there was some medical evidence for that but the 
greater impact was in the complainer herself describing what happened. Especially as she 
said, “It wasn’t even really that sore”. She could have said “That was the worse pain that 
anyone could ever conceive of” and I think everyone in the court would have believed that 
[....] So the impact is very often more in the complainer’s evidence than the medical 
evidence but if you’ve got medical evidence then to tie in and support, then that’s helpful. 
You know it reduces the possibility of saying “Well this is all just made up”.  
The link between medical record use and physical injury was observed in interviews with other 
advocates, who indicated that accusations of physical violence would be likely to encourage both 
prosecution and defence counsel to seek records:  
JC2: How can you prove an assault without proving… an aggravated assault without 
proving the injury and the extent of the injury and whether or not there has been any 
permanent impairment or disfigurement, or endangerment of life with, any of these 
aggravations without, without the medical evidence? 
In these circumstances, advocates spoke mostly about records being used to confirm or undermine 
alleged incidents of physical violence. In a prosaic sense, there was a perception that sexual 
violence often lacked medical evidence and therefore would be less likely to elicit medical record 
requests. More specifically, several individuals spoke about physical injury having a tangible 
impact on the jury.  For both SC1 and JC5, the likelihood of finding supportive information in 
medical records was much higher when the case included allegations of physical rather than or in 
addition to sexual violence:  
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SC1: Often if the, the violence has been bad enough there will be medical records, hospital 
attendances and occasionally these will include reference to sexual offending as well but 
there’s something concrete about a broken jaw, broken arm, and if it’s on-going sexual 
abuse and violence then it, it’s sadly often the case that it’s less likely to be reported by the 
complainer.  
Indeed, JC5 went on to argue directly that changing rules over disclosure meant that the use of 
records had declined markedly: 
JC5: To be honest, they [medical records] are so infrequently used now, because they are 
so difficult to get. So, an example would be if you have somebody who alleges that he is 
being violent and sexually abusive and perhaps they have reported the violence but not the 
sexual abuse. So they've gone to their doctor and said, you know, I have had a black eye 
because he's assaulting and make no mention of sexual assault, then that would be the kind 
of thing that is important because that's someone who can disclose but isn't disclosing the 
full-story until much later on. On occasion I've had to use them from a psychiatric aspect.  
Given the picture of the data thus far, the argument that records are rarely used seems extraordinary 
and speaks to a wider dissociation from the views of survivors and clinicians. The motivations for 
this response may be that in JC5’s experience, medical records are indeed much more difficult to 
obtain. Considered alongside the available case law however, this view is difficult to support, as 
the experience of WF and JC illustrates that wide-ranging requests continue to occur.
30
  
JC5’s distinction between records containing evidence of physical and sexual abuse is notable, and 
such a finding has not been reported by other researchers. Despite considerable evidence 
suggesting that medical records are used frequently in cases involving sexual abuse – often, though 
not always, to the detriment of the complainer - the participants quoted, suggested at times that 
physical abuse evidence was more powerful, particularly from a prosecution perspective.
31
 This 
impression bolsters the views of clinicians like SHD3, who noted in the previous section that 
physical abuse was much easier to prove in court. S2 also referred to this idea when discussing her 
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own case. She felt that the physical injuries she sustained during her attack bolstered her case, 
arguing that without this it may have been harder to secure a conviction:  
S2: You know I’ve said this a few times and it’s a horrible thing to have to say but in some 
ways like I was lucky because, it was like, you know rape in itself is a violent act but he 
was physically violent so there was bruises and scratches and you know vaginal tearing and 
stuff like that. So, you know the doctor spoke about those things, you know like actual 
injuries and in some ways like I say you know it’s horrible but lucky in some ways because, 
it was obvious that something had happened, you know. 
This view was not uniformly supported however, and some advocates argued that records had a 
useful role in cases involving both physical and sexual abuse – supporting the Crown’s position, as 
outlined in chapter 5. JC1 for example initially described medical records as essential evidence in 
historical cases, when the Moorov doctrine allows prosecutors to attempt to demonstrate a course 
of conduct from the accused
32
: 
 
JC1: In the context of sexual offences and domestic abuse, medical records are extremely 
important. And that’s largely because the majority of cases that are in court now are 
historical cases. So there are still current cases but they tend not to be quite so common. 
And in historical cases, there tends to be a heavy reliance on Moorov, the Moorov doctrine.  
While this response may initially appear to be more supportive of the processes outlined in this 
research thus far, where records appear to be regularly sought and used, JC1 later revised her 
comment, stating that despite occasional utility, medical records in the main, had little ultimate 
influence, particularly for the defence. This position, she argued would remain even if the 
corroboration obligation were removed:  
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JC1: My experience doesn’t show that medical records are hugely influential in mounting a 
positive defence for an accused. I think they’re of limited use in attempting to undermine 
the credibility and reliability of a complainer and even if corroboration was abolished they 
would still be used for that purpose. 
Arguments over the influence of medical records found support when advocates spoke of the 
increasing willingness of prosecutors and defence to agree medical evidence before trial. Agreeing 
the contents of medical records can mean that the prosecution and defence do not value them as 
intrinsically important to the decision on guilt. For JC2, the practice was largely beneficial to the 
defence, as prosecutors lost the jury impact of a clinician detailing harm:  
JC2: Another thing as well I would say is that increasingly there’s the tendency to agree 
much medical evidence by joint minute. If I were a prosecutor that would be the last thing 
I’d do because of the potency - that’s the way the late Lord Rodger described it - the 
potency of medical evidence when it’s, it’s presented by a real live doctor. You know who 
can explain where exactly is endangerment to life. Whereas if you’re a defence lawyer, I 
think if I can get medical evidence agreed in a joint minute, great, because it just gets read 
out in perfunctory fashion by somebody who doesn’t really care and it’s devoid of any 
emotional impact and it ticks a box in terms of getting that part of the case proved. But I 
think it’s about doing the bare minimum when it maybe should be about you know proving 
your case effectively.   
SC1 made a similar argument over the presentational nature of having a medical witness testify to 
the records though he argued that decisions were often based on the practicalities of getting 
clinicians to attend:  
SC1:  That’s one way of doing it, rather than having a doctor coming in, it might be if you 
put something in the joint minute it reduces the impact and it’s a question of balance for the 
Crown and for the defence in terms of what do you want in a joint minute, which, which the 
jury will be told is agreed facts but it might not be quite the same or as powerful as a 
witness in the witness box saying this is what happened and this is how the person 
presented at the time. But it’s, it’s about balancing all these things and also the practicalities 
of the availability of medical witnesses who you know that they have other medical matters 
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to deal with, they might have clinics or surgery or whatever and you know occasionally 
evidence is agreed because it would simply be impossible to identify a suitable time for the 
doctor to, to come to court. But in a case in the High Court, if a doctor was considered 
necessary then they would simply be told at some point “You’re having to come on this, 
this date, we’ll be as flexible as we can but you’re going to have to come to court”. 
These findings present a confusing picture and seem to contradict the findings of the data provided 
thus far, particularly as regards the frequency of record use, with several legal participants stressing 
their reluctance to rely on medical evidence, whereas routine disclosure has been indicated from 
both the available literature and the testimony of survivors and clinicians.
33
 Most research 
involving the use of complainers’ medical records (and sensitive records generally), concerns the 
use of patients’ mental health in cases of sexual violence, with defence lawyers particularly 
scrutinised for their attempts to suggest survivors are unreliable.
34
 However, several individuals in 
this project stressed that records were particularly useful for proving or disproving physical abuse, 
with less impact in cases where sexual violence is alleged. Despite this, many of these individuals 
later talked in depth about using mental health records in just those circumstances. As I outlined in 
chapter 2, one of the aims of this research was to assess whether clinicians, when recording abuse, 
in effect gave lawyers access to sexual history information that would otherwise be unavailable. 
This practice was alluded to by Temkin, and others, and in some cases, prompted researchers to 
argue that separate medical records should be made for use by medical and legal practitioners 
respectively.
35
 
As already noted, medical records and rape shield legislation can intermingle under the s.275 of the 
Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995, which can allow questioning on sexual character if a 
complainer suffers from a condition of predisposition affecting their credibility and reliability.
36
 
Defence advocates may seek to recover medical records (especially those pertaining to mental 
health) to allege that a complainer has a condition or predisposition that may lead them to be 
untruthful or unreliable. Prosecutors likewise can also choose to pursue section 275 applications if 
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they seek to lead evidence regarding sexual history or character that they believe will bolster their 
case against the accused, and while they are able to challenge defence applications, there is little 
evidence to suggest that this is routinely the case.
37
 Indeed, in 2005, Burman reported that in some 
observed trials the Crown were ‘openly supportive’ of applications made by the defence, and in 
general did not often challenge applications or proposed lines of questioning, even when asked for 
a view by the trial judge .
38
 This behaviour was also observed in the more recent case of JC 
Petitioner.
39
    
The picture emerging from this research over the use of medical records in this context is complex. 
While no clinicians described recording sexual history information in the way that Temkin’s 
participants did – and indeed, some took active steps to avoid irrelevant topics in their discussions 
with patients – there was an observable link between seeking medical records and sexual history 
evidence among legal participants. With the general embargo on sexual character evidence under 
Section 274, several advocates spoke about the supporting role that medical records often played in 
arguments for these restrictions to be lifted. In these arguments, the contents of medical records 
were perceived to be an ‘in’, providing information that could lead to further disclosure and the 
introduction of otherwise restricted information into court. 
SC3: Often the access to medical records informs a defence practitioner as to whether or 
not to make an application to lead the type of evidence that 274 prohibits. So … just as I 
mentioned, if the woman has a clinically diagnosed condition, that says she’s not a credible 
reliable witness, you’re gonna get that in, under that statutory provision. 
By contrast, several lawyers interviewed referred to section 274/5 as a ‘hurdle’ to the introduction 
of medical records, in addition to the restrictions on seeking the information initially. SC1 
described the usual process if the content of records was perceived to meet the threshold of 
character evidence:  
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SC1: But the fact that something’s in the medical records, isn’t the end of the story anyway. 
Usually you’re in the territory where 274 would prevent the evidence being led unless you 
make a 275 application so, the Crown giving us the medical records, possibly just leads on 
to a 275 application which is judicially controlled and therefore actually if there’s if there is 
slightly wider disclosure than strictly necessary there’s still a, a safeguard for it. But that’s 
probably a better way of approaching it than guessing wrongly what might be relevant, 
excluding things, redacting things, trial proceeding and ten years later an appeal having to 
proceed when that inappropriate redaction of relevant material comes to light and then an 
appeal, possibly a conviction quashed and then possibly a re-trial which is worse for, for 
everyone. But I’m not sure that the discussions – certainly publicly – are always framed in 
that way. 
A majority of legal interviewees argued rules for introducing sexual history evidence had tightened 
over their careers, several expressing the view that this position now impinged upon the accused’s 
right to a fair trial under article 6 of the ECHR.
40
 This view is noteworthy, as it challenges the 
narrative among researchers, who generally note that it is still relatively straightforward to have 
section 275 applications accepted.
41
 Indeed the position among advocates in this research seems 
almost inimical to the findings of the Scottish Justice Secretary in 2016, noted in section 6.1.
42
 
Many advocates in this research denied using s.275 applications frequently. SC2 averred that this 
was a result of the difficulty in obtaining expert opinion that would support a diagnosis that 
allowed entry of medical records into court:  
SC2: The bar is now set pretty high in relation to any type of psychiatric or psychological 
problems, including alcohol misuse. Because it has to be such that it does impact on the 
ability of the witness to give credible and reliable evidence. And that’s quite a big step for 
psychiatrists to, to take so quite often you find that you might have, you might recover the 
information but you just can’t get somebody to say that “It is such that it impacts on the 
credibility and reliability”. So it can turn out you can’t use that information. 
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By contrast, JC4 - who initially decried the idea that ‘fishing expeditions’ were mounted by 
advocates in cases of domestic abuse and/or rape - went on to detail a recent trial in which they had 
requested all entries in an individual’s record from birth relating to a specific symptom, without 
detailing any identified condition: 
JC4: I set out the basis for the information I seek and I specify and restrict what it is that I 
seek so in that particular instance, it was restricted to quote “all entries showing or tending 
to show the nature and extent of any psychiatric or psychological condition or 
predisposition relating to” and then I’ve written the complainer’s name and address and 
date of birth, “experiencing [SYMPTOMS] associated with sexual abuse between her date 
of birth, day she was born and the terminus date” and in this particular instance in that trial, 
I wanted [SYMPTOMS] right up to the present moment. Which “condition or 
predisposition may indicate the complainer is not a credible or reliable witness” closed 
quote.  
This is despite the obligation that section 275 requires ‘a condition or predisposition to be one 
which is objectively diagnosable in medical, notably psychiatric, terms’.43 The precise nature of 
‘condition or predisposition’ has in fact been disputed in several cases. In HMA v Ronald, for 
example, Lord Hodge found that this did not have to be a diagnosed medical condition, but would 
instead allow ‘other aspects of a person's behaviour would be relevant to the existence of a 
predisposition in the sense in which the word is used in s. 275(1)(a)’.44 Under this definition, JC4’s 
request would appear to be entirely proportionate. However, as the appeal court later argued in 
CJM, this meant that information that was otherwise collateral had been admitted, information 
which in fact ‘amounted to no more than the doctor's personal view on the particular complainer's 
credibility stemming from events in her life which the law deems inexpedient to explore’.45 This 
court argued, was incorrect, noting that the understanding of condition or predisposition in section 
275 should remain wedded to a formal diagnosis that was:  
Objectively diagnosable in medical, notably psychiatric, terms. The exception cannot be 
applied in the absence of medical evidence to that effect. On any view, therefore, the 
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appellant's application under s.275 could never have been allowed, since there was no such 
medical diagnosis.
46
  
In the more recent case of JC, this position was affirmed, as the appeal court objected to the 
defence’s inability to define a recognisable condition to justify the disclosure of the complainer’s 
records.
47
 Yet even with a formal diagnosis, there is dispute over whether certain conditions are 
relevant in considering the recovery of sensitive information.
48
 In this research, several legal 
interviewees referred to personality disorders as conditions that would justify disclosure of medical 
records and the discussion of medical information in court. Interestingly, this idea was rejected by 
FPsych1, an experienced forensic psychologist known and used as a witness by many of the legal 
interviewees, who argued: 
FPsych1: I don't think there's a specific condition and there isn't one that I would say, "Ok, 
you have borderline personality disorder, that means you're incredible and unreliable." It 
just doesn't work like that. You sometimes feel that there is a, a push towards that, and 
certainly I see some defence reports, one particular expert who if the person is diagnosed as 
borderline personality disorder then they say, you know, essentially they're a liar. But of 
course, you don't have to have any condition to tell lies [laughs]. You know, you can be 
perfectly of sane mind and super functioning and still, you know, not tell the truth about 
something. So there isn't an association, well there isn't a reliable association between any 
condition and, you know, fabricating accounts. 
FPsych1’s comments, particularly those noting the ‘push’ from lawyers towards defining 
personality disorders as always likely to make complainers unreliable, are illuminating, and point 
to the realities of the relationship between medical witnesses and legal counsel, with doctors, on 
occasion, obliged to promote these views at the behest of those instructing them. In a practical 
sense, they also add further weight to Raitt’s argument that there are shared understandings among 
legal professionals over the volume and type of medical information that can be used in court.   
As I have outlined, both S1 and S2 were asked to consent for disclosure without independent legal 
advice and while receiving psychiatric care. Though neither discussed rape shield legislation during 
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interview, both experienced the use of information that should usually be prohibited under section 
274 and would thus require a 275 application to admit it. Specifically, in the case of S1, usually 
prohibited evidence of a previous termination was admitted into court, as were images of her 
genitalia. This information was supplemented by records concerning S1’s previous experience of 
mental distress. For S2, the basis of the defence’s use of her mental health records was to assert 
that she was unreliable as a result of the mental illness she had suffered as a teenager. This, they 
stated, meant that both her allegations and her testimony were untrustworthy.  In both cases, given 
that the information used referred to conditions and/or predispositions that questioned the survivors’ 
credibility and reliability, rape shield legislation should have applied. Both survivors appealed to 
the trial judge over the relevance of the records at issue. S1 described this experience:  
S1: And the judge, the line of questioning of the defence, I said, by the way, I said, "that's, 
you can't ask - that's not relevant." I looked at the judge and I said, "this isn't part." And I'll 
have to try and remember what it was and we took a small break, for this and came back 
and she got to carry on with her line of questioning.  
Given the associated sensitivity, evidence of terminations is often prevented from entry into court 
by section 274.
49
 Nonetheless, medical records containing reference to abortions can on occasion 
be admitted as evidence. As noted in section 2.4.1, in their 2014 advice on obtaining sensitive 
medical records in sexual violence cases, the Crown detailed that reference to abortion could 
warrant further investigation by prosecutors, using the example of  information provided by the 
accused, ‘she told me sex was a bit uncomfortable because she recently had an abortion’.50 
I demonstrated in the previous chapter that SC1 experienced a situation where – working for the 
defence – he received evidence of a complainer’s termination, disclosed by the Crown, despite the 
accused being unaware of it. In this instance, the defence did not seek to use the information and so 
did not make a s.275 application.  As outlined by GP2, both in chapter 4 and earlier in this chapter, 
many patients are not aware this kind of sensitive information is available when records are 
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disclosed, leading to further questions over the level of informed consent that is possible when 
complainers are asked to disclose medical information in criminal proceedings.  
On balance, the attitudes of legal participants to confidentiality and the use of medical records in 
court was mixed, with some surprising findings regarding the frequency of medical record use in 
the current climate. It was a generally held belief that complainers’ privacy rights were respected, 
and that an increase in more restrictive legislation and court practices had nullified the wide-
ranging use of complainer medical records. It was these restrictions, participants argued, that 
dissuaded them from seeking medical records in domestic abuse and rape cases. Exploring why 
legal interviewees held these beliefs, it could simply be due to their perspective as defence agents. 
This hypothesis was bolstered by the view among some practitioners that restrictions on the use of 
sensitive records rules were at risk of ‘going too far the other way’ in the sense that, in an effort to 
protect the widespread use of records, the court and legislature had increased the risk of infringing 
the accused’s right to a fair trial. Given the generally accepted position elsewhere, that such 
information – particularly that relating to sexual character- continues to be used with a ‘degree of 
regularity’, this position does seem fairly unusual and is suggestive of a bias resulting from their 
everyday professional perspective.
51
  
With an absence of prosecutor interviews, it is difficult to quantify the extent to which this 
positional bias might be accountable for these views. It is important to remember however, that the 
mere fact that the legal interviewees worked as defence agents is not a sufficient reason to 
determine bias. After all, the process for training advocates in Scotland means that nearly all 
counsel will have some prosecution experience, and while this experience was less recent among 
some participants, several had worked in senior positions with the Crown within the last decade. In 
her 2011 article on the disclosure of records in rape cases, Raitt spoke about the potential for 
‘shared understandings’ between the prosecution and defence to undermine the potential for 
diverging views of concepts like ‘relevance’ to develop.52 These understandings Raitt argued were 
bound to occur in a ‘small jurisdiction like Scotland with its common training and career 
structure’.53 Raitt’s assertion was correct, and arguments for it can be found in practice, not least in 
                                                             
51
 JC Petitioner [2018] (unreported) at [15] 
52
 Fiona Raitt, ‘Disclosure of Records and Privacy Rights in Rape Cases’, The Edinburgh Law Review, 15 (2011), p. 53 
53
 Ibid, p. 53  
247 
 
the relative lack of contested 275 applications referred to above.
54
 If one accepts the potential for 
these shared understandings, then to attribute the remarks of lawyers in this study purely to their 
role as defence agents is problematic. The only way to begin to reconcile what seems to be the gulf 
between lawyers’ perceptions of confidentiality in court with those of survivors (and to an extent 
clinicians), is to argue that their views of what constitutes an acceptable confidentiality in this 
context are manifestly different.  
The data in chapter five suggested that medical records are used fairly regularly in cases involving 
domestic abuse and/or rape. This position is supported by senior staff in both medical and legal 
organisations, independent to this research.
55
 Despite this, several advocates in this chapter argued 
that records were decreasingly available and even when they were, offered questionable benefit to 
the defence. SC1 noted that records were rarely decisive, described their benefit as in 
demonstrating the presence or absence of physical injury. This position was supported by the 
findings of the Inspectorate of Prosecution, who noted in 2018 that the defence continued to use the 
absence of physical injury in medical records to attack a complainer’s credibility.56 When sexual 
abuse was alleged SC1 argued, they were of less use, he argued, owing to the greater restriction on 
evidence in such circumstances. In this assertion, he was supported by SC4 and JC2 and JC5 who 
argued that these restrictions risked under-disclosure and the miscarriage of justice. 
One difficulty in disputing these assertions lies in determining the degree of regularity referred to 
by the court in JC.
57
 But this argument alone is perhaps reductive and instead the greater focus 
should not be on assessing how often these situations occur but should be to analyse why they 
occur at all. In Scotland, as is evident elsewhere in the UK, the number of reports concerning 
domestic abuse and sexual violence in relationships continues to rise annually.
58
 Many of these 
cases do not make it to the trial stage but a substantial number do. The sheer volume of cases, in 
fact, has the potential to change the procedural makeup of the court system itself. As noted at the 
                                                             
54 Per letter from Matheson outlined in section 6.1.  
55
 Comments of the court in JC Petitioner [2018] (unreported)at [15] and the Chief Medical Officer for Scotland, 
Calderwood, SHARING OF PERSONAL SENSITIVE INFORMATION, pp. 1-3 
56 Inspectorate of Prosecution in Scotland, Thematic Review of the Investigation and Prosecution of Sexual Crimes, 
(2017), available at <https://www.gov.scot/Publications/2017/11/3053>, [date accessed: 22th August 2018], p. 195  
57
 JC Petitioner [2018] (unreported) at [15] 
58
 Jamie Grierson, 'Fall in domestic abuse files sent to prosecutors despite rise in recorded crimes', (29th November 
2019), The Guardian, <https://www.theguardian.com/society/2019/nov/25/domestic-abuse-charges-fall-despite-
rise-in-recorded-crimes> [accessed: 1st December 2019] 
248 
 
beginning of this thesis, sex cases now account for approximately 75% of cases in the High Court 
in Scotland.
59
  
Accordingly, it is possible to argue that if medical records are used with even a ‘degree of 
regularity’, then the potential for these different views of confidentiality to manifest as 
dissatisfying and unpleasant experiences for survivors and clinicians is obvious. As the experiences 
of S1 and S2 demonstrate, even on isolated occasions, the processes governing how medical 
records are created and sought, can have a huge impact on survivors’ trust in medical and legal 
services. With that in mind, I now proceed to explore survivors’ courtroom experiences, where 
their medical records were used to undermine the credibility of their allegations.   
6.4 Survivors in court  
Both S1 and S2 experienced extensive use of their medical records in court, with little warning or 
preparation. Discussing the period after giving consent for her records to be recovered, S2 spoke 
about the lack of information she received from medical and legal services:  
S2: I really struggled in those six months. You know I didn’t have really any medical 
support, there was no, I sort of just left you know. I had a couple meetings with the 
procurator fiscal, the woman there, she was really nice and just explained some stuff to me 
but. That was essentially it, there was no, nothing.  
In S2’s case, medical records sought by the Crown were disclosed and then used by the defence at 
trial, without her having chance to review or challenge the decision. When describing the 
information provided by the procurator fiscal on the use of her records, S2 replied:  
S2: Yeah. She did mention it briefly. But she couldn’t explain what exactly they would 
disclose to the defence. She just said that it would only be relevant information. And that 
was… She said they wouldn’t have access to everything that they would go through and 
pick out what was relevant and then give it to the defence or something like that.  
The concept of relevance was something both survivors returned to on several occasions during 
interview, particularly when discussing the use of information at trial.  As S1 described:  
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S1: They brought up a few things that I thought that weren't relevant at all. 
Both S1 and S2 did not object to the use of their medical records generally, but rather questioned 
the extent of the information eventually used, the way this was deployed in court and their lack of 
agency in these decisions. The extent to which the experiences of S1 and S2 can be said to 
represent the experience of survivors in Scotland, or to demonstrate a lax attitude to confidentiality 
by the Crown in general, is limited. After all, the sample of survivor interviewees in this research is 
small. However, their testimony raises further questions over the Crown’s role in protecting the 
confidentiality of complainers in these circumstances. As WF highlighted, the Crown has a duty to 
act in the public interest, and this does not always mean acting in the best interests of the 
complainer.
60
 It is therefore logical to argue that the expectations and aims of prosecutors and 
complainers are not always aligned, particularly when disclosure of medical information is 
concerned.  
In JC in 2018, the Crown made no objection in the trial of first instance to the disclosure of the 
entirety of the complainer’s medical record.61 In this case, the complainer had independent legal 
representation and accordingly, the effects of the Crown not raising objections were mitigated as 
she was able to go on to challenge the decision to disclose based on legal opinion.  
However, the case highlights the ambiguity of the complainers’ position, lacking a clear defined 
role in criminal proceedings. This is something legislators have previously attempted to tackle 
under initiatives like the Victims and Witnesses Act, which stipulated that as well as being able to 
obtain information about proceedings, ‘in so far as it would be appropriate to do so, a victim or 
witness should be able to participate effectively in the investigation and proceedings’.62 Despite the 
defence requesting all medical records related to the complainer’s mental health, the Crown had 
‘made no enquiry of any sort in relation to the complainer’s mental health prior to the hearing on 
the petition for commission and diligence’.63 Furthermore, on the day of the appeal hearing, the 
Crown then sought the opinion of the complainer’s general practitioner, but the judgement was not 
able to rule on whether this was done with her consent.
64
This behaviour suggests the Crown was 
                                                             
60
  WF v Scottish Ministers [2016] CSOH 27 at [12] 
61
 JC Petitioner [2018] (unreported) 
62
 Victims and Witnesses (Scotland) Act 2014 s.1(3d) 
63
 JC Petitioner [2018] (unreported) at [11] 
64
 Ibid, at [12] 
250 
 
content to allow the recovery of records, with the disclosure process driven by the defence and 
endorsed by the authority of the trial judge. Such a conclusion would align with the opinion of 
several advocates in this research who argued that the Crown increasingly chose not to recover 
records, ensuring that the defence then had to apply to the court through an order for commission 
and diligence. 
For both survivors interviewed in this research however, the Crown were more actively involved in 
the recovery procedure, gaining consent for retrieving records before passing them to the defence. 
As in JC, the Crown were not apparently fighting the request, but it is unclear whether their 
recovery of records was motivated by a defence request (though this appears to be the primary 
motivation in S1’s case), in response to a court order, in the interests of their own case, or in order 
to ‘cover all bases’. A more active role for the prosecution in recovering and disclosing records was 
also supported by the comments of court service staff and the findings of the medical record 
request study outlined in chapter five.  
What is clear is that this position resulted in both survivors feeling the Crown was not acting on 
their behalf when it came to protecting their sensitive medical information. While the Crown’s 
position was perfectly legally correct it does highlight misapprehensions concerning the 
prosecutor’s role and suggests that complainers are not properly informed about the public interest 
considerations that drive the actions of Crown staff. As to why this is the case, the Crown’s own 
disclosure guide stresses the need to keep complainers fully informed over ‘the implications of 
their records being obtained’.65 Notably however, the text goes on to stress to prosecutors that:   
decisions about what is allowed at trial are for the court to decide and as such no firm or 
misleading assurances should be given about the prospect of maintaining the confidentiality 
of information which is obtained.
66
 
When on the witness stand, S2 was asked questions by the defence regarding her credibility based 
on medical records from her adolescence. In interview, she detailed this experience, emphasising 
how she felt side-lined by being unable to challenge the line of questioning, (which she perceived 
to be both intensely personal and irrelevant) with the judge noting that this was a role for the 
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prosecution. Again, while this is the correct legal position, it suggests that the defined role of the 
Crown was not sufficiently explained, highlighting clearly the need for independent legal 
representation for survivors:  
S2: His defence advocate, I can’t recall exactly like how he got to that question but, he 
asked me if I’d ever self-harmed in the past. And it just sort of, for me it felt like it came out 
of nowhere. I didn’t understand what relevance it had. And I actually said, “do I have to 
answer that”. Because I knew the answer was yes. But I’m standing in that room you know 
with the judge, all these lawyers and the jury. And I’m just thinking you know in that 
moment I’m thinking “What the hell does this have to do with anything” you know because 
I’m aware that I have self-harmed, I don’t wanna lie, you know, I’m under oath I can’t, you 
know. But I don’t feel like I should have to disclose this. So I did say, you know do I have 
to answer that and the judge said something about like if there’s any objection, that the, 
procurator fiscal people would raise the objection. So yeah I had to… say yes.  
D: And they didn’t, they didn’t do anything about it, the Crown? 
S2: No, no.  
Both survivors’ comments over the role of the prosecution in protecting confidentiality raise 
several interesting questions. For S1 and S2, the Crown not only made no attempt to prevent 
distressing questions involving medical history being asked in court, but actually facilitated 
questioning through recovery of the records at an earlier stage in the legal process.  I have already 
noted that the extent to which complainers are made aware of the dynamics of their relationship 
with the Crown is questionable. Both S1 and S2 reported that they initially believed the Crown 
were acting on their behalf, or at least surmised that their interests were similar, an impression that 
Crown staff seem to have done little to disavow them of.  
The potential for these misunderstandings to manifest in the way sensitive medical records are used 
is clear. The Crown themselves appear to recognise this issue in their disclosure guidance, noting 
that ‘it is imperative that as we seek to bring prosecutions in the public interest, we do not do so at 
the expense of the victim’s rights to privacy, in accordance with Article 8 of the ECHR’.67 S1’s 
case at least, took place after the case of WF, and therefore in an atmosphere in which the Crown 
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and defence were aware of a complainer’s right to receive independent legal advice, but this was 
not communicated to her. Furthermore, the precise role of the Crown and how this diverges from 
the complainer’s was not expressed to either survivor, leading to a situation in which they gave 
consent for their records to be recovered while holding a view of the Crown’s intentions that was 
inaccurate. S1 and S2, when asked to consent to the recovery of their records, were instead warned 
that non-acquiescence would have an impact on their chance of a successful conviction. It was in 
these circumstances that they agreed. This is despite the Crown’s themselves noting that: 
The potential impact of obtaining and disclosing such material [sensitive records] should 
not be underestimated. Indeed, for some complainers the likelihood of such information 
being obtained and disclosed may influence the extent to which they will support the 
prosecution.
68
  
The experiences of S1 and S2 therefore support Raitt’s assertion – outlined in chapter 5 – that 
complainers often feel unable to refuse consent for disclosure, in order to continue criminal 
proceedings.
69
 This position was also referred to by JC2, who alluded to Crown practice:  
JC2: Well their process as I say is slightly different. There is no property of course in a 
witness. The Crown can approach the complainer and canvass their consent or send along a 
police office to canvass their consent and say well we need this for this case and… you 
know the consent is usually forthcoming… and the Crown don’t have to jump through the 
same kind of hoops as the defence do. 
Neither survivor was fully aware of the extent of the medical information that the Crown had 
retrieved or how much of this had been disclosed to the defence. Both only became aware that their 
medical records had been disclosed and would be led in evidence when attending court, as a result 
of questioning by defence advocates.  As S2 noted, the procurator fiscal did mention that relevant 
entries would be passed on. However, when asked when she became aware of quite how much 
information had been recovered, she replied:  
S2: When I was on the stand… Yeah. I think when I was in the hospital, the psychiatric 
hospital, it’s a pretty lonely place even though it’s full of people. So I had a lot of time, you 
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know didn’t have a phone or anything, just. So I did try and mentally prepare myself, I did 
sort of go through and think, what can they ask me about you know what’s the worst thing 
this guy can say? But that didn’t even, I didn’t even consider that they could bring up my 
prior medical history.  
This experience alone would seem to contravene the Crown’s assertion, in response to questions in 
this project, that prosecutors keep the complainer informed on these matters:  
Once the records are obtained and have been assessed for materiality COPFS will advise 
the witness of the information which requires to be disclosed to the defence i.e. the material 
information. In some cases contact will be made with the witness in writing or over the 
telephone and in some cases face to face meetings will be necessary. This decision will be 
taken on a case by case basis by the appropriate legal manager.
70
 
This response, given in 2018, largely mirrors Crown advice on disclosure in sexual crime cases in 
2014.
71
 For both survivors in this research, the Crown appear not to have met their own targets in 
detailing precisely what information would be sought from the medical records, leaving the 
survivors to feel that they had consented to disclosure without being fully aware of what this would 
mean when the case came to court – something that became a recurring theme during interview. 
These experiences are clearly important given the Crown’s significant role in recovering medical 
records in domestic abuse cases. As the medical record request study highlighted in chapter five, 
the Crown makes numerous requests to NHS boards – often absent of oversight by clinicians. To 
S2, the combination of the sensitivity of the information used and her lack of preparation ensured 
that the use of her medical records was an inherently painful experience: 
S2: It’s horrible because you can’t run away. You know normally when someone tries to 
defame your character or you know verbally abuse you is, I felt like I was being you know 
you can’t walk away. You can do something but you’re almost like stuck there and you 
can’t, can’t leave. It was made clear you know after the judge called that recess I said “I’m 
not going back in there. I shouldn’t have to deal with that. I don’t want to deal with that you 
know”. I was probably a bit sort of weaker at the time and it was more like “I can’t deal 
with that” rather than “I shouldn’t have to deal with that”. But you know I was told you 
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know “If you don’t go back we’ll put a warrant out for your arrest”. And again like 
compounded. I felt like the whole situation was a bit of a farce. 
D: Who said that to you about the warrant if you don’t mind? 
S2: I can’t remember. Someone who worked in the court. 
S1’s experience was similar, and she spoke in detail about how the lack of information regarding 
the process affected her:  
S1: I had no clue. Nothing. It was like no man's land, it was like a lottery. What, which one? 
It's like a, who the hell knows what they're going to bring up ever, of my private life. So 
that was so, I'll tell you what it was, the whole stage of everything was so unnerving, what 
are they going to, what are they not? What's going to be brought up? What am I going to be 
embarrassed about, shamed, what am I going to howl at, what am I going to dissociate at? It 
was like, you know that way when your stomach's churning and your heart is either going 
to stop or it's - you're just like, it's just like a rabbit in the headlights, you're-you're that 
scared that you can't think straight, you don't - their weapons are just constant and you don't 
know what they're going to fire at you next. So, it's so debilitating, it's really debilitating. 
And to go through what you'd already gone through with the perpetrator, to then have to go 
through it for everyone to hear and for everyone - and then for him to just walk.  
In both cases, the records obtained covered a period of years, concerning medical attendances from 
both survivors’ adolescence. For S1 and S2, the lack of intervention by the Crown over defence 
questions on the content of records compounded their sense of frustration with the process and led 
them to question how decisions concerning relevance were made. The effect that these experiences 
had on the survivors’ trust in legal and medical services was profound. In describing her feelings 
on the breach of her confidentiality, S1 expressed intense feelings of helplessness and a sense of 
secondary violation:  
S1: I felt [pause] absolutely shamed, embarrassed, I could have wept. I could have [pause] 
crawled into a little hole, wanted the whole world to eat me up, I was disgust - I felt dirty, I 
felt again, raped again. I felt violated, that's the right word. Very much violated. And 
[pause] like, disrespected, you know, not worthy of even living, I was that belittled 
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throughout this whole case. [pause] and I can see why some, as I said, why someone 
women, they just can't even go ahead - and they just don't even en - they just say no, and 
that's why. 
 
This impression was shared by S2, who felt that, by allowing access to her medical records, the 
court was allowing the accused to exert power over her, through gaining access to sensitive 
information from her past: 
 
S2: And I guess when I went back to hospital that day you know I sat and thought about it 
and I was like “Oh my god” like the guy who attacked me has, he knows so much about me 
you know, he’s been able to read my medical records and I don’t know… why was that 
why did the procurator fiscal decide that that was relevant to disclose to the defence? I 
didn’t understand how anyone came to that conclusion, I didn’t understand at all.  
These emotive descriptions are demonstrative of the importance that medical confidentiality has in 
court for survivors of domestic abuse and rape. The loss of control and sense of violation 
experienced by the interviewees in this research, suggests that the use of sensitive medical 
information has the potential for re-traumatisation, previously attached to other aspects of the 
criminal justice process.
72
 
S1 and S2 both had experience of their treating clinicians giving evidence in court. In the case of 
S1, several multidisciplinary practitioners were involved. S2 was aware of only a sexual health 
doctor giving evidence. S2 felt that the sexual health doctor, with whom she had a positive 
experience in a medical context, simply gave the evidence relating to their encounter and did not 
stray beyond this point. Her relative lack of contact with them seemed to inform her attitude and 
she spoke of how the situation would have been different if the clinician had come from another 
specialty. 
S2: It’s hard because the only doctor who gave evidence, I’d only met him that one time so 
I didn’t feel any sort of connection with him, it wasn’t like they’d brought my GP or 
anything like that and so I guess it’s different in that sense. And I was again quite divorced 
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from it because I didn’t see him give evidence… Yeah. I think in sort of domestic violence 
type cases, there would be more. I think because I hadn’t really spoken to my GP about it. 
The perceived closeness between S2 and her GP is notable and echoes the sentiments of GP1 and 
GP2, who both argued that their relationships with patients were often stronger than those held by 
clinicians in other specialties. The impact of these more trusting clinical relationships became 
apparent when S2 responded to a question over how she would have felt if her GP had given 
evidence:  
S2: Yeah oh I feel like that would have probably irreparably broken the relationship. 
In this, my findings support Jones’ study (outlined in chapter 2.2), which found that among patients 
in a general practice, ‘it was widely recognised that concerns about confidentiality might 
discourage patients from seeking treatment’.73 S2’s assertion over how the relationship with her GP 
would have changed had they testified is clearly speculative and might depend a great deal on how 
that GP gave evidence and whether S2 thought they had tried to respect her privacy rights during 
this process. Nonetheless, the fact that she noted that the involvement of her GP in particular had 
the potential to cause distress does suggest that the typical level of contact between patients and 
clinicians – as outlined earlier in the chapter – is a potential indicator for both parties’ perceptions 
of confidentiality in court. The picture with S1 was more complex. Several clinicians involved in 
her care subsequently gave evidence at trial. Unlike S2, she reported that her GP had given 
evidence in the case and she didn’t describe this experience as particularly negative, though she did 
note that the GP in question was the only clinician ‘that knew throughout this whole thing’ of the 
extent of abuse she had suffered. She also didn’t mention her GP using her medical history in a 
way she found inappropriate, but instead noted that they had criticised the advocate depute as 
unhelpful to S1’s case and had criticised S1’s treatment in court in general.   
As with the use of their medical records, both survivors were not opposed to clinicians discussing 
their medical care in general. It was instead the perception that clinicians would be enabling the 
exposure of irrelevant sensitive information– in a manner reminiscent to Temkin’s clinicians as 
‘handmaidens of the defence’ - that caused negative feelings.74 This feature of clinicians enabling 
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the use of medical records then recurred in interviews with both lawyers and healthcare 
professionals themselves.  
For the survivors in this research, the concept of relevance reappeared throughout our discussions, 
with both unable to comprehend why sensitive information regarding their mental and sexual 
health was used in an attempt to discredit their testimony. As I have indicated, the concept of 
relevance also appeared consistently throughout discussions with healthcare professionals and 
lawyers. But for S1 and S2, there was consistent reference to the determination of relevance as 
being poorly defined, with prosecutors failing to explain disclosure processes to them. This speaks 
to the wider arguments put forward by Raitt and outlined in chapter 2, that the ‘tensions within the 
prosecutors’ role’ lead to situations where complainers’ privacy rights are routinely unenforced, 
and the disclosure of records is ‘one area where the Crown cannot fully discharge its duty to protect 
the complainer’s interest’.75 
6.5 Conclusions  
What emerges from this chapter analysing perceptions of medical confidentiality in court is a 
picture of confusion.  
 
6.5.1 Complainer vs patient  
One issue the chapter identified concerned the relationship between clinicians and survivors in 
court. A majority of clinicians spoke about the importance of impartiality when giving evidence in 
criminal trials, either as professional or expert witnesses. Some however, depending on their 
particular role, felt that they had additional responsibilities to the complainer, and in these 
circumstances, often continued to view them as a patient. These additional responsibilities were 
particularly felt by those practising in specialties that had long-term patient contact and follow up 
(GPs) or whose work required them to spend prolonged periods of time with patients following 
rape and sexual assault (FME’s/sexual health doctors). For their part, both S1 and S2 spoke 
positively about their GPs, though both had some negative experiences with clinicians from other 
specialties.  
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No clinicians expressed direct objection to the idea of using confidential information in court, with 
most recognising that if the information had been legitimately obtained then it was essential to the 
proof of certain conduct. Some however, did question the extent of the information used, though in 
the formal environment of the court they were unable to influence processes as they had been able 
to at an earlier stage, i.e. through amending recording procedures. Though SHD2 was vehemently 
against ‘taking sides’ in a case, other participating sexual health doctors (more specifically SHD1 
and SHD4) described being emotionally invested in the outcome of some of the trials they 
participated in as witnesses, choosing the ‘side’ of the complainer in this process. These clinicians 
admitted feeling unhappy when the accused was not convicted or when they considered sentencing 
inadequate. They were likely to admit that impartiality was difficult to maintain, having seen the 
complainer in a medical context earlier in the process. This group also included individuals who 
were concerned that the evidence they gave might negatively affect a conviction if they delivered it 
poorly. These perceptions are relevant to the question of confidentiality, as they appeared to have at 
least some tangible impact on practice. SHD1 for example, knowing the effect that disclosure of 
irrelevant medical history could have on conviction, chose not to ask patients questions which 
would elicit such information, restricting her inquiries to the index incident.  
6.5.2 The usefulness of medical records  
A much larger issue this chapter identified concerned the use of medical records in court.  Contrary 
to the picture emerging from the research thus far, legal participants were divided on how useful 
medical records actually were during a trial, and while several stressed their importance, many 
argued that they had at best a minor influence on the ultimate outcome of a case. Those stressing 
the relative unimportance of records suggested that while medical information was useful in 
proving or disproving alleged physical abuse in court, it was less useful when sexual offences were 
also concerned. In this, they pointed to the absence of observable injury in rape cases as an 
example of why records were unhelpful. This argument is flawed however, when one considers the 
available evidence from other sources. After S1 was raped for example, a vast quantity of records 
was sought and used by the defence agents concerned, from a range of medical specialties;  
S1: Yeah there was A&E, was it [pause] it was for when he booted me, yeah, in the 
stomach pregnant. I went to A&E and then I got taken through to the maternity, yeah. So 
they got every record they could get their hands on. 
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As has been indicated in the literature, the absence of sexual injury can be used to impugn a 
complainer’s credibility.76 Indeed, this was part of the motivation behind the introduction of 
statutory jury directions in sexual offence cases.
77
 An absence of genital injury continues to be used 
by defence practitioners in particular to allege that rape did not occur.
78
 This practice was even 
referred to by SC1 in chapter 5.2.3 and was supported by several clinician interviewees, who noted 
that they often had to explain that the absence of genital injury was unremarkable in cases where 
they appeared as witnesses. It was bolstered further by S2, when she suggested that the presence of 
these injuries in her case were instrumental to the ultimate conviction of the accused.  
Opinion was similarly divided on the usefulness of mental health records – those most connected to 
cases featuring sexual abuse. Among legal participants, there was disagreement over what 
particular medical conditions would cause them to access medical records, with many challenging 
the idea that records would be sought that were not material to the case at hand. In these 
discussions, participants stressed that they would be by clinician witnesses, who would interpret the 
information from the records and give it weight for the jury. This approach seems consistent with 
that evidenced in landmark cases like Ronald, and in Burman’s courtroom assessment in 2007, 
where the testimony of medical experts drove determinations of what medical records were 
acceptable for use in court.
79
 Interestingly, some medical participants with experience of appearing 
as expert witnesses, were not always complimentary about this process. FPsych1 in particular, 
highlighted situations in which he had been required to look through vast amounts of a 
complainer’s medical history, on occasion having to include what he described as otherwise 
irrelevant information in his court report, simply because it may have some relation to the defence 
strategy.  
Among most legal interviewees, there was the perception that records were increasingly difficult to 
obtain, a result of restrictive legislation, the opinion of the court and a change in practice by the 
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Crown. Yet for the survivor participants, it was the Crown that led efforts to obtain their medical 
records and the court that allowed the information to be introduced.  
6.5.3 Relevance 
This chapter highlighted the importance that various groups – particularly lawyers and survivors – 
placed on the relevance of the medical information ultimately used in court. Interview data 
indicated that ideas of relevance were connected with perceptions of medical confidentiality and 
both groups talked repeatedly about the importance of using relevant medical information, though 
they differed on what this constituted. Neither S1 nor S2 objected in principle to the use of medical 
records in court. It was instead the volume and nature of the information used that caused them to 
view their criminal justice experiences negatively. In this, their views matched Raitt’s when 
discussing disclosure in 2011:  
For the purposes of disclosure, sensitive personal information such as mental health history 
could very possibly be characterised as material and relevant information. The problem 
with this lies less in the principle of disclosure of these records, and more in the ways in 
which the privacy interests of complainers could be heavily compromised in circumstances 
where they will have no access to independent legal advice.
80
 
Neither S1 or S2 had independent legal representation in their case, though S1’s trial took place 
after the WF ruling. Both survivors appealed to the judge in their trials, arguing that the medical 
information discussed by the defence was not relevant to the case at hand. In neither case was their 
position supported, with both individuals told that it was for the prosecution to challenge the 
relevance of defence questioning (the correct legal position) and, in both cases, extensive medical 
records were used.  S2 spoke of her surprise at how these determinations of relevance were made:  
S2: I didn’t know much about legal processes at that time but I knew you couldn’t ask my 
attacker about stuff about like his prior criminal record so I wasn’t sure how my medical 
records from, you know I think I was about 13, so yeah years before – had any relevance at 
all. And you know, I hadn’t ever told anyone that I’d self-harmed, it was. You know 
certainly not my mum!  
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Among legal participants, the concept of relevance was discussed as a measure by which the legal 
system ensured fair and equitable use of complainers’ medical information, with confidentiality 
breached only to the extent that was necessary. Through discussion with defence advocates 
however, it became clear that precise definitions of what constituted relevance were impossible. To 
a certain extent this was due to the singular nature of each case – even when theorising specifically 
about those involving domestic abuse. But there was also a consistent, running ambiguity over 
what medical conditions and information would suggest an issue with reliability or credibility. 
Several individuals for example, suggested that personality disorders may encourage an application 
as they increase the likelihood that a complainer may be lying. As noted in section 6.3 however, 
this was rejected by FPsych1, a senior forensic psychologist with a wealth of court experience. He 
also argued that he felt pushed by defence lawyers, to make a diagnosis of personality disorders, as 
it would more readily allow the complainer’s reliability to be questioned. FPsych1’s position has 
tacit support from the judges in JC, who in part declined the accused’s medical record request on 
the basis that he had not been able to establish that ‘any particular personality disorder is known to 
cause those who suffer from it to lie or be unreliable’.81 Other advocates interviewed noted to that 
while this information might have resulted in records being obtained in the past, it would not 
necessarily do so now. 
 
The judgement of lawyers – both prosecutors and defence – over what constitutes relevant medical 
information, is ultimately responsible for what information is then sought, obtained and disclosed. 
The concept of relevance as a legal construction then becomes inextricably linked with medical 
confidentiality. Those legal participants arguing that only relevant medical records are disclosed, 
are arguing that medical confidentiality is only breached under appropriate and limited 
circumstances. The issue is that many, while admitting a lack of knowledge over what medical 
conditions would cause complainers to be unreliable, went on to note with confidence that certain 
mental health conditions would lead them to automatically seek to recover records. This picture 
chimes with Raitt’s conclusion, that mental health records in particular, attract a significant level of 
scrutiny among lawyers in these cases, with confidentiality breached to allow decisions over 
disclosure, even when the records themselves may have no clear relevance:  
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Historical mental health records embrace a spectrum from a one-off diagnosis for a 
depressive illness, to a long period of psychotic episodes, with many shades of grey 
interposed. Such records may have no relevance whatsoever for the prosecution in hand but 
both prosecutors and defence lawyers will wish to be persuaded of that before deciding 
what requires to be disclosed.
82
 
Determinations of relevance in abuse trials remain opaque and both S1 and S2 argued that medical 
confidentiality in their cases was unfairly infringed based upon a relevance decision made by an 
individual who lacked medical training and a vested interest in the confidentiality of the records 
concerned. As S2 outlined in chapter 5.4, she was not sure that someone ‘doing paperwork in the 
procurator fiscal is an expert at mental illness’. 
6.5.4  Trust in Healthcare  
One interesting observation arising from this chapter concerns the effect that that differing 
conceptions of confidentiality and relevance can have on survivors’ post-trial. Unlike the 
questionnaire participants, both interviewees experienced the use of their medical records in court. 
In 2011, Raitt posited that the threat to medical confidentiality could directly affect complainer’s 
willingness to engage with services:  
There is a separate concern that victims who have a very real need for treatment will delay 
therapeutic help in order to preserve the confidentiality of their patient records.
83
 
This argument was justified in the responses of S1 and S2 who reported that their experiences had 
negatively affected their trust in both legal and medical services. S2 reported that her experience 
meant that it took years for her to build up her trust in visiting and speaking to her doctor and S1 
stated that she was now much more boundaried in her discussions with clinicians.  
However, the data from the questionnaire study initially seems to indicate the prospect of medical 
record use would not necessarily prevent survivors from disclosing abuse to clinicians. This was a 
surprising finding (mirroring the relative lack of concern with documentation identified from the 
questionnaire in chapter 4.3.3), as the literature has indicated that the potential use of records in 
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court actively prevents survivors discussing abuse with clinicians.
84
 Instead, in this research, all 
respondents answered that knowing their records might be used in court would not prevent them 
disclosing. This was true whether they were initially aware that lawyers could request records in 
this way or not and was equally true among those with or without criminal justice experience. 
Therefore, given the larger number of questionnaire respondents relative to interviewees, one could 
argue that the use of medical records does not necessarily affect the chance of disclosure among a 
majority of survivors.  
Ultimately however, this analysis is insufficient. Of the six questionnaire participants, only one 
reported that their medical records had been used in court, and they did not detail how this was 
done or the type of information that was disclosed.  The same individual also reported that their 
partner or ex-partner had never been tried in a criminal court for abusing them, raising the 
possibility that their records had not been used in court in this context. Accordingly, basing any 
conclusions on their assertion about future disclosure is unsafe.  Of the remaining participants, 
three had been involved in the trial process and two had not. This was unlike the experience of both 
survivor interviewees, who had both been through the trial process and had their records used.  
Clearly, this research raises numerous questions over the roles of clinicians and lawyers in 
recovering and using medical records. The quantitative study in chapter five effectively highlighted 
the gaps between the NHS and legal services and the professionals working within them, with the 
Crown able to obtain patient records without discussing this with treating clinicians.  
Questions remain over how effective further involvement of clinicians would be in this process. An 
increased role for clinicians in record disclosure has the potential to suggest some kind of return to 
paternalistic decision making, with professionals arbitrating over the content and relevance of 
medical information without involving the person they concern. Such an outcome would risk 
excluding patients and further discouraging them from engaging with services.  
What this chapter makes clear, however, is that differing perceptions of confidentiality have a role 
in determining what information is ultimately swept up in disclosure practices, and therefore the 
information that ends up in court. While the value of medical evidence in this context appears more 
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debatable than previously anticipated, the effect of medical record use can continue beyond the trial, 
even determining future interactions with clinicians and lawyers.   
6.5.5 Clarity  
This chapter, building on the two preceding data chapters, helped identify the lack of clarity 
surrounding the use of medical records in court. There was a perception among many interviewees 
that the way in which confidentiality was perceived varied depending on the professionals involved. 
This was not limited to the behaviour of defence or prosecution counsel and the court alone, but 
also appeared to be influenced by clinicians, in particular those acting as expert witnesses, who 
legitimated the recovery and disclosure of particular records based on differing opinions over what 
medical conditions justified this approach.  
A perceived lack of clarity surrounding both processes and understandings has persisted throughout 
the duration of this thesis. This will be further analysed in the final chapter, where I will outline 
what the data I have gathered suggests about the realities of medical confidentiality in cases of 
domestic abuse, with suggestions for improvements to current systems.  
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Chapter Seven: Conclusion 
This project provides novel opportunities for understanding the role that medical confidentiality 
plays in the identification, treatment and prosecution of domestic abuse. I will now outline the key 
findings of this research, before accounting for the limitations of it. Finally, I will describe the 
contributions my work makes to the wider field, and the directions for future research.  
7.1 Perceptions of medical confidentiality  
Despite the comprehensive investigation provided by the chosen methodology, the clearest 
conclusion that emerges from this research is the complete lack of apparent clarity in perceptions of 
confidentiality and the processes governing the use of medical records in court.  
Where consensus was reached, it was in the notion that perceptions of confidentiality moved 
beyond simple medical definitions. For the survivors in this research, confidentiality had largely 
ceased to be a medical concept, but was irreparably tied to the legal system following their 
experiences in court. These experiences - both negative - ultimately affected not only their views of 
the legal system that utilised their confidential information, but the health service that produced it 
and transferred it to lawyers. It is arguable that these experiences are individualised and not 
representative of the wider survivor population, with overall trust in the NHS and the criminal 
justice system unaffected by the use of confidential information. This position was indeed 
advanced by several legal participants in this research. Yet the available literature suggests that this 
link has been observed elsewhere, with authors like Raitt describing the disclosure of sensitive 
records as ‘an additional obstacle for complainants’ and Canadian researchers observing that use of 
records in court prevented survivors from engaging with health services.
1
  
What became clear from this research was that with a lack of through-line clarity in processes 
governing the use of medical information, it is possible for individuals’ medical confidentiality to 
be readily undermined, with sensitive information recorded, sought and later used. In these 
situations, the individuals whose records were involved ultimately lost faith in the institutions 
which they were encouraged to consult. Ultimately, there is every indication that S1 and S2’s 
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experiences are not unique and therefore it is possible that other survivors have experienced the 
same loss of trust in medical and legal services, to the detriment of all involved.  
For clinicians too, any attempt to discern a fixed a concept of confidentiality among interviewees is 
challenging. Generally speaking, one could argue that for the majority of the general population, 
medical confidentiality defines an often-unspoken agreement between a patient and clinician that 
what is discussed in a consultation will not be discussed outside it or that any such discussions will 
take place purely in the interests of improving patient care. Yet among my population of clinician 
interviewees, there was variation in the way that confidentiality was perceived, its limits, and the 
way that it affected everyday practice. The occurrence of domestic abuse/rape had profound 
impacts on these factors.  And while clinicians typically viewed confidentiality through the lens of 
their relationship with the patient, the presence of abuse - suspected or disclosed – dramatically 
altered this landscape. Obligations were placed upon them to pass on patient information, 
challenging confidentiality. Clinical interviewees described the threshold for reporting abuse as 
being vague and individualised, with many often feeling unsure about these decisions in the context 
of domestic abuse, unless a child was suspected of being at risk.  
Something that became clear through analysis of clinicians’ interview transcripts, was their 
divergent attitudes toward confidentiality, with discernible differences between specialties. These 
variations were at least partly driven by contact with patients who were the victims of crime, in 
particular if these patients later became involved with the criminal justice system. Those working 
in specialties with more contact with crime victims tended to have more robust discussions about 
confidentiality with their patients and were more likely to amend their documentation practices in 
anticipation of future legal action.  
Among lawyers, confidentiality was generally regarded as less important than ensuring that 
potentially relevant information reached the court.  It would be erroneous however to suggest that 
to lawyers, medical confidentiality was entirely understood through legal processes and the court. 
All recognised the importance of confidentiality in a medical setting, and two even spoke about 
confidentiality issues they had experienced as patients. This culminated in comments like that by 
JC2, that patients should be ‘precious’ about their confidentiality.  Also, while legal interviewees 
never questioned the right of the court to obtain sensitive medical information, they recognised that 
these actions constituted a breach of survivors’ medical confidentiality. This was something they 
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justified by stressing to the importance of properly investigating crime and referring to the 
controlled circumstances in which the breach occurred (within the court and limited to the duration 
of the case).  
One notable finding related to the ability of confidentiality perceptions to influence attitudes 
towards medical and legal practice. This centred on a broad-based attitude for change, particularly 
among survivors and clinicians. There was a general desire among these groups to stress that 
medical records were primarily for medical use. Contrary to some of Isaac and Enos’s findings 
which suggested that clinicians often considered potential legal proceedings when writing records, 
legal considerations were rarely foremost in the mind of interviewees when consulting with 
patients, though some did amend their recording practice when suspecting a case may proceed to 
court.
2
 This was evident for example in FPsych1’s assertion that he occasionally received records 
to make a diagnosis before trial but was unable to do so because only a ‘snapshot’ of an individuals’ 
mental health was provided, something that would not allow a holistic understanding of their health.  
Both survivors urged greater awareness of abuse and the provision of advice about the use of 
records to complainers. Furthermore, their personal experiences led S2 to call for greater 
involvement of healthcare professionals in confidentiality decisions, as she felt that lawyers lacked 
the requisite medical knowledge to determine what aspects of her medical records may be relevant. 
As she noted, ‘I’m not sure lawyers should be trying to act like doctors’.  
It is telling that nearly all clinician participants and both survivors also spoke about the need for 
and importance of improved training in the courtroom environment either for themselves or for the 
legal professionals tasked with retrieving and using medical records. Among clinicians, there was 
also an almost unanimous call for greater training on confidentiality issues, particularly in cases of 
domestic abuse.  This was twinned with a recurring uncertainty over their role in court and, on 
occasion, how this reconciled with their duty of confidentiality. There were also calls for clearer 
referral pathways for survivors, with clinicians often lamenting the lack of available services to 
provide survivors with if they chose not to report abuse to police. Many of these observations 
                                                             
2
 Nancy E. Issac and Pualani Enos, Medical Records as Legal Evidence of Domestic Violence, (September 2000), 
available at<https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/184530.pdf>, [accessed: 14th October 2019], p.  
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actually align with the guidelines for best practice suggested by NICE, indicating that such 
recommendations are not being adopted in practice.
3
 
 For survivors, in particular S2, there were calls for legal professionals to receive better training on 
how to recover medical records through engagement with the complainer and also for determining 
relevance, something I return to later in this chapter.  
One of the fundamental issues outlined through all participants’ perceptions of confidentiality was 
the lack of clarity among those involved. Numerous individuals referred to a state of disorder 
surrounding the process, from survivors’ interactions with the health service, through to their 
experiences in court. There was a common conception that no one knew what anyone else was 
doing, with the potential for misunderstandings and poor outcomes as a result. Accordingly, there 
was a desire for services to be more ‘joined up’, particularly among survivors and clinicians, as S2 
noted ‘I don’t feel like anyone knows what any of the other people are doing. So the lawyers have 
not idea about the doctors and the doctors have no ideas about the lawyers’. Participants 
acknowledged the inherent difficulties that such attempts to join up services would have, with two 
large public sector organisations like the NHS and the criminal justice system, both with their own 
resource issues and competing interests. Yet there was evidence that improved relationships 
between medical and legal organisations were beneficial among the interviewee population. The 
medical centre SHD2 worked for had developed links with both local law enforcement, the Crown 
and courts, which involved – among other things – greater training for appearing in court and 
discussions on improving practice with senior judges. SHD2 consequently reported a higher rate of 
satisfaction with legal processes than her colleagues.  
This research therefore found that while perceptions of confidentiality were distinct between 
survivors, clinicians and lawyers, there was a desire for better interactions - at least among 
survivors and clinicians – with the aim being to improve the experience of those involved in legal 
proceedings in future.  
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 NICE, 'Domestic violence and abuse: multi-agency working Public health guideline [PH50]', (February 2014), 
<https://www.nice.org.uk/guidance/ph50/chapter/1-Recommendations>, [accessed: 28th September 2019] 
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7.2 The question of consent  
Throughout this thesis, one question that arose repeatedly centred on the question of complainer 
consent and how this was negotiated in the recovery of medical records. Both survivors in this 
research described the circumstances in which they were asked to provide consent. While the 
mental health of both survivors was used at trial as a vehicle to allege that they lacked credibility in 
their allegations of rape, the fact that they were receiving psychiatric care when consent for 
disclosure was sought did not cause legal professionals to question the validity of that consent. 
Both survivors noted that they were unaware of the level of disclosure their consent permitted until 
they arrived in court and were questioned by defence counsel.  
Taken alongside notable cases like WF, JC and the testimony of both survivors in this research, the 
medical record request study offered further insights into the consent process. Of the sample 
gathered across the study period, every request for records was made by the Crown and in every 
case, it was the complainer whose records were sought and passed on without redaction or clinician 
oversight.  By combining these findings with the statistics showing a relatively low uptake for legal 
aid for ILR post-WF, it is possible to conclude that in most cases where medical records are used, 
they are obtained by the Crown, with the complainer’s nominal consent. While the Crown clearly 
occupies such an important role in these decisions, it seems inadequate not to analyse their practice 
as concerns the use of medical records.  
It was difficult to outline the Crown position in this research however, given their reluctance to be 
interviewed on the subject. From the testimony of defence advocates, it is likewise difficult to 
conclude how regularly the Crown obtain records and disclose them. Many advocate interviewees 
argued that while seeking complainer consent was the simplest way to obtain records and was 
standard practice in the past – at least in the first decade of this century – the Crown were now 
often reluctant to seek medical records, largely because this would cause a burden on them to 
scrutinise and then disclose them.  
Supporting these assertions however, is difficult. Discussion with the Scottish Courts and Tribunal 
Service indicates that formal petitions for commission and diligence relating to medical records in 
these cases remain low. Given the high number of reported requests this would suggest that the 
process of obtaining records often comes before the court stage, and that the Crown (who can 
recover records without court authority through complainer consent or the petition warrant) tend to 
270 
 
lead the process in this regard. This is then bolstered by the record request study in this thesis, 
where all attempts to recover information were made by the Crown.  
Given the fact that both survivors in this research were asked to consent when receiving psychiatric 
care, it was also instructive to consider the role clinicians occupied in the consent process. As the 
Crown themselves acknowledge in their written responses, medical professionals do, on occasion, 
resist the release of medical records.
4
 Yet the recovery process is to a large extent atomised and 
outwith clinicians’ control. In the medical records request study, there were no cases in which 
Crown requests were seen by clinicians, with records instead released by clerical staff. As was 
clear through interviews with clinicians – particularly those in acute services – often, healthcare 
professionals are not aware when or how records have been requested, or who has sanctioned 
release, until they arrive in court to give evidence. Among those with direct experience of dealing 
with legal requests for records – i.e. GP2, SHD1, SHD3 and FPsych1 - there was evidence that 
clinicians took steps to ensure that survivors were at least aware that the records relating to their 
consultations could be used in court.  
Legal interviewees were the most likely group to assert that involvement in a prosecution meant 
that a complainer should accept lawyers’ efforts to recover their records and it is on this point that 
one of the fundamental tensions between interviewees appeared. Among survivors and clinicians, 
there arose the argument that unrestrained use of a complainer’s medical records would put them 
off from participating in court proceedings, something observed by other researchers.
5
 This was 
certainly borne out by S1 and S2 who both reported ongoing negative perceptions of the criminal 
justice process as a direct result of their experiences. This position is supportive of that put forward 
by Raitt and Duff.
6
 And yet among legal interviews, there was a general assumption that the 
complainer needed to allow access to their records in such circumstances, a position reinforced by 
the Crown in the case of both survivors, who argued that non-acquiescence for record recovery 
would affect the chances of a successful prosecution.     
By failing to adequately address the idea of consent for disclosure with survivors, legal counsel – in 
particular the Crown – risk appearing as if they wilfully pressure the them into agreeing to allow 
                                                             
4
 See appendix A.  
5
 Cory et al, Reasonable Doubt, p. 11 
6
 Raitt, ‘Disclosure of Records’, pp. 33-56; Peter Duff, 'Disclosure, PII and the confidentiality of personal records', Scots 
Law Times, 33 (2010), pp. 181-184 
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access to their records, simply because this is more tactically useful. The arguments made to both 
survivors in this research, that their non-compliance would damage the chance of convicting their 
abuser, does not appear like truly informed consent, especially when the extent of potential 
disclosure was not made clear to either of them. This approach left the survivors feeling that they 
had been unfairly led and was particularly traumatic for S1 given the not-proven verdict in her case.  
 
As the Canadian Supreme Court found in R v Therens, it is intensely difficult for individuals to 
decline requests from agents of the law.
7
  This thesis provides evidence of cases in which consent 
was obtained by the Crown using the pressure of a potentially unsuccessful conviction, something 
that should never occur. This finding, alongside others presented throughout this research, 
highlights the urgent need for the processes and practices through which complainer consent is 
obtained to be outlined clearly to those concerned.   
7.3 The role of clinicians  
As I identified in chapter 2, a lack of available research indicated that the role of clinicians in the 
process of providing information for domestic abuse and/or rape trials was poorly understood. 
What information was available suggested that clinicians occupied a mostly neutral role, although, 
with Temkin’s work, it was suggested that clinicians in certain specialties – namely those working 
as police surgeons or modern day FME’s – on occasion provided lawyers with information to 
which they would not otherwise have access.
8
 Among that population of clinicians, many were 
unconcerned with protecting the confidentiality of patients who had been abused. Crucially, it was 
the anticipation of legal proceedings that shaped these attitudes, with doctors using the sanctity of 
their ostensibly confidential relationship with patients to encourage disclosures that could then be 
used as evidence in court. In doing so, these practitioners ceased to consider confidentiality as 
solely a construction between themselves and their patient but instead, as a device in which to 
obtain information that would otherwise remain unspoken. This practice, Temkin argued, made 
doctors the unwitting ‘handmaidens’ of the defence.9 
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 R. v. Therens, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 613 at [57] 
8
 Jennifer Temkin, 'Medical Evidence in Rape Cases: A Continuing Problem for Criminal Justice', The Modern Law 
Review, 61 (1998), pp. 821-848 
9
 Ibid, p.848 
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A key empirical finding from this thesis is that Temkin’s conclusions do not apply to modern day 
clinicians, who instead offered a positive vision of the changing attitude towards domestic abuse.  
All clinical interviewees expressed concern for the abuse survivors they treated as patients. None of 
those interviewed exhibited any of the views espoused by some of Temkin’s participants on the 
relative trustworthiness of the survivor in question – where survivors’ attire was, for example 
commented on by doctors.
10
 Instead, clinicians either reported a neutral position where they 
concerned themselves solely with the physical and/or mental wellbeing of the survivor from a 
medical point of view, or in some cases, a position where they were concerned not only at the 
potential treatment of the complainer in court but also at the ultimate verdict of the jury. This was 
evident in discussions of genital injury. In Temkin’s research, legal counsel opined that doctors 
often failed to note that the absence of injury did not mean that rape did not occur.
11
 In this thesis 
however, all three sexual health doctors with forensic experience discussed this issue. Furthermore, 
unlike Temkin’s sample where several clinicians saw themselves wholly as court agents, a majority 
of clinicians in this thesis expressed a continuing duty of care to their patients in the trial stage, and 
almost all reported negative perceptions of appearing in court themselves. Some clinical 
participants even referred to feelings of potential guilt, where they were concerned that the 
evidence they gave as a witness, if delivered incorrectly, would prevent a conviction where one 
was warranted. This was again most evident among sexual health clinicians.   
In cases where clinicians had more control over records, or at least had greater experience of their 
use in court, there were examples of practitioners taking a more active role over both their 
production and release. GP2 was the only clinician who spoke about actively delaying the handover 
of records in order to check with patients that their consent was genuine and, on occasion, to offer 
advice over what may be beneficial to disclose. Among sexual health doctors, particularly those 
with FME experience, there was recognition over how records could be used and a willingness to 
amend their practice accordingly, i.e. SHD1’s position of not asking questions she deemed 
irrelevant to the case at hand for fear of this information being disclosed. 
One key aspect of these findings was clinicians’ willingness to provide quasi-legal support to abuse 
survivors. This manifested in a readiness among some practitioners not to report abuse if the 
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 Jennifer Temkin, 'Prosecuting and defending rape: Perspectives from the bar', Journal of Law and Society, 27 (2000), 
p. 224 
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survivor did not want to do so – unless other individuals were at risk. This extended further in some 
cases, with several clinicians – GP2 and SHD1 in particular – either modifying the questions they 
asked (so as not to have to record irrelevant information) or contacting survivors to ensure they 
knew their records had been sought and negotiating with them what information may be relevant in 
later court proceedings.  
Generally, however, responses to domestic abuse proceedings were varied, and GP2 was the only 
participant who routinely discussed legal requests with patients. Among other clinicians, responses 
were multifaceted, with some amending their recording behaviour in anticipation of records being 
sought, some warning patients that the information they provided might have to be disclosed and 
others who took no active role in providing records for legal services.  
What this thesis showed, is that despite a willingness among most clinicians to assist in domestic 
abuse proceedings in one way or another (i.e. through preparing better for court appearances, 
learning more about confidentiality practices or advice for survivors), they were often shut out of 
the process. Instead, medical record requests were authorised without any clinician oversight and 
despite the efforts of interviewees to amend their confidentiality practice, many felt that the 
criminal justice system remained an alien environment.   
7.4 Materiality and relevance  
Perhaps the key research finding from this thesis, is the ongoing questions over materiality and 
relevance in the context of medical records and domestic abuse. As I have noted throughout the 
work, other researchers have referred to the issues in determining relevance when deciding what 
medical information to use in cases of domestic abuse and/or rape. Raitt and Duff both argued after 
the introduction of the Criminal Justice and Licensing (Scotland) Act, that relevance was too 
broadly interpreted, risking the over disclosure and overuse of complainers’ records.12 This point 
was supported by Stark who asserted that a deliberately vague definition of materiality meant that 
confusion between truly relevant and ‘tactically useful’ was possible among legal practitioners.13 
In this research, the concept of relevance emerged repeatedly, across all three groups of 
interviewees. What became clear was that the definitions of relevance held by lawyers were vastly 
                                                             
12
 See Raitt,’ Disclosure of Records’, pp. 33-56; Duff, ‘Disclosure, PII’, pp. 181-184  
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 Findlay Stark, ‘Legislating the Duty of Disclosure’, The Edinburgh Law Review, 13 (2009), pp. 494-495 
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different to those espoused by survivors and the majority of clinicians who spoke about it. Many of 
the defence advocates argued that medical records were decreasingly sought and used. This was 
due in part they said, to the growth of legislation (under the rape shield for example), and judicial 
discretion which restricted the ability of the defence in particular to seek the medical 
documentation they could previously have used. Some noted it was also as a result of the little 
intrinsic value that records offered. This was evident in SC1’s comment that records were rarely 
decisive, or JC2’s assertion that records only affected the outcome of a case if other more concrete 
evidence was unavailable. Interviewees noted that physical injury evidence was often useful from a 
prosecution perspective – or defence perspective if such evidence was absent – but that in cases 
involving allegations of sexual abuse, medical records were used less and less frequently. This ran 
contrary to the arguments of scholars in the available literature.
14
 
Correspondence with the Lord Justice General and court service staff support the notion that 
medical records are rather infrequently sought using formal commission and diligence proceedings 
in domestic abuse cases (see appendix I). Analysis of WF and JC, suggests that this position may 
be changing. In WF, Lord Glennie disputed the argument by Rape Crisis Scotland that medical 
record recovery in these cases was ‘relatively commonplace’, also noting Lord Roger’s earlier 
comments that such requests were infrequent. In the case of JC two years later however, the court 
acknowledged that such requests were made with ‘a degree of regularity’.15 
As most lawyer interviewees argued, medical records can come through disclosure by the Crown, 
but it was generally accepted that this practice had reduced in recent years. As such they were 
implicitly rejecting Raitt’s argument that the Crown and defence collaborated on disclosure closely, 
with ‘shared understandings’ of what information was relevant.16 The role of the Crown in 
obtaining records however, is supported by the information available through the medical records 
study, and the testimony of both survivor interviewees.  
On the question of relevance, legal interviewees were keen to stress that it was difficult to give 
broad definitions, as the specifics of what was relevant changed depending on the individual case. 
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 JC Petitioner [2018] (unreported) at [15] 
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 Raitt, ‘Disclosure of Records’, p. 44 
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This point is supported elsewhere and an acknowledged reason for why it has been so difficult to 
impose well-defined disclosure guidelines through statute and case law.
17
 But on the question of 
materiality, legal participants undoubtedly had the broadest definition of what information was of 
legal relevance, a finding that aligns with the conclusions of Cory et al.
18
 In this thesis, lawyers 
argued that fishing expeditions were vanishingly rare and that the court and other legal agents 
protected complainers’ interests. In some cases, (as with SC4, and JC4) these protections were 
sufficient to outweigh any requirement for ILR for complainers, though most advocates supported 
the inclusion of independent representation within the existing legal framework. It was 
acknowledged on occasion that poor disclosure choices were made, though these were mostly 
ascribed to the increased workload and reduced resources imposed upon the Crown in particular - 
as was the case in the example given by SC1 of the complainer’s mistakenly revealed termination. 
As such, many advocates noted that a better funded system could account for these errors.  
Yet for the survivors participating in this research, much of the information used from their 
medical records extended decades back into their lives and was used to impugn their credibility. 
For them, this information had no relevance to the alleged offences and instead simply highlighted 
the discrepancy between the treatment of the complainer and the accused. S2 in particular returned 
to the question of relevance repeatedly, suggesting that legal professionals should be trained on 
better identifying what relevant information was, perhaps in concert with the complainer and 
healthcare professionals. These calls were then reinforced in the comments of several clinicians, in 
particular SHD1 and FPsych1 who highlighted occasions in which they had been concerned at the 
volume of medical information provided to legal professionals.  
While this thesis did not provide any clear-cut definitions of materiality and relevance, it does 
highlight the pressing need for better communication between the parties involved in domestic 
abuse proceedings. The Crown states that no promises regarding what may be disclosed should be 
made to the complainer, as it is impossible to know what these might be.
19
 And yet, surely there is 
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space for the Crown in particular, to highlight to complainers that information they would 
otherwise consider irrelevant, may indeed be recovered and may be used in court. This should be 
communicated alongside a clearer statement of what the Crown’s role is in relation to the 
complainer because, as shown by both survivors in this research and by scholars elsewhere, this is 
not always immediately apparent.
20
 S1 and S2’s experiences, where the Crown did not object to 
particular lines of questioning, were mirrored in JC, where the Crown declined to dispute a defence 
request for the entire contents of a complainer’s medical record.21 When combined with a low 
uptake of legal aid for ILR, these findings suggest that complainers’ interests in cases involving 
medical record recovery are not always respected and as such, confusion of and disappointment in 
materiality and relevance decisions will continue.  
 
7.5 Limitations  
The limitations of this thesis were almost entirely defined by its already broad scope. As noted in 
the first three chapters, existing research in this area was scant, and accordingly, I devised a wide-
ranging enquiry comprising an extensive quantitative and qualitative methodology. In doing so I 
hoped to include as many voices involved in the creation and use of medical records in domestic 
abuse cases as possible, but inevitably, certain groups were excluded from this process, groups that 
had the potential to further enrich the findings. These risks were most clearly felt in the absence of 
testimony from solicitors and police officers. Both are heavily involved in the process of obtaining 
medical records.  
This study is limited by the absence of police input and cannot adequately address this issue. As S2 
noted, it was the police who asked her to consent to record recovery. Crown input into this project 
confirmed that the police have a defined role in reviewing records for relevance, thus, on occasion 
determining how much information is passed to the Crown and therefore potentially the defence. 
Unfortunately, neither the Crown, nor any participating defence interviewees, were able to 
adequately describe how police officers made determinations over relevance, a pressing concern 
given that they do not liaise with survivors on relevance decisions, do not have medical training 
and do not present medical records in court as evidence.  
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S2’s experience demonstrates the potential for harm when police officers are discharged to obtain a 
complainer’s consent for record recovery. As the Canadian Supreme Court demonstrated, it is a 
rare individual who refuses co-operation in such circumstances, particularly when the police and 
the Crown are widely perceived to represent the complainer’s interests.22 Further, detailed analysis 
is therefore warranted, including through the use of one-on-one interviews with police officers to 
elucidate how they determine the relevance of records in these cases.  
The absence of solicitor interviewees is also problematic, particularly in attempting to fully 
understand attitudes towards medical confidentiality from a defence perspective. Solicitors are 
involved in drafting requests for medical records, from the Crown, the court and health boards. As 
such, their input would have clarified how these requests are made, and more firmly defined the 
role of advocates in this process.  
It would have been informative to include more voices from the judiciary in this research given the 
independent role in court and novel relationship with the complainer, legal counsel and medical 
witnesses. Two senior High Court judges were consulted on the matter of confidentiality and 
disclosure, but both were speaking informally, and the interviews were not recorded. In-depth 
interviews with judges and Sheriffs (who often preside over applications for commission and 
diligence) would have given another perspective on questions of disclosure, consent and relevance 
that are otherwise absent. 
An acknowledged concern, expressed throughout the thesis, relates to the absence of in-depth 
interviews with prosecutors. Despite numerous attempts to engage with the Crown on this point, 
eventually only written responses were provided. While these clearly add some valuable insights 
into Crown perceptions of confidentiality, they lack the character of nuance and sincerity that 
interviews provide. In many ways, the Crown responses simply aped their 2013 advice on 
disclosure in cases of sexual crime. As already noted, interviews with defence advocates – who all 
had Crown experience – helped to mitigate the absence of direct Crown input.  
One question, omitted from this research but worthy of exploration concerns the position of health 
services when it comes to requests for medical records from either the Crown, the defence, or the 
court. In this thesis I suggested that health authorities rarely take a position in cases where patients’ 
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records are sought. This argument is supported elsewhere, notably by Lord Glennie in WF.
23
 Yet 
case law in other countries provides examples where health authorities have challenged legal 
applications for records. In one notable 1995 case in Canada for example, a hospital – represented 
by independent counsel - challenge the Crown’s access to patient records and won.24 This position 
was also supported in R (B) v Crown Court at Stafford, (a case cited repeatedly by Lord Glennie in 
WF), where the NHS trust holding the claimant’s records, supported her efforts to prevent their 
disclosure.
25
 JC3 suggested, in describing her work as a commissioner, that different health boards 
approached the question of record recovery differently, some allowing access strictly on hospital 
property, while others were content to dispatch the entirety of a patient’s records to her directly – 
on occasions sending multiple boxes of documentation. This suggests an idiosyncratic approach to 
disclosure that bolsters the Chief Medical Officer’s comments in 2016.26 
Given this position, it would therefore potentially have been informative to expand my line of 
questioning to health services. Firstly, I would endeavour to learn the position of health authorities 
more generally by inviting senior managers to interview, perhaps also involving the office of the 
Chief Medical Officer. In these interviews I would seek to discern why health boards take a neutral 
position in record applications, whether decisions are solely motivated by resources and whether 
they could envision situations in which requests may be fought. I would then try to elicit further 
reflection on how health authorities viewed their duty towards patient records, particularly when 
confidentiality rights conflicted with the criminal law. I would also expand my line of questioning 
with practicing clinicians, asking them how they perceived the attitude of health authorities in these 
cases and how they felt themselves when patients’ records were sought, particularly in situations in 
which they believed that the level of information sought was extensive.  
It was common among clinician participants to have negative attitudes towards the process of 
attending court and, occasionally to the investigation process, (particularly when they had direct 
contact with the police). Sexual health clinicians were, the most likely practitioners to report 
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dissatisfaction with police practice in this area. Strikingly, these were also the most likely 
individuals to express their personal feelings over particular trials and verdicts, often with negative 
perceptions of the process. It would accordingly be informative to undertake a wider exploration of 
clinicians’ experiences in court – particularly in criminal proceedings – with a focus on how they 
view the duty of confidentiality in this context, as well as their duty to the patient/complainer.  
 
7.6 Contributions  
This research provides a leap forward in understandings of domestic abuse and medical 
confidentiality. New insights have been provided into survivors’ perceptions of medical and legal 
professionals in the aftermath of their courtroom experiences. The role of clinicians in creating 
medical records in the context of domestic abuse has been explored, as has their attitudes towards 
involvement in legal proceedings, in giving evidence and accounting for patient confidentiality. 
Legal professionals’ perceptions of medical confidentiality were outlined, and the role these had in 
their everyday practice analysed.  
Through the medical records study, pioneering quantitative data has been gathered, giving the first 
glimpse of how medical records are sought from health boards in Scotland and importantly, 
providing the first insight into how frequently these requests are made. Further essential 
quantitative data was then obtained through the survivor questionnaire, which highlighted survivors’ 
voices in a way that may not have been possible for those who had not previously been engaged in 
research. The questionnaires offered ground-breaking data on the health services used by survivors, 
as well as insights into the frequency with which survivors have to avoid services altogether or 
provide alternative explanations for their injuries. By utilising a case study, the questionnaire also 
provided illuminating evidence of the confidentiality factors which affect the chances of survivors 
reporting abuse to healthcare professionals.  
Crucially, throughout this thesis, the voices of survivors have been included alongside those of 
clinicians from multiple specialties and senior defence counsel, enabling a comprehensive 
consideration of the issues first raised in chapters 1 and 2 and providing a better understanding of 
how perceptions of medical confidentiality affect the actions of each group.   
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Appendix A: Responses from Crown Office and Procurator Fiscal Service 
1. Explain the function of medical records in criminal cases? 
 
Sensitive personal records should be obtained by the Crown only where their recovery is necessary 
for the proper investigation and prosecution of crime. 
 
There are two general reasons why recovery of medical records is considered necessary: 
 
1) There is reason to believe that the medical records contain information which supports the 
prosecution case. 
 
2) There is reason to believe that the medical records may contain information which 
undermines the prosecution case or which strengthens the defence case. 
 
2. Explain the frequency with which they are used? 
COPFS does not hold data that would enable an evidence based response to be provided. 
3. Are medical records commonly sought in cases involving domestic abuse, sexual 
assault and rape? Does this create any issues? 
 
Consideration of whether or not to seize medical records is undertaken on a case by case basis 
subject to the particular evidential issues which arise in an individual case.  
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4. How are medical records used in these cases? 
 
Medical records are assessed by the prosecutor to determine if they contain information which; 
supports the Crown case; undermines the Crown case or strengthens the accused case. If the 
medical records contain such information, this requires to be disclosed to the defence. 
 
When the case calls for trial, if the prosecutor has deemed that there is information contained in the 
records which supports the Crown case, it is likely that this evidence will be introduced during the 
trial either by way of a joint minute of agreement or by leading parole evidence from a witness able 
to speak to the content of the records, usually a clinician. 
 
If the medical records contain information which undermines the Crown case or strengthens the 
accused case and the case proceeds to trial the information will be disclosed to the defence.  
 
It is likely that, before proceeding to trial, the prosecutor will seek to obtain further information 
from the relevant witness, often via precognition, about important inconsistencies between their 
account and the information contained in the records. This further information will be taken into 
account when deciding whether or not it is in the public interest to continue proceedings. 
 
5. Are medical records consulted before a case is marked for prosecution or reaches a 
preliminary hearing? 
Medical records are commonly recovered by the prosecutor after a case has been marked and 
before the indictment is served and thus before a preliminary hearing takes place. 
Defence requests to recover medical records are likely to take place later in the court process, often 
after the indictment has been served. 
 
6. What restrictions (if any) are placed on the use of these records in cases involving 
domestic abuse, sexual assault and rape? 
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The police have a duty to assess the relevance of all information obtained or generated during the 
course of an investigation. Only relevant evidence should be submitted to the prosecutor by the 
police. 
 
Relevant information is any information which appears to an investigator to have some bearing on 
the offence under investigation, or on any person being investigated, or on surrounding 
circumstances, unless it is incapable of having an impact on the case.  
Before disclosing any information to the defence the prosecutor must assess the materiality of the 
information in line with this tripartite test. Immaterial information should not be disclosed and thus 
should not be led in evidence. 
 Material information is information:  
 a) which would materially weaken or undermine the evidence that is likely to be led by the 
prosecutor in the proceedings against the accused; or 
 b) which would materially strengthen the accused’s case; or 
 c) which is likely to form part of the evidence to be led by the prosecutor in the 
proceedings against the accused. 
There is a general rule at common law, explained by Lord Justice Clerk Ross in Brady v HMA 
(Unreported), that it is not admissible to lead evidence on collateral matters in a criminal trial. 
Various justifications have been put forward for this rule. The existence of a collateral fact does not 
render more probable the existence of the fact in issue; at best a collateral matter can only have an 
indirect bearing on the matter in issue; a jury may become confused by having to consider 
collateral matters and may have their attention diverted from the true matter in issue.  
In addition to the common law prohibition on leading evidence of collateral matters, in the trial of a 
person charged with an offence to which s288C of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995 
applies (i.e. a sexual offence) section 274 of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995 prohibits 
questioning designed to elicit evidence which tends to show that the complainer:  
 is not of good character;  
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 has engaged in sexual behaviour not forming part of the subject matter of the charge;  
 has at any time (other than shortly before, at the same time as or shortly after the acts which 
form part of the subject matter of the charge) engaged in such behaviour, not being sexual 
behaviour, as might found the inference that the complainer (i) is likely to have consented to those 
acts; or (ii)  is not a credible or reliable witness; or 
 has, at any time, been subject to any such condition or predisposition as might found  the 
inference that the complainer (i)  is likely to have consented to those acts; or (ii)  is not a credible 
or reliable witness. 
Section 275 of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995 sets out the circumstances in which 
questioning prohibited in terms of section 274 may be permitted. The court will allow such 
questioning if it is satisfied that: 
 the evidence or questioning will relate only to a specific occurrence or occurrences of 
sexual or other behaviour or to specific facts demonstrating (i)  the complainer's character; or (ii)  
any condition or predisposition to which the complainer is or has been subject; 
 that occurrence or those occurrences of behaviour or facts are relevant to establishing 
whether the accused is guilty of the offence with which he is charged; and 
 the probative value of the evidence sought to be admitted or elicited is significant and is 
likely to outweigh any risk of prejudice to the proper administration of justice arising from its 
being admitted or elicited. 
It is worth noting that the courts have held that section 275 cannot render admissible, evidence that 
is inadmissible in terms of the common law. (S v HMA 2007 SLT 1026 at paragraph 73). 
 
7. Explain your approach to identifying and obtaining medical records in cases of 
domestic abuse. 
Consideration is given, as early as possible in the life of the case, to whether medical records are 
likely to contain material information as defined in section 121(3) of the Criminal Justice and 
Licensing (Scotland) Act 2010. 
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Medical records may be recovered in cases in which the complainer indicates that they: obtained 
medical treatment as a consequence of the alleged offence or disclosed abuse by the accused to a 
clinician. Therefore, cases involving physical or sexual violence are those which are most likely to 
involve the recovery of medical records. If there is reason to believe that the complainer has a 
psychiatric condition that could impact upon his/her credibility or reliability medical records 
relating to that condition may be recovered. 
 
8. How do you communicate with victims in the process of reviewing and obtaining their 
records? How do you ensure they are informed before a decision is made about their use? 
In terms of the draft COPFS policy on obtaining sensitive personal records prior to records being 
obtained COPFS will make contact with a witness to advise of the intention to recover sensitive 
personal records. The witness will be advised of the reason why records are required and the 
information that it is believed that the records contain. The witness will be asked to consent to 
seizure of their records. 
Once the records are obtained and have been assessed for materiality COPFS will advise the 
witness of the information which requires to be disclosed to the defence i.e. the material 
information. 
In some cases contact will be made with the witness in writing or over the telephone and in some 
cases face to face meetings will be necessary. This decision will be taken on a case by case basis by 
the appropriate legal manager. 
9. How do you communicate with NHS staff including the complainer’s treating 
clinicians when seeking to review/obtain medical records? 
 Communication with NHS staff is normally conducted in writing.  
10. How do you review medical records? Is this done on NHS property or elsewhere?  
Medical records should be physically recovered by the police either at their own instance or at the 
direction of the prosecutor. 
 
285 
 
After the police have assessed the records for relevancy they will submit the relevant parts of the 
records to the prosecutor. 
 
Thereafter, the prosecutor will review the records for materiality within a COPFS building.  
 
11. Explain the process of reviewing medical records for disclosure?  
 The police have a duty to assess the relevance of all information obtained or generated 
during the course of an investigation. Only relevant evidence should be submitted to the prosecutor 
by the police. 
 Relevant information is any information which appears to an investigator to have some 
bearing on the offence under investigation, or on any person being investigated, or on surrounding 
circumstances, unless it is incapable of having an impact on the case.
27
  
Before disclosing any information to the defence the prosecutor must assess the materiality of the 
information in line with the following tripartite test. Immaterial information should not be 
disclosed to the defence and should be redacted prior to disclosure. 
 Material information is information:  
 a) which would materially weaken or undermine the evidence that is likely to be led by the 
prosecutor in the proceedings against the accused; or 
 b) which would materially strengthen the accused’s case; or 
 c) which is likely to form part of the evidence to be led by the prosecutor in the 
proceedings against the accused.
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12. When in receipt of the complainers’ medical records, how do you decide what is 
material to be disclosed to the defence?  
                                                             
27 Section 118 of the Criminal Justice and Licensing (Scotland) Act 2010 
28 Section 121(3) of the Criminal Justice and Licensing (Scotland) Act 2010 
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By applying the test set out in section 121(3) of the Criminal Justice and Licensing (Scotland) Act 
2010 namely:  
Material information is information:  
 a) which would materially weaken or undermine the evidence that is likely to be led by the 
prosecutor in the proceedings against the accused; or 
 b) which would materially strengthen the accused’s case; or 
 c) which is likely to form part of the evidence to be led by the prosecutor in the 
proceedings against the accused. 
 
13. What is the role of the defence in obtaining and using medical records? 
 
The defence receive medical records or exerts of medical records from the prosecutor if the 
prosecutor has recovered medical records and judged that they contain material information.  
 
The defence may approach the prosecutor to seek disclosure of information that they believe may 
be contained in medical records.  
 
If the prosecutor holds the medical records he/she will assess if they contain the information which 
has been requested and, if so, whether that information meets the materiality test in light of the 
explanation provided by the defence as to why they believe the information to be material.  
 
If the prosecutor holds the medical records but refuses to disclose the information on the basis that 
it has been judged to be immaterial the defence can apply for a ruling on materiality in terms of 
section 128 of the Criminal Justice and Licensing (Scotland) Act 2010. If the court rules that the 
information is material the prosecutor may a) disclose the information, b)  
 
If the prosecutor does not hold the medical records he/she will consider if the records should be 
recovered in light of the defence explanation as to the materiality of the information that they 
believe is contained therein. 
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Should the prosecutor decide that the medical records should not be recovered the defence can 
apply for authority to recover medical records by commission and diligence or in terms of section 
301A of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995.  
 
14. Does the defence’s approach in seeking medical records cause a burden on the 
Crown? 
All defence requests for records need to be given detailed consideration to assess relevance and 
appropriateness of disclosure of information balanced against the complainer’s Art 8 right and that 
this can be time consuming exercise both in terms of legal and administrative resource. We do not 
hold any evidence to indicate that the defence’s approach in seeking records causes a burden.  
 
15. Explain the process of obtaining medical records by a motion for commission and 
diligence in cases of domestic abuse, sexual assault and rape? 
Such applications are most commonly lodged by the defence.  
 
On receipt of such a defence application the prosecutor will first consider the terms of the 
application, which will specify the reasons why the defence consider the information to have a 
legitimate bearing on the case to determine whether the information being sought may materially 
weaken the prosecution case or materially strengthen the defence case. If the prosecutor is satisfied 
that the information does meet the materiality test, then it should be disclosed to the defence 
without proceeding to a court hearing. 
 
Where it is determined by the prosecutor that the information being sought is not material and 
therefore not disclosable, the petition should proceed to adjudication by the Court. 
 
In order to be successful such an application must: explain the basis upon which the court is asked 
to order the haver to produce the documents; satisfy the court that the order will serve a proper 
purpose; satisfy the court granting the order is in the interests of justice; satisfy the court the 
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granting of the order for production of the particular documents would be likely to be of material 
assistance to the proper preparation or presentation of the accused’s defence; and demonstrate how 
the documents relate to the charges and the proposed defence to them. 
 
16. Explain the process of obtaining a petition warrant to allow you access to medical 
records? Does this occur often? 
The petition warrant includes “Warrant to cite witnesses for precognition and to make production 
for the purposes foresaid of such writs, evidents and articles pertinent to the case as are in their 
possession”. 
 
The authority of the petition warrant confers authority on the Crown to recover medical records for 
the purpose of precognition and evidence where that is deemed necessary. Obtaining medical 
records in this way would require the Crown to cite for precognition a person from the organisation 
holding the medical records. This method of recovering medical records is discouraged and hence 
rarely, if ever, occurs. 
17. Can you explain the effect (if any) of Lord Glennie’s ruling in WF (petitioner) v 
Scottish Ministers on the process of obtaining medical records in these cases; both for COPFS, 
the court and defence advocates? 
The tenet of the judgement is expressed in paragraph 45: 
“Though there is no provision in statute that requires intimation of the petition on the complainer, 
or any other party to whom the records relate, such a person has the right to have the petition for 
recovery intimated to her and has the right to appear or be represented in opposition to recovery of 
her records either before an order is made or at least before the documents are handed over to the 
party seeking them.” 
COPFS and SCTS have agreed that in High Court cases, where the defence lodge a petition for the 
recovery of medical records, SCTS will intimate the petition timeously on the complainer. 
COPFS will work with SCTS with a view to establishing a similar method of intimation in the 
Sheriff Court if possible. At present, on receipt of a defence application, the prosecutor should 
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write to the complainer informing him/her of his right to be legally represented during any hearing 
in which recovery of his medical records is being considered. 
 
18. For how long are medical records retained after a trial concludes and are they 
returned to the NHS Trust concerned? 
COPFS retains the medical records until the appeal period has passed and case is closed before 
either returning the records to the keeper (if originals) or destroying via confidential waste (if 
copies). This occurs approximately 3 months after the trial has concluded.  
 
19. To your mind, what are the current issues (if any) in the use of medical records in 
domestic abuse cases? How could the system be improved? 
Obtaining medical records which are held out with Scotland is often challenging and can lead to 
delay. 
On occasion, COPFS encounters resistance from medical professionals when seeking to obtain 
medical records even if the complainer has consented to his/her medical records being obtained. 
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Appendix B: Questionnaire for Abuse Survivors 
 
 
 
Project title: Medical confidentiality and domestic abuse 
 
Questionnaire for intimate Partner violence 
 
This questionnaire is designed to be completed anonymously. Please do not record your name or any other 
identifiable information anywhere on it. Return of a completed questionnaire will indicate that you consent 
for your responses to be included in the project. Once submitted, you will not be able to withdraw consent 
for participation due to the anonymous nature of the research.  
 
PART A:  
1. Domestic abuse is persistent and controlling behaviour by a partner or ex-partner which causes physical, sexual 
and/or emotional harm. It often gets worse over time. It is very common. Abuse can take many forms including 
abusers trying to control where a woman goes, what she wears, who she has contact with and her relationship with 
her children. Have you experienced domestic abuse in the past, at present or both 
  Past                                        Present                                       Both 
 
2. Which kinds of harm would you say that you have experienced? Tick all that apply 
        Physical                                  Sexual                                        Mental/emotional            
 
3. How many times have you had to get medical assistance because of abuse? Medical assistance refers to any 
situation in which you have needed aid from a doctor, nurse or dentist in any healthcare setting. 
 
 Never                                         1 time                                   2-5 times                             6+ 
 
 
Confidentiality 
 
4. It can be very difficult to discuss abuse with others, even loved ones. What, do you think is the biggest barrier 
to disclosing abuse? Disclosing means telling the healthcare worker about the abuse you have suffered and 
asking for help 
 
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
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5. If you told a doctor, nurse or dentist you had experienced abuse, which of the groups below would you not 
want them to inform? (please tick as many as apply) 
  Other medical/nursing staff                   The police                           Prosecution lawyers                                                   
 Defence lawyer                                      Social worker                      Support worker 
 
6. If your doctor, nurse or dentist says they will keep something confidential, what does this mean to you? 
 
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
7. Would you be more or less likely to disclose abuse to a healthcare worker if you thought this information 
may be shared with other healthcare workers?  
         More likely                                                           Less likely                                      No effect 
 
8. In what way would your children affect your decision to disclose abuse to a healthcare worker?  
 
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
9. Who would you be most likely to disclose abuse to (please rate from 1-7 with 1 being most likely to disclose 
abuse to and 7 being least likely? You can use the same number if it is equally likely you would disclose to 
people in two different positions).  
 A doctor                             A nurse                          Support worker in a community organisation                        
 Police Officer                    Prosecution lawyer       Family member/friend 
 Dentist 
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Case study:  
What effect would these events have on you disclosing abuse to a healthcare worker? (please tick) 
 Would 
prevent me 
disclosing 
Might affect me 
disclosing 
Unlikely to 
affect disclosure 
No effect on 
disclosure 
Your partner or ex-partner 
attended hospital with you 
    
Your child/children attended 
hospital with you 
    
You were treated in a ward 
separated by curtains only 
    
Police officers were on the ward     
You could be overheard by others     
If disclosing abuse could result in 
your partner or ex-partner being 
arrested 
    
Information would be shared with 
family/friends 
    
Your children could be put on a 
Child Protection Register 
    
Your injuries would result in you 
being hospitalised 
    
What happened would be added 
to your medical record 
    
 
 
Health effects 
 
10. How often have you avoided medical help completely, despite suffering harm caused by abuse? 
    Never                                1 time                        2-5 times                       6+ times 
 
11. Have you ever pretended that injuries caused by abuse were caused by something else when talking to a 
healthcare worker? 
  Yes                                          No 
 
12. Has deciding not to tell healthcare workers about abuse injuries later caused you any of the following health 
problems? (please tick as many as may apply) 
   None                                Mental/emotional                                  Physical                            Sexual 
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13. Have you ever suffered any form of abuse during pregnancy?  
  Yes                                          No 
 
 
 
 
 
 
14. Are you aware of any health affects you are suffering because of abuse?  
  Yes                                          No                                      Not sure 
If yes, could you write these below? 
 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Court Experience 
 
 
15. Has your partner or ex-partner ever been tried in a criminal court for abusing you?  
 Never                                     Once                                       More than once 
 
16. Have your medical records ever been used in a court case involving domestic abuse in any way? 
  Never                                       Once                                      More than once         
   
If you answered yes to question 16, how were your records used? 
 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
17. Were you aware that both prosecution and defence lawyers can seek to access your medical records in a 
court case involving domestic abuse, sexual assault or rape? 
 
  Yes                                          No 
 
18. Would knowing your medical records can be used in court prevent you from telling a healthcare worker 
about abuse in the future? 
 
  Yes                                          No 
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19. How often have you visited/used the services below as a result of domestic abuse (please tick as 
appropriate) A glossary detailing each service is available on page 9 
 1 time 2-5 times 6+ times 
Accident and Emergency    
Ambulance Services    
Dentistry    
Ear Nose and Throat (ENT) Services    
Family Nurse     
GP     
Health visitor    
Intensive care (or any other high dependency 
unit) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Maternity Services    
Oral/Maxillofacial surgery    
Mental Health services    
Neonatology    
Neurology    
Neurosurgery    
Radiology services     
Sexual Health    
Stroke Services    
Surgery (any)    
Trauma/Orthopaedics    
Any other services (please describe)    
No service attended  
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You have now completed PART A. On the next page you will find 
PART B. Please be aware that the questions in PART B are 
particularly sensitive and deal explicitly with strangulation attacks. If 
you do not want to complete PART B or are unable to complete all of 
it, please submit your questionnaire and your responses to PART A 
will be used.  
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PART B:  
 
1. Which age group are you in? 
 18-24              25-40                  41-65                 65+  
 
2. How often has your partner or ex-partner tried to strangle or choke you? 
 Never                      1 time                                2-5 times                                    6+ times  
 
3. Did he/she do it manually (with hands, an elbow or leg grip), an object (i.e. a belt or wire) or by smothering 
you (with a pillow, pinching nose and mouth together)? Tick all that apply 
 Manually                                              With object                                                 Smothering 
 
4. When you were strangled or choked did it leave visible signs on your neck, even if it gave you other 
symptoms? 
  Always left signs                            Sometimes left signs                Never left signs 
 
5. Have you ever suffered a stroke following strangulation or choking? 
  Never                                                  Once                                          More than once 
 
6. After being strangled or choked, have you ever avoided telling a healthcare worker?  
  Yes                                          No 
If yes, please explain why 
 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
7. Have you ever been strangled or choked while pregnant?  
 Yes                                   No  
If you answered yes, what effect did this have on your pregnancy and did you tell a health worker?  
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
8. Have you suffered any long-term emotional or physical health problems as a result of strangulation or 
choking?  
 Yes                                   No 
If you have, could you describe these? 
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----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
9. How often have you suffered the following in the two weeks after being strangled or choked (please tick)? 
 1 time 2-5 times 6+ times Never  
Skin     
Bruising     
Cuts/scratches     
Small red spots on your face, eyelids, scalp, below ears      
Difficulty in speaking/voice changes     
General      
Tongue Swelling     
Blood red colour in eyes     
Difficulty breathing     
Vomiting     
Heartburn     
Coughing up blood     
Bleeding from ear(s)     
Neurological      
Headache     
Seeing stars     
Loss of consciousness (pass out/black out)     
Losing control of your bladder (wetting yourself)      
Losing control of your bowels       
Droop in your face or eyelids     
Weakness in left or right of your body     
Loss of sensation to any part of your body     
Paralysis to any part of your body     
Fits/seizures     
Pregnancy      
Miscarriage     
Stillbirth      
Other      
Hearing issues     
Dizziness     
Changes in vision     
Hospitalisation     
Any other symptoms (please describe)      
None of the above   
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10. How often have you suffered the psychological symptoms below in the two weeks after being strangled or 
choked (please tick)? 
 1 time 2-5 times 6+ times Never 
Anxiety     
Confusion     
Depression     
Difficulty concentrating     
Difficulty sleeping     
Fear of death     
Hallucinations (hearing voices, seeing 
something that doesn’t exist, smelling 
odours that don’t exist, tasting things 
that are not present, feelings of being 
touched though no-one is there) 
    
Nightmares     
Problems remembering the 
strangulation attack 
    
Problems with memory generally     
Restlessness     
Ringing in ears     
Suicidal thoughts     
 
 
 
 
 
  
299 
 
Glossary for questionnaire  
Accident and Emergency (casualty) – A hospital department that deals with the immediate problems of people 
who are injured or otherwise unwell. Led by A&E doctors and nurses. 
Ambulance Services –Provide care at the scene of the emergency, drive ambulances and other vehicles, and care 
for the patients travelling in them. Led by paramedics and emergency medical technicians. 
Dentistry – The study, management, and treatment of diseases and conditions affecting the mouth, jaws, teeth, 
and their supporting tissues. Led by dentists, dental nurses and orthodontists  
Ear Nose and Throat (ENT) – Specialty involving the treatment of injuries or diseases of the ear, nose and 
throat.  
Family Nurse - A specially trained nurse who visits young mothers regularly, from the early stages of pregnancy 
until their child is two.  
GP – A doctor based in a community who treats minor or chronic illness and can refer patients to other health 
services.  
Health visitor - A trained nurse who visits people in their homes to assist or advise the chronically ill or parents 
with very young children.  
Intensive care (or any other high dependency unit) - Intensive care units (ICUs) are specialist hospital wards 
that provide treatment and monitoring for people who are very ill. Care is led by intensive care doctors and nurses.  
Maternity Services – All services directed towards caring for pregnant women and newborn babies. Provided by 
a range of healthcare professionals including: midwives, obstetricians and gynaecologists. 
Oral/Maxillofacial – Surgical specialties involving the treatment of injuries or diseases affecting the face, neck, 
mouth and jaws.  
Mental Health services – All services directed towards providing mental healthcare. Provided by a range of 
healthcare professionals including psychiatrists, psychiatric nurses, psychologists, social workers and 
occupational therapists,  
Neonatology – Medical speciality involved in caring for and treating newborn babies who need extra care after 
birth. Led by neonatologists and nurses.  
Neurology – A medical speciality focused on assessing diseases and injuries to the brain and nervous system.  
Care is primarily provided by neurologists and neurological nurse specialists.   
Neurosurgery – A surgical specialty focussed on treating injuries or diseases affecting the brain and central 
nervous system. Care mostly provided by neurosurgeons and nurses.  
Radiology services – Services using imaging methods to diagnose injury and disease, including x-rays, computer 
tomography (CT) scans, magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) scans and ultrasound scans. Led by radiologists and 
radiographers.  
Sexual Health – Any NHS organisation offering advice and treatment for sexual health, sexual assault and rape, 
sexually transmitted diseases (STIs), pregnancy and contraception. Led by sexual health doctors and nurses both 
in hospital and the community.  
Stroke Services – Hospital based services directed towards the treatment of stroke. Led by stroke physicians and 
nurses.  
Trauma and Orthopaedics – Surgical specialties that treat injuries to the bones, joints ligaments, tendons, 
muscles and nerves. 
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Appendix C: Participant Information Sheet for Survivor Questionnaire 
 
 
 
Project title: Medical confidentiality and domestic abuse 
Participant Information Sheet for questionnaires 
You are invited to take part in a research study and complete an anonymous questionnaire. 
This means that your identity cannot be connected to your involvement in the study. To 
ensure that your identity remains unknown, you will not be required to include any 
identifiable information at any point and after the questionnaire is completed, it will be 
impossible to connect you with it.  
Before you decide whether or not to take part, it is important you understand why the 
research is being done and what it will involve. Please take time to read the following 
information carefully. Ask a member of staff if anything is unclear or if you would like more 
information.  
What is the purpose of the study? 
The study aims to discover more about your experiences with medical and legal services 
following abuse.  
Why have I been chosen? 
You have been chosen as you are over 18 years old and have personal knowledge about the 
effects that abuse can have on health.  
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Do I have to take part? 
No. It is important that you know that involvement is entirely voluntary. Whether you 
decide to take part or not, the care and support you receive from Scottish Women’s Aid will 
not be affected. 
What will happen to me if I take part? 
If you wish to become involved, please tell a member of staff.  
You can ask any questions before taking part. Should you wish to participate, you will then 
be given a copy of the questionnaire to complete. Please do not write your name anywhere 
on this questionnaire.  
Once you have completed your questionnaire, please return it to a member of staff in the 
sealed envelope provided. 
What do I have to do? 
SECTION A will assess your experiences following abuse, asking you to describe why you did 
or did not report abuse, whether you suffered injuries, how you chose whether or not to 
seek medical assistance and whether you had to attend court.  This includes 19 questions.  
SECTION B is more specific, asking whether you have been strangled or choked by an 
abuser. Despite evidence from several UK based charities that strangulation is a frequent 
occurrence in abusive relationships, there has been very little effort to ask survivors about 
it.  This includes 10 questions.  
Some of the questions in SECTION B will require you to recount potentially upsetting and 
distressing details about a strangulation attack. If you do not want to complete SECTION B 
then please leave it blank.  
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What are the possible benefits of taking part? 
You will receive no direct benefit from taking part in this anonymous study but the 
information collected from your participation will be used to try and make changes to assist 
others in similar situations, improving the ways that health and legal services treat survivors.  
What are the possible disadvantages and risks of taking part? 
This topic is highly sensitive and potentially upsetting. It will require you to think about past 
or on-going abuse, perhaps that you have not discussed in detail with others.  
Charity staff will be available throughout to provide support if necessary. At the end of this 
form, you will find a list of supportive organisations you could contact over the phone, 
should you wish to.   
Will my taking part in this study be kept confidential? 
Yes. In the interest of safety, this questionnaire is anonymous and you will not have to sign a 
consent form. Instead, handing in a completed questionnaire will indicate that you consent 
for your answers to be used anonymously. Once you hand it in, it will be impossible to 
remove your questionnaire from the study. 
When the project is completed, I will send questionnaires to a secure data storage facility 
for ten years before destruction. Genuine researchers will be able to request access to these 
anonymous questionnaires for use in other appropriately approved research studies. 
Researchers cannot trace your questionnaire back to you so you will not be contacted again 
regarding your participation  
Nothing you write in the questionnaire will be shared with the police. However, I will make 
charity staff aware if anonymous responses suggest that the wider group of those completing 
questionnaires are at risk of harm. In these cases, it will not be possible to identify you 
personally.  
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What will happen to the results of the research study? 
The completed questionnaires will be used to generate statistical data for a PhD thesis, due 
for completion in January 2019. Your anonymous responses may be used in other 
publications, for example in conference papers, journal articles and other collaborations. 
Results summaries will be provided to Scottish Women’s Aid centres for you to view. 
Who is organising and funding the research? 
I am a Leverhulme Trust funded Doctoral Scholar based at Glasgow University, co-
supervised by Professor Matthew Walters and Dr Angus Ferguson. My research focuses on 
the importance of medical confidentiality in cases of domestic violence, sexual assault and 
rape, looking at the experiences of survivors with medical and legal services. 
All research on this project is funded by the Leverhulme Trust and has been organised in 
collaboration with senior staff at the University of Glasgow.  
Who has reviewed the study? 
The project has been reviewed by an NHS Research Ethics Committee.  If you wish to 
discuss the ethical considerations of the project, please contact the individuals listed below. 
Independent adviser for clinical (NHS REC approved) studies 
Dr Imtiaz Shah 
Consultant Physician 
Langlands Building 
Queen Elizabeth University Hospital 
Glasgow G51 4TF 
imtiaz.shah@ggc.scot.nhs.uk 
Contact for Further Information 
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If you want to ask questions about the research please tell a member of staff. If they cannot 
answer your questions, they can pass them on to me directly.  
Useful contact numbers  
Should participation in this project make you uncomfortable or upset, then staff members 
will be available for help and support. 
If there are any issues related to this topic which lead you to become distressed or upset or 
encourage you to report abuse, I would suggest that you contact staff at the organisation 
you are at or any of the following: 
 Karma Nirvana (dealing in particular with forced marriage and honour based crimes): 
0800 5999 247  
 Rape Crisis Scotland: 08088 01 03 02 (between 6pm and midnight) 
 Scottish Women’s Aid: 0800 027 1234 (24/7 helpline) 
 Scottish Women's Rights Centre: 0808 801 0789 (Tuesdays 6-9pm, Wednesdays 
1.30pm-4.30pm)  
 
Thank you for reading this Information Sheet. 
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Appendix D: Participant Information Sheet for Survivor Interviews 
 
 
Participant Information Sheet for Survivor Interviews 
Study Title: Medical Confidentiality and domestic violence, sexual assault and rape  
I am a Leverhulme Trust funded Doctoral Scholar based at Glasgow University, co-supervised 
by Professor Matthew Walters and Dr Angus Ferguson. My research focuses on the importance 
of medical confidentiality in cases of domestic violence, sexual assault and rape, looking at the 
experiences of survivors with medical and legal services. 
You are invited to take part in a research study. Before you decide, it is important to 
understand why the research is being done and what it will involve. Please take time to read 
the following information carefully and discuss it with others if you wish before choosing 
whether or not to take part.  
What is the purpose of the study? 
My project aims to discover more about your experiences with medical and legal services 
following abuse, in particular the use of your medical records in court by medical and legal 
services. 
This investigation is important as there is currently a lack of understanding over the processes 
governing the use of these records and how their use affects those involved.  Particularly 
outside of those working in the legal sector.  
Why have I been chosen? 
You have been chosen as you are over the age of 18 and have direct experience with medical 
and legal services following abuse.  
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I’ve attached a list of template themes for discussion but that doesn’t mean you have to discuss 
anything you’re uncomfortable with or that you can’t include information they don’t cover.  
Do I have to take part? 
In line with University of Glasgow ethical guidance, it is important you know that involvement is 
voluntary. If you do wish to take part, please contact Sandy Brindley. Her contact details are 
available at the end of this document.  
Should you become involved in this project, you retain the right to withdraw until you have 
chance to review your interview transcript in Tara House. After reviewing your transcript, you 
will not be able to withdraw from the project.  The care and support you receive from Rape 
Crisis will be unaffected if you decide to withdraw from the project.  
What will happen to me if I take part? 
I will interview you for up to one hour. Interviews will take place in a quiet room in Tara House 
with the time and date arranged to suit you. You will arrive at Tara House and will be 
introduced to the lead researcher for the project, Dominic Reed, to discuss this information 
sheet before you will be asked to sign a consent form. You will have chance to ask any 
questions that you may have before the interview begins. The interview will be recorded using 
a Dictaphone.  
I will ask you questions about your experiences following domestic abuse, sexual assault and 
rape. We will discuss whether you chose to disclose abuse or not and the use of your medical 
information in any subsequent court cases. 
You have the right not to answer any questions without giving a reason and this decision will be 
respected.  
Staff from Rape Crisis Scotland will be on hand throughout to provide reassurance and advice if 
necessary. A familiar staff member can sit in on the interview if you would like. 
What do I have to do? 
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If you want to be involved or want further information, please contact Sandy Brindley (National 
co-ordinator for Rape Crisis Scotland). Her contact details are at the end of this document. You 
can then arrange a suitable date/time for the anonymous interview.  
What are the possible benefits of taking part? 
You will receive no direct benefit from taking part in this study. The project as a whole aims to 
improve medical and legal responses toward survivors in cases of domestic abuse, sexual 
assault and rape.  
What are the possible disadvantages and risks of taking part? 
The topic in discussion is highly sensitive and potentially upsetting. It will require you to think 
about past or on-going experiences of abuse, or of traumatic experiences you faced in court. 
If you become distressed, you can stop the interview and withdraw from the study without 
giving a reason.  
I have also attached a list of organisations you could contact over the phone. 
The risk of your involvement being revealed is extremely low and I have taken numerous steps 
(outlined below) to stop this from happening.   
If you reveal an immediate risk to your personal safety during interview, I may have to inform 
Rape Crisis Staff.  
Will my taking part in this study be kept confidential? 
The University of Glasgow insists on strict adherence to ethical guidelines concerning 
participant confidentiality and all personal information will be anonymised so that you can take 
part in interviews without threat to your privacy.  
In the interest of safety, your completed consent form and this participant information sheet will 
be stored in Tara House. You can arrange access to these at any time you wish to see them.  
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When the project is completed, I will transfer your anonymised interview recordings and 
transcripts to a secure storage facility for a ten-year period before they are destroyed.  During 
this time, other researchers will be able to apply to request access to anonymous data only. 
Their access will depend on their agreement to the data repository’s end user license 
agreement and my own permission as principal investigator 
I will destroy all your personal information upon completion of the PhD project.  
What will happen to the results of the research study? 
Before your interview transcript is used, you will have chance to view it in Tara House if you 
would like.  
I will use anonymous interview transcripts in my thesis which I expect to complete by January 
2019. I may also use them in other publications, for example conference papers and journal 
articles.   
I will make a summary of my findings available to view at the Rape Crisis Offices.  
Who is organising and funding the research? 
All research on this project is funded by the Leverhulme Trust and has been organised in 
collaboration with senior staff at the University of Glasgow.  
Who has reviewed the study? 
The study has been reviewed by the University of Glasgow College of Medical, Veterinary and 
Life Sciences ethics committee. The contact details for the committee are outlined below:  
Ethics committee contact 
Mr. Neil Allan                                                                                                     
Room B314 
Sir Graeme Davies Building 
University Avenue                                                                                        
Glasgow  
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G12 8TA 
Telephone: +44 (0)141 330 5206 
Email: mvls-ethics-admin@glasgow.ac.uk 
Contact for Further Information 
Should you wish to take part or would like more information about the research, please 
contact Sandy Brindley by phone or email. Her contact details are listed below.  
Email: Sandy.Brindley@rapecrisisscotland.org.uk 
Telephone: 0141 331 4180 
 
Further Information 
If you wish to discuss any issues raised by this research, I would suggest you contact staff at the 
organisation you are at or any of the following: 
o Karma Nirvana (dealing in particular with forced marriage and honour based crimes): 
0800 5999 247  
o Rape Crisis Scotland: 08088 01 03 02 (between 6pm and midnight) 
o Scottish Women’s Aid: 0800 027 1234 (24/7 helpline) 
o Scottish Women's Rights Centre: 0808 801 0789 (Tuesdays 6-9pm, Wednesdays 1.30pm-
4.30pm)  
Thank you very much for your consideration 
Dominic Reed  
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Appendix E: Participant Information Sheet for Clinician Interviews  
 
 
 
Project title: Medical confidentiality and domestic abuse  
Participant Information Sheet for Clinician Interviews 
Study Title: Medical Confidentiality and domestic violence  
I am a Leverhulme Trust funded Doctoral Scholar based at Glasgow University, co-supervised by 
Professor Matthew Walters and Dr Angus Ferguson. My research focuses on the importance of 
medical confidentiality in cases of domestic violence, sexual assault and rape. 
You are invited to participate in this research study. Before you decide whether or not to take part, 
it is important you understand why the research is being done and what it will involve. Please take 
time to read the following information carefully.  
What is the purpose of the study? 
This study will assess: 
 The health effects of abuse 
 Survivors’ interactions with the NHS  
 The use of sensitive medical information by legal services 
Why have I been chosen? 
You have been chosen as you are a doctor, nurse or dentist who has direct experience of treating 
domestic abuse survivors. Given the intense use of health services by survivors of abuse, clinician 
perspectives are an important element of this research. 
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Attached is a template list of interview themes and example questions. Please note this list is not 
exhaustive and you will have opportunity to include information they do not cover, should you 
think this appropriate. 
 
Do I have to take part? 
In line with NHS ethical guidance, it is important you know that involvement is entirely voluntary.  
Should you become involved in this project, you retain the right to withdraw until you have had 
chance to review your interview transcript. Due to the confidential nature of the study, it will not 
be possible to remove your data once the transcript has been returned. 
What will happen to me if I take part? 
The time and date of your anonymous interview will be arranged to suit you and will last no longer 
than 1 hour.  Multiple sessions can be arranged if necessary.  
Anonymous interviews will be conducted on NHS grounds or in a meeting room on the University 
of Glasgow campus. They will be recorded with a password protected Dictaphone and will follow a 
semi-structured approach, with discussion driven by interviewees.  
Before beginning, you will have the chance to ask any questions. I will then ask you to complete a 
written consent form, which I will remove for secure storage. You will retain a copy.  
What do I have to do? 
Anonymous interviews will address your experience in treating survivors of domestic abuse, sexual 
assault and rape, discussing identification, disclosure, confidentiality, injuries and (if relevant) 
interactions with legal services. Discussion will not focus on the specifics of individual cases but 
instead on the underlying processes.  
What are the possible benefits of taking part? 
You will receive no direct benefit from taking part in this study, however the project as a whole 
aims to improve understandings of medical and legal responses to domestic abuse, sexual assault 
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and rape. Suggestions for addressing the typically low disclosure rate associated with these 
offences are welcome. 
 
What are the possible disadvantages and risks of taking part? 
The topic in discussion is highly sensitive and upsetting. It will require you to recall patients who 
may have suffered appalling acts of abuse. While I appreciate you will routinely deal with difficult 
situations, this topic remains an emotive one. 
I have provided a list of professional and advisory groups for you to discuss any concerns regarding 
your participation.   
The risk of your participation being identified is extremely low and I have taken numerous steps 
(outlined below) to prevent this occurring.    
Will my taking part in this study be kept confidential? 
The NHS and University of Glasgow insist on strict adherence to ethical guidelines concerning 
participant confidentiality and all personal information will be anonymised so you can take part 
without fear of privacy infringements. 
When the PhD project is completed, I will transfer your anonymised interview transcript and 
recording to a secure data storage facility for a period of ten years before destruction. During this 
time, other bone fide researchers will be able to request access to anonymised data. Their access 
will be contingent upon their agreement to the data repository’s end user license agreement and 
my own permission as Chief Investigator. 
All your personal data will be destroyed upon completion of the PhD project.  
Assurances on confidentiality will be strictly adhered to unless evidence of serious harm, or risk of 
serious harm, is uncovered. In such cases the University may be obliged to contact relevant 
statutory bodies/agencies. 
What will happen to the results of the research study? 
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I will include your transcribed interviews as anonymised excerpts in my doctoral thesis which I 
expect to complete by January 2019. I may also use your anonymised transcripts in other 
publications, for example in conference papers, journal articles and other collaborations.    
I will provide you with a copy of your interview transcript for comment before it is analysed.   
I will also provide you with a copy of the key findings of the project after its completion.  
 
Who is organising and funding the research? 
All research on this project is funded by the Leverhulme Trust and has been organised in 
collaboration with senior staff at the University of Glasgow.  
Who has reviewed the study? 
This study has been approved by an NHS Ethics Committee. 
Contact for Further Information 
If you wish to take part or would like any further information please contact me, using the 
information below: 
Principal Investigator  
Dominic Reed 
Leverhulme Trust Doctoral Scholar 
Room 115 
Lilybank House 
Glasgow 
G12 8RT 
Email: d.reed.1@research.gla.ac.uk 
Independent adviser for clinical (NHS REC approved) studies 
Dr Imtiaz Shah 
Consultant Physician 
Langlands Building 
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Queen Elizabeth University Hospital 
Glasgow G51 4TF 
imtiaz.shah@ggc.scot.nhs.uk 
Supervisory team 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Additional Information  
Should you become uncomfortable, upset or want to discuss anything further as a result of the 
interview process, I have attached below a list of potential contacts. 
Professional organisations 
 British Medical Association (24/7): 0300 123 1233 (General Enquiries) OR 0330 123 1245 
(Counselling + Doctors Advisor Service)                   
 General Medical Council:  0161 923 6602 (Monday-Friday 08:00-18:00, Saturday 09:00-
17:00)                          
 Nursing and Midwifery Council - 020 7637 7181 
 Royal College of Nursing - 0345 772 6100 (Advice and Counselling available, 08:30-20:30)  
Advocacy groups 
 Karma Nirvana (dealing in particular with forced marriage and honour based crimes): 0800 
5999 247  
 Rape Crisis Scotland: 08088 01 03 02 (between 6pm and midnight) 
 Scottish Women’s Aid: 0800 027 1234 (24/7 helpline) 
Professor Matthew Walters  
Room 337 
Wolfson Medical School Building 
University of Glasgow 
Glasgow G12 8QQ 
Telephone: 0141 330 5691  
Email: Matthew.Walters@glasgow.ac.uk 
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 Scottish Women's Rights Centre: 0808 801 0789 (Tuesdays 6-9pm, Wednesdays 1.30pm-
4.30pm)  
Thank you for reading this Information Sheet 
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Appendix F: Participant Information Sheets for Defence Advocates  
 
 
Participant Information Sheet for defence advocates 
Study Title: Medical Confidentiality and domestic violence  
I am a Leverhulme Trust Doctoral Scholar at the University of Glasgow, co-supervised by 
Professor Matthew Walters and Dr Angus Ferguson. My research focusses on the importance 
of medical confidentiality in cases of domestic abuse, sexual assault and rape.   
You are invited to take part in a research study. Before you decide it is important you 
understand why the research is being done and what it will involve. Take time to read the 
following information carefully and discuss it with others if you wish. Please contact any of the 
individuals listed below if anything is unclear or you would like further information.  
What is the purpose of the study? 
After Lord Glennie’s ruling in WF, Petitioner [2016] CSOH, the role of medical records in 
criminal trials concerning domestic abuse, sexual assault and rape has come under greater 
scrutiny. I would like to assess how medical records are sought and used in these cases by both 
prosecution and defence lawyers.  
This investigation is important as there is currently a lack of understanding over the processes 
governing the use of these records, particularly outside those working in the legal sector.  
Why have I been chosen? 
You have been chosen for involvement given the essential role of defence advocates in 
ensuring fair trial rights for the accused. Defence perspectives are an important element of this 
research. 
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The project will involve recorded, one-to-one interviews of no longer than one hour.   
Do I have to take part? 
In line with University of Glasgow ethical guidance, it is important you know that involvement 
in this research is entirely voluntary. If you wish to take part, please contact me for further 
information.   
Should you become involved in this project, you retain the right to withdraw until you have 
chance to review your interview transcript. From the point of returning your transcript for 
analysis, you will not be able to withdraw your data as this will compromise the confidential 
nature of the study.  
What will happen to me if I take part? 
I will interview you for up to one hour. These interviews will take place in stables or if this is not 
possible, in a pre-booked meeting room on the University campus.  Your interview will be 
arranged for a time and date to suit you.  
To accommodate busy schedules, interviews will last no more than one hour and can be 
completed over multiple sessions if necessary. 
I have attached a copy of template interview themes and topics. Please note this list is not 
exhaustive and you will have opportunity to include information they do not cover, should you 
think this appropriate.  
You will discuss obtaining and using medical records in criminal cases involving domestic abuse, 
sexual assault and rape, reflecting on the value of these records and any 
advantages/disadvantages concerning their use at present.   
What do I have to do? 
Contact me using the details below to arrange an interview.  No further action is required.  
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What are the possible benefits of taking part? 
You will receive no direct benefit from taking part in this study, however the project as a whole 
aims to improve understandings of medical and legal responses to domestic abuse, sexual 
assault and rape.  
What are the possible disadvantages and risks of taking part? 
The topic in discussion is highly sensitive and potentially upsetting. It will require you to think 
about past cases with distressing outcomes. While I appreciate that you routinely deal with 
difficult situations, the topic remains an emotive one. I have provided a list of some relevant 
organisations for you to contact to discuss any potential concerns this study may cause.  
The risk of your involvement becoming known is extremely low and I have taken numerous 
steps (outlined below) to prevent this occurring.   
Will my taking part in this study be kept confidential? 
After completing a signed consent form, your involvement will be anonymised and your 
consent form, interview recording and interview transcript will be securely stored at the 
University. You will retain a copy of your consent form.  
When the PhD project is completed your anonymised interview recordings and transcripts will 
be transferred to a secure data storage facility and held for a period of ten years before 
destruction. During this time, other bone fide researchers will be able to request access to 
anonymised data. Their access will be contingent upon their agreement to the data 
repository’s end user license agreement and my own permission as principal investigator. 
All personal data will be destroyed upon completion of the PhD project.  
Assurances on confidentiality will be strictly adhered to unless evidence of serious harm, or risk 
of serious harm, is uncovered. In such cases the University may be obliged to contact relevant 
statutory bodies/agencies. 
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What will happen to the results of the research study? 
Transcribed interviews will be included in my thesis as anonymised excerpts. I expect to 
complete this thesis by January 2019. Transcripts may also be used in anonymous form in other 
publications in the interim or after thesis submission, for example in conference papers and 
journal articles.   
Following transcription of your interview, I will make a copy available for you to view prior to its 
inclusion in my research.  
At the end of the project, I will provide you with a summary of the key findings.  
Who is organising and funding the research? 
All research on this project is funded by the Leverhulme Trust and has been organised in 
collaboration with senior staff at the University of Glasgow.  
Who has reviewed the study? 
The project has been reviewed by the University of Glasgow’s College of Medical, Veterinary 
and Life Sciences ethics committee.  
Contact for Further Information 
If you would like to take part or receive further information about the project, please contact 
me, using the information below: 
Principal Investigator  
Dominic Reed 
Leverhulme Trust Doctoral Scholar 
Room 115 
Lilybank House 
Glasgow 
G12 8RT 
Email: d.reed.1@research.gla.ac.uk 
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Supervisory Team 
Professor Matthew Walters  
Room 337 
Wolfson Medical School Building 
University of Glasgow 
Glasgow G12 8QQ 
Telephone: 0141 330 5691  
Email: Matthew.Walters@glasgow.ac.uk 
Ethics committee contact  
Neil Allan 
MVLS Ethics Administration 
Room B314, Sir Graeme Davies Building  
University Avenue  
Glasgow  G12 8TA 
tel: +44 (0)141 330 5206 
email: mvls-ethics-admin@glasgow.ac.uk 
Thank you very much for your consideration.  
 
 
Additional information 
If you are distressed or otherwise affected by participation in this research, I would suggest 
that you contact any of the following organisations.  
 Abused Men in Scotland (AMIS): 0808 800 0024 (9 am - 4pm every day) 
 Karma Nirvana (dealing in particular with forced marriage and honour based 
crimes): 0800 5999 247  
 Rape Crisis Scotland: 08088 01 03 02 (between 6pm and midnight) 
 Scottish Women’s Aid: 0800 027 1234 (24/7 helpline) 
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 Scottish Women's Rights Centre: 0808 801 0789 (Tuesdays 6-9pm, Wednesdays 
1.30pm-4.30pm)  
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Appendix: G: Consent form for interviewees 
 
 
 
 
 
Centre Number:  
Project Number: 
Subject Identification Number for this trial: 
 
CONSENT FORM 
 
Title of Project: Domestic abuse and medical confidentiality 
 
Name of Researcher(s): Dominic Reed  
          Please initial box 
 
 
- I agree to take part in the above study 
 
 
- I confirm that I have read and understand the information sheet dated 12/07/17 
(version 1.1) for the above study and have had the opportunity to ask questions. 
 
 
- I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw at any 
time during the interview without giving any reason, without my legal rights being 
affected. 
 
 
- I have been given the opportunity to ask any questions I have about the research. 
323 
 
 
 
- I agree to the interview being audio-recorded 
 
 
- I understand that I will be able to withdraw from the study up until I have had chance to 
review my transcript. After this point, I understand that I will not be able to withdraw 
from the study.   
 
 
- I agree to my anonymised audio-recorded interview being used for research purposes 
by the lead researcher, including the use of unidentified verbatim quotation. 
 
 
- I understand that material gathered during this interview may be used in future projects, 
conference papers, publications and collaborations with other researchers. 
 
- I understand that I, or any others I mention, will not be identified in any subsequent use 
or publication drawing on my interview. Where used, my name will be replaced with an 
alphanumeric code and my comments made unidentifiable.  The same is true of anyone 
else I have named. 
 
- I agree to my anonymised interview recordings being archived for a period of 10 years and 
subject to use or publication by other genuine researchers during this time. 
 
 
- I agree to anonymised transcripts of my interview being archived for a period of 10 years  
and subject to use or publication by other genuine researchers during this time. 
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Name of subject Date Signature 
 
 
 
 
    
Name of Person taking consent  Date Signature 
(if different from researcher) 
 
 
 
 
   
Researcher Date Signature 
 
 
 
 
 
(1 copy for researcher, 1 for participant) 
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Appendix H: Table for recording medical record requests by NHS staff 
 
 
 
Project title: Medical confidentiality and domestic abuse 
 
Table 2: Requests for medical records  
 
 
 
Case reference:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Who requested the records? 
 
Whose records were 
requested? 
Extent of 
records 
requested 
(give answer 
in months, 
years or full) 
Were requested 
records seen by 
clinician? 
Redaction 
possible?  
Procurator 
fiscal  
Defence  Court  Police  Other Accused Complainer  Yes No  Yes  No 
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Appendix I: Letter from the Lord Justice General allowing research to begin 
The Lord President's Private Office 
Parliament House Edinburgh EH1 IRQ  
 
  
 
Dear Mr Reed, 
Research into medical confidentiality and domestic abuse, sexual assault and rape 
The Lord Justice General has had an opportunity to consider your application dated 17 
March 2017. 
From the High Court perspective the information can be supplied as there is a facility to 
capture applications for medical records made through commission and diligence in 
cases concerning domestic abuse, rape and/or sexual assault. This allows the cases to be 
The Sheriff Court, however, d 
identified and the data that you seek can be obtained. Early indications suggest there 
are relatively few relevant cases. 
oes not yet have the same facility as the High Court for 
recording these applications. There is no easy way to identify cases other than by 
carrying out a manual search through every case to find the relevant information. 
The Lord Justice General is happy to grant permission for you to approach the High 
Court of Justiciary to discuss obtaining the data for the number of requests for medical 
records made through commission and diligence in cases concerning domestic abuse, 
rape and/or sexual assault. It would be helpful if, before contacting the Court, you 
would indicate the time period within which your interest in these cases lies, as case 
papers are not kept on court premises indefinitely. Would you also please clarify the 
type of data variables you wish to be collected so that the impact on staff time can be 
assessed? Given the sensitive personal data contained in these documents it would be 
inappropriate to allow you direct access to them. 
Due to the demands that would be placed on Sheriff Court staff to obtain the 
information you request the Lord Justice General is not minded to grant you permission 
to approach the Sheriff Principal at Glasgow at this time. 
Yours sincerely 
Paul Gilmour 
Private Secretary to the Lord President 
Dominic Reed 
Lilybank House 
University of Glasgow 
Glasgow 
G12 8RT 
23 March 2017 
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Appendix J: Letter confirming ethical approval from NHS West of Scotland Ethics 
Committee  
 
 
W oSRES 
W est of Scotland Research Ethics Service 
 
Mr Dominic Reed 
Levehulme Trust funded Doctoral Scholar 
University of Glasgow 
Lilybank House, Bute Gardens 
University of Glasgow 
Glasgow 
G12 8RT 
 
West of Scotland REC 4 
Research Ethics 
Clinical Research and Development 
West Glasgow Ambulatory Care Hospital 
Dalnair Street 
Glasgow 
G3 8SJ 
(Formerly Yorkhill Childrens Hospital) 
 
Date 19 September 2017 
Direct line 0141 232 1808 
E-mail WoSREC4@ggc.scot.nhs.uk 
 
Dear Mr Reed 
Study title: Medical confidentiality and domestic abuse, a mixed 
methods assessment of medical and legal responses in 
Scotland. 
REC reference: 17/WS/0190 
IRAS project ID: 209310 
Thank you for your submission of 13 September 2017, responding to the Committee’s request 
for further information on the above research and submitting revised documentation . 
The further information was considered in correspondence by a Sub-Committee of the REC. A 
list of the Sub-Committee members is attached. 
328 
 
We plan to publish your research summary wording for the above study on the HRA website, 
together with your contact details. Publication will be no earlier than three months from the date 
of this opinion letter. Should you wish to provide a substitute contact point, require further 
information, or wish to make a request to postpone publication, please contact 
hra.studyregistration@nhs.net outlining the reasons for your request. 
 
Confirmation of ethical opinion 
On behalf of the Committee, I am pleased to confirm a favourable ethical opinion for the above 
research on the basis described in the application form, protocol and supporting documentation 
as revised, subject to the conditions specified below. 
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Conditions of the favourable opinion 
The REC favourable opinion is subject to the following conditions being met prior to the start of 
the study. 
Management permission must be obtained from each host organisation prior to the start of the 
study at the site concerned. 
Management permission should be sought from all NHS organisations involved in the study in 
accordance with NHS research governance arrangements. Each NHS organisation must 
confirm through the signing of agreements and/or other documents that it has given permission 
for the research to proceed (except where explicitly specified otherwise). 
Guidance on applying for NHS permission for research is available in the Integrated Research 
Application System, www.hra.nhs.uk or at http://www.rdforum.nhs.uk. 
Where a NHS organisation’s role in the study is limited to identifying and referring potential 
participants to research sites ("participant identification centre"), guidance should be sought 
from the R&D office on the information it requires to give permission for this activity. 
For non-NHS sites, site management permission should be obtained in accordance with the 
procedures of the relevant host organisation. 
Sponsors are not required to notify the Committee of management permissions from host 
organisations 
Registration of Clinical Trials 
All clinical trials (defined as the first four categories on the IRAS filter page) must be registered 
on a publically accessible database within 6 weeks of recruitment of the first participant (for 
medical device studies, within the timeline determined by the current registration and publication 
trees). 
There is no requirement to separately notify the REC but you should do so at the earliest 
opportunity e.g. when submitting an amendment. We will audit the registration details as part of 
the annual progress reporting process. 
To ensure transparency in research, we strongly recommend that all research is registered but 
for non-clinical trials this is not currently mandatory. 
If a sponsor wishes to request a deferral for study registration within the required timeframe, 
they should contact hra.studyregistration@nhs.net. The expectation is that all clinical trials will 
be registered, however, in exceptional circumstances non registration may be permissible with 
prior agreement from the HRA. Guidance on where to register is provided on the HRA website. 
It is the responsibility of the sponsor to ensure that all the conditions are complied with 
before the start of the study or its initiation at a particular site (as applicable).  
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Ethical review of research sites 
NHS sites 
The favourable opinion applies to all NHS sites taking part in the study, subject to management 
permission being obtained from the NHS/HSC R&D office prior to the start of the study (see 
"Conditions of the favourable opinion" below). 
Approved documents 
The final list of documents reviewed and approved by the Committee is as follows: 
 
Document Version Date 
Copies of advertisement materials for research participants 
[Questionnaire poster] 
1.1 12 July 2017 
Evidence of Sponsor insurance or indemnity (non NHS Sponsors 
only) [University of Glasgow clin trials insurance] 
 27 July 2017 
Interview schedules or topic guides for participants [Clinician 
Interview themes] 
1.1 12 July 2017 
Non-validated questionnaire [Domestic Abuse Questionnaire] 1.2 13 September 2017 
Other [Angus Ferguson CV]  20 July 2017 
Other [Lord Justice General's Letter]  23 March 2017 
Other [Sandyford Clinic Management Approval ]  11 November 2016 
Other [Clinician Interview Poster ] 1.1 12 July 2017 
Other [UK Data Service End User License] 06.00 08 October 2015 
Other [Medical record requests data table ] 1.1 12 July 2017 
Other [Destruction of Personal Data ] 1.1 12 July 2017 
Other [Participant Information Sheet for questionnaire] 1.2 11 September 2017 
Participant consent form [Clinician Interview consent form] 1.1 12 July 2017 
Participant information sheet (PIS) [PIS for Clinician Interviews ] 1.1 12 July 2017 
REC Application Form [REC_Form_04082017]  04 August 2017 
Research protocol or project proposal [Protocol Form ] 1.1 12 July 2017 
Summary CV for Chief Investigator (CI) [Dominic Reed CV ] 1.1 12 July 2017 
Summary CV for supervisor (student research) [Matthew Walters 
CV] 
 12 July 2017 
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Statement of compliance  
The Committee is constituted in accordance with the Governance Arrangements for 
Research Ethics Committees and complies fully with the Standard Operating 
Procedures for Research Ethics Committees in the UK. 
After ethical review 
Reporting requirements 
The attached document “After ethical review – guidance for researchers ” gives 
detailed guidance on reporting requirements for studies with a favourable opinion, 
including: 
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